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I PACIFIC WAR

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Reports
of

General MacArthur

JAPANESE OPERATIONS IN THE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

VOLUME II— PART I

COMPILED FROM
JAPANESE DEMOBILIZATION BUREAUX RECORDS

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-60007

Facsimile Reprint, 1994
CMH Pub 13-1

FOREWORD

The Reports of General MacArthur include two volumes being published by the
Department of the Army in four books reproduced exactly as they were printed by
General MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters in 1950, except for the addition of this
foreword and indexes. Since they were Government property, the general turned over
to the Department in 1953 these volumes and related source materials. In Army and
National Archives custody these materials have been available for research although
they have not been easily accessible. While he lived, General MacArthur was un-
willing to approve the reproduction and dissemination of the Reports, because. he be-
lieved they needed further editing and correction of some inaccuracies. His passing
permits publication but not the correction he deemed desirable. In publishing them,
the Department of the Army must therefore disclaim any responsibility for their ac-
curacy. But the Army also recognizes that these volumes have substantial and endur-
ing value, and it believes the American people are entitled to have them made widely
available through government publication.

The preliminary work for compiling the MacArthur volumes began in 1943
within the G-3 Section of his General Staff, and was carried forward after the war by
members of the G-2 Section, headed by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby with Pro-
fessor Gordon W. Prange, on leave from the University of Maryland, as his principal
professional assistant. Volume II of the Reports represents the contributions of Jap-
anese officers employed to tell their story of operations against MacArthur's forces.
The very large number of individuals, American and Japanese, who participated in the
compilation and editing of the Reports would make a complete listing of contributors
relatively meaningless.

Volume I narrates the operations of forces under General MacArthur's command
from the Japanese attack on Luzon in 1941 through the surrender in 1945. While
service histories have covered much of the same ground in separate volumes, no single
detailed narrative of General MacArthur's leadership as commander of the Southwest
Pacific Area has yet appeared. Chapters dealing with the reconquest of Borneo,
plans for the invasion of Japan, and the Japanese surrender make a distinctly new
contribution. Volume I Supplement describes the military phase of the occupation
through December 1948, reporting events not treated elsewhere in American publica-
tions. Volume II on Japanese operations brings together a mass of information on
the enemy now only partially available in many separate works. Collectively, the
Reports should be of wide interest and value to the American people generally, as well
as to students of military affairs. They are an illuminating record of momentous
events influenced in large measure by a distinguished American soldier.

Washington, D.C. Harold K. Johnson

January 1966 General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

FOREWORD TO THE 1994 EDITION

I determined for several reasons to republish General MacArthur's reports to
commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of World War II. First, the Reports of General
MacArthur still stand as a detailed account from MacArthur's perspective of his opera-
tions against the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific Area. Second, the Reports offer a
unique Japanese version of their operations in the Southwest Pacific that remains one
of the few English-language descriptions of Imperial Army campaigns during World
War II. Third, excellent illustrations, many of them original artwork commissioned for
the Reports, plus superb maps give these volumes an enduring value for military histo-
rians and the American public. Finally, while General MacArthur remains a towering
figure in American historiography, the passage of fifty years has dimmed the contribu-
tions of the U.S. Army units that first checked the Japanese southward advance in
Papua New Guinea, then spearheaded the counteroffensive along the north New
Guinea coastline that enabled MacArthur to make good his promise to return to the
Philippines. The veterans of these campaigns, both men and women, deserve to be
remembered for their contributions to the Nation in its time of greatest peril. These
are General MacArthur's Reports, but they are also
diers who served under his command.

Washington, D.C. Harold W. Nelson

31 January 1994 Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military

PREFACE

This volume parallels the record of Allied operations in the SWPA from the
Defense of Luzon, 8 December 1941, to the Surrender Negotiations in Manila, 15
August 1945. It is the Japanese official record, contained in operational monographs
furnished by the Japanese Demobilization Bureaux, the successors to the former War
and Navy Ministries, developed by Officers of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters,
Tokyo, and on the Staffs of major Japanese Commanders in the field. Like Volume I,
the material is thus presented by eye witnesses to events, and is supported by official
documentary evidence.

It is a record of bitter resistance and tenacious fighting by a first-class Army and
Navy, led by Diplomats and Military Politicians through the holocaust of national
destruction, an Army that was steeped in medieval cruelty, but fought with the most
modern technical skill and savage valor, until superior skill and equal valor broke the
spell of the Samurai and the legend of an invincible Empire.

Douglas Mac Arthur

TABLE OF CONTENTS — PART I

Page

CHAPTER I : Pre- War Japanese Military Preparations 1941 I

Summary I

Pearl Harbor Planning (January-November 1941) 6

^Dctotacr 1 q^. 1 .........,.•,.....,.,..,......,,.»,....,.,...•...•....,.....■•*■■•■* 8

November 1941 9

December 1941 17

CHAPTER II : Pre-War Japanese Espionage and Intelligence, 1040-1941 ... 21

Philippines 23

New Guinea . 24

East Indies 29

CHAPTER III : Politico-Military Evolution Toward War 30

Historical Background 30

Drift Toward Crisis 31

War Deliberations 34

CHAPTER IV : Basic Strategy and Military Organization 44

Strategy for a Long War 44

Manpower and Materials 45

Shipping 49

Areas to be Occupied , 50

Estimate of Allied Strategy 5 1

Timing of the Attack 52

Central Command Organization 52

Strength and Organization of Forces 54

CHAPTER V : Initial Offensives 59

Planning of Invasion Operations

Operational Strength

Operations Orders 66

Pearl Harbor Operation 71

South Seas and Southern Operations 74

CHAPTER VI : Conquest of the Philippines 79

Preliminary Planning 79

Assignment of Forces ,

Final C^perations Plan ......a.................

vii

*.-■•«•

. . . .

Page

Launching of Operations 90

The Race for Manila , 95

The Fall of Manila 102

Manila to Bataan 103

Bataan, First Phase 106

Reinforcement and Preparation no

Bataan , Second Phase , 114

Fall of Gorregidot . . . ^ ^ 7

Surrender 122

CHAPTER VII : Threat to Australia : The Papua Offensive 124

Invasion of the Bismarcks.. 124

Advance to New Guinea 1 26

Plans Against Australia 131

Abortive Sea Advance on Port Moresby 134

Plans for a Land Offensive 138

Landing at Buna 142

Advance to Kokoda 143

Final Plans Against Moresby 143

Fighting on Guadalcanal... 146

Build-up of Forces in New Guinea 149

Attack on Milne Bay 153

Owen Stanleys Offensive 157

Retreat from the Owen Stanleys 164

CHAPTER VIII : Defense of Papua 171

Eighth Area Army Activated 171

Situation in Buna Area 1 73

First Phase of Fighting 176

Reinforcement Attempts 1 77

Fall of Buna l80

Sanananda — Giruwa 181

Strengthening of Bases in New Guinea 188

The Wau Offensive 190

Evacuation of Guadalcanal 193

Menace of the B-17's 197

Eighteenth Army Reinforcement 200

Battle of the Bismarck Sea 202

Shift of Emphasis to Papua 205

CHAPTER IX : Fighting Withdrawal to Western New Guinea 208

Southeast Area Situation, June 1943 208

» - -

Page

Defense of Salamaua 212

Attack on Lae 216

Fighting in the Central Solomons 219

Evacuation of Lae and Ramu Valley Operations 221

New Strategic Defense Zone 225

Dampier Strait Defense: Finschhafen 229

Bougainville 233

Dampier Strait Defense ; New Britain 236

Saidor 240

Isolation of Rabaul 244

Bougainville Counteroffensive 246

Southeast Area Situation, March 1944 248

CHAPTER X: Western New Guinea Operations 250

Strategic Planning 250

Western New Guinea Defenses 252

Setbacks to Defense Preparations...

....... * J /

Hollandia-Aitape 261

Failure of the Reinforcement Plan.... 272

Revision of Defense Plans 273

Wakde— Sarmi 276

Biak First Phase 283

The Kon Operation 287

Philippines Sea Battle 292

Biak Final Phase — Noemfoor

• 2Q <

Aitape Counterattack 297

End of the New Guinea Campaign — Sansapor 303

CHAPTER XI : Philippine Defense Plans 304

Strategic Situation, July 1944 304

Importance of the Philippines 305

Local Situation 309

Southern Army Defense Plans ^!2

Battle Preparations No. 11

Central Planning for Decisive Battle ^ig

Army Orders for the Sho-Go Operations 322

Navy Orders for the Sho-Go Operations ^ 2 §

Preparations for Battle ^

Final Preparations, Central and Southern Philippines

CHAPTER XII : Prelude to Decisive Battle 343

Initial Air Strikes

Invasion of Palau .
Defense of Morotai
Hour of Decision. Nears
Formosa Air Battle

ILLUSTRATIONS— PART I

Plate Page

1 Imperial Rescript Declaring War , xiv

2 Japanese Aerial Photo Coverage, Northern Luzon, Nov-Dec 1940 .. 5

3 Resting Comrades 1 3

4 Disposition of Air Forces in South Sea Area 22

5 Disposition of Australian Forces, July 1940 26

6 Japanese Estimates of Java Troop Strength and Disposition, 1941.. 27

7 Japanese Column on the March 35

8 Japan's Basic Strategy, December 1941 46,47

9 Central Command Organization, 8 December 1941 53

ro Army Chain of Command, 8 December 1941 55

11 Navy Chain of Command, 8 December 1941 57

12 Disposition of Japan's Military Forces Prior to Outbreak of War.. 64,65

13 Pearl Harbor Attack, 8 December 1941 (Tokyo Time) 69

14 Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941 (Tokyo Time) 73

15 Southern Operations, December 1941-May 1942 76,77

16 Japanese Air Operations in Philippines, December 1941 84

17 Military Topography of Luzon 85

18 Composition and Missions of Landing Forces 89

19 Air Raid on Clark Field 92

20 Invasion of Philippines, 8-25 December 1941 96

21 Race to Manila, December 1941— January 1942 97

22 Lingayen — Cabanatuan Operation, 22 December 1941-3 January 1942 100

23 Attack on Cavite Naval Base 101

24 Bataan Operations, First Phase, Early January-22 February 1942 . 105

25 Supply Train Marching Toward the Front 1 09

26 Fourteenth Army Plan of Attack — Bataan, 22 March 1942 113

27 Bataan, Second Phase, and Corregidor Operations 116

28 Gun Smoke Road, Corregidor , 120

29 Bataan Meeting of Gen Wainwright and Gen Homma 121

30 Conquest of E. New Guinea, Bismarcks, and Solomons, 1942 128

31 Japanese Landing Operations 1 29

32 Battle of the Coral Sea, 4— 11 May 1942 137

33 Terrain Along the Kokoda Trail 140

34 Hardships of the Troops in the Owen Stanleys 144

35 First and Second Battles of Solomon Sea, August 1942 147

36 Army-Navy Cooperation on Guadalcanal 150

37 Operations on Guadalcanal, August-November 1942 151

38 Landings on Milne Bay, August-October 1942 154

39 Owen Stanley Penetration, 21 July-26 September 1942 I5 8

Plate Page

40 Takasago Unit Fighting Through Owen Stanleys 162

41 Looking at Port Moresby from Owen Stanley Mountain Range ... 166

42 Withdrawal from the Owen Stanleys, September— November 1942,.. 167

43 Buna— Gona Operation, November— December 1942 178

44 Fate of Yasuda Force on New Guinea Front 182

45 Buna-Gona Operation, January 1943 1 86

46 Withdrawal from Buna and Wau to Salamaua-Lae 187

47 Wau Offensive, January— February 1943 19 1

48 Sea Battle in South Pacific 104

49 Suicide Unit Bidding Farewell to Commanding General Sano 195

50 Troops at Work, Southern Area 1 99

51 Battle of Bismarck Sea, 2—4 March 1942 203

52 Japanese Dispositions in New Guinea and Solomons, June 1943... 210

53 Salamaua-Lae Operations, June-September 1943 214

54 Navy Supplying Army Personnel by Submarine 218

55 New Georgia Operation, June— October 1943 222

56 Ramu Valley Operation, September— November 1943 223

57 Japan's National Defense Zone, September 1943 227

58 Operations in Finschhafen Area, September— December 1943..... 23 1

59 Bougainville Operation, November 1943-March 1944 235

60 Western New Britain Operation, December 1943-February 1944 238

61 Ramu Valley and Saidor Operations 242

62 Defense of Admiralties, February-March 1944 243

63 Summary of Japanese Movements in Eastern New Guinea 247

64 Dispositions in New Guinea, 21 April 1944 254

65 Japanese Engineer Activities in South Pacific , 259

66 Army Day Poster: " Develop Asia " 262

67 Hollandia Operation, April-June 1944 267

68 Deadly Jungle Fighting, New Guinea Front , 271

69 Sarmi-Wakde Operation, May— July 1944 279

70 Biak Operations, May-June 1944... 286

71 Naval Movements During Biak Operation, 2—13 June 1944 290

72 Fierce Fighting of Otsu Unit in Saipan 294

73 Japanese Staff Conference : West Cave, Biak 298

74 Aitape Counterattack, 10 July-5 August 1944 302

75 Changes in Shipping Routes, January 1943— August 1944 306

76 Strategic Position of Philippines, July 1944 308

77 Unloading Operations, Philippine Area 313

78 Subchaser in Action 321

79 Plans for Sbo Operation No. i, August 1944 324

80 Japanese Air Disposition in Philippines, September 1945 332

Plate Page

81 Japanese Dispositions in Southern Area, September 1944 336, 337

82 Japanese Ground Dispositions in Philippines, September 1944 . 339

83 Preliminary Operations in the Philippines, Sept— Oct 1944

84 Morotai Operation, September— October 1944 ^<r l

85 Air Force Day: Propaganda Poster

86 Transoceanic Air Raid During Typhoon 359

xiii

IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

We, by grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne of a line unbroken for ages
eternal, enjoin upon ye, Our loyal and brave subjects :

We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire. The men
and officers of Our army and navy shall do their utmost in prosecuting the war, Our public servants
of various departments shall perform faithfully and diligently their appointed tasks, and all other
subjects of Ours shall pursue their respective duties ; the entire nation with a united will shall
mobilize their total strength so that nothing will miscarry in the attainment of our war aims.

To insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to world peace is the far-sighted policy
which was formulated by Our Great Illustrious Imperial Grandsire and our Great Imperial Sire suc-
ceeding Him, and which We lay constantly to heart. To cultivate friendship among nation and
to enjoy prosperity in common with all nations has always been the guiding principle of Our
Empire's foreign policy. It has been truly unavoidable and far from Our wishes that Our Empire
has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain. More than four years have passed
since China, failing to comprehend the true intentions of Our Empire, and recklessly courting
trouble, disturbed the peace of East Asia and compelled Our Empire to take up arms. Although
there has been re-established the National Government of China, with which Japan has effected
neighbourly intercourse and co-operation, the regime which has survived at Chungking, relying upon
American and British protection, still continues its fratricidal opposition. Eager for the realization
of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, both America and Britain, giving support to
the Chungking regime in the name of peace, have aggravated the disturbances in East Asia.
Moreover, these two Powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, increased military preparations
on all sides of Our Empire to challenge us. They have obstructed by every means our peaceful
commerce, and finally resorted to a direct severance of economic relations, menacing gravely the
existence of Our Empire, Patiently have We waited and long have We endured, in the hope
that Our Government might retrieve the situation in peace. But our adversaries, showing not the
least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement ; and in the meantime, they have
intensified economic and military pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to submission. This
trend of affairs would, if left unchecked, not only nullify Our Empire's efforts of many years for
the sake of the stabilization of East Asia, but also endanger the very existence of Our nation. The
situation being such as it is, Our Empire for its existence and self-defense has no other recourse
but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path.

The hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors guarding Us from above, We rely upon the
loyalty and courage of Our subjects in Our confident expectation that the task bequeathed by
Our Forefathers will be carried forward, and that the sources of evil will be speedily eradicated and
an enduring peace immutably established in East Asia, preserving thereby the glory of Our Empire.

The 8th day of the 12th month of the 16th year of Showa

Signature

TO JO. Hideki Piime M

HASHIDA. Kunihiko Minister

SUZUKI. Teiichi Minister

]NO. Sekiya Minister

KOIZUMI, Chikahiko Minister

IWAMURA, Miehiyo Minister

SHIMADA, Shigetaro Minister

TOGO, Shigenori Minister

TERASHIMA, Takeshi Minister

KAYA. Okinobu Minister

KISHI. Nobusuke Minister

HATTA, Yoshiaki Minister

Tide

inister. Minister of War
of Education
of State

of Agriculture and Forestry
of Health and Social Affairs
of Justice
of Navy

of Foreign Affairs
of Communications
of Finance

of Commerce and Industry
of Railway

PLATE NO. 1
Imperial Rescript Declaring War

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CHAPTER I

PRE-WAR JAPANESE MILITARY PREPARATIONS 1941

By 5 November 1941 the Imperial Japanese
Government had positively committed itself to
taking up arms against the United States,
Great Britain, and the Netherlands if, by the
first part of December, no diplomatic solution
of the Pacific crisis appeared attainable.' This
formal decision was made at the Imperial con-
ference of 5 November, 17 days after the for-
mation of the Tojo Cabinet. 1

At this date Japan's military preparations
for war were already far advanced. The Imperi-
al conference of 6 September, in view of the
unpromising outlook of negotiations with the
United States, had decided that such prepara-
tions be rushed to completion by the end of
October. Under that decision steps were taken
to mobilize snipping for Army and Navy use,
and the Army began assembling its invasion
forces in Japan Proper, Formosa, and South
China.*

The idea of a surprise attack on Pearl Har-
bor in the event of war was initially conceived

by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-
in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, in January
1941. 4 From June of the same year, as Navy
leaders became more convinced that their
strategy must be based on the hypothesis of
fighting the United States and Britain simul-
taneously, Admiral Yamamoto actively pressed
his plan against the opposition of some mem-
bers of the Navy General Staff, and it was
finally accepted in principle on 20 October.''

At the annual Navy war-games, held in
Tokyo from 10 to 13 September, the general
problem under study was fleet operations to
establish Japanese control of the Western Paci-
fic, assuming the United States, Britain, and
the Netherlands as enemies. The war-games
were conducted on the hypothesis of a sortie
by the main body of the American fleet into
the Western Pacific to block Japanese invasion
operations against the Philippines, Malaya, and
the Dutch East Indies. However, a special,
restricted group of high-ranking staff officers
simultaneously studied problems involved in a
surprise task force strike at Pearl Harbor. 6

1 Basic material for this chapter and Chapter II is contained in Research Report No. 131, Japan 's Decision to
Fight, 1 Dec 45, published by ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Service), an operating agency of G-2 GHQ
SWPA, handling the translation and dissemination of captured enemy documents and the interrogation of prisoners of
war. This material has been revised in the light of additional research and Japanese source documents not previously
available. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 Imperial Conference decisions leading up to the final declaration of war are covered in detail in Chapter III.

3 Cf. Chapter III.

4 ATIS Research Report No. 131, op. ctt,, p. 66.

5 Cf- n. 2, Chapter V. The final detailed plan of the Pearl Harbor attack was approved by Admiral Osami
Nagano, Chief of Navy General Staff, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, on 3 November, two days before
the issue of Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1 laying down the general outline of fleet operations.

6 Shown Juroku Nen no Nihon Kaigun Z"jo Enshu no Sogo Hokoku s^.£f<0 R sfcffcflt H h?jt i §©iRjieHS'lr
(Summary Report on Japanese Naval War Games, September 1941). Compiled by Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomiolca,
Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section.

By 3 November the basic plan for all naval
operations attendant upon the commencement
of hostilities had been agreed upon and was
embodied in Combined Fleet Top Secret Ope-
rations Order No. i, issued on 5 November.
Two days later Combined Fleet Top Secret
Operations Order No. 2 designated 8 Decem-
ber 7 as the approximate date of the opening of
hostilities (Y-Day), and units of the Pearl Har-
bor Task Force were simultaneously ordered to
assemble in Tankan Bay by 22 November. The
definitive date for the start of war (X-Day) was
not fixed until 2 December, when the Task
Force was already well on its way to Hawaii.
A Combined Fleet order issued at approximate-
ly 5:30 p.m. on that date designated 8 Decem-
ber as X-Day. 8

Final Army preparations were also completed
during November. Imperial General Head-
quarters on 6 November established the order
of battle of the Southern Army under over-all
command of General Hisaichi Terauchi, and
on 15 November designated the Philippines,
British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and
part of Southern Burma as the areas to be
occupied. Invasion assignments were made to
the various forces under Southern Army com-
mand on 20 November. 9

Army and Navy operational plans were co-
ordinated through an Army- Navy Central
Agreement concluded in Tokyo on 10 Novem-
ber between General Terauchi, Commander-in-
Chief of the Southern Army, and Admiral
Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Com-
bined Fleet. This basic document, which

defined the relative commands, spheres of ju-
risdiction, missions, and responsibilities of the
two services in all areas where joint operations
were envisaged, was supplemented by detailed
operational agreements concluded in mid -No-
vember between the Fleet and Army command-
ers assigned to each area.

The Japanese military authorities were both
far-sighted and thorough in certain of their
preparations for the war. Selected units were
given specialized training in jungle warfare and
amphibious operations ; secret agents were dis-
patched to future zones of operation for pur-
poses of espionage and reconnaissance ; maps
of crucial areas were prepared far in advance ;
morale and training literature was written and
distributed to units ; special striking forces were
organized, equipped with tropical issue, and
staged to carefully selected assembly areas where
a maximum of security was assured ; and the
necessary transport and convoy facilities were
arranged in advance.

Official unit reports refer to the periods 27
July-7 December 1941, 12 October-14 Nov-
ember 1941, and ioOctober-8 December 1941
as having been devoted to preparation for the
Philippine and Malayan Operations. Units
receiving this training were currently in
Manchuria, the vicinity of Shanghai, and at
Palau.

By 10 November 1941, copies of a pamphlet
entitled, " Read This and the War is
Won ", had been received by 55th Division
Infantry Group.' The text was clearly pre-
monitory of the imminence of war with the

7 7 December West Longitudinal time. Unless otherwise specified, hours and dates throughout this volume
are Tokyo time. Japanese Army and Navy operational records employ Tokyo time exclusively regardless of the area
under discussion. For purposes of checking against Volume I, Southwest Pacific Area Series : The Campaigns of
MacArthur in the Pacific, local times are given parenthetically where desirable. In Chapter III, however, the dates of
diplomatic notes, official statements, and governmental orders are the dates of the issuing government.

8 ATLS Research Report No. 131, op. cit., pp. 77-8.

9 For details of Army orders covering the Southern operations, consult Chapter V.

10 Textual extracts from Kore $ae Yomeba Kateru til 3 3 (Read This and the War is Won)
are given later in this chapter.

United States, Great Britain, and the Nether-
lands. Copies of this were issued to each
Japanese soldier before embarkation for overseas.

The significantly named South Seas Detach-
ment was already organized, on paper at least,
by 15 November 1941. It comprised the force
which took Guam on 10 December and later
moved on to Rabaul and New Guinea."

On 15 November, the Commanding General
of the South Seas Detachment, Maj. Gen,
Tomitaro Horii, issued a " Message to Warriors
in the South Seas," addressed to all personnel
serving under his command. This message
forecasted with great explicitness the coming
of war. No date of outbreak was mentioned,
but the tenor of the communication was that
of a commander to his troops on the eve of
battle.

Certain elements of the newly formed South
Seas Detachment were being routed to a staging
area in Japan as early as 14 November 1941.
A part of the 47th Antiaircraft Battalion, for
example, left its station in Manchuria and was
transported to the port of Sakaide in Northern
Shikoku, via Pusan and Ujina. A major
portion of the South Seas Detachment appears
to have rendezvoused there. On 22, 23, and
24 November, various units embarked and
departed for the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands.
The transports arrived at their destination on
27 November 1941, some touching briefly at
Chichi-Jima en route to Haha-Jima. At Haha-
Jima the troops rested and trained. On 4
December, the convoy sailed to carry out the
attack on Guam.

On 29 November 1941, at 1500 hours, 1st
Lt. Sakigawa, Commanding Officer of 2nd
Company, 55th Transport Regiment, issued
Saki Operation Order No. 2. This read

in part, " The Detachment will attack Guam
Island."

The mounting of the attack on British
Malaya has been partially reconstructed from
official documents and diaries deriving from
the 41st Infantry Regiment, 106th Land Duty
Company, Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing
Party, and 77th Air Regiment, elements of
all of which participated in the operation.

On 17 November 1941, 41st Infantry Regi-
ment, which had been stationed in the vicinity
of Shanghai since at least early October, train-
ing for the Malayan Operations, held a review
and ceremony in honor of their " departure for
the field ". On 18 November, elements of the
regiment left Shanghai on the Ryujo Mam for
the assembly point at Samah, on the southern
shore of Hainan Island. The diary of one
member contained the following entry under
date of 18 November : " . . . . orders have fi-
nally arrived. The time has finally come for
us to display activity. Are we going to be at
war with A, B and D?" On 21 November
the Ryujo Mam was anchored at Takao. Its
date of arrival at Samah is not known, but other
elements of the regiment had reached Haikow
in Northern Hainan by 20 November. On
the same date further elements of the regi-
ment embarked on the Aobayama Mam and
on 21—22 November sailed from Woosung
for Samah. Part of the 106th Land Duty
Company left Saigon on the Tokokawa Mam
on 23 November and arrived at Samah on 25
November. On 25 November also, elements
of Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing Party,
while en route to Palau, were ordered to change
course and head for Samah. A second section
of the 106th Land Duty Company embarked
on the Taikai Mam at Saigon on 27 November

11 The mission assigned to the South Seas Detachment in the first phase of operations was to capture Guam
and Rabaul. Its dispatch to New Guinea in July 1942 for the abortive Japanese drive on Port Moresby was not decided
until January 1942. Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono Icht Nankm Sbitai no Sakusen ^S^iSiffclMlJl'li^©— #?£5Sl8£
COf^ife (Southeast Area Operations Record Part I: South Seas Detachment Operations) 1st Demobilization Bureau,
Sep 46, pp. 4, 22.

and arrived at Hainan on i December. On 3
December, the 2d Squadron of the 77th Air
Regiment was ordered to co-operate with
the 70th Airfield Company in the air de-
fense of Samah. By 4 December, the assembly
was complete. On 4 December, the advance
landing forces sailed in convoy for Malaya.

Preparations for the eventual conquest of the
Philippines date farther back. There is evi-
dence of extensive pre-war aerial reconnaissance
of northern Luzon during the period 27 No-
vember to 15 December 1940.'* (Plate No. 2
shows the photographic coverage obtained and
the dates on which the flights were carried
out.)

Other evidence indicates that the training of
units earmarked for participation in the Philip-
pines campaign was probably under way by
early fall of 1941. An extract from Fourth Air
Army Ordnance Order No. 12, dated 26
March 1944, reads :

Death certificate and service record of Sergeant
Takeo Goto :

Unit : 25th Water Purification Unit.
Year of conscription : 1939
Service: 27 July 1941 to 7 December 1941,
Manchurian Border Defense and preparation for
the Philippines operations.'*
The main lines of the operational plan for
the Philippines invasion were worked out at
the joint Army-Navy staff conference held at
Iwakuni, on the Inland Sea, from 14 to 16 No-
vember. Orders were issued on 20 November
to Fourteenth Army units in Formosa directing
them to concentrate at the assembly points in
readiness for embarkation.'*

The Tanaka Detachment, one of the advance
landed at Aparri and Vigan, on

northern Luzon, embarked at Takao between
23 and 25 November and moved to the naval
port of Mako, in the Pescadores, which had
been fixed as the starting point of the advance
invasion convoy. This force and the Kanno
Detachment (Vigan landing) remained at Mako
until 1700 on 7 December, when the convoy
sailed for northern Luzon."

On 16 November and 26 November respe-
ctively, the commanders of the heavy cruiser
Kako and the light cruiser Katori addressed
their crews in terms clearly indicative of the
imminence of war. On the latter date also,
Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo informed
some of the personnel of the task force
assembled at Tankan Bay that they were to
attack Pearl Harbor.

Various individuals displayed advance
knowledge or suspicion of the imminence of
war. It is not certain in some cases whether
this was based on information derived from
reliable official sources or from rumor and
popular gossip. Nevertheless, as early as
October 1941, the rumor was current on Truk
that war would break out with the United
States between 25 December 1941 and 1 Feb-
ruary 1942. On 18 November, a member of
the 41st Infantry Regiment commented on the
probable imminence of war with " A, B and
D." On 26 November, a member of the 144th
Infantry Regiment, South Seas Detachment,
wrote, " Our battle zone will be Guam Island."
Two other members of the South Seas Detach-
ment displayed similar knowledge of impending
hostilities on 29 November.

Between 2-7 December knowledge of the
scheduled outbreak of hostilities on 8 December
quite general among members of stri-

17. Cf. discussion in Chapter II.
13 ATIS Bulletin No. 1060, p. 10.

14 Hito Sakmen K,roku Dai Mi JfcBf*W*2«iB-J|B
Demobilization Bureau, Jun 46, p. 53.

15 Cf. Chapter VI.

i-*no*+- fl--f-ta i. i) +-R+x.am

I I

1940. 1 1
1940. \2

. 27.

1940.

. 7.

1940

[ I

1940.

13.

1940.

. 15.

1940

15.

PLATE NO. 2
Japanese Aerial Photo Coverage, Northern Luzon

king forces. On 2 December tKe captain of the
aircraft carrier Kaga announced to the crew that
war would commence on 8 December. On 4
December Maj. Gen. Horii, Commanding
General of the South Seas Detachment, issued
a formal statement to the effect that Imperial
Japan had, on 2 December 1941, decided to
declare war on the United States, Great Britain,
and the Netherlands. Thereafter knowledge
of their objective appears to have been wide-
spread among members of the South Seas
Detachment. Evidence of similarly wide-
spread knowledge among the forces assembled
at Samah for the Malayan Operation is more
scanty, but there appears to have been some
awareness of their goal.

On 1 and 3 December orders for the air
defense of Keeking and Samah respectively were
issued by the 48th Field Antiaircraft Battalion
and 77th Air Regiment. These clearly antici-
the possibility of enemy air attacks.
The evidence upon which the foregoing
summary is based is further amplified in the
following paragraphs. References have been
arranged chronologically in accordance with the
date of the most significant entry contained in
the diary or other captured document under
examination.

Pearl Harbor Planning Qan.-Nov. 1941)

When Japanese planes struck immobile
United States warships and aircraft at Pearl
Harbor on 8 December 1941, they were execu-
ting pin-pointed plans conceived months in ad-
vance and cloaked in the utmost secrecy. Au-
thoritative Japanese documents obtained since
the termination of war and interrogations of the
high naval personnel who participated in or had
knowledge of this planning make it pos-

16 Cf. Chapter IV.

17 ATIS Research Report No. 131, op. cit., p. 66.

sible to reconstruct a complete and accurate
picture of how the Pearl Harbor attack was
conceived and developed over an eight-month
period preceding the final outbreak of hosti-
lities.

Prior to 1941 Japanese naval planning for a
possible war with the United States had been
based upon the assumption that the latter would
be Japan's only enemy, and it envisaged await-
ing attack by the American fleet in the Western
Pacific where Japan's numerically inferior fleet
could operate at an advantage. 16 By the end
of 1940, however, Japan's entry into the Tri-
partite Alliance and the United States' aid com-
mitments to Britain had created a new inter-
national line-up which made previous Japanese
naval planning obsolete. The Japanese Navy
began to plan for a simultaneous war against
the United States and Britain.

The idea of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
at the outset of war, with the object of gaining
at least temporary naval supremacy in the
Western Pacific, was first conceived in early
January 1941 by Admiral Yamamoto, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined
Fleet. Admiral Yamamoto at that time ordered
Rear Adm. Takijiro Onishi, chief of staff of
the Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the feasibility
of such an attack.' 7

On the basis of this preliminary study, Ad-
miral Yamamoto in June 1941 began actively
pressing for the adoption of his plan by the
Navy General Staff as part of Japan's naval
strategy in the event of war. Crippling the
United States fleet at Hawaii at the start of
hostilities, he argued, was absolutely essential
to place the Western Pacific under Japanese
control for the period necessary to complete
the occupation of the strategic areas and eco-
nomic resources of the South. Were Arne-

rican fleet strength at Hawaii left intact, it could
immediately make an incursion into the Wes-
tern Pacific in the midst of the Southern ope-
rations, catching the Japanese fleet dispersed in
different areas and unable to deploy for a
decisive battle. Under these conditions, he
warned, the United States would probably
seize Japan's island bases in the Marshalls and
transform them into advance bases of operation
against Japan. 18

Despite Admiral Yamamoto's arguments,
his plan was vigorously opposed by a section
of the Navy General Staff on the ground that
swift occupation of the Southern areas was the
prime necessity, and that this might fail if
Japanese naval strength were divided between
operations against Hawaii and support of the
Southern invasions. It was further pointed
out that detection of the Japanese force en
route to Hawaii might result in its complete
destruction, and that, even if this did not
occur, the attack would be ineffectual if the
bulk of the United States fleet was not caught
in Pearl Harbor."

This disagreement in the Navy High Com-
mand had not been resolved by 10 September,
when staff officers of all fleet units assembled
at the Naval War College in Tokyo for the
annual Navy war games. Just four days earlier
the Imperial conference of 6 September had
debated the issue of war or peace in a dramatic
session and had decided that Japanese military
preparations must be speedily brought to com-

pletion." The games therefore took place
amidst an atmosphere of unusual tension,
further heightened by the fact that the central
problem of study assumed an American fleet
attack into the Western Pacific as a result of
Japanese invasion operations in the Southern
area. 11

Admiral Yamamoto himself planned and
exercised over-all supervision of the games. A
general study session, including chart ma-
neuvers participated in by all officers in tactical
command of fleet units, occupied the first three
days — 10, u, and 12 September. The last day,
13 September, was devoted to a special study
session. Thirteen umpires headed by Rear
Adm. Seiichi Ito, Vice-Chief of Navy General
Staff, ruled on the execution of maneuvers. The
Japanese (Blue) Forces were under command of
Rear Adm. Matomi Ugaki, Chief of Staff of
the Combined Fleet, and the British-American
(Red) Forces under command of Vice Adm.
Shiro Takasu, First Fleet Commander,

While the principal games were conducted
on the old hypothesis of meeting an American
fleet attack in the Western Pacific, a restricted
group of staff officers of the Combined Fleet
and commanders of those fleet units which
eventually made up the Pearl Harbor Task
Force" met in a separate and top-secret session,
the purpose of which was to study problems
connected with a possible surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor. These problems included :

1. Feasibility of an attack if (as estimated)

18 Statement by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited.

19 Ibid.

20 Cf. Chapter III.

21 Summary Report on Japanese Naval War Games. Compiled by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited.

22 In addition to Admiral Yamamoto and other umpires, participants in the special Pearl Harbor study session
were: Rear Adm. Ugaki, (Chief of Staff) and nine staff officers of the Combined Fleet: Vice Adm. Chuichi
Nagumo, (C-in-C), Rear Adm. Ryunosuke Kusaka (Chief of Staff), and two staff officers of the First Air Fleet;
Rear Adm. Tamon Yamaguchi (Commander) and two staff officers of the 2d Carrier Division ; Rear Adm. Tadaichi
Hara (Commander) and two staff officers of the 5th Carrier Division ; the commanders and one staff officer each of
the 3d Squadron, 8th Squadron, and 1st Destroyer Squadron. Ibid,

only 50 per cent of American Pacific Fleet

were in harbor.

2, The possibility of detection by American
search planes before the attack could be
executed.

3. The refueling at sea of Task Force units
with inadequate cruising range.

The conclusions reached with regard to the
solution of these problems were those later
embodied in the actual operational plan and
carried out in the Task Force attack. 21 How-
ever, it was not until 20 October, after Ad-
miral Yamamoto had threatened to resign over
the issue, that Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief
of Navy General Staff, approved the Pearl
Harbor plan in principle over General Staff
opposition. Preparation of the detailed attack
plan was completed during October and finally
sanctioned by Admiral Nagano on3 November. 8 *
In order to preserve secrecy, knowledge of the
plan in its entirety was limited to the Chief
and Vice-Chief of the Navy General Staff,
the Chief and members of the Operations
Section, Navy General Staff, Commander-in-
Chief, Chief of Staff, and most staff officers of
the Combined Fleet, First Air Fleet and Sixth
Fleet. 1 ' Evidence indicates that Army leaders

were not informed until sometime in Novem
ber, following the issue of Combined Fleet
Top Secret Operations Order No. 1. 16

Even in this order, issued on 5 November,
the missions of the Advance (Submarine) Force
and the Task Force which were to participate
in the Pearl Habor attack were left blank in
the printed text, and the missing portions were
communicated verbally only to those listed in
the preceding paragraph. 17 The commanders
of the Task Force units, which assembled
in Tankan Bay between 15 and 22 November,
were not informed of the attack plan until
Vice Adm. Nagumo, commanding the Force,
issued Task Force Top Secret Operations
Order No. 1 on 23 November, three days
before departure for Hawaiian waters. 18 Crew
members were told that Pearl Harbor was the
target only after receipt of the Combined
Fleet X-Day order on 2 December. 29

October 1941

Prisoner of war Iwataro Fusei, (JA 145 118),
a civilian laborer in naval employ present at
Truk throughout October 1941, stated that:
When he was at Truk in October 1941, there were
rumors that a war with the United States would start

23 Cf . Chapter V.

24 (1) ATIS Research Report No. 131, op. cit., p. 66. (2) Statement by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously

cited.

25 (1) ATIS Research Report No. r3i, op. cit., p. 67. (2) Statement by Vice Adm. Mitsumi Shimiru,
C-in-C, Sixth Fleet.

26 "I did not know at the time of the October conference (liaison conference between the Government and
Imperial General Headquarters following formation of the Tojo Cabinet) that the Navy already had well-laid plans for
the Pearl Harbor attack. . . At a later conference, I believe in November, I was informed of this plan." Interrogation
of General Hideki Tojo, Premier and War Minister, Oct 41-Jul 44.

27 Cf. Chapter V. (extracts from Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1).

28 ATIS Research Report No. 131, op. cit., pp. 78-9.

29 (1) Seaman 3d Class Shigekt Yokota (JA 100037), crew member aboard the aircraft carrier Kaga in the
Pearl Harbor attack, later taken prisoner of war, stated that on 2 December the Commander of the Kaga, Capt.Jisaku
Okada, addressed the ship's company and announced that war would be declared against America on 8 December.
ATIS Interrogation Report, Ser. No. 230. (2) Another prisoner of war, Seaman Masayuki Furukawa, crew member
of the carrier Shokaku, stated that the commander " informed the crew of the intended strike on 4 December."
JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Ser. ADM-ioio22, to Jan 44.

about 2j December 1941 at the earliest and 1 February
1942 at the latest. When he returned to Japan in
November 1941, rumors of war were far less current
than at Truk.*

A " Report on Conditions " issued by
Lt. Col. Ryuto, Commanding Officer of the
42d Anchorage Group, dated 15 June 1942,
states :

Record of General Situation since Mobilization.

The mobilization order was issued on 12 September
1941. Organization from the Hiroshima Western
District No. 2 Force was completed by 1/ September.
We left Ujina on 29 September, sailing to Osaka
where 40th Sea Duty Company was attached to us. We
left Osaka on 1 October and reached our destination
at Palau on 10 October where we established an
anchorage headquarters. Then we made preparations
for the landing operations which were to accompany
the War for Greater East Asia .»»

Personal history register of Leading Pvt.
Hisazo Kashino of the 41st Infantry Regiment,
contains the following entries :
to October 1941 — Left Ningpo.

11 October — Landed at Shanghai.

12 October to 14 November — Prepared for Malayan
operations in the vicinity of Shanghai.

22 November — Left Woosung, Shanghai.

8 December — Landed at Singora, Thailand. f

November 1941

Diary belonging to an unknown member of
the 41st Infantry Regiment contains the entries
quoted below. This regiment participated in
the attack on Malaya, which was mounted
from the port of Samah on Hainan Island.
12 October 1941 — Reached Woosung Pier and return-
ed to Kiangvan Barracks.

23 October — Okabe Force was assembled and heard
an address from the newly appointed brigade comman-

der, Maj. Gen. Saburo Kawamura. There wilt be a
general inspection of the three battalions tomorrow,
4 November — Jungle combat training for expected
type warfare,

13 November — Received rations and other
items for tropical combat (medicines ,
etc).

20 November — Anchored off Haikow on Hainan
Island. . . .

2 December — Weighed anchor and sailed again for
Samah.

rj December — Assisted by our guns and tanks, our
unit was the first to enter Gubun Street. Capt.
Omori, 1st Lt. N.kki, and 2nd Lt. Takahashi were
killed, tst Lis. Okano and Yanagizawa were
wounded. V

The pamphlet quoted below, entitled,
" Read This and the War is Won ", was to be
issued to each Japanese soldier before he
embarked for overseas. The frontispiece
consists of a map of South China, French Indo-
China, Thailand, Burma, the Federated Malay
States, the Netherlands East Indies, and a
small section of the Northwest Australian
Coast. The date of publication of the pam-
phlet is not definitely known. A captured copy,
however, was received by 55th Division Infantry
Group on 10 November 1941. (Elements of
55th Division figured ptominentlv in the attack
on Guam in December 1941 and later in the
Burma Campaign). Furthermore, its length and
the nature of the contents indicate original
preparation at a date considerably prior to this.
Pertinent sections of this pamphlet are re-
produced below:

What sort of place is the southern field of opera-
tions ?

(/) It is the treasury of the Orient which has
been invaded by the white men of England, America,

30 ATIS Interrogation Report, Set. No. 97, 14 Hpr 43, p. 16.

31 ATIS Research Report No. 131, op. cit., p. iz.

32 ATIS Current Translations No. 64, 13 Jul 43, pp. 16-7.

33 ATIS Current Translations No. 54, 14 Jun 43, p. 39.

France, and Holland.

(2) One hundred million Orientals are being
oppressed by three hundred thousand white men.

It amounts to this — these whites possess scores of
Oriental slaves from the moment they are born. Is
this the intention of God ?

(3) It is a source of world supply of oil, rubber,
tin, etc.

Rubber and tin are essential for military supplies,
and for these valuable resources the southern countries
are the richest in the East. The malevolence of
England and America, who have prevented Japans
purchasing these materials by just means, is one of the
reasons which necessitates the present military opera-
tions.

It is quite clear that the Netherlands East Indies
and French Indo-China cannot oppose Japan alone,
but with the support and threats of England and
America they are showing hostility to Japan. The
lack of oil and iron is Japan's weak paint, but lack
of rubber, tin, and tungsten is the weakest point of
America. America's chief sources of supply of these
are the South Seas and Southern China. If these
could be stopped, it not only would enable Japan to
obtain the much-wanted oil and tin but it would stick
a knife into America's sorest spot. The essence of
America's opposition to Japan's southward advance
lies here.

(4) It is a land of perpetual summer.
Bananas and pineapples are plentiful all the year

round ; at the same time troublesome malaria-mosqui-
toes are everywhere. In the Java and Singapore areas
motor roads have been developed everywhere, but there
are many uncivilised places, jungles, and swamps where
neither man nor animals pass.

Why must we fight and how must we fight ?

(1) By the Imperial will for the peace of the
Orient.

The Meiji Restoration saved Japan from invasion
by foreign powers. The Showa Restoration, by com-
plying with the Imperial wilt for the peace of the
Orient, must rescue Asiatics from disputes amongst
themselves and the invasion of the white race and
return Asia to the Asiatics. Peace in Asia will ensue,
and this will be followed by peace in tlx world being

firmly established.

Japan is given a great mission to save Manchuria
from the design of Soviet Russia, free China from ex-
ploitation by the English and Americans, and then
aid the independence of Thailand, Annam, and the
Philippines, thus to bring about the happiness of the
natives of the South Seas and India. This is the
spirit of equality and brotherhood.

(2) While destroying the enemy show compassion
towards those without crime.

Understanding this war as one between races, we
must enforce our just demands on the Europeans, ex-
cluding Germans and Italians, without extenuation.

(3) Is the enemy stronger than the Chinese
Army ?

Comparing the enemy with the Chinese Army, since
the officers are Europeans and non-commissioned officers
for the greater part natives, the spiritual unity through-
out the Army is zero. It must be borne in mind
that the number of airplanes, tanks, and guns is far
superior to those of the Chinese Army. However, not
only are these of old types but their users are weak
soldiers, so they are not of much use. Consequently,
night attack is what the enemy fears most.

(4) We must he prepared for the war to be a
prolonged affair and proceed with every preparation
for a drawn-out conflict.

What course will the war follow ?

Long voyage followed by landing operations.

Ail fields of operations are in the South Seas over
a thousand miles from Formosa. Some places take a
week to ten days to reach. This wide sea is crossed
by convoys of several hundred warships and merchant-
men. Looking back, our ancestors conquered this
rough sea and carried on trade and fought with wooden
sailing ships hundreds of years ago. After several
days journey in the confines of shipboard, enemy re-
sistance on the shores must be overcome and landings
enforced.

What to do aboard ship :

The most important thing in landing operations is
the maintenance of secrecy. If the enemy gets to know
in advance where we plan to land, it will be very
difficult.

There are many instances where a simple thing

written in a letter has been the cause of the defeat of
a whole Army, or where a word dropped oyer a glass
of wine in a cafe just before departure has been the
cause of secrets coming to the ears of spies.

Remember how the 4/ Romn kept their secret
through such trials until they had avenged their Lord ;
encourage one another to do libwise.

There ts a timely story of a soldier attached to a
certain unit, who landed in Southern China during
the present Incident, wrote a letter and dropped it in
the sea, sealed in a bottle. The letter was earned by
the tide to the coast of Korea. Supposing the letter
had reached Vladivostok — what would have been the
consequence ? Often a clue is caught by aircraft and
submarines which are at sea to find out the movements
of our transport ships. Care must be observed in the
disposal of dirt and rubbish.

Battle :

(1) Squalls, mist, and night are over all.
Europeans are dandies, and delicate and cowardly.

Therefore, rain, mist, and night attacks are the things
they detest most. They consider night suitable only
for dances but not for fighting — we must take advan-
tage of this.

(2) Unlike the Chinese soldiers, our present enemy
may use gas. If you cast aside your gas mask because
of the torment of wearing it in the heat, the con-
sequence may be serious.

Action in particular zones:

Action in swamps and paddy-fields :

French Indo-China and Thailand are, next to
Japan, the chief rice-producing countries, and there are
paddy-fields everywhere and large swamps here and
there. IV hen passing through these places, each soldier
must use snowshoes (made of straw and sticks).

The present war is a war with Japan's rise or fall
at stake. What is at the bottom of America's action
of gradually prohibiting the export of oil and iron to
Japan, as if to strangle her slowly by "silk-wool " ?
If they stopped these exports at once, Japan, in her des-
peration, might march into the South. If the export
of the rubber and tin of the South are checked by
Japan, America's own sufferings will be far greater
than those of Japan, who is harassed for want of oil
and ore. It has been the policy of America up to

now not to anger Japan, though weakening her.

Japan has waited too long — if Japan is patient any
longer our aircraft, warships, and motor cars will not
move. Five years have passed since the beginning of
the China Incident. Over 1,000,000 comrades have
exposed their bones on the continent. The arms of
Chiang Kai-shek, which killed these comrades, were sold
mostly by England and America. Both England and
America are prejudiced against the solidarity of the
Oriental races as something that stands in the way of
their making the Orient their permanent colony and
are concentrating every effort on letting Japan and
China fight. Our allies, Germany and Italy, are
continuing a battle of death in Europe against Eng-
land, America, and Soviet Russia. America is already
assisting England and is essentially participating in
the war. For the existence of Japan herself and her
obligation to the Tripartite Alliance, not a minute
longer must be endured. Japan is confronted with a
great mission, bravely to put the last finishing blow,
as representatives of the Oriental race, to their invasion
of several hundred years. Our incomparable Navy is
in full readiness and is infallible : 5—3—3 is the ratio
in figures, but if spirit is added, it is More-
over, half of the British Navy has been smashed by
Germany. For the Navy, now is the best time. The
Chungking Government's umbilical cord is joined to
England and America. Unless this cord is severed
soon, the Japan-China Incident will never be per-
manently settled. The total settlement of the holy
war is the present war. The spirits of over a hundred
thousand warriors are guarding us. The mass for the
dead comrades is to win this war.

Whilst showing our heartfelt thanks to the Navy,
who, conquering thousands of miles of sea and remo-
ving enemy interception, are protecting us without sleep
and rest, we must fully repay them for their trouble
with good war results. We are privileged with an
important and honorable mission to stand as repre-
sentatives of the Asiatic race and to reverse the history
of the world, succeeding our glorious history of 2,600
years and for the trust and reliance in us of His
Majesty the Emperor. Both rank and file with one
mind must exhibit the real value of Japan's sons in
this full-dress display watched by the whole world.

The completion of the Showa Restoration to free Asia
in realization of the Imperial will, which is for peace
in the East, rests an our shoulders. 1 *

The pamphlet entitled, " Message to War-
riors in the South Seas ", was issued on 15
November 1941 above the signature of Maj.
Gen. Horii, Commanding General of the South
Seas Detachment, which comprised the main
force in the attack on Guam."

RESTRICTED

A Guide for Warriors in
The South Seas

South Seas Detachment Hqs.

15 November 1941
Horii Force Staff — Educational Pamphlet No. 1
Instructions regarding the attached M Message for
Warriors in the South Seas "

To all units and militarized civilian personnel
under my command:

This pamphlet, together with the previously dis-
tributed " Collection of Imperial Rescripts," to which
are annexed : " Field Service Instructions " and " Read
This and the War is Won ", is to be used as material
for the practical strengthening of morale in the
field.

ij November 1041
Tomttaro Horii
Commanding General,
South Seas Detachment

Instructions given to the officers, men, and avilian
employees under His Majesty the Emperor and under
my command, on the occasion of the formation of the
South Seas Detachment and their departure for opera-
tions :

In obedience to the orders of His Imperial Majesty,
I now take command of your honored unit as an in-
dependent force, and am about to undertake a vital

duty. I cannot repress my deep emotion, and I feel
keenly the gravity of my responsibility.

I am convinced that the world situation surroun-
ding East Asia faces an unprecedented crisis, and the
fate of the Empire hangs in the balance. I believe
that all of you, habitually bearing in mind the Im-
perial Edicts, have obeyed the orders of your superiors
and have striven with all your might ; however, at this
time when your unit has been newly organized and is
about to take the field, you are to stress to yourselves
these three great principles with fullest courage : —

The strict observance of military discipline ; the
strengthening of esprit de corps ; and the determina-
tion to fight to the death for certain victory. Whether
you be under the higher commands or under the com-
mand of subordinate officers, whether you be officers
or militarized civilian personnel, true to the spirit of
loyalty, you are to have faith in and assist the com-
bined actim of the land and sea forces working toge-
ther as one body , thus you shall do your utmost to
utilize the results of your training and to display the
combined fighting strength of the detachment.

You will take care of yourselves, bear in mind my
wishes, and upon the opening of hostilities determine
to exalt still more the true worth of the Detachment,
swiftly bringing the Holy War to a successful termi-
nation, and thereby carrying out the Sacred Imperial
Desire.? 6

The professional notebook of Ensign Toshio
Nakamura, contains the following passage :

Address by our Captain upon the occasion of my
boarding ship. Delivered by Capt. Yujt Takahashi
(of the heavy cruiser Kako) 16 November 1941 :

For three years you have studied your duties dili-
gently. And now I believe that as you stand here, at
the battlefront, your emotions have been heightened
as you sense impending action.

When you reflect upon it, this is no training
squadron ; you have been assigned directly to the front.

34 ATIS Research Report No. 131, op. ctt., pp. 13-15.

35 This is the same commander and the identical unit which later operated in the abortive Japanese drive
over the Owen Stanley Mountains, in New Guinea, toward the vital Allied base at Port Moresby. The South Seas
Detachment had been organized under Maj. Gen. Horii's command by 15 November. ATIS Enemy Publications
No. 41, Miscellaneous Personnel Records of Horn Butai and Sakikawa Butat. 8 Sep 43, p. 10.

36 ATIS Captured Document No. 89, 17 Oct 42, p. 2.

Original Painting by Sen tarn hv.iu

Photograph l»y U.S. Army Signal f nrps

PLATE NO. 3
Resting Comrades

Officers in charge of your guidance and their assistants
have been selected J but the fact of the matter is that
each and every one of them has his battle station and
shall not be able to devote his wholehearted attention
to your instruction. You appreciate, I am sure, the
present situation and will not depend on others too
heavily. You must undertake your duties assertively,
with a healthy spirit of initiative. Moreover, at this
time, special emphasis should be given to the caution,
' Always be at your station ! ' It is extremely im-
portant that line officers always be on deck, so that
they are able to master anything that comes along.
In short, the present situation is certainly nearing its
climax; indeed, it is in its most pregnant stage. I
earnestly desire from you an uncommon amount of
determination and effort."

Diary belonging Co Superior Private Yama-
shita of 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment,

contains the following entry :

18 November 1941 — About 1530 hours left Shang-
hai, which has so many memories for me, and boarded
Ryujo Mam at 1730 hours. . . .with Kialing as the
objective, the brigade has been deployed for maneuvers
in order to exploit all the more its success as a
mechanized force. W t are keenly feeling the pressure
of the situation and orders have eventually come.
The time has finally come for us to display activity.
Are we going to be at war with the three powers A,
B, and D? (Letters are written in English in the
original). With a feeling of serious tension, I am
aware that the most gratifying event since the begin-
ning of Japanese history is the fact that we have now
set out for the field.

21 November — Anchored in sight ofTakao*

Partial translation of a file dated July —
December 1941, entitled " No. 3 Situation of
Both Sides Prior to the Outbreak of War,"
(issuing authority unknown), is set forth below.
The section quoted is not dated, but it is ap-
parent from internal evidence that it antedates

37 JICPOA Translations, Item No. 4986, pp. 25

38 ATIS Current Translations No. 45, 1 Jun 43,

39 ATIS Current Translations No. 46, 2 Jun 43,

23 November 1941. The Tanaka Detachment
landed in the vicinity of Aparn on 10 Decem-
ber 1941.

IV. The Tanaka Detachment will start embark-
ing at Takao between 2} and 25 November. The
plan of embarkation is as shown on the attached sheet.

As from 0000 on 26 November, the Detachment
will come under the direct control of Lt. Gen.
Masaharu Homma, Commanding General, Fourteenth
Army, The troops newly attached to the force will
come under the command of Tanaka Detachment
as of 0001 hours on 26 November. . . .

Preparations having been finally completed, the
convoy carrying Tanaka Detachment sailed at 1700
hours on the yth from Miko Anchorage in the Pes-
cadores under the direct guidance of escorts. Sailing
through the Straits of Formosa in a rough sea, the
officers and men were in high spirits. No enemy air-
planes or submarines were encountered.

During the evening a squall came up but the con-
voy sailed on. All were ready and anxious to meet
the enemy. 19

Address No. 29 by the Commanding
Officer of the light cruiser Katori, dated 26
November 1941 (Wednesday) at sea, and bound
with a number of news reports and official
communiques summarized by 00/61 Naval
Intelligence Section, is set forth below. Part
of the page was burned. A complete translation
of the remainder is given :

Thirty-seven years ago, when war between Russia
and Japan became inevitable, the Emperor Meiji
approached the Russian Government asking them
to reconsider the declaration of war, to do everything
possible to avoid the consequent calamity. We were
extremely grateful for his benevolence.

Recently when Ambassador Kurusu was ordered to
the United States — (I do not know whether he was
sent for the same purpose as in the above incident
before the Russo Japanese War or not) — but at least

Apr 44, t| 67.
p. 27.
pp. 2-3.

I believe that he carried with him the Emperor's sincere
hope that the evil of this war would be prevented. It
is clearly known that this procedure is the tradition
of our Empire.

In spite of the Emperor's benevolence, however,
the American statesmen are arrogant and think that
they are the greatest people in the world, and nothing
can shake their belief. I suppose, therefore, in spite
of the attempt of Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu to
prevent war, there is no hope of a peaceful settlement.

Ultimately, there is no other way to determine the
outcome than by using our own force. At this par-
ticular time, we of the Kafori, attached to Sixth Fleet,
are about to take our place in the disposition of the
fleet. Not only the submarine force, but also the
Air force and surface units are mobilizing. It will
not be long before operations begin.

I would like you to understand that when we put
to sea the day before yesterday, it was not for an
ordinary voyage, but for something entirely different.
At this time, I would like you to bear in mind that
we have an opportunity which comes but once in a
lifetime. . .

Diary, presumably belonging to a member of
144th Infantry Regiment, contains the following
entries :

iy November 1941 — Today we held a review and
ceremony for leaving for the field, participated
in by all personnel of the unit. . . .

21 November — Advance party left in the morning.
Unit commander in charge of military flags left about
1300.

23 November — It rained during the morning and
we departed in the rain. We left from Asakura
Station at 1950, arrived at Sakaide about 0500. . . .

24 November — Departed Sakaide. Mat sue Maru
left harbor at 2810.

25 November — We left the Inland Sea and
headed southeast. . . ,

26 November — Our battle zone will be Guam
Island. . . .In the morning I went on deck and saw
transports to the left, right, and rear. On anti-

aircraft observation duty.

28 November—Arrived at Haha-Jima about
1650

1 December — Held maneuvers during morning.
Went on antiaircraft observation duty. About 1500
ship (TN: or " ships") got under way. Roused at
2200 for landing operations. Roused again at 0100.
About 0/00 we returned to Haha-Jima Harbor. . . .

4 December — Gave Banzai facing toward Asimi-
yazo and left the harbor of Haha-Jima. At 0930 we
proceeded southeast to " X ". We received an order
announcing the declaration of war. We expected to
land at "X" on the 10th. . .

Diary of Seaman 2nd

Kamimura contains the following entries :

22 November 1941 — Went to Yokohama in the
afternoon. Was invited aboard the Arima Maru for
supper,

24 November — Sailed at 1400 hours. It is said
that we are taking a direct route southward to Truk.
Outside the harbor we sighted the Hikawa Maru.

Particularly on this voyage an air of seriousness
prevails which has been lacking on most occasions.
Received 10 Yen through telegraphic remittance. I
presume that we will not be receiving any pay for a
substantial period.

2 December — Left Truk at 0900 hours for Kwaja-
lein. We cruised, sharply on the lookout for mines.
Today is the fifth day of preparations, and dispositions
have been completed. It is rumored that on the sixth
day the Navy is to advance on a simultaneous general
attack. Can it be a fact ? Though I try to consider
it calmly, my eyes and body reveal a state of ex-
citement.

7 December — In the morning, after inspection of
our division was concluded, the ship's captain gave us
an address and read the Imperial message. We were
instructed that action would commence at 0100 hours
on the morning of the 8th. I was very excited on
hedring that Japan would declare war on the United
States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies.
Comfort packets were distributed among us. Was

40 ATIS Enemy Publications No. 67, News Report and Official Communiques, to Dec 43, p. t.

41 ATIS Captured Document No. 98, 24 Oct 42, pp. 1-3.

mightily glad to receive them. At 1900 hours we
separated from the speaal service ship. After anchor-
ing I drank beer and got drunk.* 1

Personal history register of rst Class Pvt.
Tadatoshi Yamakawa of the 41st Infantry
Regiment contains the entry quoted below.
The original attack on Malaya was mounted
from Samah :

28 November 1941 — During assembly off Samah

Harbor on Hainan, was admitted to a

from Kyushu Maru.

1 January 1942 — Overtook his own unit at Kampar,
Perak.n

Diary, owner and unit unknown, but pre-
sumably a member of the South Seas Detach-
ment, contains the following entries :

18 November 1941 — From 1000 hours infantry
group held war exercises under General Horii.

24 November — Left Marugame at 0630 hours.
Boarded Mat sue Maru at 1530 hours. Sailed at 1800
hours.

28 November — 1650 hours stopped over at Haha-
Jima, Ogasdwara Archipelago.

29 November — Went ashore for communication.
America has disguised herself till now. We are going
to meet the enemy at Guam Island with ever-increasing
spirit.

3 December — Landed Haha-Jima at 0230 hours
to wash clothes. It seems that the Japanese- American
talks will finally break down.

4 December — Worshipped the Imperial Palace at
o8}o. Gave ) Banzais! There was a speech.
Japan- America, War ! It looks as though the hard-
ships we have borne until now will be rewarded ! We
have received life for Showa's reign. Men have no
greater love than this. Convoy to sail ! 0900 !
Now, prosper, fatherland !

4 December — South Haha-Jima at 1422 hours.
' The Empire has decided to go to war against
America, Britain, and Holland. The South-

ern District Army will quickly capture important
regions in the Philippines, British Malaya, and the
Dutch Indies after beginning attack on 8 Decem-
ber.

1 For this purpose the first Japanese air attack
will be carried out.

' The South Seas Detachment will co-operate
with Fourth Fleet to capture Guam. If there is no
separate order, the landing will take place on 10
December.

' Horii Operation Order A, No. ij. Each unit
will act according to Order A, No. 7, which has
already been issued.'

8 December, uoo, war declared /«

Diary, owner and unit unknown, but pre-
sumably a member of the South Seas Detach-
ment, contains the entries set forth below.
The entry of 29 November 1941 anticipates a
Japanese landing north of Talofofo Bay on
Guam.

22 November 1941 — 0527 hours. Reached Saka-
ide. woo hours. Inspection tour of the Chenbon
Maru.

23 November — lyoo hours. Left Sakaide.

27 November — Sighted Bonin Islands. 0800
hours, reached Haha-Jima.

28 November — 0900 hours. Went to Yokohama
Maru for liaison.

29 November — Training for boarding motor
barges during the morning. It has been decided
that battalion will land on the north side of Tar a
Bay (presumably Talofofo Bay on Guam).

ning from 2000 hours.

3 December — Battalion officers to meet on Yoko-
hama Maru from 0900 hours. Training in smoke
flares and gas. Conference of company commanders,
decided to land at Iriya Bay. Two first-class cruisers
came to the anchorage point to escort us and we

42 ATIS Current Translations No. 78, o Sep 43, pp. 1, 13-5-

43 ATIS Current Translations No. 64, 13 Jul 43, p. 17-

44 Ibid., p. 1.

feel very safe.

4 December — The convoy left at 0900 hours.

6 December — Heard the Japanese news broadcast
in the salon. Our mission is to attack the United
States*

Diary belonging to Ifujt, a member of Palau
No. 3 Defense Unit, contains the following
entries :

29 November — War ? All leave was cancelled
and I heard that a huge Army unit is out here some-
where. (Written at Palau)

5 December — We received a written order from
Commanding Officer of No. 3 Base to take up No. 2
Guard Dispositions from today ; it is really going to
be a serious affair.

6 December — // is said that American airplanes
are reconnoitering our positions.

8 December — Declared war on America and
Great Britain.'* 6

December 1941

Diary, owner and unit unknown, contains
the following entries :

24 November 1941 — Embarked on Daifuku Maru
(3,52} tons) of N. Y. K. Line at Sakaide.

26 November — Destroyer Uzukt ts escorting our
convoy.

2 December — Loaded horses at Haha-Jima.
4 December — Order of Tomitaro Horii, South
Seas Detachment Commander:

On 2 December Imperial Japan decided on war
with Great Britain, the United States of America,
and Holland. Imperial Japan will, on 8 December,
carry out its first air attack against the United
States. This detachment will, if there is no special
order, land on Guam.v

Diary of Haruichi Nishimura, member of
1st Special Naval Landing Party, Yoshimoto
Unit, contains the following entries :

7 November — Conscripted.

30 November — Boarded Kirishima Maru at Ujina.
Escorted by Destroyers No. 36 and 37. Headed for
Palau.

2 December — Heard over radio that American
fleet (j ships) had left harbor. Heard that we are to
land on the Philippine Islands after resting at Palau.

j December — Arrived Palau.

6 December — Enemy submarine sighted 5000 me-
ters away.

7 December — Relations between United States and
Japan are getting worse.

8 December — War was declared at 0800. Katsuta
Maru sunk.**

File of reports, entitled " Thailand Opera-
tions," belonging to the 77th Air Regiment,
contains the following passage :

4—7 December 1941 — Protection of Twenty-fifth
Army transport convoy and preparation for occupation
of Thailand.**

Diary belonging to Shigeo Morilcami, of
Horii Force (South Seas Detachment], Tak -
mori Unit, contains the following entries :

22 November 1041 — Our departure for Sakaide
leaving familiar Z.entsuji behind. About 1930 hours
left Sakaide Harbor behind, bound in 00 direction.

23 November — About 0300 hours our ship stopped.
A mountain can be seen to the east, and a factory zone
below it. My friends were saying that it was Senshuji.

27 November 1941 — We also put in at Chichi- Jxma
at 0100 hours. We again departed for Haha-Jima
at 1100 hours.

28 November — Landed the horses at Oki Village
Grammar School on Haha-Jima.

3 December — Sailing preparations.

4 December — Will depart for Guam Island,
which is called Omiyajima.

5 December — Will depart at 1000 hours. We are
cruising safely.

6 December — Cruising safely . We will disem bark

45 ATIS Current Translations No. 52, 11 Jun 43, p. 31.

46 ATIS Bulletin No. 527, 26 Nov 43, p. 8.

47 ATIS Current Translations No. 23, Mar 43, p. 4c.

48 ATIS Bulletin No. 470, 21 Oct 43, pp. 15-16.

49 ATIS Bulletin No. 1518, 25 Oct 44, pp. 3-4.

in three days.

8 December 1941 — Imperial General Headqu arters.
War was declared against England and the United
States at 1 2 jo hours. In the afternoon, I heard from
Captain Takamori that the Hawaiian Islands are being
bombed by our Air force. The Philippines and Hong
Kong are also being bombed. At 0800 hours of the
8th, our Takamori Unit worshipped the Palace. We
will finally begin landing from 1200 hours of the 9th.
On the morning of the 8th, tome islands could be
faintly seen for the first time.™

Diary belonging to Yaichi Takahashi, of
South Seas Detachment, Antiaircraft Unit,
Takahashi Platoon, contains the following
entries :

14 November 1941 — W r finally received orders to
go to the front. On 28 July we had separated from
the friendly 73d Force in Korea and were reorganized
as the 47th Antiaircraft Battalion. On 14 November
at 0900, we carried out the last ceremony of farewell
on the parade ground. When we were leaving for
the front, Commander Fuchiyama gave instructions
and read a written oath addressed to the Imperial Palace.
I have no reluctance in giving my life and being killed
in action. We went up to the Goku Shrine to pray
for our ultimate victory. We received sacred Sake
from the god. Then we shouted " Banzai " three
times and dismissed.

At 1900, we entrained. We were on a freight
car. About 50 troops. All were waiting the time
for leaving the friendly Kainei. . . .

ry November — At 0600, we eventually arrived at
Pusan Station. We stayed in Pusan City today.

18 November — Today the Iso Unit is leaving.
At 1300, the loading was finished. It was about two
years since we were on a ship. The inside of the ship
was the same as when we came on her. After a time
I noticed that the ship was sailing.

19 November — This is Japan. It was two years
since I had seen Japan. Ujina — the Iso Unit was
divided into two groups here, then we n>ere all embarked

on the big ships. I was in the Takahashi Platoon.
The ship was the Matsue Mam.

On the 23rd at 0600, we arrived at our destination,
Sakaide. At 1/30, we finally left. We did not know
where we were going. On the 28th at 1630 hours, we
caught sight of a big island northeast of the ship.
Several ships which had come before us were at this
island, Haha-Jima. It was four days since we left
Sakaide. . . .

4 December — At 0930 hours, we eventually left
the island. We immediately began to prepare for
combat. Approaching enemy position. We were on
board 18 days, and every day was the same routine.
On 11 December at 0100 hours, we came, at last, face
to face with enemy positions. We have a mission on
Guam Island. s '

Diary and notebook belonging to Yutaka
Morita, of 144th Infantry Regiment, contains the
following entries :

22 November 1941 — 0140 hours. Arrived Sakaide
Station in Kagawa Prefecture. Boarded the trans-
port Moji Maru with 9th Company, one company of
mountain artillery, 3 guns, 50 horses, cavalry, and
part of an engineer unit.

1 December — Afternoon. Prepared for landing.
Held landing practice. Warships and transports
started out of Chichi- Jima at 1800 hours preparatory
tu departure.

2 December — 0030 hours. Waited two hours with
landing equipment but the motor boats were not ready
and the landing was cancelled. The ships and trans-
ports returned to Chichi-Jima at 0600 hours, 1330
hours. Four warships, eight airplanes. Loaded
some more horses on the ship again.

4 December — 0930 hours. Warships and transports
which were in readiness at Haha-Jima harbor sailed
for their destination.

j December — Convoy sailed south.

10 December — Landed Guam Island at 0400
hours."

50 ATIS Current Translations No. 49, 9 Jun 43, p. 34.

51 ATIS Current Translations No. 68, 23 Jul 43, pp. 33-4.

52 ATIS Current Translations No. to, 25 Dec 42, pp. 17-9.

Diary belonging to Leading Pvt. Sagaei

Matsuura, of the 144th Infantry

contains the following entries :

29 September 1941 — Received induction orders.

j October — Entered service,

8 October — Completed mobilization.

22 November — Embarked. Sailed in the evening.
Arrived off Osaka in the morning. We did not sail
during the day. Set sail at night. Headed due south.
We sailed southward till the morning of 27th. When
I went up on deck in the morning, I saw a little
island. It was one of the Bonin Islands.

27 November — Reached Chichi-Jtma, Departed
at ogoo hours the same day. Reached Haha- Jima before
noon and anchored. There are not many people
living on this island. Ships come here one after another.
The bay is filled with large ships. It seems as though
there are about seven or eight men-of-war here too.
At first there were names on the warships ; Uzuki,
Yuzuki, and Kikuzuki etc., but the names were taken
off. This transport ship had MI written on the smoke
stack but it also has been removed. Horses were un-
loaded on Haha-ftma. Horses and dogs romped
around the hills. Those who had previously been
here say that the women are not beautiful, but they
speak the Tokyo dialect. We fished to pass the time
till 4 December. In the meantime horses were loaded.
I suppose we are again headed for hot places. We
had mosquito nets and lunch boxes made for us.

4 December — Today we are really going to set
out for our destination. We sailed around 10 o'clock.
We started in the morning with a warship as escort.
It was the Kurogame. They were practically all car-
rying airplanes. As soon as we entered this harbor,
two airplanes were started as if they had rehearsed
going out on reconnaissmce. There were many escort
ships. As long as the Navy is present, there is nothing
to be afraid of.

6 December — Tomorrow, we are told, Guam
Island will be attacked and occupied. During the
voyage all necessary preparation of arms, such as 150
rounds of ammunition, were tn readiness. With these

we can kill. It is heavy, but I feel like taking more.

to December — At 0200, we will bid farewell to
this boat. We got on this boat on the 21st and
started to sail on the morning of the roth. W e lived
on it for 20 days. At night we made various prepa-
rations for tomorrow's landing. I packed food for j
meats in my haversack along with 150 rounds of
ammunition. It is supposed to be packed as light as
possible, but it is very heavy. We landed on one
portion of the island which was barely visible in the
dark. We anticipated enemy fire but did not encoun-
ter any. We landed successfully without incident."
Diary belonging to Gumpei Imoto, of French
Indo-China Expeditionary Force, 106th Land
Duty Company, contains the following entries :
1 November 1941 — Reached Saigon at 0600 hours.

27 November — Left Saigon at about 1400 hours.

28 November — En route.

29 November — En route.

30 November — En route Taikai Maru.

1 December — Safely arrived in the morning at
Hainan Island.

2 December — Still anchored at Hainan.

3 December — Remained aboard Taikai Miru
until 1600 hours and transhipped to Kashii Maru.
Stayed aboard that night.

4 December — Departed at 0600 hours for our
destination.

7 December — Reached Singora safely at 2400 hours.

8 December — At ojoo hours, made preparations
for opposed landing. Around 0600 hours an unopposed
landing was made. Took the enemy completely by
surprise.™

Diary belonging to Chitoshi Sato, of South
Seas Detachment, contains the following
entries :

14 November 1941 — Departed for Pusan.
tjf November — Travelling south by train.

16 November — Still on train.

17 November — Approached Keijo.

19 November — Loaded guns on ship and sailed
from Pusan harbor.

53 ATIS Current Translations No. 62, 7 Jul 43, pp. 19-20.

54 ATIS Current Translations No. 57, 26 Jun 43, p. 8.

20 November — Entered Moji harbor at oyoo
hours, loaded coat at Ujina harbor, was separated
from battery commander and 2d Lieutenant Taka-
hashi. Loaded guns on Mm sue.

22 November — Left Ujina harbor for Sakatde.
Went through Inland Sea,

24 November — Left Sakaide tn the evening.

27 November — Escorted by warship Uzuki,

28 November — Arrived at Ogasawara Islands.

29 November — Landed at Haha-Jima,

30 November — Picked bananas, coconuts, and
papayas at Haha-Jima.

4 December — ogoo hours left Ogasawara, , , ,
10 December — Infantry made opposed landing at
Guam this morning at or 00 hours."
Diary belonging to Susumu Kawano, of
106th Land Duty Company, contains the fol-
lowing entries :

23 September — Drilled. Inspection for all mo-
bilized personnel. From 0/00 hours visitors were
allowed in camp area.

6 October — /700 hours arrived Saigon.

23 November — Left on transport Tokokawa

Mirn.

25 November — Arrived Samah, Hainan Island.
Transferred to Kasha Mjru.

} December— 30 transports headed towards the
theater of operations with naval escort.

8 December — Made opposed landing at Smgora,
Thailand.^ 6

Diary, owner and unit unknown, contains
the following entries :

24 November 1941 — Arrived at Haikow, Hainan
Island.

27 November — Left Haikow,

30 November — Arrived at Humen.

2 December — Left Humen.

4 December — Arrived Samah harbor.

5 December — Sailed from the harbor at 0400
hours for operations.

8 December — Arrived at Singora, Malay Fenin-
sula at 0140 hours.™

55 ATIS Current Translations No. 74, 18 Aug 43, p. 32.

56 ATIS Current Translations No. 57, 26 Jun 43, p. 31.

57 ATIS Bulletin No. 747, 24 Feb 44, p. 6.

CHAPTER II

PRE-WAR JAPANESE ESPIONAGE AND INTELLIGENCE

1940-1941

General

Japan's strategic planning of its war opera-
tions was based upon intelligence gathered
by the armed services and their overseas
agents over a considerable period of time
preceding the outbreak of hostilities. When
the Japanese forces struck on 8 December 1941,
they possessed a fairly accurate knowledge of
ground, air, and naval strength in the areas at-
tacked, of the locations of airfields and fortifi-
cations, and of the terrain and climatic condi-
tions under which they would have to fight.
As the operations progressed , gaps inevitably
became apparent in Japanese intelligence, but
these were not serious in the first phase of
hostilities.'

Examples of the type of information gathered
and available to Imperial General Headquar-
ters for the planning of the initial operations
are the original intelligence maps reproduced
in Plate Nos. 4 and 5. The sketch map
showing the dispositions and strengths of
American, British, and Dutch Air forces in
the Philippines and Southern area (Plate No. 4)
was issued on 6 December 1941 by Army Air
Defense Headquarters at Keelung, Formosa.
It bears the notation that the map was compiled
" before the crisis " and that the air strengths
indicated were "estimated currently to be

undergoing marked reinforcement." The map
reproduced in Plate No. 5 contains detailed
order of battle information on Australian
ground forces as of July 1940.

Similar maps showing troop dispositions and
strengths, airfields, and other military instal-
lations on the islands of Java and Sumatra
were compiled prior to the war and used in
the planning of Southern Army operations.
{Plate No. 6)

Augmentations of British troop strength in
the Malaya, Singapore, and Burma-Thailand
border areas in the months prior to the out-
break of war were noted in a " Simplified
Table Showing Changes in the Southern Situ-
ation Since August 1941 issued by 20th
Division Headquarters. Extracts containing
intelligence apparently derived from confiden-
tial Japanese sources follow :

(From Chief of Staff Report, mid -September 1941)
Strength on the Burma-Thjiland border is approxi-
mately 50,000. In Burma there are an additional
2,000 to 3,000 Volunteer Army troops.

(From Chief of Staff Report, end October 1941)
Increase in strength in MAaya is presumed to be
10,000 Australian troops. Strength at Singapore in
mid-August was approximately 5,000 Australians.
Although information is lacking on numbers,
transports carrying Australian reinforcements had
reached Singapore by the end of August. The
regular Army strength of 48,000 has reached ap-
proximately 60,000. If a rough estimate of the

1 Until the capture of Manila, intelligence was lacking regarding the existence of strong defense positions on
Bataan Peninsula. Cf. Chapter VI. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section
Files, GHQ FEC.

PLATE NO. 4
Disposition of Air Forces in South Sea Area

increase in Hindu troops is included (increase not
according to confirmed intelligence), total strength
does not exceed the estimate of 71,000— 75,000 by the
Singapore Foreign Affairs at the end of August.'

Philippines

The Army General Staff was also in pos-
session of extensive intelligence concerning the
defenses of the Philippines. A compilation of
reports entitled, " Situation of Both Sides Prior
to the Outbreak of War ", covering the period
from July to December 1941, contained esti-
mates of American and Filipino troop and air
strength as follows : J

The strength of the American Garrison Army in
the Philippines was 12,000 (American about 3,500;
native about 6,500). Because of the international
situation, however, this number was increased by about
5,200 Americans and 6,000 natives, so that by July
of this year, the total reached 22,000. The Fdipino
National Guard and patrol scouts were included under
General MacArthur, the American Far Eastern Army
Commander, who was to undertake the united com-
mand of all troops in the Philippines.
Status of the American Garrison Army:

1. Philippine Division :

24th Infantry Brigade was not m operation in
peacetime, but its Headquarters was established at
Santiago about July 1941,

2. 94th Tank Battalion (American) was newly
organized at Fort Stotsenberg.

3. The strength of the Air Force has increased
successively as follows :

Army

24th Pursuit Regiment P-35
3d Pursuit Squadron P-36
lyth Pursuit Squadron P-38
20th Pursuit Squadron P-40
24th Pursuit Squadron 27 planes at Nichols Field

above types included.

19th Bomber Regiment

1st Pursuit Squadron

14th Bomber Squadron B-t? (12 planes)

28th Bomber Squadron B-18 (13 planes)

36th Bomber Squadron (Type of plane unknown)

0-19, 0-46,
0-4/, 0-52,
(13 planes)

2d Reconnaissance Squadron
19th Reconnaissance Squadron

4. The Philippine Defense Regulations call for
development of divisions of 7,600 officers and men.
( Referred to on separate sheet. ) However, indications
are that many divisions are far from complete, and
some even lack regimental commanders. Also, the
required equipment is not provided, and some infantry
regiments are not equipped with infantry guns.

5. Training points m Luzon are as follows:
Aparri Laoag Vigan
Bangued Toridanita

Echague Tuguegarao
12th Infantry Regiment is training in Luzon.

6. For defense purposes, Luzon is divided into
northern and southern districts. Planes reported in
Central Luzon are as follows:

Fighters 130
Bombers 30
Navy patrol planes 20

Total 180

Extensive aerial photo coverage of northern
Luzon, including the Lingayen Gulf, Vigan,
and Aparri coastal sectors (Plate No. 2), was
obtained by Imperial General Headquarters
a year before the outbreak of war. Commer-
cial planes of the Nippon Airways, manned
by military pilots and observers, flew seven
photographic missions over Luzon between 27
November and 15 December 1940, ranging as
far south as Lingayen Gulf on the west coast
and Baler Bay on the east. Lamon Bay, where
the Japanese 16th Division landed in the in-
vasion operations, and Bataan Peninsula were
not covered by these missions. Flights were
made at an altitude of over 21,000 feet and,
except at the southernmost point, beyond range

1 ATIS Research Report No. 131, Japan's Decision to Fight, 1 Dec 45, p. 33.
3 ATIS Current Translations No. 46, 2 Jun 43, pp. 1-2.

of detection by defense installations at Clark
Field."

New Guinea

Detailed reports by military intelligence
agents who toured the southern areas prior to
the war were also in the hands of the Army
planning staffs. One such report, made by
Major Tetsuo Toyofuku' on the basis of per-
sonal observation in March 1941, covered Brit-
ish New Guinea and was used as the basis of
an intelligence study on this area compiled by
the Army General Staff. The study was re-
produced by General Headquarters, Southern
Army, in 1942 for use in the New Guinea
operations. Text of the study, entitled " Mili-
tary Data on British New Guinea," follows :

Part I — Military Value of British New Guinea
and Solomon Islands;

These possessions, together with the Dutch East
Indies Archipelago, form a natural harrier intersecting
the Pacific Ocean from north to south. The northern
end is within the radius of action of our bombers from
most of our South Sea Mandated Islands, and the
southern end is within the radius of action of bombers
from the northern part of Australia. [It is approxi-
mately woo kilometers from Truk and Ponape
Islands in our South Sea Mandate, to Rabaul, capital
of the Australian Mandated Territory; approximately
1250 kilometers from Coaktown, North Australia, to
Rabaul, and approximately 600 kilometers to Port
Moresby. ) They are separated from the Australian
Continent by the narrow Torres Strait. Consequent-
ly, possession of this territory would make it easy to
obtain command of the air and sea in the Southwest
Pacific and to acquire " stepping stone " bases for
operations against Australia. Control of the southern
coast of New Guinea, in particular control of Torres

Strait, would cut communications between the South
Pacific Ocean and Dutch East Indies as well as the
Indian Ocean Area, and would force the enemy fleet
to detour to the southern coast of Australia.

Part II — Observations on Landing Operations in
British New Guinea ;

The area of the Bismarck Archipelago is approxi-
mately 50,000 square kilometers and corresponds to
the combined area of our Formosa and Shikoku.
However, the population of these territories (New
Guinea and Bismarcks) is approximately 850,000
natives, most of whom live in the coastal regions.

Nowhere are these territories as yet developed.

Since the greater part is uninhabited, the com-
munications facilities naturally are poor, and even the
roads are like the government roads of Australian-
controlled New Guinea, whose total length is only 136
miles (approximately 218 kilometers) of which 109
miles is in the Central Province, 16 miles in the
Eastern Province, and 11 miles in Southeastern Pro-
vince. It is recognised thit these roads only connect
the villages in the vicinity of the coast.

In regard to present military preparations, it ap-
pears that there are small forces and installations in
the important political and transportation centers such
as Rabaul, Port Moresby, etc. The other sections of
the territory are not defended at all.

Landing operations on these various islands can,
therefore, be carried out easily at any place where it
is possible to land. However, advance and occupation
from the captured points by land would be extremely
difficult and practically impossible in view of the un-
developed road system and the difficulty of supply.
Therefore, even if a point is occupied, it will only
secure the vicinity of th.1t point, and occupation of
the whole territory will be difficult unless the enemy's
fighting spirit is completely demoralized.

It would be advisable to attempt landing opera-
tions at Rabaul, Lae (capital of the Australian
Mandated Territory), and Port Moresby (capital of

4 Original aerial photographs, showing date and time of flight, altitude, name and rank of pilot and observer,
were obtained from the Imperial Land Survey Bureau, Japanese Government. On file with Engr Intel Div, GHQ FEC.

5 The experience gained by this officer was subsequently utilized through his appointment to the staff of the
South Seas Detachment, which landed at Buna in July 1942 and was virtually annihilated in the Owen Stanleys
and Buna campaigns.

Australian controlled New Guinea), which are points
of military, political, economic, and communications
importance. Considering the weakness of the enemy's
present defenses and the strength that will be sent to
this area by the Australians in the future, great
strength will not be required. There are dwellings
in these cities, but commodities, especially food and
drinking water, are scarce, and self-sufficiency for a
long period would be difficult. Our necessities,
especially rice, bean paste (miso), and soy sauce, are
not stored at all, so there is no other way but to depend
on supply from the rear. The difficulty of supply
from the rear must be recognised, and it will be
necessary to carry large quantities. . . .
Landing Operations at Port Moresby :
( j) General Condition of Harbor and City :
Port Moresby has a good, wide harbor, and the
bay is entered by passing between Hanudamava Island
(at the mouth of the harbor) and Bogirohodobi Point,
approximately t.j miles to the east. At the beginning
of 1940 there were approximately 800 Europeans,
approximately 20 Chinese, and no Japanese residents.
The natives (approximately 2000) have built their
village over the water and live apart from the white
residents. The city is situated between Tuaguba Hill
and Ela Hill on the eastern shore of the harbor, and
is the center of the government, military affairs,
economics, transportation, communications, etc. of
Australian-controlled New Guinea. There are various
offices, including government offices and branch offices,
a radio station, a government-managed electric power
plant, church, school, European and native hospitals,
an ice plant, bank, hoiels, etc.

(2) Value of Port Moresby as a Naval Base :
Although the harbor is rather small for a fleet

base, it is fairly deep (maximum 10 fathoms), and
the bottom is alluvial soil, and one or two squadrons
could anchor without difficulty. A space between the
coral reefs outside of the harbor offers a very wide
anchoring place, large enough for a large fleet to
anchor. However, installations for repairs and supply
have not been fully established, so it is valuable only
as a port of call.

(3) Military Preparations :

Information obtained by observation of the actual

area follows :

(a) Garrison Strength:
Army:

There is a barracks at Granville East (approxi-
mately 1 kilometer northeast of the city), which, judg-
ing from its size and the amount of equipment, can
accommodate approximately 1,000 men. The present
garrison appears to be composed wholly of infantry
troops, without artillery.

Others :

A Royal Australian Artillery Detachment (2 offi-
cers, 38 non-commissioned officers, and privates, who
arrived with 6-inch guns) apparently is stationed on
Ela Hill and will be reinforced, judging from the
fact that the number of barracks on the hill is being
increased.

Navy :

The strength is not known but appears to be
about jo men. The orderly room is located at the
side of the government pier. The station ship has
not been identified ; only 2 or 5 launches have been
identified.

(b) Installations :

A road for military use has been built to the top
of Ela Hill, and two 6-inch guns are placed an top
of this hill. The main line of fire of these guns ap-
parently is directed toward Basilisk Passage. The
guns are exposed on top of the hill. According to
information, they will be increased by two more guns.
In addition to the Kila Kila airfield, approximately
4 kilometers east of Port Moresby, an airfield for
military use, approximately 11 kilometers from Port
Moresby (location unknown), is expected to be con-
structed. A single road parallel to the coastal high-
way, and halfway up the hill of Tuaguba, is being
constructed.

(4) Passage of channels:

The greatest difficulty in a landing operation at
Port Moresby would be passing through the waterways.
There are three channels entering the harbor of Port
Moresby. LUjeblad Passage, on the extreme west, has
a very strong current and shoals. This passage cannot
be used in general because there are shallows before
the mouth of the harbor. Therefore, it is difficult to
enter this passage. Basilisk Passage, in the center, is

PLATE NO. 5
Disposition of Australian Forces, July 1940

PLATE NO, 6

Japanese Estimates of Java Troop Strength and Disposition 1941

the channel used by vessels at present, but it is about
6 kilometers from the gun emplacement an Eld Hill
and thus is within the guns' effective range. In
general, unless the gun emplacement is destroyed, it
would be difficult to enter through this channel.
Padana Nahua, at the extreme east, is quite wide
(about poo meters) and is outside the effective range
of the gun emplacement (about 18,000 meters). This
channel should be selected for an entrance. Ho.vever,
all three waterways are neither very deep nor wide,
and could easily be covered with mines and other ob-
stacles. These obstacles must be cleared first of all.
If a place where the Nateara and Sinavi coral reefs
can be passed over with boats could be found, then
an approach could be made without risking the danger
of passing through the channel. Anchoring outside a
coral reef is very difficult, so in such a case the trans-
fer to boats would have to be made while drifting.
Fresh water :

This area, in general, consists of barren mountains
and is dry for the period of eight months between
June and January each year. The rainfall is very
small. The residents who depend on rainfall some-
times have to transport water from other areas m
order to maintain their means of living. The Govern-
ment has constructed water storage tanks with galvaniz-
ed iron roofs for use during droughts, at a place 137
meters above sea level southwest ofTuaguba Hill, in
back of the city, and this water storage is used in
emergencies. Their capacity is said to be several tens
of thousands of tons, but this is not definite. The
problem of drinking water is most urgent in this area,
and the extension of a water supply line is especially
important in planning the establishment of a harbor.
According to rumor it is planned to bring the water
down from the Laloki River, and arrangements for
this will be completed about August of this year.

Fuel :

It is said that 5,000 drums of gasoline, 3,000 drums
of heavy oil, a large quantity of motor oil etc., are
stored in Carpenter's Warehouse. The nature of the
gasoline used for airplanes is not known.

Automobiles:

For military use — about 50.

For civilian use — about 200 (no busses).

Part III Value of Bismarck Islands and British
New Guinea as air bases in case of war with Bri-
tain and America :

1. Essentials :

As explained in Part I, the Bismarck Islands are
within the radius of action of bombers operating from
most of our South Sea Mandated Islands. In turn,
Torres Strait and the northern part of Australia are
within aerial domination from the Bismarck Islands
and British New Guinea, and this territory, in general,
is fudged to possess an important value from the stand-
point of air operations in a war against Britain and
America. In particular, if air superiority over Torres
Strait is gained, it is thought that it wonld be ad-
vantageous in cutting off enemy communication be-
tween the Pacific Ocean and Dutch East Indies, as well
as the Indian Ocean.

In regard to the possession of airfields in this area,
the first principle is to use established airfields, and if
necessary to construct new ones on farmland in flat
areas.

The established airfields are not wholly adequate
to fulfill military requirements, but some of them can
be utilized immediately and can be extended with
a small expenditure of labor.

As fuel is difficult to obtain in this area, in general
it must be supplied from the rear. Much of the
equipment for repairs and construction is inadequate.

The condition of the established airfields, landing
fields and air network at present in British New
Guinea is as shown m Appendix Map No. 10. (Map
not attached)

2. Value of Bismarck Islands and their vicinity :
(Appended Map No. 6, Reference No. 6) [Not at-

(1) Essentials :

The established airfields in the Bismarck Islands
and their vicinity are two landing fields at Rabaul
and Vunakanau, and it is planned to construct others
at Kavieng (northeastern end of New Ireland), Nama-
tanai, Buka Passage (the strait separating Bougainville
and Buka Islands in the Solomons), and Kteta (the
capital of Bougainville). Only one place in the har-
bor of Rabaul is used for seaplanes, but another is
located at Kileg on Galawa Island, across the Lolobo

(northeastern toast of New Britain). While the
situation regarding aviation gasoline is not known,
apparently almost none at all is stored. Planes ope-
rating on a regular schedule apparently refuel at
Salamaua or Moresby on the return trip. There are
no reports of aviation gasoline being supplied at
RdbauL

j. Value of Island of New Guinea :
(/) Essentials:

There are airfields and landing fields on the Island
of New Guinea. Most of them are concentrated in
Morobe Province because they are used by planes that
transport gold from mines developed in the province.
The airfields used mainly by land-planes are at Sala-
maua, Lae, Wau, Madang, Wewak, Port Moresby,
etc. Salamaua and Wau are the only two airfields
on which we have definite information at present. To
discuss the value of the airfields m British New Guinea
from the above data is futile. However, sinte these
(the two airfields at Salamaua and Wau\ are typical
of those used by the regular air lines, I believe they
are sound references for use in estimating the others.
It seems that the only specially-constructed seaplane
base is at Port Moresby. 6

East Indies

The lengthy background of Japanese espio-
nage and subversive activity in the Netherlands
East Indies is attested by the following passage
from an article entitled, " New Life of the
People of Sumatra" :

It was the Achin People who fought against
Holland and very bravely defended their independence
to the end. The Achin People are naturally fearless.
Their native place is on the northern edge of
Sumatra ; in area it is one and a half times the size
of Formosa, and it has the sea on three sides. Again,
there are many mountains and geographical factors.
Due to these, the natives were able to resist fiercely
for 40 years following 18/3. Controlled by one
family, these warriors hid in the woods and often
conducted violent guerrilla warfare, harassing the
Dutch troops. The last ten years it was a chronicle
of chivalry that the Japanese youth, Motohiko Ban,
struggled hard to assist the young tribal chief, Pan-
namu. However, in 1922, Ban was recalled to
Japan by the Foreign Office, and the Achtn finally
broke up their swords and submitted J

An insight into more recent phases of
possible Japanese espionage in the Netherlands
East Indies is provided by the following ex-
cerpt from an account of the Japanese opera-
tion against Java written by an unnamed staff
officer, a lieutenant colonel, and published in
the Osaka Mainichi :

It was dark when we arrived at Bandoeng. Late
that night, I went into a room of the old Homan
Holel, where I stayed over two years ago. . . .

For the purpose of meeting the Army Commander
in the afternoon, I went to the Ifuta Hotel, north of
Bandoeng. I asked for the old room which I took
the year before last.*

6 ATIS Research Report No. 131, op. cic, pp. 39-42.

7 Ibid., p. 39.

8 ATIS Enemy Publications No. 32, Account of the Netherlands East Indies Operation, 11 Aug 43, p. II.

CHAPTER III
POLITICO-MILITARY EVOLUTION TOWARD WAR

Historical Background

The sudden, far-flung attacks unleashed by
Japan's armed forces against Pearl Harbor and
the Asiatic possessions of Great Britain and
the United States before dawn on 8 December
1941 rang up the curtain on the Pacific War.
It was to be a gigantic struggle, fought over
an area covering 38 million square miles of the
globe and every kind of terrain from the tundra
wastes of the Aleutians to the jungles of Burma
and New Guinea.

This desperate act was characterized by
the enemy press as " national suicide," but
the politico-military clique which gambled
Japan's fate in war saw it as the only
alternative to a retreat from policies and
ambitions to which they stood irrevocably
committed.

The Manchurian Incident of 18 September
1 93 1 had evoked a strong reaction in the
United States, expressed in repeated diplomatic
protests from Washington. Great Britain

aligned itself with the United States when hos-
tilities spread to the Shanghai area in March
1932, imperilling British interests, and both
nations supported China in an appeal to the
League of Nations. The final League report
adopted in February 1933 was so adverse that
Japan, rather than yield, served notice of with-
drawal from League membership.

Anti-Japanese sentiment intensified in Bri-
tain and the United States following the out-
break of the Sino-Japanese War on 7 July 1937.'
On 1 July 1938, six months after the embar-
rassing sinking of the American gunboat Panay
by Japanese Navy planes, the United States
Government imposed a so-called " moral em-
bargo " on the export of aircraft and aircraft
parts to Japan. It was the initial step in a pro-
gressively more stringent economic blockade.

On 3 November 1938 Japan proclaimed the
establishment of a " New Order for East Asia". 1
The United States and Britain promptly
recognized this as a covert threat to China's
" Open Door " and countered with loans of
25 million dollars and 50 million pounds,

1 The Japanese Government had endeavored in the early stages to localize the hostilities and achieve a
diplomatic settlement. Marquis Koichi Kido, later Lord Privy Seal and closest adviser to the Emperor, recorded
in his Diary: " Prince Konoye (then Premier) was deeply concerned over the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hos-
tilities and exerted every effort to terminate the Incident and prevent its expansion. I did my utmost to support
his stand." Kido Nikki : Kyokuto Kokusai Gun/i Saiban m okem Kido Hikokunin no Sensei Kokyosho sfcp ^
HK!^St^J(CKrtS5ftF^— K-^A^gtltfttif (Kido Diary : Affidavit of Defendant Koichi Kido in International
Military Tribunal for the Far East) p. 54. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-a Historical
Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 In his speech announcing the New Order (^C^ffi W$;M»), Premier Ayamaro Konoye declared: "Japan
does not reject co-operation with other Powers in China, or intend to damage the interests of third Powers. If such
nations understand the true intentions of Japan and adopt policies suitable for the new conditions, Japan does not
hesitate to co-operate with them for the peace of the Orient."

respectively, to the Chungking Government.
The League of Nations on 20 January 1939
also proffered aid to Chiang Kai-shek.

Japanese troops occupied Hainan Island, off
the South China coast, in February 1939 and
at the same time closed the Yangtze to all
neutral commercial shipping. On 26 July of
the same year, the United States served notice
of its intention to abrogate the Japanese-Ameri-
can Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, the
trade basis upon which the two countries had
operated since 191 1. In December 1939 air-
craft plans and equipment as well as equipment
used in manufacturing high-grade aircraft gaso-
line were added to the list of items, export of
which to Japan was forbidden.

On 30 March 1940 the Wang Ching-wei
Government was formally inaugurated at Nan-
king in opposition to the Chungking Govern-
ment. The United States promptly refused
recognition of the new regime, as a Japanese
"puppet," and offered Chiang another loan,
this time for 20 million dollars. This was
followed on 2 July with enactment of an export
control law covering national defense materials,
the implied intent of which was to curb the
Japanese national potential.

Under this law an export license system was
first applied to aircraft materials and machine
tools, and was later broadened to include high-
grade gasoline, high-grade lubricating oil and
first class scrap iron. 3 Thereafter new items

were frequently added to the list. Since Japa-
nese domestic production of crude oil supplied
but 1,887,000 barrels of the minimum of 34,
600,000 barrels annually required to maintain
national defense and economic life,' 1 the Ameri-
can curb on oil exports alone was regarded in
Japanese governing circles as a crippling blow
to Japan's basic industry and, indirectly, to her
national safety.

Drift Toward Crisis

On 22 July 1940 the second Konoye Cabinet
took office and, five days later, carried out a
sweeping revision of basic Japanese policies in
the light of changes in the world situation. 1
This revision committed Japan:

1. To strive for speedy conclusion of the China
Incident by cutting off all assistance to Chung-
king from outside powers.

2. To maintain a firm stand toward the United
States on one front, while strengthening politi-
cals with Germany and Italy and ensuring
more cordial diplomatic relations with Russia.

3. To open negotiations with the Dutch East
Indies in order to obtain essential materials. 6

Japan's anxiety to end the China stalemate
was a paramount consideration. The hos-
tilities on the Continent had bogged down and
constituted a severe drain on the nation's re-
sources. Acting under the decisions of 27 July,
the Konoye Cabinet therefore concluded a

3 "The restrictions of exportation of scrap iron to Japan was paricularly alarmimg to all Japanese in view of the
prevailing iron shortage and the production process in Japan." Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban m okeru Hikakunsn Tojo
Hidtk, no Stnstt Kokyosho *SS€Wr^^*SS^JtC jfttt Z>&& AMtikZimvliV P fl<* (Affidavit of Defendant Hideki
Tojo in International Military Tribunal for the Far East) Doc. No. 3000.

4 Statement by Maj. Gen. Kikusaburo Okada, Chief of War Plans Section, Economic Mobilization Bureau,
War Ministry.

5 The fall of France in mid-July posed the question of the fate of French colonies in the Far East, and it
also heightened the belief in high military circles that Germany would successfully overwhelm Britain. The result was
to strengthen the hands of those demanding a stronger policy in the South and closer ties with the Axis Powers.

6 Decision taken by a Liaison Conference of the Government and Imperial General Headquarters, 27 July
qo.Juyo Kokusaku Kettet Bumbo M (Pile on Important National Policy Decisions).

"Joint Defense Agreement" with the French
Vichy Government under which Japanese
troops were dispatched to northern French
Indo-China, for the purpose of blocking the
last remaining supply route to Chungking/
Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka explained
the limited motive of this act in a special plea
to the United States Ambassador in Tokyo,
but Washington countered with an added loan
of 25 million dollars to Chiang Kai-shek. 8

In the same month Japan sought relief from
the American oil embargo by dispatching a
special mission headed by Commerce Minister
Ichizo Kobayashi to Batavia to negotiate an
agreement with the Dutch East Indies, the
major oil-producing country in the Far East.
Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshizawa took over
Che negotiations from December 1940, but the
parleys finally ended in failure in June 1941."
As a corollary, French Indo-China later failed
to deliver to Japan rice and rubber in the
amounts fixed by an agreement reached in
May 1941.

Four days after the dispatch of troops into
northern Indo-China, Japan implemented an-
other decision of the July Liaison Conference
by concluding the controversial Tripartite Mili-
tary Alliance with Germany and Italy on 27
September 1940. The professed object of the
alliance was to deter the United States from
going to war in either the Atlantic or Pacific,'
but whatever Japan's real motives, the pact
merely increased British and American sus-
picion of Japanese intentions and brought on

new counter-measures.

In October the United States issued a gene-
ral evacuation order to all Americans within the
" East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere ". Since
early in the year, the bulk of the United
States Fleet remained concentrated in Hawaiian
waters," and on 13 November Britain es-
tablished a new Far East Military Command
in Singapore. Malaya, Burma, and Hongkong
were placed under this command, and military
preparations were pushed in close liaison with
Australia and New Zealand,

Beginning early in 1941, Japanese fears were
heightened by a series of secret staff conferences
among high-level Army and Navy representa-
tives of the United States, Britain, China, and
the Netherlands. In particular, the Manila
conference in April, which was attended by
the Commanding General, Philippines Depart-
ment (Major General George Grunert), the
United States High Commissioner to the
Philippines (The Hon. Francis B. Sayre), the
British Commander-in-Chief for the Far East
(Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham), the
Commander of the United States Asiatic Fleet
(Admiral Thomas C. Hart), and the Acting
Governor-General of the Netherlands East
Indies (The Hon. Hubertus van Mook), was
interpreted by Japan as a sign that the so-called
ABCD Powers were formulating concrete plans
of immediate military collaboration.

Japanese intervention in the border contro-
versy between Thailand and Indo-China in
February 1941' 2 was followed three months

7 Great Britain had closed the Burma Road to supplies for Chungking on 17 July 1940, but in October re-
opened it in support of American policy.

8 Japanese recognition of the Nanking Government on 30 November 1940 was answered by a further United
States loan to Chiang of 100 million dollars,

9 Affidavit of Tojo, op. cit.

10 Japan's diplomatic strategists also entertained the idea that Soviet Russia might be induced to join the
Alliance, thereby creating a favorable preponderance of power vis-a-vis the United States and Great Britain.

11 The main body of the United States Fleet moved from San Diego to Hawaii in January 1940. On 7
May the U. S. Navy announced that it would remain at Pearl Harbor indefinitely.

12 The United States considered the "mediation " move a Japanese design to extract new concessions from
both disputing parties.

later by new American and British loans of 50
million dollars and ten million pounds, res-
pectively, to the Chungking Government. The
United States further bolstered this financial
aid by extending the Lend-Lease Act to cover
arms shipments to China.

In April 1941 Japan realized one of its major
diplomatic objectives with the conclusion of
the Japanese-Soviet " Non-Aggression Pact."
However, the outbreak of the Soviet-German
war only two months later created an entirely
new situation, The Konoye Cabinet resigned
on 16 July, reassembling two days later under
the same Premier but with Matsuoka,
the architect of the Axis Pact, replaced as
Foreign Minister by Admiral Teijiro Toyoda."
The new cabinet was geared to rehabilitate
relations with the United States, a course
which conservative Navy elements had stoutly
advocated.' 1

The American Government refused to take
seriously the conciliatory trend of the new
government line-up since Japanese troops
shortly moved into southern French Indo-
China;"' and the United States retaliated on 26
July by freezing all Japanese assets. London
took similar action, also abrogating the British,
Indian, and Burmese commercial treaties with
Japan, and the Netherlands Government fol-

lowed suit.

Japan now found its trade cut off with all
areas except China, Manchuria, Indo-China,
and Thailand. Economic rupture was com-
plete with the United States, Britain, and the
Netherlands, who controlled the key materials
essential to Japan's national defense and in-
dustrial existence. The gradual decline of the
nation's power potential was inferentially in-
evitable.

The stoppage of fuel imports assumed para-
mount strategic importance. Even if Japan
were to suspend all industrial expansion and
further military preparations, and to undertake
an epochal increase in synthetic petroleum pro-
duction, it was estimated that approximately
seven years would be required before output
would reach the annual consumption level of
34,600,000 barrels.' 6 Meanwhile, essential in-
dustries dependent upon liquid fuels would be
paralyzed within a year. In two years the Japa-
nese Navy would be immobilized.

An international impasse was fast approach-
ing, but Japan's leaders in August 1941 hesi-
tated to take the final plunge.

In a war against the material power of Bri-
tain and the United States, Japan's inherent
economic weakness seemed to make the risk
too great. Premier Konoye, who had long

13 "I recommended Admiral Toyoda for the foreign portfolio because of my ardent desire to further the
Japanese -American negotiations. Admiral Toyoda had served as Navy Vice-Minister, and not only was he versed in
Navy affairs. . . .but he was one of those who supported the view that an American-Japanese conflict should be avoided
by every means possible." Konoye Ayamaro Ko Shuki jffiftfSclF&^-Tifl (Memoirs of Prince Ayatnaro Konoye) p. 30.

14 In a conversation with Premier Konoye shortly after the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance in September
1940, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, stated with regard to a Japanese-
American war : " If 1 am told to fight regardless of the consequences, I shall run wild for the first six months
or a year, but I have utterly no confidence for the second or third year. The Tripartite Pact has been concluded,
and we cannot help it. Now that the situation has come to this pass, I hope you will endeavor to avoid a Japanese-
American war." Ibid,, p. 3,

15 This move was under a "Joint Defense Agreement " concluded 21 July between Japan and the Vichy Gov-
ernment. The agreement was announced in Tokyo on 26 July simultaneously with the United States freezing order.
Japanese troops advanced into Saigon 28 July.

16 Notes of Maj. Gen. Kikusaburo Okada, Chief of War Plans Section, Economic Mobilization Bureau,
War Minis try.

subscribed to this view," decided to make
a new effort to break the deadlock in the Japa-
nese-American negotiations. 8 His Memoirs
record :

During this period I racked my brains in search of
some way to overcome the crisis between Japan and
America. Finally I made the firm resolution to attempt
a personal meeting with the President. I revealed my
intention to the War and Navy Ministers for the first
time on the evening of 4 August

The War and Navy Ministers listened tensely to
my resolution. They could not reply at that meeting,
hut later the same day the Navy expressed complete
approval and voiced hope for the success of the proposed
meeting. The War Minister replied by written memo-
randum which stated:

" The Army raises no objections, provided

however that the Premier firmly adheres to the
fundamental principles of the Empire's revised proposal
[to the United States'] and provided that if after
every effort has been made, the President still fails to
understand the Empire's real intentions, and proceeds
along the present line of American policy, Japan will
firmly resolve to face war with the United States."' 9

The Konoye proposal was laid before Presi-
dent Roosevelt on 17 August and met with an
initially favorable response. However, the
State Department's insistence that the meeting
be held only after a prior agreement on basic
principles resulted in a stalemate." The sands

of diplomacy were running out

War Deliberations

Amidst this atmosphere of high tension, the
Emperor on 6 September summoned the Cabi-
net and representatives of the Army and Navy
High Command to a conference at which, for
the first time, the question of peace or war was
squarely posed. Deliberation centered upon an
" Outline Plan for the Execution of Empire
Policies " (Tetkoku Kokusaku Suiko Yoryo),
which provided :

j. In order to guarantee the existence and defense
of the Empire, preparations for an eventual
war against the United States, Great Britain
and the Netherlands shall be completed approx-
imately by the latter part of October.

2. Concurrently with the above, the Empire will
exert every effort to secure realization of its
demands through diplomatic negotiations with
the United States and Great Britain. [The
minimum terms which Japan would accept m
an agreement with the United States were set
forth separately.'}

3. In the event that these negotiations fail to a-
chieve the Empire's demands by the early part
of October, it shall immediately be resolved to
go to war with the United States, Great Britain,
and the Netherlands.* 1

for both Army and Navy High

iy "Japan's dependence for materials, particularly war materials, ort the United States and Great Britain was
her one great weakness. The impossibility of overcoming this was repeatedly confirmed by researches of the Planning
Board since the time of the first Konoye Cabinet, The conclusion reported was always : ' Impossible '." Konoye
Memoirs, op. cit., p. 4.

18 These negotiations were initiated in April 1941, shortly after the arrival of Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura,
newly-appointed Japanese Ambassador, in Washington. The talks virtually came to a standstill following Japan's
move into southern Indo-China and the American freezing order.

19 Konoye Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 32, 34-5.

20 At the 17 August interview between the President and the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, the
President went so far as to mention Juneau, Alaska, and mid-October as the possible time and place for the proposed
meeting. However, the formal reply handed to Admiral Nomura on 3 September " evaded a clear-cut expression of
his (the President's) stand regarding the meeting and stated that Japanese agreement on fundamental principles was a
pre-requisite. Here it became clear that the State Department's views had prevailed," Ibid., pp. 36, 38-9.

21 File on Important National Policy Decisions, op. etc,

Original Painting by Ryohei Koiso

PLATE NO. 7
Japanese Column on the March

Commands, Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief of
the Navy General Staff, backed up the plan
with a warning that Japan's power to fight was
steadily declining due to exhaustion of essential
war materials and the increased military prepa-
rations of the ABCD Powers. Instead of
" letting time slip idly by," he declared, the
nation must first push its own war preparations
and, if diplomacy fails, " advance bravely into
offensive war operations." The statement was
especially significant because it reflected the
views of the Navy, the role of which would be
of paramount importance in war with the Unit-
ed States. Essential extracts follow r

The High Command sincerely hopes that the Gov-
ernment will exhaust every possible means of settling
the present situation diplomatically. However, if Japan
should be obliged to resort to war, the High Command,
from the standpoint of military operation*, ts of the
opinion that the gradual exhaustion of most of the
country's essential materials such as petroleum, is lower-
ing the national defense power, and that, if this conti-
nue^ Japan in the end will fall irrevocably into a
condition of impotency.

Meanwhile the United States, Britain, and other
Powers are swiftly reinforcing then military establish-
ments and strategic defenses in the Far East, and war
preparations in these countries, especially in the United
States, are likewise being greatly accelerated. Conse-
quently, by the latter half of next year, the United
States will be far ahead in its preparations, and Japan
will be placed in an extremely difficult position.

Under such conditions, it is highly dangerous for
Japan to let time slip idly by without attempting to do
anything. I think that Japan should, first of all, carry
out preparations as best it can : and then, if our
minimum demands essential to self-defense and national
existence are not accepted in the diplomatic negotiations
and war finally becomes inevitable, we should not lose
our opportunity but should advance bravely into offen-
sive war operations with firm resolution, thus seeking
the salvation of our country.

22 Juyo Shorui Tsuzuri ifc H^fSS*''' (File of
member. Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry,

In regard to the outlook for <uch operations, it can
be considered from the outset that the probability of
an extended war is extremely great. Japan, therefore,
must have the determination and the preparations to
conduct an extended war. It would be fust what we
are hoping for if the United States, seeking a quick
decision, challenged us with its main naval strength.

Considering the present position in the European
war, Great Britain can dispatch to the Far East only
a very limited portion of its naval strength. Hence,
if we could intercept the combined British and American
fleets in our own chosen area of decisive battle, we are
confident of victory. However, even victory in such a
battle would not mean the conclusion of the war. In
all probability, the United States will shift its strategy
to a long war of attrition, relying upon its invincible
portion and dominant material and industrial strength.

Japan does not possess the means, by offensive opera-
tions, to overcome its enemies and force them to aban-
don the war. Hence, undesirable as an extended
war would be due to our lack of resources, we must
be prepared for this contingency. The first requisite is
immediate occupation of the enemy's strategic points
and of sources of raw materials at the beginning of
the war, thus enabling us to secure the necessary re-
sources from our own area of control and to prepare
a strong front from an operational viewpoint. If this
initial operation succeed*, Japan will be able to estab-
lish a firm basis for fighting an extended war even
though American military preparations progress accord-
ing to schedule. For Japan, through the occupation
of strategic points in the Southwest Pacific, will be
able to maintain an invincible front. Thereafter, much
will depend upon the development of our total national
strength and the trend of the world situation.

Thus, the outcome of the initial operations will
largely determine whether Japan will succeed or fail
in an extended war, and to assure the success of the
initial operations, the requisites are :

i. Immediate decision on whether to go to war,
considering prevailing circumstances in re-
gard to relative Japanese and enemy fighting
strength ;

Documents I ireserved by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae,

2. Assumption of the 'nitiative ;

j. Consideration of meterological conditions in
the zone of operations to facilitate tnese opera-
tions.

It is necessary to repeat that the utmost effort must
be made to solve the present crisis and assure Japan's
security and development by peaceful means. There
is absolutely no reason to wage a war which can be
avoided. But to spend our time idly in a temporizing
moment of peace, at the price of later being obliged
to engage in war under unfavorable circumstances, is
definitely not the course to take in view of the Empire's
program for lasting prosperity.

Although the conference finally adopted the
"Outline Plan," Baron Yoshimichi Hara, Pre-
sident of the Privy Council, pressed for further
clarification by the High Command of the ap-
parent subordination of diplomacy to prepara-
tions for war, 2 ' The Emperor himself, in a rare
departure from constitutional precedent, inter-
vened to second the demand, voicing regret that
the Army and Navy had not made their attitude
fully clear.

With this, His Majesty took from his pocket a sheet

of paper on which was written a verse composed by the
Emperor Meiji :

" When all the earth's oceans are one,

Why do the waves seethe and the winds rage ? "

Reading this aloud, His Mjjesty said, " 1 have
always endeavored to spread the peace-loving spirit of
the latt Emperor by reciting this poem."

Silence swept the chamber, and none uttered a
word N

After this dramatic moment Admiral Nagano
again rose to express " trepidation at the Empe-
ror's censure of the High Command p and to
assure His Majesty that "the High Command
places major importance upon diplomatic nego-
tiations and will appeal to arms only in the last
resort.""

Nevertheless, failing diplomatic success
within a fixed time limit, Japan now stood
committed to war.

In actuality, Japanese military preparations
for the " Great East Asia War " far antedated
the outbreak of hostilities. Even long before
the decision to fight was taken on the highest
policy-making level, the Army and Navy had
independently begun gathering intelligence,
making clandestine aerial surveys, compiling
maps, experimenting with new-type weapons

23 Hitherto the armed services had. at east outwardly, accepted diplomacy as the primary means of achieving
Japan's objectives. In April 1941 Imperial General Headquarters had decided its Basic Policies for the South
as follows !

1. The aims of the Empire's immediate policy in the South are to hasten the settlement of the China Incident
and to increase the total national defense power. This requires;

(a) Establishment of close and inseparable military, political and economic co-operation with French Indo-
China and Thailand ;

(b) Establishment of close economic relations with the Netherlands East Indies;

2. Basically, diplomatic measures will be taken to atrain the above objectives.

3. In carrying out the above policies, military force will be used for our country's self-defense and existence
only if no other solution can be effected when the following situations develop:

(a) If the Empire's existence is threatened by an American, British, or Dutch embargo;

(b) If American, British, Dutch, and Chinese encirclement of Japan becomes so serious as to overly
endanger national defense. Juyo Kokusaku Kettei no Keit Gatsetsu WMWi^ti^^^Hf^l^M (Summary
of Circumstances Leading to Decisions on Important National Policies) Foreign Ministry and 1st and 2d
Demobilization Bureaus, Jun 46.

24 Konoye Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 43-4.

25 ibid., p. 44.

and conducting special types of training which
were specifically applicable to an eventual war
against the United States, Great Britain, and
the Netherlands.

As early as July 1940, Japanese Army intel-
ligence possessed detailed information regard-
ing order of battle and troop dispositions in
Australia.** Between 27 November and 15
December 1940, a year before Pearl Harbor,
Japanese aircraft successfully carried out pho-
tographic reconnaissance of parts of northern
Luzon, including the Lingayen Gulf, Vigan,
and Aparri coastal areas 27 where the Philippine
invasion forces were to land following the out-
break of war.

Intelligence data regarding troop and air
strength, ground force dispositions, airfields,
harbors and fortifications were also assembled
well in advance of hostilities for Java, Sumatra,
Singapore, New Guinea, and the Philippines. 38
To assure trie success of the Pearl Harbor
attack, special intelligence arrangements were
set up to obtain accurate, up-to-date reports on
the number and location of American naval
units in the harbor. 19

Midget submarines, the precursors of Japan's
tokko (special attack) weapons, 10 had been secret-
ly developed by the Navy as early as 1934, but

as war with the United States grew imminent
during the summer of 1941, experiments were
rushed to completion at the Kure Naval Station
in attaching these small craft to long-range
mother submarines capable of carrying them to
a distant zone of operations and then releasing
them for attack upon designated targets. Five
of these suicide craft were used for the first
time in the attack on Pearl Harbor. 3 '

During the late summer and fall of 1941
Japanese units destined to take part in the
invasions of the Philippines, the Dutch East
Indies and Malaya were put through intensive
training in amphibious operations and jungle
warfare along the South China coast and in
special training areas near Canton, on Hainan
Island, and in Indo-China. Morale pamphlets,
special military manuals, and training guides
all based on the assumption of war against
Britain and the United States were prepared
for advance distribution.* 1

Following the 6 September Imperial confe-
rence, the tempo of Japan's war preparations
sharply mounted. Steps were taken to mobilize
and fit out about r ,500,000 tons of shipping for
Army and Navy use. At the same time the
assembly of the troops and supplies required
for operations against the United States, Britain

26 See Plate No. 5.

27 See Plate No. 2 and discussion in Chapter II.

28 Cf. Chapter II on Pre-War Japanese Intelligence.

29 From 15 November 1941 bi-weekly code reports were received in Tokyo from the Japanese Consulate
General in Honolulu. Statement by Rear Adm. Kanji Ogawa, Vice-Chief, Third Bureau (Intelligence), Imperial
General Headquarters, Navy Section.

30 Japanese suicide weapons and tactics are dealt with more fully in Chapter XVII,

31 Cf. Chapter V, section on Pearl Harbor Operation.

32 A morale pamphlet entitled Kore Sat Yomeba Kateru C*t3 ^WWMBX 3 (Read This And War is Won)
was distributed to divisional commands in November 1941. Brief extracts follows: "The present war is a war with
Japan's rise or fall at stake. . . . What is at the bottom of America's action in gradually prohibiting the export of

oil and iron to Japan, as if to strangle her slowly by silk-wool? Japan has waited too long. If we are patient

any longer, our aircraft, warships and motor cars will not move. . . . For the existence of Japan herself and her
obligation under the Tripartite Alliance, not a minute longer must be endured. Japan is confronted with a great
mission, as representative of the Oriental race, to bravely deliver the finishing blow against Occidental aggression of
several hundred years." ATIS Research Report No. 131, Japan's Decision to Fight, 1 Dec 45, pp. 13-5.

and the Netherlands, and their concentration
in preliminary staging areas in Japan Proper,
Formosa, and South China were begun. Actual
organization of the various southern invasion
forces and the deployment of operational
strength in the areas where hostilities were to
begin, were to be carried out only after the
final decision to go to war had been taken.
According to the 6 September plan, this
decision had to be made by mid-October."

Only four days after the Imperial conference
of 6 September had debated the issue of war or
peace, the top-ranking staff officers and fleet
commanders of the Navy assembled at the
Naval War College in Tokyo to take part in
the annual " war games." The problem set
for the games was an invasion of the Southern
area, but a restricted group of the highest of-
ficers of the Combined Fleet simultaneously
studied behind barred doors technical problems
involved in a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. *

On 10 November, the general terms of Army-
Navy co-operation in the Southern operations

were agreed upon in Tokyo, and between 14
and 16 November detailed operational plans
were elaborated by the Fleet and Army com-
manders directly concerned in a conference held
at the headquarters of the Iwakuni Naval Air
Group, on the Inland Sea near Hiroshima."

Meanwhile, the parallel diplomatic efforts to
revive the Washington negotiations made no
headway. Foreign Minister Toyoda in Sep-
tember pressed for reconsideration by Wash-
ington of the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye con-
ference, and the American Ambassador in
Tokyo, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, strongly counsel-
led this course in dispatches to the State Depart-
ment.' 6 On 2 October, however, Secretary
of State Cordell Hull, in a memorandum
handed to Ambassador Nomura in Washing-
ton, reiterated that general withdrawal of Japa-
nese troops from both China and Indo-China
remained a prerequisite for any Japanese-
American agreement.' 7

The Konoye Cabinet, unable to agree on the
course that Japan should take in view of these

33 Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section estimated that 15 October must be the deadline for the
decision if war preparations were to be completed by the end of that month. Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattori,
Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

34 The war games Lasted from 10 to 13 September.

35 Details of Army-Navy Central Agreement and operational agreements concluded at the Iwakuni conference
are given in Chapter V.

36 As paraphrased by the State Department, a dispatch sent by Ambassador Grew on 29 September 1941
stated : " The Ambassador, while admitting that risks will inevitably be involved no matter what course is pursued
toward Japan, offers his carefully studied belief that there would be substantial hope at the very least of preventing
the Far Eastern situation from becoming worse and perhaps of ensuring definitely constructive results, if an agreement
along the lines of the preliminary discussions were brought to a head by the proposed meeting of the heads of the
two Governments. ... He raises the question whether the United States is not now given the opportunity to halt
Japan's program without war, or an immediate risk of war, and further whether, through failure to use the present
opportunity, the United States will not face a greatly increased risk of war. . . , Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan,
Simon SC Schuster (New York, 1944) pp. 193-4.

37 The American memorandum demanded :

1. That Japan unconditionally accept the following four basic principles:

(a) Full respect of the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of other nations;

(b) Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations ;

(d) Maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific, except where it might be modified by peaceful means.

2. General withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indo-China.

3. Abandonment of exclusive economic arrangements between Japan and China. Summary of Circumstances
Leading to Decisions on Important National Policies, op. cic

conditions, resigned on 1 6 October, and two days
later War Minister General Hideki Tojo form-
ed a new government. Despite the mid-October
deadline, Premier Tojo pledged continued
efforts for a diplomatic settlement.' 8 Then,
on 5 November, a newly summoned Imperial
conference revamped the 6 September " Out-
line Plan for the Execution of Empire Policies."
Japan's resolution to accept war was reaffirmed;
preparations therefor were to be completed by
the end of November ; however diplomatic
negotiations were to be continued in the hope
of effecting a compromise."

Explaining the purport of the revised plan
before the conference, Premier Tojo declared
that eight Liaison conferences of the Govern-
ment and Imperial General Headquarters,
held between 23 October and 2 November,
had reached the conclusion that war with the
United States, Great Britain, and the Nether-
lands " was now unavoidable," and had unani-
mously decided to concentrate effort on war
preparations, although still seeking to break
the deadlock by diplomatic means.* 1

With the deadline for war now set at the
end of November, speed was of the essence.
The same day that the Imperial conference
took place, the Navy Section, Imperial General
Headquarters and Admiral Yamamoto, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, issued
orders for the fleet to prepare for the outbreak
of war.'" The following day, 6 November, the
Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters
fixed the order of battle of the Southern Army
and directed its commanding general to move
his forces to the assembly areas and points of
departure for the invasion of the "southern
strategic areas." 11

On the diplomatic front the urgency was no
less great. On 6 November Ambassador
Extraordinary Saburo Kurusu left by air for
Washington to make the final effort for a
peaceful solution.'" Without waiting for his
arrival, Japan on 7 November transmitted its
Proposal " A " through Ambassador Nomura,
and when this was rejected, Proposal " B " for
a temporary modus vivendi freezing war moves
in the Pacific was presented by Ambassador

38 "I personally know that on the morning of 18 October, after agreeing to take the portfolio of Navy Mini-
«er. Admiral Shimada went to see the new Premier, General Tojo, for the purpose of stipulating a condition for his
entry into the Cabinet. This condition was that diplomatic negotiations with the United States must be continued
with the avowed objective of reaching a peaceful settlement of the matters in dispute. Admiral Shimada told me
and several others at the Navy Ministry that Tojo had expressed complete agreement. . . Kyokuto Kakusai Gunji
Saiban ni okeru Shonin Sawamoto Yono no Seiuei Kokyosbo ffi&m^tt^MlC^tt 3f£Ai?4vffli&« Atf \£M
(Affidavit of Witness Yorio Sawamoto, International Military Tribunal for the Far East), Doc. No. 2889.

39 The Imperial conference decided :

"1. In order to bring about a more favorable situation and ensure its defense and national existence, the
Empire, with the determination to accept war with the United States and Great Britain, will complete its war prepara-
tions by the end of November. At the same time, it will endeavor to effect a compromise through diplomatic
negotiations based on Proposals ' A ' and ' B dealt with separately.

" 2. In the event that these negotiations fail, decision will be made immediately to go to war against the United
States and Great Britain." Affidavit of Tojo, op. cit.

40 File of Important Documents, op. cit.

41 (1) Daikairei Dai Ichi-go -fd& & Wi~ Sfi (Imperial General Headqurters Navy Order No. t) 5 Nov 41. (2)
ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 39 (Part VIII), 4 Jun 45.

42 Daihonyei Rikugun Tosui Kiroku ^^S?r"4 JpffiSllsfiU (Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command
Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Nov 46, pp. 22-4.

43 Ambassador Kurusu, notified only two days previously of his mission, flew to Hongkong where, by
arrangement with the United States State Department, departure of a trans-Pacific Clipper was delayed to accommo-
date him. This haste reflected the new war deadline.

Kurusu on 20 November, three days after his
arrival in Washington, 44

It was at this crucial juncture that the Hull
note of 26 November was delivered. Describing
the reaction to the note in a statement made
after the war, Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, at
that time Navy Minister, said :

7( was a stunning blow. It was my prayer that the
United State* would view whatever concessions we had
made as a sincere effort to avoid war and would
attempt to meet us half-way, thereby saving the whole
situation. But here was a harsh reply from the United
States Government, unyielding and unbending. It
contained no recognition of the endeavors we had made
toward concessions in the negotiations. There were
no members of the Cabinet nor responsible officials of
the General Staff who advocated acceptance of the Hull
note. The view taken was that it was impossible to
do so and that this communication was an ultimatum
threatening the existence of our country. The general
opinion was that acceptance of this note would be
tantamount to the surrender of Japan. ^

On 21 November, Imperial General Head-
quarters had ordered the Combined Fleet to
move at the appropriate time to positions of
readiness for the start of operations. 46 The
various naval task forces, though subject to
recall in the event of a Japanese-American
agreement, left for their designated theaters of
operation toward the end of November.

On 29 November a Liaison conference of the
Government and Imperial General Headquar-
ters concluded that war must be launched.
Instructions were sent to Japan's ambassadors
in Germany and Italy to secure commitments

whereby :

1. Germany and Italy would immediately declare
war against the United States upon the outbreak
of Japanese- American hostilities;

2. None of the three Powers would enter into a
separate peace with the United States and Great
Britain ; and

3. The three Powers would not make peace with
Great Britain alone. 1 '' 7

On 1 December an Imperial conference met
to ratify finally the decision to fight. It was a
moment of grave solemnity when, in the pre-
sence of the Emperor, Premier Tojo rose to
announce :

In accordance with the decision reached at the
Imperial conference of 5 November, the Army and
Navy have made full preparations for war, while the
Government has continued to exert all possible effort
to adjust diplomatic relations with the United States.
However, the United States has not receded from its
original demands. In addition, the United States,
Great Britain, the Netherlands and China, in collusion,
have demanded a one-sided compromise, adding new
conditions such as unconditional withdrawal of our
troops from China, repudiation of the Nanking
Government and abrogation of the Tripartite Treaty
with Germany and Italy.

If our country should yield, its prestige would be
lost, and the China Incident could not be settled.
More than this, the very existence of Japan would be
imperilled. It is now clear that our country's claims
cannot be realized through diplomatic negotiations.

Economic and military pressure by the United States,
Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China is increasing.
From the standpoint both of national strength and of
military operations, the point has finally been reached

44 Proposal "A" offered: i. Gradual withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, with the exception of
garrisons in North China and Inner Mongolia, within two years after the conclusion of peace with China ; 2.
Withdrawal of troops from French Indo-China as soon as the China war ended. Proposal " B ", in addition to
calling a halt to fresh war moves in the Pacific, envisaged a limited restoration of commercial relations, including
resumption of American oil shipments to Japan.

45 Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban ni okeru Hikokumn Shimada Shigetaro no Senset Kokyosbo ■fSjftlSK-^^ii$ ; t](CSi'
rt &fe£-& KMm$S±8i<D$LWn&& (Affidavit of Defendant Shigetaro Shimada, International Military Tribunal for

the Far East) Doc. No. 328.

46 Daikairei Dai Go-go ^Cift^^S^ (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 5) 21 Nov 41.

47 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit Doc. No. 1204.

at which the nation can no longer allow matters to go
on unchanged.

Under these conditions our country is obliged to
take up arms against the United States, Great Britain
and the Netherlands in order to solve the present
situation and to preserve its national existence. Already
the China Incident has continued for four years, and
today we are plunging into an even greater war. It
indeed fills us with trepidation that His Majesty has
been caused such grave anxiety.

However, the strength of our country is many times
greater than before the China Incident. Our internal
unity is stronger, and the morale of the officers and
men of the Army and Navy is higher. I am firmly
convinced that, with the entire nation unified in
determination to die for the country, we shall break
through this national crisis.* 8

The Imperial conference then formally
resolved "to open hostilities against the United
States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands as a
result of the failure of the Japanese-American
negotiations and in accordance with the Outline
Plan for the Execution of Empire Policies decid-
ed on 5 November."'"

On the basis of this decision, Imperial
General Headquarters on the same day ordered
the Commanding General of the Southern
Army to start invasion operations on 8 De-
cember, 5 " and on 2 December orders were issued

to the Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet
fixing the same date for the commencement of
attacks by the Navy. 5 '

On 6 December a Liaison conference of the
Government and Imperial General Headquar-
ters decided that Ambassador Nomura should
be instructed to deliver. Japan's final note ending
the Japanese-American negotiations at 1 : 00
p.m. 7 December, Washington time, 30 minutes
before the scheduled launching of the attack on
Pearl Harbor. 53

At 10 : 30 p.m. 7 December, with hostilities
only five hours away, the United States Em-
bassy in Tokyo received from the Washington
State Department a triple-priority code dispatch
instructing the Ambassador to transmit " at the
earliest possible moment " a personal message
from President Roosevelt to the Emperor urging
efforts " to restore traditional amity and prevent
further death and destruction in the world." 53
This dis patch, though stamped by the Japanese
Government Telegraph OSce as having been
received at 12 : 00 noon,^ was delivered with a
lo^-hour delay." After it had been decoded,
Ambassador Grew personally handed the mes-
sage to Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo at
12 : 30 a.m., 8 December, and the latter pre-
sented it to the Emperor in an extraordinary

48 File of Important Documents, op. cit.

49 File on Important National Policy Decisions, op. cit.

50 Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op, cit.

51 Daikatrei Dai Juni-go jz\%$t!$-\~— M. (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 12) 2 Dec 41.

52 Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban ni okeru Hikakunin Togo Shigenori no Sensei Kokyosho S^^j^¥^Sc!WJ ICJ&ft
b&%^£Wfc& < V'MM Qf&ff (Affidavit of Defendant Shigenori Togo, International Military Tribunal for the Far
East) Doc. No. 2927.

53 Affidavit of Joseph C. Grew, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Doc. No. 1224.

54 Ibid.

55 Testimony given before the International Military Tribunal for the Far East by Tatelci Shirao, official of the
Foreign Telegraph Section, Telecommunications Bureau, Ministry of Communications at che outbreak of war, indicated
that on 6 December Lt. Col. Morio Tamura, on duty with the Communications Section of the Army Genera! Staff,
ordered Shirao to "delay the delivery of all foreign telegrams by five and ten hours on alternate days for security
reasons ", and that such instructions were issued to the Central Telegraph Office. Asked under cross-examination
whether 7 December was a five or a ten-hour day, Shirao replied, "I believe that it may have been a ten-hour day."
Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban m okeru Shonin Shirao Tatek, no Sensei Kokyosho H^f^Ufc^] K&rt SIS KW&T ^
<&mM (Affidavit of Witness Tateki Shirao, International Military Tribunal for the Far East) Doc. No. 2597.

audience at 3 : 00 a.m. ,s

Even as the Emperor read the President's
plea to seek ways " of dispelling the dark
clouds ", the first wave of planes from the Japa-
nese task force north of Oahu was nearing the
target, and at precisely 3 : 25 a.m. the first
bombs rained on Pearl Harbor." 17 The ma-
chinery of war was irrevocably in motion.

In Tokyo, at 1 1 : 40 on that day, the solemn
notes of the national anthem warned anxious
radio listeners that an important announcement
was impending. Then the voice of Premier

Tojo, reading the Imperial Rescript declaring
war,* 1 leached a stunned and silent nation.
The broadcast ended with the strains of a
martial song, " Umi Yukaba," its words grimly
expressive of the fatalism with which the
nation went to war.

Across the sen,

Corpses in the water ;
Across the mountain,

Corpses heaped upon the field;
I shall die only for the Emperor,

I shall never look back.™

56 Between 0030 and 0240, when he proceeded to the Imperial Palace, Foreign Minister Togo had the Presi-
dent's message translated and made arrangements for the special audience through the Imperial Household Minister
and the Lord Privy Seal. He also took the translation to Premier Tojo at about 0200 before going to the Palace,
where the audience lasted from 0300 to 0315. Affidavit of Togo, op. cit.

57 Cf. Chapter V.

58 See Plate No. 1.

59 f&^^tfTkfR < Is Umi yukaba mizuku kabane

lil^ii^tf^^S"?"^ Yama yukaba kusamusu kabane

*dH«3*»C t£?E&3t> Ogimino henikoso shiname
1) Hi It C Kaerimiwa seji

CHAPTER IV
BASIC STRATEGY AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Strategy for a Long War

It was obvious to Japan's military strategists
that the Pacific War would be a long one. The
superior fighting potential of the United States
made it improbable that Japan could inflict a
crushing defeat on its adversary at the outset.
The tremendous distances involved rendered a
direct attack on the American mainland im-
practicable ; finally, Japan not only had the
United States to contend with, but Great
Britain and the Netherlands as well.

Equally obvious was the certainty that pos-
session of the natural resources for war would
become a decisive factor. Japan did not have
these raw materials within its own territory, and
foreign sources of supply were blocked. The
supply of liquid fuel, for example, was practical-
ly limited to the quantity on hand, and stock-
piles were barely adequate for two years of
armed conflict.

The first objective of Japan's strategy, there-
fore, was the conquest of the rich colonial areas
in the South, whose vital resources added to
those within the Japanese Empire, Manchuria,
and Occupied China would provide a firm
economic basis for waging an extended war.'

The fleet was assigned the vital task of block-
ing superior enemy naval power and supporting
ground-force invasion operations.

In view of the handicap resulting from the

pre-war ratio of 7.5 to 10 between the Japanese
and American fleets, it was considered that the
American fleet must be crippled by a surprise
blow at the outbreak of war, giving Japan
mastery of the sea long enough to attain its
strategic objectives in the Western and South-
west Pacific. With American air and sea power
temporarily crushed, and vital American and
British bases, as well as the Netherlands Indies,
in Japanese hands, it was estimated that Japan

two years, provided the fleet sustained no
serious losses.

Once the initial objectives were taken, Japan
would possess an outer defense perimeter ex-
tending from Burma through Sumatra, Java,
Timor, Western New Guinea, the Caroline and
Marshall Islands, and Wake. The vast sea
areas within this perimeter, except for the
Solomons — New Guinea — Philippines line,
were generally favorable to the establishment
of a strong strategic inner defense. (Plate No. 8)
Within this zone, the Japanese fleet, especially
its carrier forces, supplemented by land-based
air strength, would be able to operate at great
advantage, provided the United States and
Britain were unable to build up their air strength
sufficiently to swing the balance in their favor.

As regards land operations, it was estimated
that the Army, if successful in its initial ope-
rations, would be able to secure and maintain
its hold on the occupied areas. An anticipated

1 Ju\o Shorui Tsuzun tfirHfSJ$l$$ (File of Important Documents) Preserved by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, member,
Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry. All source materials cited in this chapter are located m G-2 Historical
Section Files, GHQ FEC.

British counterattack against Burma could be
successfully withstood by utilizing favorable
terrain features and furnishing reinforcements
when necessary. The southern areas, China,
Manchuria, and Japan Proper would be strongly
garrisoned, and as long as the destruction of
Japanese shipping could be held within reasona-
ble bounds, 2 profitable exploitation of the oc-
cupied territories was deemed possible. With
all the needed raw materials at its disposal,
Japan's economic and military capacity to carry
on the war could be guaranteed for about two
years.

Beyond that date, however, a number of
unpredictable factors made it impossible for
Imperial General Headquarters to plan with
certainty. The relative position in regard to
armaments, fleet strength, and air power three
years hence could not be accurately foretold.
What changes would Japan's material power
and morale undergo ? Every shift in the world
situation, especially in" the European War,
would have profound repercussions in the Paci-
fic. These great imponderables rolled up
like a stormy wave, making it impossible to see
ahead beyond the first two years of war.

Manpower and Materials

Aside from strategic problems, Japan's war
planners devoted special attention to three
principal elements which conditioned the na-
tion's over-all fighting strength. These were
manpower, raw materials, and transportation,
especially shipping.

Paradoxically, as far as manpower was con-
cerned, the very over-population which was one
of the pressure factors behind Japanese expan-
sionism now became a factor in Japan's favor.

Japan Proper, covering an area of only 381,000
square miles, supported in 1940 a population
of 73,114,000.* The population, for the past
ten years, had been increasing at the rate of
800,000 to one million annually. With this
reserve of manpower, immediate mobilization
demands could be met easily, and the needs
of industry could be filled throughout an ex-
tended war.

War-weariness had increased appreciably
during the later years of the China Incident.
But confronted by the new and graver challenge
of a life-or-death struggle against the United
States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, the
Japanese people could be expected to rise to
the test. Japan's leaders entertained no doubt
that traditional loyalty and obedience would
keep the people's morale from breaking even
under the strain of a long war.

As for raw materials, Japan expected to be
practically self-sufficient in coal, iron, and indus-
trial salts within the Japanese-Manchurian-
Chinese bloc, if adequate marine transportation
could be assured. Kyushu, Hokkaido, Sakha-
lin, and North China were the main sources of
coal for general use. Coal for steel production
came chiefly from Sakhalin, Manchuria, and
North China. North and Central China
could be counted on for iron ore, while indus-
trial salts were available in Korea, Manchuria,
North China, and Formosa.

The annual production of steel was approxi-
mately 5,000,000 tons. The overall steel plan
for 1941 was as follows :

Production goal : 4,760,000 tons

Navy Allotment : 950,000 tons

Army Allotment : 900,000 tons

Ordinary consumption : 2,910,000 tons
These estimates were revised in November

2 Cf. section on Shipping.

3 Jinko Tokei Soran kujfffltf&L (General Compilation of Statistics on Population) Population Branch,
Welfare Ministry Research Institute. Sep 43, pp. 2-3.

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JAPAN'S BASIC STRATEGY]
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DECEMBER 194

IONOLULU

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First phase offensive

Outer defense perimeter of
conclusion of first phase operations

Boundary between Army and
Navy defense areos

Major Allied bases

ISO*

PLATE NO. 8
Japan's Basic Strategy, December 1941

1 941 to conform to a decrease in production
and an expected increase in Navy requirements
in the event of war. The new figures were :
Production goal: 4,500,000 tons

Navy Allotment : 1,100,000 tons

Army Allotment : 790,000 tons

Ordinary consumption: 2,610,000 tons
Of the 2,610,000 tons allotted for ordinary
consumption, it was planned to allocate 300,
000 tons to the shipbuilding industry on a
priority basis, in order to achieve a ship con-
struction goal of 600,000 tons annually.' 1 It was
estimated that, if the Southern campaign suc-
ceeded, it would be possible to carry on a long
war with a steel program of these proportions.

The shortage of liquid fuel was Japan's
Achilles heel. The combined output of natural
and synthetic oil did not exceed 3,459,000
barrels annually. War needs must be drawn
mainly from reserves, at least until the oil-
producing territories in the south could be
occupied, developed, and fully exploited.

Allowing for the possibility that the oil wells
in the southern area might be totally destroyed
before they tell into Japanese hands, the Gov-
ernment and Imperial General Headquarters
developed a supply plan which would barely
meet estimated war requirements
Supply : (in thousand barrels)

Stock pile : 52,836

Domestic production :

1 st year

2nd year

3rd year

Crude oil

i>573

1,258

1,887

Synthetic oil

1,887

2,516

Total

3,460

3,774

5.032

Production

in the southern areas

1 st year

and year

3rd year

Borneo

1,887

6,290

15,725

Sumatra

6,290

12,580

Total

1,887

12,580

28,305

Demand:

1st year

2nd year

3rd year

ivimcary

23,902

22,644

21 ,072

Non-military

8,806

0,000

Total

32,708

31,450

29,878

Balance: (exclusive of

minimum

reserve 1

9,435,000 bis)

1st year

2nd

year 3rd year

16,040

944

4,403

Included in

Japan's

liquid fuel

reserves 1

of 1 December 1941 were 6,919,000 barrels of
aviation gasoline. The production program
called for 503,200 barrels during the first year,
2,075,700 barrels during the second year, and
3,396,600 during the third year of the war.
Wartime requirements were computed at 4,500,
000 to five million per year, and plans were
drawn up on the basis of these figures. The
margin of safety was so slight, however, that
considerable difficulty was anticipated in the
second and third years. 6

To meet Japan's domestic requirements for
staple food, 397 million bushels of rice must be
available annually. The rice supply plan for
1942 called for domestic production of 298
million bushels, the balance of 99 million
bushels to be made up by imports from Korea,
Formosa, Thailand, and French Indo-China.
Transports returning empty from the zone of
operations would be utilized to make up any
shortage of non-military shipping. If, due to
military operations, imports from Thailand
and French Indo-China fell short of the
estimated 50 million bushels counted upon
from the two countries combined, soy beans,

4 Memorandum Report submitted by Lt. Gen. (ret.) Teiichi Suzuki, President of the Planning Board, at the
Imperial conference of 5 Nov 41. Preserved in the Notes of Maj. Gen. Kikusaburo Okada, Chief of War Plans
Section, Economic Mobilization Bureau, War Ministry.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

sweet potatoes and miscellaneous grains grown
in the Homeland, Korea, Formosa and Man-
churia would be used to make up the deficit. 7
Although shortages of a few special materials
like cobalt and high quality asbestos were
anticipated, control of the southern supply
areas and the speedy development of occupied
China 8 were expected to produce a steady sup-
ply of important materials such as bauxite, raw
rubber, raw materials for special steels, metals,
non-ferrous metals, leather, cotton, hemp, and
oil. This plan, however, depended entirely
upon the maintenance of adequate marine trans-
portation, and Imperial General Headquarters
realized fully that this factor would prove a
decisive one in the Pacific War.

Shipping

In November 1941, Japan's total shipping
amounted to 6,720,000 gross tons, including
motor sailboats over 100 tons. Of these, ser-
viceable ships aggregated 5,980,000 gross tons,
including 360,000 gross tons of oil tankers.'

It was estimated that the level of imports
required by the " Materials Mobilization Plan
of 1941" could be maintained during hostilities,
provided a minimum of three million gross tons
ofsh ipping was reserved at all times for non-

military use. With this tonnage, approximately
five million tons of materials could be transport-
ed monthly, even if wartime shipping efficiency
dropped by 15 to 20 per cent. Actually, the
monthly average of tonnage transported during
the first half of 1941 corresponded to this
estimate, but since military requirements con-
tinued to tie down 2,800,000 tons of shipping
long after the Southern operations had entered
a relatively inactive phase, the reservation of
three million tons of ships for non-military use
became a difficult problem.

In view of the vital importance of shipping,
Imperial General Headquarters had given care-
ful consideration to probable war losses and
replacement construction plans. The Navy
estimated that losses would aggregate 800,000
gross tons during the first year, 600,000 the
second year, and 700,000 the third year.
Imperial General Headquarters, however,
estimated that losses during the first year of
the war would amount to between 800,000
and one million tons,'" and that subsequently
losses would decline." On this basis, decision
was made to build 1,800,000 gross tons of
new ships over a three-year period, an average
of 600,000 tons annually."

Japan's private shipbuilding capacity at the
start of war was approximately 700,000 gross

7 Ibid.

8 Extract from report of Chief of Staff of Izeki Force, North China, 25 August 1941 : "Due to the
present international situation and the increase in national military preparations, the importance of exploiting
and utilizing the resources of this area must be considered. The accumulation of these military supplies will be
subdivided into procurement by military authorities and purchases by civilian agencies. The items to be acquired
by civilians are copper ore, copper wire scrap, copper scrap, brass scrap, cases, melted cases, tin, coin, pewter,
and antimony ore.

" Scrap iron in North China will be acquired by the Nippon Iron Industries Company. Other resources to be
acquired are nickel, cobalt, tungsten ore, molybdenum ore, copper, lead, zinc, quicksilver, high grade asbestos, high
grade mica, nonferrous metals, steel, and other minerals.

" An investigation squad organized by the army has reported the probable presence of iron, sulphur, fluorspar
and zinc in the vicinity of Yancheng and of iron m Suehchuanling." ATIS Bulletin No. 1555, 5 Nov 44.

9 Notes of Maj. Gen. Okada, op. cit.

10 Ibid.

1 1 Statement by Maj. Gen. Okada, previously cited.
t2 Notes of Maj. Gen. Okada, op. cit.

tons, limited by an engine building capacity
sufficient to power only 600,000 tons. In order
to achieve the required goal of 600,000 tons of
new ships annually, the Government planned
to allot a yearly ration of 300,000 tons of steel,
plus copper and other essential metals, to the
shipbuilding industry, to lower shipbuilding
standards, to institute thoroughgoing Navy
control of all stages of construction from raw
materials to finished ships, and to take steps
to assure an adequate labor supply,''

To maintain the level of shipping needed
for nonmditary use, the Army had to restrict
the number of requisitioned ships to a mini-
mum, regardless of the effect on military plans
and operations. Imperial General Headquarters
fixed the limits of requisitioned tonnage for
Army and Navy use as follows EM

Army : (Gr OSS tons)

1st to 4th month : . . . . 2,100,000

Fifth month : 1,700,000

Sixth month : 1,650,000

Seventh month: 1,500,000

Eighth month: 1,000,000

Navy:

Monthly: 1,800,000

(Including 270,000 tons of tankers)
In other words, the Army's needs in requi-

sitioned ships would be at their peak during
the first four months of the Southern operations
and thereafter were expected to decrease gradu-
ally until a constant level of one million tons
was reached. After September 1942, it was
estimated that a total of 2,800,000 gross tons
would satisfy the combined requirements of
both Army and Navy." Shipping requirements
were figured so closely that any upward revision
in Army demands might upset the balance of
the war program. It was therefore agreed that
neither service could boost its shipping allot-
ment without reference to the Liaison confer-
ence of the Government and Imperial General
Headquarters.

Areas To Be Occupied

The primary decision which Imperial Gene-
ral Headquarters was called upon to make in
the development of Japan's war plans was the
delimitation of the areas to be occupied by the
military forces. Economic and strategic con-
siderations were uppermost in shaping this
decision.' 6

First, from the standpoint of military stra-
tegic necessity, the United States must be
expelled from the Philippines' 7 and its island

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Statement by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy
:tion, and Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

16 Data regarding Imperial General Headquarters decision on areas to be occupied furnished by Rear
Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, and Col.
Hattori, previously cited.

17 Post-war interrogations of former Japanese military and naval leaders conclusively establish the vital
strategic importance of the Philippines in Japan's 1941 war planning.

{1) The Japanese Navy, which already had plans for Pearl Harbor, felt that it was necessary to attack the
Philippines at the same time to insure the success of our operations. The Navy felt that war with the United States
was inevitable, and that to by-pass the Philippines would seriously hamper naval operations. The Philippines were a
distinct threat as a base on the Navy's flank." Interrogation of General Hideki Tojo, Premier and War Minister
1941-4.

(2) The Philippines were included within the scope of operations in the southern area because of their strategic
importance and not for any political or economic reason. During the first half of 1941 when the Southern operations
were being studied, the Army and Navy did not at first agree on the inclusion of (he Philippines in the invasion plans.
As a result of joint research conducted by the Operations Sections of the Army and Navy, the Army agreed to invade
the Philippines at the beginning of the war. (Statement by Col. Hattori, previously citi

bases at Guam and Wake captured, while Bri-
tain's important Far Eastern bastions at Singa-
pore and Hongkong must likewise be placed
under Japan's control. These strategic positions
were the key to the control of important areas.
To protect Singapore, Burma must also be
taken.

Second, in order to secure the economic
resources required for the prosecution of a long
war, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, the Celebes, and
Malaya must be successively occupied.

Third, seizure with small military forces of
important points in the Bismarck Archipelago,
centering on Rabaul, was also decided upon in
order to protect the important Japanese naval
base of Truk, but no definite plan was made
for the invasion of New Guinea.

The areas enumerated would give Japan a
strong strategic position in conjunction with
the existing Japanese island possessions from
the Marshalls west through the Carolines and
Marianas.

Estimate of Allied Strategy

The Army and Navy General Staffs made
a shrewd appraisal of the possible lines of
action open to the Allied Powers. This
estimate was as follows :' s

/. The Allies would attempt to isolate Japan
politically and economically. At the same time, they
would step up aid to Chiang Kai-shek in order to hold
as many of Japan's effective forces immobile on the
Continent as possible.

2. The United States and Great Britain would
try to delay Japan's penetration of the southern areas
by reinforcing their own air and sea power in the
Philippines-Singapore areas and by holding these stra-
tegic bases as long as possible. The main body
of the United States fleet also might, depending upon
the trend of the early operations, attempt a trans-Pacific
thrust, presenting the possibility of a decisive sea battle.
Allied air and sea forces would hirrass Japanese sea
traffic with guerrilla tactics to interfere with lines of
communication.

3. When their mobilization was finally comple-
ted, the Allies would attempt a large-scale counter-
offensive with air, sea, and ground forces, preparatory
to a decisive naval battle. The United States would
probably launch Us counteroffensive from the southern
and middle Pacific, where there were good sites for air
bases. An offensive mounted across the Northern Pacific
seemed unlikely because of unfavorable weather condi-
tions. Should an American offensive be launched
early in Japans southern campaign, the chances were
that it would be from the Central Pacific.

4. In the event that the United States and Great
Britain elected to avoid decisive battle early in the
war, they would probably limit themselves for the time
being to submarine and air attacks on Japanese supply
lines. At the same time they would endeavor to
secure their communication lines with Australia and
India with a view to the eventual use of these territories
as bases for the start of a counteroffensive.

j. In all likelihood, Great Britain would he
forced to employ the bulk of its strength in Europe,
and would play a minor role in the Pacific operations.
However, it could not be predicted with certainty
whether the United States would elect to throw its
main strength first against Japan or against the Axis

(3) In all planning, taking the Philippines was considered imperative because of their strategic position as an
American base. The Navy planned to take the Philippines in order to eliminate the United States naval base there,
thus forcing the United States Navy to operate from far distant bases. The Philippines lay athwart the line of
communications to the south, and it was necessary to remove this threat. It was military common sense that the
Philippines had to be taken in the initial attack. The Philippines were an economic burden to Japan. The Planning
Board knew this in advance. Nor were there any political motives for the Philippines attack. It was purely for
strategic military reasons... to eliminate the threat of American advance bases on the Japanese line of communi-
cations to the southern regions of Indonesia, Malaya, etc. Statement by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited.

18 Statements by Col. Ichiji Sugita, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section,
and Rear Adm. Tomioka and Col. Hattori previously cited.

Powers in Europe. Japanese strategists, after carefully
weighing the possibilities, estimated that first priority
would be given to Europe.

6. The United States and Great Britain, already
counting Chiang Kai-shek as an ally, would undoubt-
edly attempt to bring the Soviets into the war.

Timing of the Attack

With the decision to fight taken and the
areas to be occupied defined, the next vital
question facing Imperial General Headquarters
was the selection of the most propitious moment
for opening the hostilities.' 9

In a war to be waged with inferior forces
against three enemy countries, it was deemed
absolutely essential that Japan exploit to the
fullest the advantage of choosing the moment
to strike and seizing the initiative from the
start of the operations. Were Japan to wait
passively until war finally resulted from a step-
by-step process of deterioration, Imperial Head-
quarters estimated that loss of the initial tactical
advantage would make it impossible to attain
the basic Japanese strategic objectives.

It was estimated that, if war were not start-
ed before March 1942, economic inferiority
would be such as to preclude any hope of
success.

In order to guard against the remote pos-
sibility of an attack by the Soviet Union while
Japan would be heavily engaged in the south,
it was considered advisable to start hostilities
early enough so that the Southern operations
would be near completion before the end of
the winter, during which a Soviet attack from
the north would be unlikely.

In view of the steady tightening of defensive
arrangements among the ABCD Powers, par-
ticularly joint Anglo-American defense arrange-
ments in the Malaya and Philippines areas, it
was deemed advantageous to start hostilities at
an early date.

Assuming that the fleet would take the
" Great Circle " route to attack Pearl Harbor,
navigational and weather conditions would be
extremely unfavorable after January. Similarly,
navigational conditions off Malaya would be-
come unfavorable in January and February.

To facilitate air and landing operations, it
was advisable to select a date during the last-
quarter moon.

To achieve a successful surprise attack oper-
ations should begin on Saturday or Sunday.™

In accordance with the decisions taken by
the Imperial conference of 6 September, " the
High Command first planned to launch hostili-
ties early in November. Then, with the revision
of these decisions by the 5 November Imperial
conference,* 1 the anticipated opening of hosti-
lities was postponed until early December.
The final decision on the date of the attack
was held in abeyance until the outcome of the
Japanese-American negotiations became clear.

Following the Imperial conference of r
December, which finally ratified the decision
to fight, 8 December (Sunday, 7 December in
Hawaii and the United States) was fixed by
Imperial General Headquarters as the date for
the start of the war.

Central Command Organization 21

With the outbreak of the China Incident

10 Section on "Timing of the Attack " is based on data prepared by Rear Adm. Tomioka and Col. Hattori,
previously cited.

20 The Japanese correctly appraised the social and convivial implications of the American " week-end".

21 Cf. Chapter III.

22 Cf. Chapter III.

23 Material in this section is based on statements by Rear Adm. Katsuhei Nakamura, Senior Adjutant of Navy
Ministry, and Col. Hattori, previously cited.

PLATE NO. 9
Central Command Organization

in 1937, Imperial General Headquarters was
established as the central directing and coordi-
nating organ of the Army and Navy High
Commands. This body was divided into the
Army and Navy Sections, in which the
Chiefs of General Staff of both services and the
chiefs and selected subordinates of the more
important bureaus and sections of the War and
Navy Ministries and the Army and Navy Gen-
eral Staffs were included. (Plate No. 9)

The Board of Militay Councillors, a special
body created in 1887, comprised of selected
generals as well as the Board of Field Marshals
and Fleet Admirals, composed of all field
marshals and fleet admirals, were to advise
the Emperor on matters of great military im-
portance, and were also available to the
services for consultation.

The Army and Navy Chiefs of General
Staff were the Emperor's highest advisers in all
matters involving the operational use of the
fighting forces. Such matters did not pass
through the Premier or the Cabinet. In
other words, it was the special characteristic
of the Japanese military High Command that
it enjoyed complete independence from control
by political organs of the Government in
military matters.

To unify political and military strategy du-
ring war and promote closer co-ordination, the
Government and High Command, in Novem-
ber 1937, established the Imperial General
Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference.

Members ordinarily included the Premier,
Ministers of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs,
and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General
Staffs. Decisions arrived at by this body
were to be implemented by the responsible
military or governmental agency.*" 1

Strength And Organization Of Forces

Originally, Japan's basic policy was to main-
tain its controlling position in the Far East.
Its armament, therefore, was developed mainly
for use in its own and neighboring territories.
The two potential enemies were the United
States, a naval power on the east, and Russia,
a military threat on the Continent to the west.
For this reason, Japan could not subordinate
one service to the other, and maintained an
Army and Navy of equal strength.

Although both services made tremendous
advances during the China Incident, a great
disparity still existed between their strength
and that of the United States Navy and the
Soviet Army. Armament building and opera-
tional plans had been scaled to a conflict with
one enemy before the Pacific War. Military
operations against more than two nations had
hitherto not been considered.

Japan had no independent Air force. Each
service possessed its own air arm. After the
outbreak of the China Incident in 1937, Japan
began expanding its Air forces. Growing reali-
zation of the importance of air power as proved

24 The Liaison conference convened only when necessary until November 1940, when meetings began to be
held twice weekly at the Premier's official residence. In July of the following year, after Germany invaded Russia,
the members agreed to make more active use of the Council, and the meeting place was then changed to the Im-
perial Palace. Following the establishment of the Koiso Cabinet in July 1944, the Council was newly designated as
the " Supreme War Direction Council," but its functions remained unchanged.

PLATE NO. 10
Army Chain of Command

by active operations stimulated this expansion."
The late start of the program, however, made
it impossible to build up an air strength of
planes of advanced design in the amount con-
sidered desirable before the beginning of the
Pacific War. The Army Air forces had been
operating with planes of short or medium range.
Development of long range aircraft had not been
emphasized.

At the time of its organization, the Japanese
Army had been modeled first on the French
and then on the Prussian Armies. From ex-
perience gained in the Russo-Japanese War,
however, and profiting by the lessons of World
War I, Japan adopted a unique system of or-
ganization, tactics, and training suitable to the
requirements for operations in East Asia.

Following the outbreak of the Manchurian
Incident, the potential enemy was obviously

the Soviet Union. To oppose superior Soviet
forces training emphasized offensive operations,
individual courage, and proficiency in all
branches of military science. Fire power and
mechanization were not, however, stressed.

During the six years' interval between the
Manchurian and China Incidents, military per-
sonnel strength was enormously increased, and
further augmentation between 1937 and 1941
brought the total strength up to 51 divisions
at the outbreak of war. 26 However, due to a
lack of caw materials and limited budgets,
little new equipment of improved design was
issued. The Chinese forces, poorly train-
ed and equipped, offered little stimulus to ef-
ficiency, and as a result Japanese staff officers
grew slack as hostilities dragged on, and the
whole standard of training deteriorated.

As the political situation vis-a-vis the

Growth of Army and Navy Air Forces
1035-1941'

Army 1

Navy*

Carrier Based

Land Based

Total

Year

Fighters Bombers

Ren

Total

Fighters

Bombers

Torpedo

Other

Planes

Types

1935

188

1 08

132

r 3 8

590

1936

216

120

144

132

160

772

1937

210

120

540

216

132

204

108

178

838

1938

240

330

130

700

269

132

228

132

200

961

1939

280

450

180

910

201

132

288

156

228

1,005

1940

360

500

200

167

132

264

180

306

1.049

8 Dec 1 941

550

660

290

1,500

252

443

198

1,669

1 Statistics include only first-line aircraft.

2 Compiled by ist Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government.

3 Compiled by 2d Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government.
* Figures not available.

26 From a strength of 17 divisions (not including 13 reserve divisions) during the period 1924-36, the Army
expanded as follows :

Year No. of Divisions

^937
1938

'939
1940
1 94I

24 (Not including 6 reserve divs.)

(Statistics compiled by isr Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government)

United States deteriorated, emphasis was shifted
from preparation for war with the Soviets.
This change was immediately reflected in Japa-
nese combat tactics, and special training was
begun for war against the United States and
Great Britain.

The combat services were barely able to
maintain sufficient armament to equip those
forces already stationed overseas. Conse-
quently, Japan Proper was short of air defense
installations. There were practically no modern
air defenses in the major cities, and air defense
training never progressed beyond the point
of arousing the people to become aware of
passive precautionary measures.

The Navy, modeled on the British system
at the time of its organization, had evolved a
distinct Japanese form of its own following the
Sino-Japanese War a decade later. Its primary
mission until about 1935 had been to maintain
command of the Western Pacific Ocean.

The Washington Naval Treaty limited the
capital ship strength of the Japanese Navy to
60 per cent of that of the British and American
fleets. Adequate defense of the country posed
the problem of meeting a numerically superior
naval force if the American Navy were con-
centrated. As a result, Japanese naval strategy,
prior to World War II, was based on the
concept of intercepting the American fleet while
the latter was en route to attack in Far Eastern
waters.

Along with this basic concept of strategy,
the Japanese Navy developed its own special
battle tactics which stressed the use of large
high-speed submarines and night attacks by
destroyers. Since naval thinking continued to

be based largely on the idea of fleet engage-
ments at sea, undue emphasis was laid upon
first-line combat vessels, with relative disregard
for the small-type auxiliaries needed for am-
icus operations.
Lack of adequate funds, raw materials, and
industrial power forced the Navy to curtail its
construction plans considerably. The optimistic
view that small-type vessels and amphibious
equipment could easily be produced in wartime
through accelerated shipbuilding proved ab-
surd. The beginning of the war found the
Japanese Navy with a strength of 68 per cent
of that of the United States in first-line combat
ships. However, in small-type auxiliaries, Japan
had only 156 ships totalling 490,364 tons {38.5
per cent) as compared with 1,273,469 tons for
the American Navy.

In December 1941 the Japanese Navy com-
prised 391 ships of all types, aggregating
1,466,177 tons. These included ten battleships
(301,400 tons), ten aircraft carriers (152,970
tons), 38 cruisers (257,655 tons), 112 destroyers
(165,868 tons), 65 submarines (97,900 tons),
five seaplane tenders (58,050 tons), and five
submarine tenders (33,445 tons). During the
hostilities, new ship construction and conver-
sion added to the fleet two 64,000-ton battle-
ships (Yamato and Miuashi), nine aircraft car-
riers, six escort carriers, six cruisers, 63 destroy-
ers, 126 submarines, and 615 auxiliaries. The
Yamato and Musashi, commissioned 16 Decem-
ber 194 1 and 5 August 1942 respectively, were
the world's largest and most heavily armed
capital ships, carrying guns of 45-centimeter
(17.7 inches) caliber. 17

phib

27 Statistics compiled by 2d Demobilization Bureau, Japanese Government.

CHAPTER V
INITIAL OFFENSIVES

Planning of Invasion Operations

Japan's initial strategy, as outlined earlier,
was formulated with the dual purpose of gain-
ing swift control of the economic resources of
the southern regions, essential to the prosecu-
tion of the war, and of eliminating British and
American military bases which barred the way
to these resources and might be used as
counter-offensive springboards against Japan.'

The primary objectives of the initial Japanese
operations, therefore, involved the invasion of
the Philippines, Malaya, Borneo, and the Neth-
erlands East Indies, with particular emphasis
on the seizure of Manila and Singapore, the
two major bases of the United States and
Great Britain in the Far East. The Pearl
Harbor attack, although held essential by do-
minant Navy opinion to assure Japanese supre-
macy at sea for the execution of the Southern
Operations, 1 was, in fact, a secondary and
supporting operation.

The magnitude of these operations, unprece-
dented in military history, gave rise to difficult
planning problems. Intensive studies were
carried out by Imperial General Headquarters
to determine the sequence of operations and
the allocation of the limited ground, sea, and
air strength available so as to ensure local
superiority of forces in the areas of attack.

During the initial planning stage, two al-
ternative sequences for the invasion operations
were considered : (r) Philippines, Netherlands
East Indies, Malaya ; and (2) Malaya, Nether-
lands East Indies, Philippines. However, after
full study, Imperial General Headquarters
concluded that it would be most advantageous
to exploit the psychological element of surprise
to the utmost. The proposed sequences were
therefore scrapped, and it was decided to attack
the Philippines and Malaya simultaneously with
the Navy's surprise blow at Pearl Harbor on
the first day of war. Seizure of Borneo, the
Celebes, Sumatra, and Java was to follow under
a schedule which divided the " First Phase "

1 All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 Prior to 1941 Japanese naval war planning had not envisaged offensive operations as far east as Hawaii.
Naval strategy against the United States called for the capture of the Philippines and Guam, depriving the American
fleet of its operating bases in the Western Pacific, and then awaiting attack in Japan's sphere of naval superiority. In
1941, however, plans had to be revised to meet the possibility of war against both the United States and Britain. In
September 1941 Admiral Yamamoto. Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, began advocating a new plan calling
for an attack on Pearl Harbor, designed to cripple the American fleet at the start of hostilities. This, he argued,
was essential to give Japan control of the Western Pacific for the period necessary to carry out operations in the
Southern Area. The plan, however, met strong opposition by the Operations Bureau, Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Section on the ground that it was too risky and would divert too much fleet strength from the Southern
Operations, compromising their success. After Admiral Yamamoto had threatened to resign his command unless
the plan were adopted, it was finally approved by Admiral Osami Nagano, Chief, Navy General Staff, Imperial
General Headquarters, Navy Section, on 20 October. (Statement by Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, Chief, First Bureau
(Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section)

(Dai-ichi dan operations into the

following three periods :

First Period : Invasion of the Philippines, Mala-
ya, Borneo, Celebes, Timor,
and key points in southern Sumatra
and the Bismarck Archipelago.

Second Period : Invasion of Java and occupation,
at the opportune time, of airfields in southern Burma.

Third Period: Pacification of occupied areas
and, depending on the situation, completion of ope-
rations in Burma.*

Although no fixed time limits were set for
the completion of operations in the various
areas, Imperial General Headquarters estimated
that the major part of the invasion operations
could be completed in 50 days for the Philip-
pines, 100 days for Malaya, and 150 days for
the Netherlands East Indies. 4

Tactical procedures varied according to the
enemy situation and Japanese capabilities in the
different areas of attack. In the Philippines,
General MacArthur's air strength, which Japa-
nese intelligence indicated was undergoing
gradual reinforcement, was a potential threat to
the Japanese invasion fleet of slow-speed trans-
ports. 5 Hence it was decided to precede the
landing of ground troops with intensive air at-
tacks, executed jointly by Army and Navy air
units, with the objective of paralyzing enemy
air power. 6 In the Malayan invasion, for which
high-speed transports less vulnerable to air at-
tack were reserved, it was planned to start land-

ing and air operations almost simultaneously.

Three particularly thorny problems presen-
ted themselves to Imperial General Headquar-

10ns :

1. Whether Japanese Army and Navy air
strength, operating from 300-mile distant bases in
southern French Indo-China at the extreme limit of
land-based fighter plane radius, would be able to
provide effective cover for the landing forces against
relatively superior British air power.

2. Whether air bases acquired through the
occupation of Borneo and Malaya could be im-
mediately and effectively exploited in the ensuing
operations against Sumatra and Java.

5, Whether the vital oil-producing areas could
be taken before the wells and installations had been
seriously damaged.

The first and second problems were the self-
imposed consequence of the allocation of
virtually the entire carrier strength of the Com-
bined Fleet to the Pearl Harbor operation. To
ensure minimum air cover for the Malaya
landings, fighter units of the 3d Army Air
Group in Indo-China had to be considered
wholly expendable, 7 and possibly heavy damage
to the escorting naval units of the Southern
Expeditionary Fleet was also accepted as a cal-
culated risk. The second problem was met by
the decision to push the speedy occupation of
strategically located air bases in Borneo and

3 (1) Nampogun Sakusen Kiroku i^f^J^f^fJfffBi^ (Southern Army Operations Record) ist Demobilization Bureau,
Jul 46, pp. 8-9. (2) Statements by Lt. Gen, Shinichi Tanaka, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), and Col. Takushiro
Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, both of Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

4 Ibid.

5 Fastest troop transports were assigned ro the Malayan invasion, leaving only the slower ships for the Philippines
operation. (Statement by Col. Ichiji Sugita, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section)

6 " The method of attack for the Philippines differed from that for the Malaya area. In the former operation,
an air offensive to annihilate enemy air strength was to be carried out first, after which advance troops would capture
enemy air bases and finally the main forces would be landed." Southern Army Operations Record, op. cit., p. 25.
Cf. Chapter VI.

7 Hasty construction of an airfield on Phuquoc Island, off the southwest coast of Indo-China, during the first
part of November 1941, helped to extend slightly the range of Indo-China based fighter planes. From this field

a, and to effect their prompt restora-
tion to operational use by the Japanese Air
Forces.

To insure acquiring the needed oil resources
intact, plans were laid to capture the main oil-
producing centers in Dutch and British Borneo
soon after the start of hostilities, and as soon
as air bases had been taken in Malaya, to take
Palembang by airborne assault. 8

Operational Strength

In the autumn of 1941, when preparations
began for the Southern Operations, the total
strength of the Japanese Army stood at 5 r divi-
sions, of which 28 were assigned to operations
in China and 13 stationed in Manchuria and
Korea for defense against the Soviet Union.
Only ten divisions remained in the homeland,
five of which were newly-formed and of ques-
tionable fighting ability. The Army Air Forces
had approximately 1,500 first-line planes.

Of this total strength, owing to commitments
in China and inability to risk weakening defense
against the Soviet Union, Imperial General
Headquarters decided that not more than 1 1
divisions and two air groups (approximately 700
planes) could be allotted to the Southern Ope-

rations. The Navy, for the accomplishment of
its double mission of supporting the land inva-
sions and attacking Pearl Harbor, was in a
position to employ almost the entire strength
of the Combined Fleet, including the bulk of
the naval air force of 1,669 planes. 9 The maxi-
mum transport and supply shipping tonnage
which could be made available for Army and
Navy use was approximately 3,900,000 tons."

Despite the apparent weakness of these forces
in relation to the vast scope of the projected
operations, Imperial General Headquarters esti-
mated that its invasion plans would succeed.
The combined troop and air strength of Great
Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands
in the planned theater of operations was esti-
mated at approximately 370,000 men and 720
planes," with a naval strength of approximately
12 to r6 battleships and five or six aircraft
carriers. However, this potential fleet strength
was dispersed, with the main elements stationed
in the Indian Ocean and at Hawaii.' 2

Military intelligence reports on the target
areas in September 1941 indicated that
the bulk of the ground strength mentioned
above was composed of colonial troops of in-
ferior quality. Taking this into consideration,
Imperial General Headquarters estimated that

fighters were able to cover the landings of the main Malaya invasion forces at Singora and Pattani, in southern
Thailand, but effective cover for the diversionary landing at Kota Bharu, farther south, remained difficult. AT1S
Enemy Publications No. 278, Malaya Campaign 1941-1942. 11 Jan 45, p. 10.

8 Palembang, besides its importance as a major oil-producing center, was also strategically valuable as an advance
air base to be used in the subsequent operations against Java.

9 Cf. Chapter IV, p. 54.

10 Statement by Maj. Gen. Kikusaburo Okada, Chief, War Plans Section, Economic Mobilization Bureau,
V7ar Ministry. Cf. Chapter III.

1 1 Regular Army strength was estimated at about 232,000, the remainder consisting of volunteer and native
troops. Plane strength was estimated by area as follows : Malaya, 200 plus ; Burma, 50 ; Hongkong 10 ; Philippines,
160 plus; Netherlands East Indies, 300. Daihonyei Rikugun Tosui Kiroku iz^W£W-M.Wii£$& (Imperial General Head-
quarters Army High Command Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Nov 46, pp. 37-41.

12 The United States was believed to have eight battleships and three aircraft carriers at Hawaii, while British
strength was estimated at two battleships in the Malaya area and two to six battleships and two or three aircraft
carriers in the Indian Ocean area (including East and Southeast Africa). United States Strategic Bombing Survey,
Japan's Struggle to End the War. Appendix A, p. 18.

success could be assured by maneuvering avail-
able Japanese military strength so as to develop
a three-to-one local superiority of forces in all
invasion sectors.' 3

Achievement of this superiority required
adherence to a carefully determined invasion
schedule and the double use of troops and ship-
ping in successive operations. Thus, it was
decided that forces and shipping assigned to
the Phil ippines, Hongkong, Guam and Malaya
operations would be used again in succeeding
ope rat ions. '* The Burma operations were to
be carried out by troops diverted from other
combat zones where they were no longer
needed.

To provide the 1 1 divisions called for by the
invasion plans, five divisions were diverted
from the China front, and six were taken from
the homeland. These were further reinforced
by the addition of the bulk of the Kwantung
Army's service troops, which were withdrawn
from Manchuria,' 5 The main strength of the
3d Air Group was detached from the China
Expeditionary Forces, and the main strength of
the 5th Air Group was taken from Manchuria.
Both were reorganized to include the best air
units from China, Manchuria, and Japan
Proper.

Just before the outbreak of hostilities, the
tactical grouping and disposition (Plate No. 12)
of Army forces allocated to the Southern
Operations were as follows :' 6

gon, French Indo-

14th Army :
Philippines
Attack Force

ipb Army :
Burma
Attack Force

16th Army :
East Indies
Attack Force

25th Army :
Malaya
Attack Force

Army reserves:

$d Air Group ;
Malaya
Attack Force

China

Army Headquarters \
Army troops (6}th
Brig. & other ele- in
merits) Formosa
48th Dtvision (mam
elements)
16th Division in Amami-Osbima
Remaining elements in Pesca-
dores and Palau
Army Headquarters \ in S.
Elements 55th Divi-llndo-
sion ) China

Army troops j in N.

55th Division (lessllndo-
elements) ] China

33d Division in Central China
Army Headquarters in Japan

Elements 36th Division (36th
Mixed Inf Group) in Palau
Army Headquarters on Hainan
5th Division Island
Imperial Guards Division in S,
Indo-Cbina 1 ?
18th Division in Canton
Army troops in Formosa
21st Division in North China
56th Division (main elements)
in Japan Proper
5 fighter groups

4 light bomber groups
4 heavy bombe r
groups

2 reconnaissance

Southern Army: General

s in Sai-

in South
China
■and N.
hdo-
China

13 Data on Imperial Genera! Headquarters j

; prepared by Lt. Gen. Tanalca, and Col,

cited.

14 Plans for the Philippines operation called for the transfer of the 48th Division, after the fall of Manila, to
the South for employment in the invasion of Java.

15 The 5th, 18th, ztst, 33d, 38th and Imperial Guards Divisions were taken from China, and the 2d, 16th,
48th, 55th and 56th Divisons from Formosa and Japan Proper.

16 Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.

17 The Imperial Guards Division was temporarily transferred to the Fifteenth Army for initial operations (pacifi-
cation of Thailand j but was then restored to the Twenty-fifth Army for participation in the Malaya campaign.

jib Air Group : 2 fighter groups \
Philippines 2 light bomber groups' in S.
Attack Force 1 heavy bomber group {Formosa
1 reconnaissance Unit 3

China Expeditionary Forces: General Head-
quarters in Nanking
23d Army: Army Headquarters

Hongkong 38th Division

Attack Force

Guam Occupation Force : Directly under Imperi-
al General Headquarters

[Canton

South Seas
Detachment :

Head-]

in Bonin
Islands

Main Body:

Detachment
quarters
144 Inf. Regt
1 artillery battalion
Other elements

The Imperial General Headquarters decided
that virtually the whole of the Navy's " outer
combat force 'W^i'fPP^)' 8 would be employed in
the operations against the United States, Great
Britain, and the Netherlands. The tactical
grouping of this force and mission assignments
in the initial operations were as follows :' 9
Combined Fleet

Under direct command C-in-C,
Combined Fleet.
Mission : To support overall
operations.

6 battleships, 2 aircraft car-
riers, 2 light cruisers, 1
destroyer.
Under C-in-C, 1st Air Fleet.
Mission : To attack the Ameri-
can Fleet in the Hawaii area
and subsequently support opera-
tions of the South Seas and
Southern Forces.

6 aircraft carriers, 2 battle-
ships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light
cruiser, 11 destroyers, 3 sub-
marines.

Task Force :

Advance (Sub- Under C-in-C, 6th Fleet,
marine) Force : Mission : To reconnoiter Ha-
waiian waters in advance of
Pearl Harbor attack, cooperate
with Task Force in execution of
attack, and attack enemy naval
forces along west coast of the
United States.

27 submarines, 1 submarine
tender, t coastal defense
ship.

South Seas Under C-in-C, 4th Fleet.

Force: Missions: To occupy Wake ;

defend and patrol inner South
Seas area and protect surface
traffic ; cooperate with the Army
in the successive occupation of
Guam and RabauL

Southern Under over-all command of C-

Forces: in-C, 2d Fleet.

Missions: To destroy enemy
fleet and air strength in the
Philippines, Malaya, and Dutch
East Indies areas ; act as surface
escort and support landings of
Army forces in Philippines,
Malaya, Borneo, and Thai-
land , prepare for invasion ope-
rations in the Dutch East Indies,
Timor, and Burma.

Main Body: Under direct command C-in-C,
2d Fleet.

2 battleships, 2 heavy crui-
sers, 10 destroyers.

Philippines Under C-in-C, 3d Fleet.

Force: t aircraft carrier, j heavy

cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 29
destroyers, 4 torpedo boats,
4 minesweepers, 3 base
forces.

Malaya Under C-in-C, Southern Expe-

Force : ditionary Fleet.

18 The Japanese Navy employed this term to cover combat forces for employment in operations outside Japanese
home waters, as distinguished from the " inner combat force " (|*3Hc which operated only in home waters.

19 Statement by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, member, Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry.

it Is M f*

Northern Force

HOHOMUSHlflO

* /. + -V ■' 1)

KAMCHATKA

CHISMIMA •
(KURlLE.ISK

ise Command

PACIFIC

OCEAN

JAPANESE DISPOSITIONS
PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF WAR

7 DECEMBER 1941

MIOWAY IS

\H u a

MARCUS

Seas Del

mmwi

iouth S bos Force

'J ++iHtfi

IARIANA IS

IS «

(Carrier)Tosk Force '

A."

■ * 4 m a

HAWAIIAN I S, $ augj *vaa

J.' TS HONOLULU

WAKE

3t it

Advlsubmarine)
Force

HARBOR rv

-. ^J. HAI

5^ '>*.£r*6

PIm/Soufh Seas Force

UK I 3 J

" r ls S8fc1h Seas Force

JALVlT "

6 ' * * '<- t »H

T»»»» GILBERT IS
fcj

-If? 6 .

Vcf«V \

- - <r»«0

PHOCNrX IS

SET 'J »» \/k SOLOMON 15

' ■

V c ENTREc*5reauB 15 f »<w

"TV ■• 6uao6loa»iItC\

m m

CORAL SEA

Luefn .

sta cruz is

SAMOA IS

LEGEND

Deployment ol army forces
for Southern Operations.

NEW HEBRlD

7 < 's-ifiti
FIJI IS

no"

s^ffi MM

Novai station
China Area Fleet
Blue indicotes Army; brown, Navy

PLATE NO. i2
Disposition of Japan's Military Forces Prior to Outbreak of War

Force:

Northern
Force :

$ heavy cruisers, ji light
cruisers, jj destroyers, 16
submarines 1 minelayer, 1
coastal defense ship, 1 naval
air flotilla, 2 base forces.
Air Force : Under C-in-C, nth Air Fleet.

2 naval air flotillas {shore-
based), 2 destroyers.
Under Commander, 5th Sub-
marine Flotilla.

2 submarines, 1 submarine
tender.
Under C-in-C, 5th Fleet.
Missions: To patrol and
defend waters east of Japan
Proper ; defend the Bonm Is-
lands : guard the route of the
Task Force ; protect surface
traffic.

2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer,
2 torpedo boats, 1 shore-based
air group, t base force.

China Seas Under C-m-C, China Seas

Fleet: Fleet.

M sstons : To conti nue opera-
tions in China and destroy local
enemy forces; cooperate with
the Army in taking Hongkong;
protect surface traffic in Chinese
coastal waters; cooperate with
ground forces.

2 coastal defense ships (old-,
type heavy cruisers), r light
cruiser, j destroyers, 6 tor-
pedo boats, 13 gunboats, j
base forces, 4 Special Naval
Landing Parties.

Operations Orders

The basic orders directing the Army and
Navy forces to prepare for hostilities in early
December were issued by Imperial General
Headquarters immediately following the 5 No-
vember Imperial conference which fixed the
end of November as the final deadline for the
decision on war in case of failure to achieve a
diplomatic settlement. 3 *'

The Imperial General Headquarters Navy
Directive No. 1, issued on 5 November,
ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Combined
Fleet, to prepare " for the eventuality that war
with the United States, Great Britain, and
the Netherlands may become unavoidable in
the first part of December." 11

It directed that the necessary forces be assem-
bled " at the appropriate time at initial staging
areas and laid down the general plan of fleet
operations, which was incorporated in Com-
bined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No.
1, issued on the same date. 31 Essential portions
of this order follow :

Preparations for War and Start of Hostilities

j. Preparations for War

a. The Empire anticipates the outbreak of war
with the United States, Great Britain, and the
Netherlands. When it has been decided to complete
over-all operational preparations, an order will be
issued setting the approximate date (Y-Day) for
the commencement of operations and announcing
"First Preparations for War." The various
forces will, upon receipt of this order, act as fol-
lows:

20 Cf. Chapter III.

21 ATIS Research Report No. 131, Japan's Decision to Fight, 1 Dec 45, p. 75.

22 The original text of Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1 was recovered from the Japanese
cruiser Nachi, sunk in Manila Bay, in April 1945. Translated in full in ATIS Limited DisHbudon Translation
No. 39 (Part VIII), 4jun 45, pp. 2-54, The contents of Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1 had
been worked out during October, but it was not drawn up in final form until Admiral Yamamoto and his staff were

to Tokyo early in November in anticipation of the Imperial conference decision. The order numbered
120 pages and was reproduced in 700 copies.

(j) All fleets and naval units, without
special orders, will be organized according to
the allocation of forces for the First Period
Operations of First Phase Operations, and will
complete battle preparations. At the appropriate
time, as directed by their commanders, they will
proceed to alert {f$$|) areas prior to the start
of operations.

(2) All units will be sharply on the alert
for possible attacks by American, British and
Dutch forces.

*****
b. When the necessary advance forces for the
execution of operations are dispatched to the aieas
of operations, " Second Preparations for War "
will be ordered. The various forces will, upon
receipt of this order, act as follows :

(/) Submarine forces attached to the Ad-
vance Force, Task Force, Commerce Destruction
Force,** Southern Force, and South Seas Force
will, at the appropriate time as directed by
their commanders, leave for then respective
areas of operations.

(2) The remainder of these Forces will, as
directed by their commanders, proceed so as to
be in designated positions for the start of hosti-
lities.

* * * * *
2. Start of hostilities

a. The date for the start of hostilities ( X-Day)
will be fixed by Imperial Order (to be issued

several days in advance). After 0000 hours on
X-Day, a state of war will exist. *« All forces will
commence operations according to plan.

* * i *• *
First Phase Operations
1. Operational Plan

a. The Advance Force, Task Force, South
Seas Force, Northern Force, and Main Body will
operate against the American Fleet.

The Advance Force [will scout and carry out
surprise attacks on enemy naval forces in the Hawaii
area and on the west coast of the United States.~\

The Task Force [will attack and destroy enemy
naval forces at Hawaii at the start of hostilities.^

The South Seas Force will occupy or destroy
enemy key points in the vicinity of its operational
area 16 and prepare to meet enemy naval forces in
the Australian area.

The Northern Force will be charged with pa-
trolling against the Soviet Union.

b. The Southern Forces, while holding local
superiority, will annihilate enemy naval forces in
the Philippines, British Malaya, and Netherlands
Indies areas, and will carry out the following ope-
rations in cooperation with the Army.

(1) Operations against British Malaya and
the Philippines will be launched simultaneously.
The initiative will be taken in launching a
sustained air offensive against enemy air and
naval forces in these areas, and Army advance
expeditionary groups will be landed as quickly

23 The " Commerce Destruction Force ", a subsidiary unit of the Combined Fleet, consisted of only three
converted cruisers.

24 In case of a serious enemy attack before X-Day, the Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1
stipulated that " forces attacked will counterattack immediately." It further directed that military force might be used
after " Second Preparations for War " had been ordered, (i) " if American, British or Dutch ships or planes approach
the vicinity of our territorial waters and their action is deemed to constitute a danger" ; {2) " if our forces operating
outside the vicinity of our territorial waters encounter positive actions by American, British or Dutch forces such as
endanger our forces." ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 39 (Part VIII), op. cit., p. 5.

25 As a special precaution to guard the secrecy of the Pearl Harbor attack plan, the bracketed portions were left
blank in the printed text of the order and were communicated verbally only to a restricted number of high Navy
General Staff officers and staff officers of Combined Fleet, First Air Fleet and Sixth Fleet Headquarters. Statement
by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited.

26 Separate Table 1 of the Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1 specified that the South Seas
Force would " invade Wake and Guam " and would also " invade Rabaul if the situation warrants " during the first
period of hostilities. ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 39 (Part VIII), op. cit., p. 45.

as possible in strategic areas of Malaya, the
Philippines and British Borneo. Air forces will
be moved forward and air operations intensified.

(2) Following the successful completion of
these operations, the main bodies of the Army
invasion groups will be landed in the Philippines
and Malaya and will quickly occupy these areas,

(j) During the first period of operations,
strategic points in the Celebes, Dutch Borneo, and
southern Sumatra will be occupied. If favorable
opportunity arises, strategic points in the
Moluccas and Timor will also be taken, and
necessary air bases established in these areas.

(4) As these air bases are completed, Air
forces will gradually be moved forward, and
enemy air strength in the Java area will be
destroyed. When this has been accomplished,
the main body of the Army invasion group will
be landed and will occupy Java.

(j) After the capture of Singapore, stra-
tegic points in northern Sumatra will be taken,
and operations will be carried out at the ap-
propriate time against Burma to cut the enemy
supply route to China.**

The basic Fleet order quoted above was fol-
lowed on 7 November by Combined Fleet Top
Secret Operations Order No. 2, which fixed
Y-Day, the approximate date for the start of
hostilities, as 8 December and ordered " First
Preparations for War A further order of
the same date ordered the Task Force to as-
semble at Tankan Bay, in the Kuriles, and take
on supplies until 22 November. 19

On 21 November Imperial General Head-

quarters Navy Order No. 5
mander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet to ad-
vance the necessary forces at the appropriate
time to positions of readiness for the start of
hostilities. At the same time Imperial Gen-
eral Headquarters Navy Directive No. 5 stipu-
lated that these forces should immediately be
ordered to return to home bases in the event
of a Japanese-American agreement.'" A Com-
bined Fleet operations order issued on 25 No-
vember stated :

The Task Force will move out of Tankan Bay on
26 November and, taking every precaution to conceal
its movements, will advance by late evening of $
December to a rendezvous point at 42 degrees N.
tyo degrees IV., where refueling will be speedily
earned out.*'

Following the Imperial conference decision
to go to war, Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Section on 1 December issued an
order to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined
Fleet, which stated :

/. The Empire of Japan has decided to open hos-
tilities against the United States, Great Britain, and
the Netherlands during the first part of December.

2, The Combined Fleet will destroy enemy naval
and air forces in the Far East and will repulse and
destroy any enemy naval forces which may come to
the attack.

3. The Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet,
will cooperate with the Commander-in-Chief, Southern
Army, in executing swift attacks on American, British,
and Dutch strategic bases in East Asia and in oc-

27 Part VIII of the Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. i outlined Second Phase Operations
to begin after the capture of the Netherlands East Indies, specifying the following areas " to be occupied or
destroyed as speedily as operational conditions permit": (i) Eastern New Guinea, New Britain, Fiji and Samoa;
(2) Aleutians and Midway; (3) Andaman Islands; (4) Strategic points in the Australian area. Ibid., pp. 6, 9.

28 Full text of the Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 2 read : " First preparations for war.
Y-Day 8 December," Ibid,, p. 55,

29 ATIS Research Report No, 131, op, cit., p. 77.

30 This directive was implemented by a Combined Fleet Operations Order dated 22 November, which stated:
" In the event an agreement is reached in the negotiations with the United States, the Task Force will immediately
return to Japan." Ibid.

31 Ibid., p. 78.

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PLATE NO. 13
Pearl Harbor Attack, 8 December 1941

cupying and securing vital areas in the South.*
On 2 December Imperial General Head-
quarters Navy Directive No. 12 ordered the
Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, to
launch operations on 8 December. In pursuance
thereto Admiral Yamamoto issued a Combined
Fleet order on the same day, designating 8
December as X-Day."

Concurrently with these fleet orders, Imperial
General Headquarters Army Section issued
the basic orders and directives for Army in-
vasion operations in the Southern area. An
order issued on 6 November named General
Hisaichi Terauchi Commander-in-Chief of the
Southern Army, fixed the order of battle, 5 " and
directed invasion preparations as follows :

/. Imperial General Headquarters has prepared
for the invasion of strategic areas in the South.

2. The Commander-in-Chief Southern Army,
shall, in cooperation with the Navy, concentrate his
main forces in Jndo-China, South China, Formosa,
and the Ryukyu Islands and shall carry out prepara-
tions for the invasion of the strategic southern areas.
The start of the invasion operations will be by separate
order.

J. In the event of attack by American, British
and Dutch forces, either together or singly, the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Southern Army, is authorised to
counterattack with the forces at his disposal in
defense. 3 *

The general plan of joint Army-

tions and definition of respective spheres of
responsibility were laid down in a Army-
Navy Central Agreement concluded in Tokyo
between 8 and ro November by General Tera-
uchi, for the Southern Army, and Admiral
Yamamoto, for the Combined Fleet. j6 This
was implemented by a series of detailed opera-
tional agreements concluded between the fleet
and Army commanders assigned to operations
in each invasion area at a joint staff conference
at Iwakuni, on the Inland Sea, from 14 to 16
November."

On 15 November a further Imperial General
Headquarters Army Order to the Commander-
in-Chief, Southern Army, stated :

/. Strategic ureas to be occupied are the Philip-
pines, British Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and a
part of southern Burma.

2. In executing these operations, effort will be
made to preserve order and stability in Thailand and
Indo-Ch'ma . and from these areas the blockade of
China will be reinforced.

3. Military government will be established in
occupied territories in order to assure the restoration
of order, the acquisition of vital resources for national
defense, and the self-sufficiency of the occupying
forces. ^

Acting under this directive and the Army-
Navy Central Agreement, General Terauchi
issued implementing orders to the forces under
Southern Army command on 20 November,

32 Ibid., p. 76.

33 Ibid., p. 78.

34 Order of battle as given on pp. 60-3.

35 Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. dr., p. 24.

36 The agreement fixed the areas to be occupied as the Philippines, Guam, Hongkong, British Malaya, Burma,
the Rismarcks, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, the Celebes, and Timor. Initial attack plans followed the lines of Combined
Fleet Order No. I, and Army and Navy strength was allotted as already outlined on pp. 60-2. Nampo Sakusen Chuo
Kyotei MJj ftM^yiffliTii (Army Navy Central Agreement, Southern Operations) Japanese Government Demobilization
Bureaus, Nov 45. pp. 4— it.

37 Four agreements were concluded, as follows: (1) 2d Fleet-i4th Army; (2) 2d Fleet-i6th Army; (3) 4th
Fleet-South Seas Detachment ; (4) tith Air Fleet-sth Army Air Force. A fifth operational agreement covering the
Malaya invasion was reached at Saigon in the middle of November between the 25th Army, the Southern Expeditionary
Fleet and the 3d Air Group.

38 Imperial General Headquarters High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 25-6.

allocating the Fourteenth Army (Lt. Gen.
Masaharu HommaJ to the invasion of the
Philippines, the Twenty-fifth Army (General
Tomoyuki Yamashita) to the invasion of
Malaya, the Fifteenth Army (Lt. Gen. Shojiro
Iida) to the occupation of Thailand and
operations in Burma, and the Kawaguchi
Detachment (main strength composed of one
infantry regiment of the r8th Division, tem-
porarily detached from Twenty-fifth Army,
under command of Maj. Gen. Seiken Kawa-
guchi) to the invasion of British Borneo. The
5th Army Air Group was placed under
Fourteenth Army command for the Philippines
operations, and the 3d Army Air Group was
assigned principally to support of the Malaya
invasion. 35

The date for the launching of hostilities was
finally fixed by an Imperial General Headquar-
ters Army order issued to the Commander-in-
Chief, Southern Army, on 1 December, which
stated :

1. The Empire of Japan has resolved to wage
war against the United States, Great Britain and the
Netherlands.

2. The Commander-in-Chief, Southern Army,
will begin invasion operations on 8 December. How-
ever, if a Japanese-American agreement should be
reached before that date, the operations will be
cancelled.

3. Prior to 8 December, the Commander-in-
Chief, Southern Army, is authorized :

a. In the event the enemy takes the initiative
in launching a serious attack, to begin invasion
operations at an opportune moment, in cooperation

with the Navy.

b. In the event oj a British invasion of Thai-
land, to occupy that area at an opportune moment
in cooperation with the Navy.

c. In the event enemy aircraft repeatedly re-
connoiter our strategic bases or troop convoys, to
order that they be shot down*

General Terauchi left Tokyo by air on 25
November and reached Saigon on 5 December,
three days before the scheduled start of hosti-
lities. There he set up the General Headquar-
ters of the Southern Army.

Pearl Harbor Operation

By 22 November the 32 warships comprising
the Carrier Task Force under command of Vice
Adm. Chuichi Nagumo (Commander-in-Chief
FirstAirFleetjhad concentrated at the assembly
point in Tankan Bay, where final battle prepara-
tions were completed. Task Force Top Secret
Operations Order No. 1, laying down the plan
of attack, was issued on 23 November.'''

The eastward movement of the Task Force
began at 0600 on 26 November. In order to
escape detection while en route, the Force
maintained strict radio silence and took a north-
erly course well off commercial shipping lanes
and beyond the range of patrol planes from
American island bases. 13 A destroyer screen
moved ahead of the main force in order to
give advance warning if unfriendly vessels
were encountered. Whenever weather condi-
tions were favorable, refueling was carried out
from supply train tankers"

39 Southern Army Operations Record, op. cit., p. 12.

40 Imperial General Headquarters High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 74-5.

41 ATIS Research Report No. 131. op. cit., pp. 78-82.

42 DaiToa Senso Senkun (Koku — Hawaii Kaistn) ^j$Lj2< fit 'F'llS Till) GfotS? — -" > ? 4 (Battle Lessons of the Greater
East Asia War — Air, Hawaii Operation) Navy Battle Lessons Analysis Committee, Air Section, Aug 42, Vol. I, pp. 4-5.

43 Had refueling at sea been impossible due to rough weather, it was planned that the destroyer screen would
separate from the Task Force and return. The cruising range of other Task Force units, which normally could not
have operated beyond 160 degrees West, was extended by loading extra drums of heavy oil on deck and in empty
spaces below decks. ATIS Research Report No. 131, op. cit., p. 67.

At 0400 4 December, the Task Force altered
its course to the southeast and proceeded
until 0700 on X-r Day, 7 December, when it
headed due south and began the final run to-
ward Oahu at a speed of 24 knots. (Plate No,
13) At 0130 on 8 December, from a point
approximately 200 nautical miles north of
Oahu, the First Attack Unit of 183 planes
took off from the decks of the six carriers,
formed over the Task Force, and at 0145 headed
for Pearl Harbor.' 14

Flying at 3,000 feet over dense but broken
cloud formations, the first wave sighted the
northern shoreline of Oahu at 0310 and im-
mediately deployed, receiving the order to
"attack " at 0319 (0749 Hawaii time). Dive
bomber groups spearheaded the attack with
swift strikes at Wheeler, Hickam and Ford
Island airfields, crippling enemy fighter strength
before it had a chance to get off the ground.
Immediately thereafter torpedo plane and level
bomber groups converged on the fleet anchor-
age at Ford Island and attacked the heavy units
lying at berth.

The second wave of 167 planes took off from
the carriers at 0245, reaching offshore the
eastern coast of Oahu at 0424 (0854 Hawaii
time), when the " attack " order was given.
Dive and level bombers again swept in on the
fleet anchorage, striking at ships not severely
hit in the first attack. Fighter groups went
in as escorts with both first and second waves,
and when enemy air opposition failed to devel-
op, they strafed ground targets. Both attacks

continued from thirty minutes to one hour.

By 0830 (1300 Hawaii time) all aircraft,
except nine missing from the first wave and
20 from the second, had returned to the carriers,
and the Task Force began its withdrawal to
the northwest at full speed. On 16 December
the carriers Soryu and Hiryu (2d Carrier
Division) and cruisers Tone and Chikuma (8th
Squadron) broke off from the Task Force to
take part in softening-up air attacks against
Wake. The rest of the force continued toward
home bases, arriving in the Inland Sea on 23
December.

On the basis of photographic analysis and
reports by flight personnel, the Navy estimated
the results of the Pearl Harbor air strike as
follows : Sunk — four battleships, one cruiser,
two tankers ; heavily damaged — four battle-
ships ; lightly damaged — one battleship. Ap-
proximately 248 planes were estimated des-
troyed on the ground, 17 shot down in the
air, and possibly 230 destroyed in hangars. 4 '

Coordinated with the air strike were simul-
taneous attacks by the Advance (Submarine)
Force, under command of Vice Adm. Shimizu.
This Force, consisting of 27 of the Navy's best
submarines, had left its bases in Japan and
Kwajalein, in the Marshalls, between 16 and
24 November, and by X-i Day had taken up
positions controlling the entrance to Pearl
Harbor. Its missions were to observe enemy
: movements prior to the Task Force attack,
y out torpedo attacks (with A-Target
submarines)'' 5 simultaneously with the

44 Battle Lessons of the Greater East Asia War, op. cit., p. 40.

45 (1) Ibid., pp. 58-9. (2) An Imperial General Headquarters Navy Information Bureau communique issued
at 1300 18 December announced the results as : " Sunk — 5 battleships, 2 A or B-Class cruisers ; heavily damaged— 3
battleships, 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers ; medium or light damage — 1 battleship, 4 B-Class cruisers. 450 enemy
planes destroyed by bombing and strafing ; 14 shot down." ATIS Research Report No. 132, The Pearl Harbor Opera-
tion, 1 Dec 45, p. 17.

46 These craft were carried aboard long-range "mother" submarines fitted with a mechanism for releasing them
in the zone of operations. Mechanical improvements and training of the crews were completed barely in time to
permit their employment in the Pearl Harbor operation.

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PLATE NO. 14
Pearl Harbor on 8 December 1941 (Tokyo Time)

air strike, to attack any enemy ships trying to
put to sea, and to watch the movements or
surviving enemy warcraft after the Task Force
withdrawal. 47

Between 2012 and 2303 on 7 December,
several hours in advance of the air strike, five
midget submarines were released from their
" mother " submarines at positions from five
to twelve nautical miles from Pearl Harbor and,
aided by moonlight, gradually made their way
toward the harbor entrance. Since radio com-
munication was then discontinued, exact know-
ledge of their actions was lacking, but it was
believed on the basis of offshore observation
and later radio reports that at least three of the
craft had successfully penetrated into the har-
bor. A heavy explosion witnessed at 163 1 8
December was believed to indicate that a large
warship had been sunk or severely damaged,
presumably by midget submarine action. 4 *

Although rescue submarines remained off
Oahu for several days to pick up any of the
midget craft which might have survived the
attack, none returned. 49 Until early January
part of the Advance Force continued to operate
in the vicinity of Hawaii, largely to observe
fleet activity and interfere with the anticipated
transport of reinforcements to the Far Eastern
zone of operations. Most of these submarines,
at different times, proceeded to the west coast
of the United States to

South Seas and Southern Operations'"

White Vice Admiral Nagumo's Task Force
temporarily crippled the United States Pacific
Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Japanese forces in the
South Seas area and Southeast Asia began
operations in execution of other phases of the
over-all war plan. (Plate No. 15)

The Navy's South Seas Force, charged with
operations in the general area of the Japanese
mandated islands, began air attacks on 8 De-
cember to knock out American air bases on
Guam, Wake, and Howland Islands. On 10
December troops of the Army's South Seas
Detachment, with the naval support of the
South Seas Force, effected surprise landings on
the northwestern and eastern shores of Guam
before dawn and occupied the island without
serious resistance.'* This eliminated the isolated
enemy base in the heart of the Japanese manda-
ted islands.

At Wake, following repeated attacks by
Navy planes based in the Marshalls, 1,000
special naval landing troops attempted a dawn
landing on 10 December but were forced to
withdraw due to effective air attack by remain-
ing American planes and heavy seas. Follow-
ing the arrival of the aircraft carriers Soryu and
Hkyu, diverted from the Task Force returning
from Hawaii, and 500 additional naval landing
troops, a successful landing was accomplished
during the night of 22-23 December, and the

47 ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 39 (Part VIII). op. cit., p. 44.

48 ATIS Research Report No. 1 31, op. cit,, pp. 71—2.

49 One of the midget submarines which failed to penetrate into the harbor attacked small enemy craft on 8
December until it was finally disabled. One of its two crew members, Ensign Sakamaki, was taken prisoner and was
the only survivor.

50 ATIS Research Report No. 131, op. cit., p. 74.

51 Excluding the Philippines, covered in Chapter VI.

52 The Guam invasion force (South Seas Detachment) sailed from Haha-Jima, in the Bonins, on 4 December.
Kaigum Niinyo Butai Sakusen noGaiyo natabint Butai Shisetsu no Ippan Jokyo fS^l^r^St^fl^lfe^t&^jlE^SR^iSk'Sf© —
tfcjftSt (Outline of South Seas Naval Force Operations and General Situation of Facilities) 2d Demobilization Bureau,
Jul 49, p. 3.

island was completely occupied the following
day.«

In the Gilbert Islands, naval landing parties
occupied Makin and Tarawa on 10 December
and immediately constructed an advance air
base on Makin. The capture of these islands
and of Wake, enabling their utilization as air
bases, strengthened the Navy's strategic outer
defense line against American counterattack
from the Central Pacific.

In the principal theater of operations in
Southeast Asia, the Japanese forces struck
swiftly at the strategic center of British strength
in Malaya. The advance invasion units of the
Twenty-fifth Army (main strength of the 5th
Division and elements of the r8th Division)
embarked from Hainan Island on 4 December.
Early on 8 December^ these forces, supported
by the main strength of the Navy's Malaya
Force and under air cover provided by the 3d
Army Air Group, began landing operations
at Singora and Pattani, in southern Thailand,
and Kota Bharu, in northern Malaya. The
Kota Bharu force, severely attacked by British
planes after it landed on the beach, temporarily
withdrew but, with reinforced air cover,
succeeded in a second landing later the same
day."

Concurrently with the landing operations,
land-based bombers of the 226. Naval Air
Flotilla flew from Indo-China bases at 0500 on

8 December to bomb enemy military installa-
tions at Singapore. Two days later, on 10 De-
cember, Navy torpedo planes and bombers crip-
pled the British Far Eastern Fleet by sinking the
powerful battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse
and a destroyer in the waters east of Malaya.^ 6

With the occupation of Singora, Pattani and
Kota Bharu, Army Air units immediately began
operating from these advance bases, gained
mastery of the air over Malaya and provided
direct support for the ground forces advancing
on Singapore. The Twenty-fifth Army's drive
progressed smoothly despite sporadic enemy
resistance, and by late January 1942, all units
had reached thejohore Straits at the southern
tip of Malaya. Singapore fell on 1 5 February."

To the north, the Imperial Guards Division
(temporarily attached to the Fifteenth Army)
moved across the Indo-Chinese border into
Thailand on 8 December, while some of its
elements landed by sea at points along the Kra
Isthmus. These operations were accomplished
without resistance. In January, the main
strength of the Fifteenth Army (55th and 33d
Divisions) concentrated at Rahaeng and Bang-
kok in preparation for the invasion of Burma.' 8

In the Borneo and Celebes area, Japanese
operations likewise proceeded according to plan.
Embarking at Camranh Bay, French Indo-
China, on 1 3 December, the Kawaguchi De-
tachment (three infantry battalions plus Yoko-

53 Outline of South Seas Naval Force Operations and General Situation of Facilities op. cit., pp. 5-8.

54 Landings began at the following times ; Kota Bharu 0215 (0015 Malay Time) ; Singora 0410 (0210 M. T.) ;
Pattani 0430 (0230 M. T.) Marat Sakusen Khoku Dai Nijugo Gun .S^f^lSMtllSsff— "hi? (Malay Operations Record :
Twenty-fifth Army) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Sep 46, pp, 42-3.

55 ibid.

56 This striking success bolstered Japanese morale and strongly influenced subsequent air operational methods.
Two Japanese accounts of the engagement are published in ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, The Hawaii-Malaya
Naval Operations, 27 Mar 43, pp. 12-8.

57 Unconditional surrender was signed at 1950 on 15 February at a meeting between General Yamashita,
Commander-in-Chief of the Malaya Invasion Forces, and Lt, Gen. Sir A. E. Percivai.

58 Imperial General Headquarters on 22 January issued an order to the Commander-in-Chief, Southern Army,
to launch operations jointly with the Navy for the occupation of important points in Burma. Imperial General Head-
quarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 83.

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Southern Operations, December 1941— May 1942

sulca 2d Special Naval Landing Force) landed
near Miri, on the coast of British Borneo, on
1 6 December and occupied the oil fields and
airfield. 59 The detachment, moving by sea, took
Kuching on 23 December. Brunei, Labuan
Island, Jesselton, and Tawau were taken in sub-
sequent operations. 60

Strategic points in Dutch Borneo were oc-
cupied by elements of the Sakaguchi Detach-
ment which, after taking Davao in the Southern
Philippines, had hopped tojolo Island, in the
Sulu Archipelago. This force occupied Tara-
kan on 11 January 1942 and Balikpapan on 24
January. Simultaneously with these operations,
Navy forces invaded the Celebes, taking Mena-
do on if January, Kendari on 24 January and
Amboina on 31 January. 6 ' These operations
gave the Japanese forces control over important
oil-producing areas and at the same time
provided strategic forward bases for conti-
nuation of the southward advance on Java.

In the China area, joint Army-Navy plans
at the start of hostilities called for the invasion
of Hongkong as soon as the Malaya landings
had been accomplished. The 38th Division
(Twenty-third Army) and the Second China
Expeditionary Fleet were assigned to this
operation. 61 The 38th Division moved from
Canton to the Kowloon Peninsula on 14
December, and joint Army-Navy amphibious
operations against Hongkong began on 18

December. On 25 December the British
forces surrendered. 6 ' Meanwhile Japanese
Army and Navy units in the Shanghai and
Tientsin areas took control of the foreign
concessions there.

The initial offensives of the Japanese armed
farces on virtually every front thus attained
a measure of success that was beyond
original expectations. The United States and
Great Britain were forced to assume the defen-
sive, while the security of the Japanese home-
land against Allied counterattack was greatly
strengthened through the seizure of strategic
areas. Acquisition of the resources of the
southern regions not only cut off the flow of
these resources to the United States and Great
Britain, but placed Japan in a favorable eco-
nomic position for the prosecution of an ex-
tended war.

Only in the Philippines, despite the early
capture of Manila, did the Japanese Army fall
sharply behind its invasion timetable as a result
of the wholly unexpected and bitter resistance
offered by General MacArthur's isolated forces
on Bataan. 64 The protracted American defense
of Bataan, which was brought into sharp relief
by the unexpectedly early conquest of Singapore,
a modern fortress with facilities far in excess of
the rundown, antiquated installations of
Corregidor, required extraordinary measures
by Imperial General Headquarters. 65

59 Bomneo Sakusen Kiroku & # ftWt~iid$k (Borneo Operations Record), ist Demobilization Bureau, Dec
46, pp. 7-8.

60 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

61 Ranryo Higashi In Jo Koryaku Sakusen WlH&'P-UffiSWift-l (Netherlands East Indies Naval Invasion Opera-
lions) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 49, pp. 23-9.

62 Imperial General Headquarters Army Order to Commander-in-Chief, China Expeditionary Forces, 1
December 1941 : " 1. Commander-in-Chief, China Expeditionary Forces, in cooperation with the Navy, will capture
Hongkong, using as the main body the 38th Division undei the command of the Commanding General, Twenty-
third Army. 2. Operations will commence immediately after the landings in Malaya or upon confirmation of the
air attack." Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 75.

63 Shina Homen Sakusen Kiroku T%.M'%t(S\ifMt£i%, (China Area Operations Record) tst Demobilization Bureau,
Dec 46, Vol. I, pp. 26-30.

64 Cf. Vol. I : Southwest Pacific Area Series : The Campaigns of MacArthur m the Pacific, Chapter 1, p. 16, n. 29.

65 Cf. Chapter VI.

CHAPTER VI

T OF THE PHILIPPINES

Preliminary Planning

As the westernmost bastion of American
military power in the Pacific, the Philippines
in December 1941 were clearly marked as one
of the first objectives of the Japanese armed
forces.' The primary purposes which Imperial
General Headquarters planned to achieve
through their capture were not necessarily
political or economic, but essentially strategic
in character : 2

To deny to American ground, fed and air forces
the use of the Philippines as an advance base of
operations.

To secure the line of communications between the
occupied areas in the south and Japan Proper,

To acquire intermediate staging areas and supply
bases needed to facilitate operations in the southern

1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Col. Ichiji Sugita, Imperial Japanese Army, Duty assign-
ments of this officer were as follows : Staff Officer (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, Feb
39-9 Nov 41 ; Staff Officer (Intelligence), Twenty-fifth Army, 9 Nov 41 — 23 Mar 42 ; Staff Officer (Intelligence),
Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 23 Mar — 9 Nov 42 ; Staff Officer (Intelligence), Eighth Area Army,
15 Nov 42 — 15 May 43 ; Staff Officer (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 15 May — 15 Oct
43 ; Chief, Intelligence Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 15 Oct 43 — 31 Mar 44; Staff Officer
(Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 1 Apr 43 — 16 Jul 45 ; Staff Officer (Operations),
Seventeenth Area Army, 16 Jul — 23 Aug 45. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical
Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 Cf. Chapter IV, section on Areas to be Occupied ; n. 17, pp. 48-9.

3 (1) Interrogation of General Hideki Tojo, Premier and War Minister, 1941-4. (2) Statements by Rear
Adm. Sadatoshi Tomtoka, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, and Col.
Takushiro Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

4 Theoretical plans for an invasion of the Philippines in the event of war with the United States had previously
been formulated by both the Army and Navy General Staffs as part of normal military preparedness against major
potential enemies. However, until the summer of 1941, no concrete plans were seriously considered, and Army
strategists saw a possibility of by-passing the Philippines and avoiding war with the United States, even if Japan
embarked on operations against Britain and the Netherlands. By September, decision had been reached that such a
course would be too risky, and that the Philippines must therefore be included in the overall plan of operations.
(Interrogations of Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial Genera! Headquarters, Army
Section, and General Tojo, previously cited.)

areaJ

Serious study of the tactical and logistic
problems involved in an invasion of the Philip-
pines simultaneously with operations against
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies got under
way in September 1941, when over-all inter-
national developments had convinced Imperial
General Headquarters that an eventual Japa-
nese move against British and Dutch posses-
sions in Southeast Asia would almost certainly
bring the United States into war. By the
early part of October, when special Army war
games took place in Tokyo to test the tactical
plans being elaborated for the invasion of the
southern area, the main lines of the Philippines
operation plan had been tentatively worked out
and were subjected to study as part of the

In view of the clearcut military necessity of
seizing the Philippines in the first phase of
operations, the Army and Navy General Staffs
kept close surveillance on changes in Philip-
pine defense strength during the planning
period.' Following General MacArthur's re-
call to active duty in July 1941 as Commanding
General, United States Army Forces in the
Far East (USAFFE), a marked acceleration
was noticed in the organization and training
of Philippine Army units, and intelligence re-
ports indicated a substantial reinforcement of
American heavy bomber forces based in the
Philippines and of the submarine strength of
the United States Asiatic Fleet at Cavite.

General Staff estimates based on intelligence
received up to 15 November 1941 placed
United States regular army ground strength
in the Philippines at approximately 22,000 offi-
cers and men, comprising one infantry division
and service troops stationed principally in the
Manila area, with elements at Baguio and
Tarlac, and three coast artillery and one
antiaircraft artillery regiments garrisoning Cor-
regidor, El Fraile, Carabao and Caballo Islands,
and Subic Bay. 6 In addition, native troop
strength of the Philippine Army was estimated
at rrojooo, organized in ten divisions. Seven
of these were stationed on Luzon, principally
in the central area from Lingayen to Batangas,
with one division on Panay, one divided
between Cebu and Bohol, and one on

Mindanao. 7

United States Army air strength in the
Philippines was estimated at one fighter group
of four squadrons (108 planes) at Nichols
Field ; one bomber group at Clark Field, com-
prising three bomber squadrons (about 38
planes), one fighter squadron (27 planesj and
two reconnaissance squadrons (13 planes); and
20 fighters based on other subsidiary fields,
an aggregate total of 206 aircraft. Besides
these, the Navy was believed to have about
70 scout planes and carrier-borne fighters at
Olongapo and Cavite."

Japanese estimates placed the ship strength
of the United States Asiatic Fleet at two heavy
cruisers, one light cruiser, 15 destroyers and

In view of the limited strength at his dis-
posal, Imperial General Headquarters antici-
pated that General MacArthur would not at-
tempt an absolute defense of the Philippines,
but would carry out a strategic delaying action
calculated primarily to hold up the Japanese
southern advance as long as possible and con-
sume the fighting strength of the Japanese
forces." 5 In the initial phase, it was expected
that aircraft and submarines would be em-
ployed to impede the landings. Ground forces
might then be thrown against the beachheads
in an attempt to engage the landing troops
before they could consolidate their positions,
but an equal or greater possibility was that

5 Cf. Chapter II, p. 22.

6 Hito Sakusen Kiroku D<ii Ikki tt&f^$£$Effi8^J(l (Philippine Operations Record, Phase One) tst De-
mobilization Bureau, Jun 46, pp. 14-8.

7 These units were identified as follows: nth Division north of Baguio ; 2tst, 31st, 41st and elements of 71st
and 91st Divisions in central Luzon; 51st Division in southern Luzon (Legaspi); 61st Division on Panay, 81st
Division on Cebu and Bohol ; :01st Division on Mindanao. By December, total Philippine Army strength was
expected to reach 125,000. Ibid., pp. 14-6.

8 Ibid., pp. 16-7.

9 Dai Toa Senso Saikun (Koku) ±<U®MTtWN (tt&) (Battle Lessons of the Great East Asia War : Air) Navy
Battle Lessons Analysis Committee (Air Division), Oct 42.

10 Data on General Staff estimate of General MacArthur's probable courses of action furnished by Col. Arata
Yamamoto, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, Sep 41-Oct 43.

General Mac Arthur would decide
immediate commitment of his main strength
on the beaches.

In the event that the Japanese landings
were successfully accomplished, it was antici-
pated that General MacArthur would deploy
his troops in key positions around Manila and
endeavor to hold the capital as long as pos-
sible. The Intelligence Section of the Army
General Staff also foresaw the possibility of
an enemy withdrawal to Bataan Peninsula, but
since knowledge was lacking regarding the
existence of any prepared defense positions in
that area, such a contingency was not regarded
seriously. It was estimated that, if such a
withdrawal took place, the enemy forces could
easily be bottled up and destroyed."

In conjunction with General MacArthur's
tactics on land, it was expected that the United
States Asiatic Fleet would first attempt to
impede the Japanese landings and then concen-
trate on harassing lines of communication. To
gain greater safety, it was considered probable
that American naval units would make use of
bases farther south, and possibly join British
and Dutch naval forces in combined operations
against the Japanese Fleet.

With this estimate of enemy strength and
tactics as a basis, the Army Section of Imperial
General Headquarters developed a preliminary
operational plan which set the early capture
of Manila as the primary tactical objective of

the invasion forces and assigned only secondary
importance to the destruction of enemy troops.
Since Manila was the central core of American
military, naval and air bases in the Philippines,
General Staff planners took the practical view
that its capture would largely achieve the main
strategic purpose of the Philippines invasion :
the cjuick elimination of American bases threat-
ening Japan's r.dvance into the southern area.
It was also expected that the fall of Manila
would exert a strong psychological effect toward
demoralizing Filipino resistance, and thereby
facilitate the pacification of the remainder of
the Philippines."

The second essential feature of the Imperial
General Headquarters plan was the decision to
begin operations in the Philippines with an
air offensive prior to the landing of ground
forces, whereas, in Malaya, immediate landings
were envisaged. To ensure the safety of the
Philippine invasion convoys from bombing
attack, it was therefore imperative to knock out
enemy air power as quickly as possible, and
also to preface the main landings with the
seizure of advance air bases.' 3

As a result of these considerations, Imperial
General Headquarters decided to throw the
entire effort during the first few days of hos-
tilities into a powerful and sustained air offen-
sive against the major concentrations of enemy
air strength. Since these were located principal-
i area anc

11 When plans for the Philippines operation were studied at the special Army war games in October 1941, Lt.
Gen, Masami Maeda, later appointed Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Army, asked what consideration had been
given to a possible withdrawal of the enemy forces into Bataan. The question was brushed aside without discussion,
and it was evident that Imperial General Headquarters had formulated no definite plans to cope with that eventuality
(Statement by Lt. Col. Monjiro Akiyama, Staff Officer (Air Operations), Fourteenth Army.)

12 Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.

13 (1) Special importance was placed on the initial air operations because it was believed that the success
or failure of the Philippines operation would depend upon the annihilation of enemy air power. Statement by Col.
Hattori, previously cited. (2) Whether Japan could accomplish the invasion of the Philippines in a short time
depended upon whether American air power could be destroyed at one blow. Hito Koryaku Sakusen ni okeru Kdtgun
Sdkusen Jokyo Ifctf Sfff^ft-WpN'^ (Operational Situation of the Japanese Navy in the Invasion of the
Philippines) 2d Demobilization Bureau, 15 May 46, p. 1.

the range of Japanese Army planes operating
from southern Formosa, it was necessary to
obtain the cooperation of naval air strength,
including long-range bombers based in south-
ern Formosa, as well as seaplane and carrier
forces. The boundary of air operations between
the Army and Navy was to be fixed at 16
degrees N. Lat. t placing all the enemy's major
bases in the Manila area within the Navy's
operational sphere. (Plate No. 16)

Imperial General Headquarters estimated
that enemy air resistance would be sufficiently
neutralized within two to four days to permit
execution of the next step in the operational
plan : the landing of advance detachments on
northern and southern Luzon with the mission
of seizing air bases at strategic points and
quickly preparing them for operational use by
the Japanese forces. The airfields at Aparri,
Laoag and Vigan were designated as the initial
objectives on northern Luzon, while the south-
ern Luzon force was to seize the airfield at
Legaspi. Prior to the advance landings on
Luzon Proper, occupation of Batan Island, 150
miles north of Aparri, was planned as a pre-
liminary step to facilitate fighter cover of the
north Luzon landings.' 4

Airfield construction and maintenance units,
going in with the advance forces, were to pre-
pare the occupied fields for operational use
within a few days of their capture, and Army
and Navy Air units were then to move im-
mediately forward and resume offensive opera-
tions. Allowing a further brief period for these
operations to complete the destruction of enemy

air power, Imperial General Headquarters
initially estimated that the main landings could
be carried out on X-Day plus 9 at Lingayen

Gulf, and X-Day plus 11 at Lamon Bay.' 5
These estimates were revised upward by five
days in the final operations plan.

The basic plan of attack against Manila
envisaged a two-pronged pincers movement, the
main invasion forces landing at Lingayen Gulf
and driving toward the capital from the north,
while a strong secondary force was to land at
Lamon Bay'*' and advance on Manila from the
southeast, splitting the enemy defense effort.
Since it was the shortest rcute, it was decided
to direct the main effort toward Man a via
Tayug and Cabanatuan, skirting the eastern
edge of the Luzon plain.' 7 (Plate No. 17)

Parallel with the main operations on Luzon,
the over-all invasion plan called for the seizure
by small forces of Davao, on the southern
coast of Mindanao, and Jolo Island, in the
Sulu Archipelago. Strategically, occupation
of these points was designed to obtain air
bases for impeding a possible southward with-
drawal of the American forces in the Philip-
pines and were also needed as staging points
for the scheduled invasion of Celebes and
eastern Borneo.

Imperial General Headquarters, taking into
consideration the troop requirements for other

infantry strength to be employed
in the Philippine landings at a total of 21
battalions.' 8 The allocation of these forces by
landing area was as follows : Northern Luzon

14 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 24-5.

15 Ibid., pp. 37-8.

16 In the initial planning stage, Batangas Province, on the west coast of Luzon, was also considered as a pos-
sible site for the secondary landing. Lamon Bay was chosen because it offered a shorter and less dangerous route of
sea approach. Ibid., pp. 50-1.

r 7 Ibid., p. 39.

18 The Fourteenth Army, after its assignment to the Philippines invasion, requested a strength of two and
one-half first-line combat divisions for the execution of the Philippines landings, but Imperial General Headquarters
refused the request. Transport tonnage allotted to the Philippines was also pared down from an originally estimated
800,000 tons required to 630,000 tons. (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 48-50- (*)
Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Masami Maeda, Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Army.

advance landings, three battalions ; Legaspi
advance landing, two battalions ; Lingayen
Gulf, nine battalions ; Lamon Bay, three bat-
talions ; Davao and Jolo, four battalions.' 9

The Navy, in addition to furnishing the
bulk of the air strength to be employed in the
initial phase of the operations, was assigned
the missions of destroying enemy fleet and air
strength in the Philippines area, protecting the
assembly points of the invasion convoys, pro-
viding surface escort and naval support of the
landing operations, and guarding against pos-
sible counterattacks by Allied naval forces.
Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section
anticipated that the major threat of such
counterattacks would come from the American
Asiatic Fleet, possibly reinforced by Allied fleet
units. In the event, however, that the main
body of the United States Pacific Fleet sortied
into the Western Pacific, plans were made to
divert the main strength of the Navy's Southern
Forces to counter the attack.

Assembly points of the invasion convoys
were selected with special attention to the
maintenance of secrecy and safety from enemy
submarine and air attack. To avoid overlarge
concentrations of ships in southern Formosan
harbors, it was decided to stage the main in-
vasion forces from three ports : Keelung and
Takao, on Formosa, and the naval base of
Mako, in the Pescadores. The Lamon Bay
and Mindanao landing forces were to stage
respectively from Amami-Oshima, in the Ryu-
kyu Islands, and Palau, in the western
Carolines.

Imperial General Headquarters estimated
that the occupation of key areas in the Philip-

pines could be accomplished within a period
of about fifty days. 2 " On the basis of this
estimate, it was tentatively decided to withdraw
one combat division as soon as the major
military objectives had been achieved, and to
reassign it to the invasion of Java. Most of the
naval forces were to be withdrawn at the same
time and reorganized as the Dutch Indies
Force. This would leave relatively weak Army
and Navy forces to complete the occupation
of the islands and secure them against enemy
counterattack, but it was anticipated that
Filipino cooperation could readily be won
through political concessions and that the
islands would be safe from counterattack
behind the rampart of Japan's defenses in
the mandated islands.

it of Forces

In accordance with the over-all plans elabo-
rated by Imperial General Headquarters, the

ing the Philippines invasion to the Fourteenth
Army, under command of Lt. Gen. Masaharu
Homma, peacetime commander of the For-
mosa Army. To provide Army air support,
the 5th Air Group, under command of Lt.
Gen. Hideyoshi Obata, was transferred from
Manchuria to Formosa and placed under
Fourteenth Army command. 1 ' Naval mis-
sions incident upon the operation were as-
signed by the Combined Fleet to the Phil-
ippines Force under Vice Admiral Ibo
Takahashi, Third Fleet Commander, and the
Eleventh Air Fleet under Vice Admiral
Nishizo Tsukahara."

IQ Phili ppine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., p. 50.

20 Statement by Col. Hatton, previously cited. Cf. Chapter V, n. 4, p. 58.

21 Hito Koku Sakusen Kiroku Dei Ikki &&&&ftW&&M- J to (Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase One)
1st Demobilization Bureau, Jun 46, pp. 1, 19.

22 ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 39 (Part VIII) 4 Jun 45, p. 45. (2) Operational Situation of
the Japanese Navy in the Philippine Invasion, op. cit., pp. 2—3.

PLATE NO. 16
Japanese Air Operations in Philippines, December 1941

ji v y & ^ f£ H

MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY OF LUZON

Reefe along projecting sections) of lha coast;
o th e r sec t io ns , w i th so ndy hta hti exceeding

1.2 miles in frontal width Idenl (or landing
Scattered coconut groves on tlie coast;
fields and paddle* inland. Tro >p movement
easy. Llrtgayen not suitable fo lending
large unite.

tt*t»tS**«sSlU
River tordable during

Ing with heavy equip
menl difficult mm** ' 'Jf
at bridge points. >

Dense Jungle. Transport of hedv
material and deployment of
t l tpej a HWM y tmi

Fortified Corregidor bars
entrance to Manila Boy.

Western Cavils Prov abruptly
««oep4 tor oreo nor th of Ternile
where siege guns con be dec loved

EUvolliy In malm

PLATE NO. 17
Military Topography of Luzon

Ground force strength assigned to the
Fourteenth Army for the
its mission centered around two
bat divisions, the 16th and 48th, which were
to execute the initial phases of the operations,
and the 65th Brigade, which was to move in
subsequently as a garrison force. 2 * The 48th
Division, based in Formosa, was among the
Japanese Army's most experienced units and
specially trained in amphibious operations.
The 1 6th Division, scheduled to execute the
secondary landing at Lamon Bay, was picked
as one of the best divisions then available in
Japan Proper.

These units were reinforced by two tank
regiments, five heavy field artillery battalions
(Army artillery), approximately five field anti-
aircraft artillery battalions, four independent
antitank companies, and an independent mortar
battalion. To meet the special requirements
of the operation, an unusually strong comple-
ment of independent engineer units and bridge
companies was included in the Army's attached
service forces.

Combat strength of the 5th Air Group
consisted of two fighter regiments, two light
bomber regiments, and one heavy bomber regi-
ment, plus an independent reconnaissance and
observation unit. Strength in Army aircraft
aggregated 192, including 72 fighters, 8r
bombers and 39 reconnaissance and observation
planes. 1 *

Principal units composing Fourteenth Army
order of battle for the first phase of the Philip-
pines operation were as follows

Fourteenth Army Headquarters
t6th Division

48th Division

3d, 8th, gth, 10th Ind. Antitank Cos.

4th, yth Tank Regiments

1st, 8th Heavy Artillery Regts.

pth Ind. Heavy Artillery Bn.

40th, 45th, 42th, 48th Field A. A. A. Bns.

30th, 31st Ind. Field A. A. A. Cos.

15th Ind. Mortar Bn.

3d, 21st Ind. Engr. Regts.

3d Ind. Engr, Co.

26th, 28th Bridge Material Cos.

13th, 14th River Crossing Material Cos.

Army signal units

6th Railway Regt.

Shipping units

Line of Communications units
1st Field M. P. Unit
jth Air Croup
Headquarters
4th Air Brigade
50th Fighter Regt
8th Light Bomber Regt.
16th Light Bomber Regt.
14th Heavy Bomber Regt.
24th Fighter Regt.
10th Ind. Air Unit 26

To permit employment of virtually the
Army's full strength in the crucial assault on
Luzon, Imperial General Headquarters and the
Southern Army decided to transfer the initial
mission of occupying Davao and Jolo to the
Sixteenth Army, assigned to operations against
eastern Borneo and Java. Under this arrange-
ment, the Sixteenth Army's Sakaguchi Detach-
ment ( 56th Mixed Infantry Group Hqs. ;
146th Infantry Regt. reinf.) provided the main
strength of the Davao landing force. One
infantry battalion of the 16th Division was

23 The 65th Brigade consisted of three infantry regiments. Cf. p. 100.

24 Philippine Air Operations, Phase One, op. cit,, p. 22.

25 Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai lkki Bessatsu JtJSftilc.idfVft^WS'Jflft I Philippine Operations Phase One, Sup-
plement) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Jul 46.

26 The 10th Independent Air Unit was composed of the 52d, 74th and 76th Independent Air Companies, all
equipped only with reconnaissance and observation craft.

temporarily attached for occupation duty, thus
effecting early release of the Sakaguchi De-
tachment for its further missions on Jolo and
in eastern Borneo. The 16th Division force
remaining at Davao was then to revert to
Fourteenth Army command.

Naval surface strength allotted to support
the Philippines operation comprised the bulk
of the Third Fleet, reinforced by the attachment
of two destroyer squadrons (less elements)
and one cruiser division from the Second Fleet,
the 4th Carrier Division (Ryujo and one
destroyer) from the First Air Fleet, and the
1 ith Seaplane Tender Division from the Com-
bined Fleet. 17 This gave the Philippines
Force an aggregate strength in combat ships of
one aircraft carrier, five heavy cruisers, five
light cruisers, three seaplane tenders, 29
destroyers, four torpedo boats, 13 minesweepers
and four minelayers.

To carry out its missions, the Eleventh Air
Fleet assigned the bulk of its land-based
forces, the 21st and 23d Air Flotillas, with
a combined strength of 146 bombers, 123
fighters, 24 flying boats, and 15 reconnaissance
planes. 18 These were in addition to 16 fighters
and 18 torpedo planes composing the com-
plement of the Ryujo, and a total of 68
seaplanes operating from surface units. 29 Ag-
gregate naval air strength assigned to the
Philippines operation thus reached 412 planes.
Combined initial allotment of Army and Navy
aircraft totaled 604.

Filial Operations Plan

By early November, the Commander-in-

Chief of the Southern Army and Combined
Fleet had completed study of the Imperial
General Headquarters outline plan of opera-
tions and had reached agreement on the gen-
eral terms of Army-Navy cooperation. The
commanders and principal staff officers of the
Fourteenth Army, 5th Air Group, Third Fleet
and Eleventh Air Fleet were then summoned
to participate in the joint Army-Navy confer-
ence at Iwakuni from 14 to 16 November,'
and the final Fourteenth Army operational plan
for the Philippines invasion was drawn up.
Its essentials were as follows

/. The objective of the operations will be to
crush the enemy's principal bases and defeat bis forces
in the Philippines. In cooperation with the Navy,
the Army will land its main forces on Luzon, over-
come enemy resistance, and quickly occupy Ahnila.
Thereafter it will occupy other vital points in the
Philippines.

2. Prior to the start of hostilities, the Army will
assemble its advance elements at Mako and Palau,
and its main forces on Formosa and the Nansei
(Ryukyu) Islands, All necessary precautions will be
taken to guard the iecrecy of the above movements
and of the operational preparations.

j. The operations will begin with air attacks on
the Philippines. The Army Air forces will be
responsible for attacking enemy air power north of
16 degrees N. Lot., and the Navy Air forces will be
responsible for same mission south of that line.

4. At the appropriate time following the start of
air attacks, the advance elements of the Army and
Navy will execute landings and occupy enemy air
bases as follows :

" A " Detachment will occupy Aparri.

" B " Detachment will occupy Vigan and Laodg.

" C " Detachment will occupy Legaspi.

27 (1) Hito Koryaku Sakusen #^ScH8-f£lfc (Philippine Invasion Operations) Combined Fleet Headquarters, Jun
42, pp. 2-3. (2) ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 39 (Part VIII), op. cit., p. 45.

28 Battle Lessons of the Great Asia War, op. cit.

29 Nihon Kaxgun Hensei Suii oyobi Heiryoku Soshitsu Hyo B^MWHNIII-JfcC^^K^K (Table Showing
Organizational Changes and Losses of Japanese Naval Forsces) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 49, pp. J-i and L-i.

30 Cf, Chapter HI, p. 37.

31 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 21-8, 31.

" D " Detachment will occupy Da* no.
Naval unit will occupy Batan Island.
As soon as the above airfields are rendered operational,
Army and Navy Air forces will move forward and
conduct operations from these bases.

j. When the major portion of the enemy air
strength in the Philippines has been destroyed, the
Army will land its main forces on Luzon, swiftly
capture Manila, and occupy other vital points in the
Philippines. The Army's main strength will land at
Lingayen Gulf, and the 16th Division at Lamon Bay.

6. The Third Fleet will be responsible for surface
escort of the landing forces. Navy Air forces will
primarily be responsible for air escort of the advance
troops while en route to the landing points. Army
and Navy Air forces will support the northern Luzon
advance forces during the landings and operations
immediately thereafter. Navy Air forces will suppoit
the advance forces landing at Legaspi and Davao.

y. Navy Air forces will primarily be responsible
for air escort of the main Army forces while en route
to Lingayen Gulf, and Army and Navy forces will
cooperate in anchorage defense. Army Air forces will
primarily be responsible for supporting the landing
operations and operations immediately thereafter.
Navy Air forces will primarily be responsible for
supporting the landings at Lamon Bay.

8. The 6}th Brigade will follow the main forces
and disembark at Lingayen Gulf. After the major
part of the operations has been completed, the Army
will prepare to divert the 48th Division.

9. Fourteenth Army headquarters will first be
located at Taihoku, but will be transferred to Takao
prior to the start of operations. The Army com-
mander will land on Luzon with the main force of
the Army. The Commander oj the Eleventh Air
Fleet will be at Takao.

On 20 November, four days after the
adoption of the final plan, General Terauchi,
Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army,
issued formal orders to the Fourteenth Army
confirming the main points of the plan. The

order stated in part : J *

The Fourteenth Army, in accordance with the
following instructions, will occupy the enemy's princi-
pal bases in the Philippines, particularly the capital
city of Manila, and crush enemy resistance.

1. Offensive operations will begin with the
launching of air attacks against the enemy's air
strength on Luzon.

2. Advance forces will leave their respective
staging points on and subsequent to the day prior to
the first air attack, effect landings on northern Luzon
and in the Legaspi area, and establish f 01 ward air
bases. Air operations will be continued from these
bases.

3. Taking advantage of the results achieved by
the air operations, the Army will land its mam
strength in the Lingayen Gulf area and will land its
supporting strength in the vicinity of Lamon Bay
by approximately the 15th day of hostilities. These
forces will quickly occupy Manila.

Movement of Fourteenth Army troops to the
designated staging areas in Formosa, Amami-
Oshima and Palau began immediately with the
issuance of the 20 November order. On the
same day, 16th Division elements (33d Infantry
Regiment) assigned to the landings at Legaspi
and Davao embarked from Nagoya, reaching
Palau between 28 and 30 November. On 25
November the main strength of the Division
embarked at Osaka and moved to Amami-
Oshima, where it arrived on 3 December.
The Division's 9th Infantry Regiment, which
was slated to reinforce the 48th Division in the
main landing on Lingayen Gulf, meanwhile
embarked for Formosa, reaching its destination
by 5 December."

The 48th Division troops assigned to the
advance landings at Aparri and Vigan (2d
Formosa Infantry Regiment) boarded trans-
ports at Takao, southern Formosa, and moved

32 Ibid., pp. 53-4.

33 Ibid., pp. 58-9.

AND MISSIONS OF LANDING

$ ft ft ft

ADVANCE FORCES

± m n m

LANDING FORCES'*

BATAN ISLAND U< 9 y)

Nival landing unit (temporarily organised)
Elm ■ , 4 .h Airfield Bn (Army)

VIGAN (£">¥ y)
Kanno Detachment

itr Bn (-a coa) tc 3rd Bn/and Fa

i boy/4*K Mt Arty Regt

i boy/4jth AAA Bn
i bny/4«h AAA Bn
Army «ir service units

APARRJ(T^»)
Tanaka Detachment

and Formosa Inf Regt (-V.gan Force)
in Bn (-1 btry)/48t£ Mt Arty Regt
40th AAA Bn ( sbrry)
Army air lervice uniu

LEGASPI l\rH% f-)

Detachment (idth Inf Gp i":'
33rd Inf Regt (-■« BnJ
i brry'iand Arty Regt
are in Special Landing Force (-1 Co)
I AirheUf Construction Unit (Navy)

I Inf Regt 7
6

bibbs*

DEPARTURE
DATE

7 Dec

Capture

Af-rri Maao(^)

8 Dec

Capture and maintain Vigan Mako (M&> ^ 7 Dec id Dec

7 Dec i» Dec

Capture and maintain Legaipi Palais^:?*) 8 Dec U Dec

DAVAO

Sakaguehi Deiachmexlt (}6th Mixed Inf Gp Hq)<"' i
146th Inf Regt 6
■ it Ba/«.6th Arty Regl ■•
tit Co/}6th Engt Regt
Miura Detschmenrt***)
tat Bn/33«1 W

Kure and Special Landing Force (-J plata)

and Airfield Construction Unit (Navy)

JOLO(*nJ

[jrd Bn (-1 cosWiatkh Inf Regi]t~t
Elfna/Kun 1 It A£ and Special Landing Forces
3rd Airfield Construction Unit (Navy)

UNGAYEN (FIRST ECHELON) f 9

47th Inf Regt (-tit Bn) 1 emit

4th Tk Regt (-! en) 8 destroyer*

and Bn '4f th Mt Any Regt ay transports

UNGAYEN (SECOND ECHELON) I 9 V tfi*

Fourteenth Army Ho 1 cruller

48th Div Hq 7 destroyers

1st Formosa Inf Regt
I co/fth Tit Regt
7th Tk Regt

IK Bn/47th Inf Regt (Div reserve)

48th Mt Arty Regt (-1st St and Bra)

4*th E»r Regt (-elm.)
Uejima Detach mem fist Bn/oth Inf Regt eV elmal
Army Arty

UNGAYEN (THIRD ECHELON) [ 9 v fl ^ >(JB=»»I

* * ■mm

MAIN FORCES

(1) Capture Davao (including
(a) Mrfat** Stttt Airfield

Palau (^'?!|-)

■ 6-17 Dec

ao Dec

CLMLxiift Jolo I i [if Eudi no

ifiA

Davao iir^t)

Land in

Mako

» Dec

,8 Dec

.8 Dec

if Dec

« Dec

aa Dec

and Bn/oth Inf Regt (Army reserve)
3rd Bn/oth Inf Regt (Left flank '

(Formosa)

LAMON BAY ('»*;'»)
,6th Div He,

1 6th Div (-9th, 33rd Inf Regis & other elms)

17 Dec

24 transports

(near Okinawa)

■ Elements of I'lTn l'tg units, such si "g"' 1 . •hipping and line of communication unns, w
** The Searastuchi Drorfnmi, one of the cmhit dementi assigned to the Sirteenth Arm? on 6 N.jv 41, sum

Amy COflVSInsW on so Nov. Following the invasion of Davao s portion of die farce, Msisumcrfd Dtetsrhmm
SfcWagucfu Dasachment regrouped end prepared ro pntictpmor to the invasion of Dutch Borneo.
— The Mien Detach™,,, formed from Fourteenth Aonr forces, «s .nached t» the SJuiguchi Drochmen, foe the

fee the I

"of Jcde^u'tV^n^.

aa Dec

14 Dec

the Stnreiuh
of >he

PLATE NO. 18

Composition and Missions of Landing Forces

between 23 and 25 November to the nearby
naval port of Mako, in the Pescadores, where
final landing preparations were completed.
The main strength of the Division simul-
taneously began assembling at Takao, Mako
and the northern Formosan port of Keeking.
By the end of November, the 65th Brigade had
also completed its movement from the Japanese
mainland and was assembled in Formosa.''

Concurrently with the assembly of the inva-
sion troops, the 5th Air Group and Eleventh
Air Fleet rapidly concentrated at southern
Formosan bases in readiness for the launching
of the initial air offensive. All units of the
5th Air Group were assembled at their bases
at Heito, Koshun, Choshu and Kato by 6
December. Land-based bombers and fighters
of the 21st and 23d Air Flotillas prepared to
operate mainly from bases at Tainan, Takao,
Taichu and Patau.

Between 24 November and 5 December,
operational orders were issued by the Army
commander to all units specifying the com-
position and missions of the various landing
forces (Plate No. 18), air force assignments,
and essential points of the landing operations.
Details of cooperation were worked out in
agreements concluded between the Army and
Navy commanders directly assigned to each
landing operation. 3 '

The land, sea and air forces were now poised
for the attack. Organization for combat was
completed, and morale high. On 1 December
Lt. Gen. Homma transferred his headquarters
to Takao, and Vice Admiral Takahashi, Com-
mander of the Third Fleet, raised his flag
aboard the Ashigara at Mako. On 2 Decem-

ber orders were received from General Hisaichi"
Terauchi, Southern Army Commander-in-
Chief, and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto,
Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet,
designating 8 December as X-day.

The Army Air forces began operations ac-
cording to plan early on 8 December. Taking
off before dawn from bases in southern For-
mosa, 43 Army planes struck the first blows
at enemy airfield at Tuguegarao and barracks
at Baguio, on northern Luzon. The attacks
were made at approximately 0800 (0700 local
time), about four hours and a half after the
first bombs from Japanese carrier planes struck
Pearl Harbor.

Due to heavy fog over their airdromes at
Tainan and Takao, naval land-based aircraft
scheduled for the initial attacks were late in
taking off, finally clearing their fields at about
0930. This force, made up of 108 Navy land-
based attack planes and 84 fighters, had as its
objectives Clark Field and the American fighter
base at Iba, on the west coast of Luzon. The
formations arrived over their targets shortly
after 1330 (1230 local time) and carried out
highly successful attacks. Meanwhile, carrier
planes took off from the Ryujo at a point 100
miles east of Mindanao during the early morn-
ing hours and carried out an effective strike
on Davao.

Since radio intelligence showed that Philip-
pines defense installations had been alerted at
0430 on 8 December, it was assumed that the
enemy had already received news of the Pearl
Harbor attack and that the Japanese air units
would encounter energetic resistance from both
intercepter aircraft and antiaircraft artillery.
Resistance, however, proved much weaker than
anticipated, with the result that the attacks
achieved a spectacular degree of success, es-

34 Ibid, p., 60,

35 Ibid., pp. 58-9.

pecially at Clark Field. 3 *

While the first air attacks were being
mounted, the advance force convoys were at
sea, heading toward the various invasion objec-
tives. Surface and air cover was furnished the
convoys by the Third Fleet, and by Army and
land-based Navy units operating from airfields
in southern Formosa.

At dawn on 8 December the Batan Island
landing force made an unopposed landing and
seized the airstrip. On 9 December fighters
of the Army's 5th Air Group landed on the
strip and found it suitable for operational use.
Airfield construction units swiftly effected neces-
sary improvements, and fighter units moved
forward to support the landing operations at
Vigan and Aparri.

On 10 December, while the Navy Air force
carried out heavy neutralization strikes against
the airfields in the Manila area, the Tanaka
(2d Battalion, 2d Formosa Infantry, reinf.) and
Kanno (rst and 3d Battalions, 2d Formosa
Infantry, reinf.) Detachments effected their
dawn landings at Aparri and Vigan against no
opposition. The airfields were quickly occupied.
The Kanno Detachment immediately pushed
north from Vigan along the coast road and
took the airfield at Laoag on 12 December.
Meanwhile, a small element of the Tanaka
Detachment advanced up the Cagayan River
and took Tuguegarao. There was no enemy
air reaction to these operations except individual
sorties against Vigan anchorage by large-type
American aircraft. 37

The captured airdromes were rapidly prepar-
ed for use as advance operational bases, and
units of the Army's 5th Air Group quickly

moved forward according to plan. The 24th
Fighter Regiment advanced to Vigan on 11
December, and on 12 and 14 December the
50th Fighter Regiment and one element of the
1 6th Light Bomber Regiment arrived at
Aparri.' 8 On the 13th more than 100 navy
bombers carried out neutralization strikes on
Del Carmen, Clark, Iba and Nichols fields.
Also on the 13th, 15 Army heavy bombers
and fighters hit Clark Field.

The successful exploitation of advance bases
soon gave the Japanese Air forces an overwhelm-
ing superiority which was to have a great effect
on later operations. On 15 December, it was
estimated that the combat strength of the
United States Air Forces had been reduced to
about ten bombers, ten flying boats and
twenty fighters." It was presumed that
enemy air strength had been dispersed to the
central Philippines and to Iloilo, Del Monte,
and Jolo to the south. In less than a week
the Japanese had gained control of the skies
over the Philippines.

In the interim, amphibious operations con-
tinued to progress satisfactorily. The Kimura
Detachment landed in the vicinity of Legaspi
at 0245 on 1 2 December without encountering
any enemy opposition and quickly overran the
nearby airfield.'' Naval Air units supported
the operation by continuing the neutralization
of enemy airfields in the Manila area on 12-13
December. Japanese air losses were negligible.

In the north the Tanaka and Kanno Detach-
ments, having accomplished their mission, were
regrouped for further operations. General
Homma, seeing that the enemy was not con-
ducting an aggressive defense in northern

36 Operational Situation of the Japanese Navy in the Philippines Invasion, op. cit., p. 4.

37 Ibid., pp. 4-5.

38 The Group Commander, Lt. Gen. Hideyoshi Obata, advanced to Aparri on 18 Decembet. Philippine Air
Operations, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 32, 34, 38, 47.

39 Operational Situation of the Japanese Navy in the Philippines Invasion, op. cit., p. 5.

40 Responsibility for operation of this field was assigned to the Navy. Philippine Operations Record, Phase
One, op. cit., pp. 62-3, 69.

Original Painting by Kci Sato

Photograph by U.S. Army Signal Corps

PLATE NO. to
Air Raid on Clark Field

Luzon, on 13 December ordered the Tanaka
Detachment to leave a small security guard at
Aparri, and advance along the coastal highway
to Vigan. The Kanno Detachment was
similarly ordered to leave a small rear echelon
at Vigan and advance its main body down the
coastal road to Rosario. On 15 December
Fourteenth Army amended these orders to
effect the merger of the Kanno Detachment with
the Tanaka Detachment, placing Colonel
Tanaka in command. This new unit was given
the mission of advancing south down the west
Luzon coast road to Rosario, there to link up
with the Lingayen landing force, which at this
time had not yet left Formosa.*'

In southern Luzon, ground operations were
also progressing rapidly. The Kimura Detach-
ment, advancing from its Legaspi beachhead,
was racing up the Bicol Peninsula against only
scattered resistance, repairing damaged roads
and bridges on the way. By 18 December the
detachment took Naga, and on 2r December
its advance guard entered Daet. Behind them
the captured Legaspi airdrome was being used
as an operational base by nine fighters of the
23d Air Flotilla, which landed there on 14
December/ 1

In the early dawn of 20 December the
Mindanao invasion force, under Maj. Gen,
Shizuo Sakaguchi, landed near Davao on Min-
danao island. Resistance by the garrison of
some 3,500 Filipino-American troops was
quickly overcome and, by 1500 the same day,
Davao and the airfield were occupied. 41 The
Miura Detachment (rst Battalion, 33d Infantry,
reinf.) and a naval airfield construction unit
were left in the vicinity of Davao, while one

element of the Sakaguchi Detachment and some
naval landing troops proceeded to Jolo Island,
occupying the city of Jolo at 1030 25 Decem-
ber. The airfields at both Davao and Jolo
were developed as operational bases. On 23
December twelve fighters and two reconnais-
sance aircraft of the 23d Air Flotilla landed
at Davao, and on 26 December the first Navy
fighters landed on Jolo. 44

General Homma, although reassured by the
news of these early successes, continued to
carry out thorough preparations for the landing
operations of the main body of the Fourteenth
Army at Lingayen Gulf. On 17 December his
estimate of the situation was substantially as
follows : 45

/. The main ground strength of the enemy
forces on Luzon consists of one Philippine-American
division and seven divisions of the Philippine National
Army. This fotce is disposed in two areas. The
Philippine- American division and five divisions of the
National Army are concentrated in the central part of
Luzon in preparation for counter attacks against the
main Japanese landing at Lingayen Gulf. Two
divisions of the National Army are deployed at key
points in southern Luzon in readiness for expected
landings by the Japanese foices along the coast of
Lamon Bay and in Batangas Province.

2. The mam strength of the United States Air
Force has been destroyed. The remaining strength
(approximately jo fighters and 10 bombers) probably
will carry out individual sorties.

Preparations for transportation of the Japa-
nese main forces were completed on schedule.
At Amami-Oshima the 16th Division embark-
ed in the 24 transports of the Lamon Bay attack
force. The force weighed anchor on 17 Decem-

41 Ibid., pp. 69-70.

42 Philippine Invasion Operations, op. cit., pp. 20, 30.

43 More than 23,000 Japanese civilians in the area were liberated. Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op.
cit., pp. 79, 81-2.

44 Philippine Invasion Operations, op. cit., pp. 50, 54—5.

45 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 48-5,

ber and headed tor Lamon
elements of the Third Fleet. Meanwhile the
48th Division and other elements of the Linga-
yen landing force embarked at Keelung, Takao,
and Mako in three convoys with a total of 76
transports. These convoys with their naval
escorts sortied on 17—18 December en route
to Lingayen Gulf. (Plate No. 20)

The main attack force entered Lingayen Gulf
at 1 00 1 22 December without encountering
any opposition. In the darkness an error was
made as to the point of anchorage, the lead
transports advancing too far south. The frontal
spread of this disposition was 15 miles. For
this reason long distance surface movements
with small craft became necessary.

The plan of assault called for the first echelon
to land on the right in the vicinity of Agoo at
0540, the 47th Infantry Regiment in the assault.
The second echelon (less the Uejima Detach-
ment) was to land in the center at Caba, near
Santa Lucia, at 0550, the 1st Formosa Infantry
Regiment in the assault. The Uejima Detach-
ment was to effect landings on the left at Bauang
at 0730, the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regi-
ment in the assault. The 3d Battalion of the
9th Infantry Regiment from the third echelon
was to be committed at 0730 m the vicinity of
Santiago. The third echelon was constituted
as a floating reserve. 4 *

The initial landings were effected as schedul-
ed on 22 December. Although enemy fire
from the beaches was heavy during the ap-
proach, causing some casualties, resistance on
the beaches was found to be moderate and was
quickly dispersed.

Soon after the first landings a sudden deteri-
oration of the weather threatened to impede
operations, but it was decided to continue
according to plan. During the day the trans-
port area received both air and submarine

attacks, but no heavy casualties were sustain-
ed."- The Navy's 2d Base Force completed
the defense installation of the advance base
early in the day, while surface units continued
to patrol the gulf entrance.

Air support for the operation was fully
effective. The Army Air forces, responsible for
supporting and protecting the landing, main-
tained an air umbrella over the anchorage with
planes dispatched from northern Luzon bases.
Meanwhile bombers attacked Nichols, Camp
Murphy, Li may, Clark, Del Carmen, and
Batangas airfields in neutralization strikes, while
direct air support was afforded in landing forces.

After dispersing the light resistance encoun-
tered in the vicinity of the beach, the main torce
pressed inland. The main body of the 48th
Division immediately turned south toward
Rosario, taking two routes, the main coastal
road and a parallel road slightly to the east.
Along the coastal road more than ten U. S.
tanks were destroyed. At about 1900 hours on
the night of 22 December, the division advance
guard reached Damortis and nearby Rosario.

The Uejima Detachment, charged with
taking San Fernando and covering the Army's
left flank, had meanwhile carried out its sche-
duled landing near the mouth of the Bauang
River at 0730 on the 22nd. Stubborn enemy
resistance was met, but, by 1400 hours, the
defenders were driven inland, and a junction
was effected at San Fernando with the Tanaka
Detachment, which had advanced down the
coast road from Vigan according to plan. On
the right of the Uejima Detachment, the 3d
Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment, respon-
sible for driving inland and seizing the Nagui-
lian airfield, simultaneously landed at Santiago,
and, meeting little enemy resistance, carried out
its assigned mission by the evening of 22
December. This battalion then assembled in

46 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, Suppl., op. cit., pp. 1-2.

47 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 88-9.

the Naguilian area and prepared to advance
on Baguio.

On 23 December landing operations con-
tinued under improved weather conditions, but
progress was slow. The remaining elements
of the 48th Division, including Army artillery
units and rear echelon units under Army con-
trol, were still not ashore. During the morning
General Homma landed at Bauang and estab-
lished the command post of Fourteenth Army.

Meanwhile front-line units pushed ahead.
The 48th Division routed a Philippine-Ameri-
can force of approximately 1,700 men near Sison
and occupied the town by evening. Elements
pushing down the coast road occupied Mabilao.
The Tanaka Detachment, moving south, reach-
ed the 48th Division area by evening and
reverted to 48th Division control.

During the next two days unloading opera-
tions progressed smoothly, and on 25 December
debarkation of the 48th Division was completed.
The debarkation point had been shifted to the
south, so that by the 26th unloading was being
accomplished over the beach in the vicinity of
Damortis. The landing of the greater part of
the Army was completed by 28 December.
Because of a typhoon, the departure of the
second invasion convoy carrying the 65th Bri-
gade from its staging area on Formosa was
postponed until 30 December.

The secondary landing on the east coast of
Luzon had also been successfully executed.
Shortly after midnight on the night of 23—24
December the main body of the 16th Division
was landed between Atimonan and Siain on
Lamon Bay, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 20th

Infantry Regiment, in the assault. The 2d
Battalion, 20th Infantry was landed at Mau-
ban.'* The main force encountered light enemy
resistance but soon cleared the area east of the
Atimonan isthmus ridge. An element advanced
towards Calauag via the coastal road from Siain
in order to cut the route of withdrawal of the
enemy force retiring before the Kimura Detach-
ment, then pushing west from Daet. On the
Atimonan — Siain beach the 1st Naval Base
Force took over base construction, and unload-
ing continued until 28 December.

The Race for Manila

Fourteenth Army operations on all sectors
were proceeding with complete success. No
large scale counterattack against the Lingayen
landing force had materialized, and the lack of
resistance encouraged the Army Commander to
drive rapidly to the final objective — Manila,
with no change in plans. The morale of officers
and men was extremely high. The two divi-
sions, the 48th from Lingayen and the 16th
from Lamon Bay, began a race for the honor
of entering the capital city first.' 19 (Plate Nos. 21
& 22)

The 48th Division, not waiting for the land-
ing of its rear echelon, moved rapidly south-
ward. Mountainous terrain restricted forward
movement to a narrow front. The initial
objective was to seize the Agno River crossings.
Advance units of the tst Formosa Infantry
Regiment and the 48th Reconnaissance Reg-
iment crossed the Agno against opposition on
26 December, and thereafter, took Carmen,

48 The 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, which landed at Mauban, first encountered stiff resistance by Philippine-
American troops deployed along the coast, and later ran into an enemy force with more than ten tanks at Piis, three
miles northwest of Lucban. After beating off enemy counterattacks, the battalion succeeded in rejoining the main
force. (Statement by Maj. Shoji Ohta, Staff Officer (Intelligence), 16th Division.)

49 Since the objective of the Imperial General Headquarters was to capture Manila, the main .strength of the
48th Division, anxious to beat the 16th Division into Manila, was rushed to the city. (Interrogation of Lt. Gen.
Maeda, previously cited.)

it I l ^ 1

INVASION OF PHILIPPINES

8-25 DECEMBER I94I

Sokoquchi D«ll+Miiro Det|

PLATE NO. 20
Invasion of Philippines, 8 — 25 December 1941

PLATE NO. 21

Race to Manila, December 1941 — January 1942

Rosales, and Tayug. In order to protect the
Lingayen anchorage and secure the Army's
right fknk, the Uejima Detachment took
Dagupan on the same day. On 27 December,
in the center, the 47th Infantry Regiment
crossed Agno and occupied Umingan. On the
same day Baguio fell to the 3d Battalion, 9th
Infantry. The main body of the Army was
now disposed north of Agno. Crossings had
been secured. Flank guards were out to right
and left, and the Army stood poised for the
final effort.

The 16th Division advancing from the
Atimonan area had not been idle. Destroying
armed resistance in its advance, the division
pressed on to Candelaria and Lucban on 27
December. In the area northeast of Calauag,
the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry (less one com-
pany) linked up with the Kimura Detachment
which had driven up the Bicol Peninsula from
Legaspi. (Plate No. 21)

The rapid advances by the two divisions
continued to be supported by the 5th Air
Group, which moved its bases still farther south
to keep pace with the ground troops. Air
units arrived at Naguilian airfield on 26 Decem-
ber and at Carmen on the 27th. Naval air
units continued to carry out attacks against
remaining enemy fleet and air strength, and
especially against transport shipping in Manila
Bay.

The Fourteenth Army Commander was by

this time aware that enemy forces were moving
northward from Manila with the probable
intention of retiring into Bataan and Corregidor.
He nevertheless decided to adhere to the origi-
nal operations plan, and ordered the 48th
Division to advance immediately on Manila. 50
Cabanatuan was set as an intermediate objective.

On 27 December the Commanding General
of the 48th Division, Lt. Gen. Yuitsu Tsuchi-
hashi, issued a voluminous and detailed field
order for the projected operation, based on the
Fourteenth Army order. This order was in
substance as follows

1. (a) Three of the enemy divisions, the nth,
/tst, and gist have been routed, and one ele-
ment of the zist Division has been met and
defeated,

(b) The Uejima Detachment under Army
control will advance south from San Fabian
and guard the Fourteenth Army right flank.

2. This division wdl drive on Manila, advanc-
ing frst to Cabanatuan and clearing the area
of the enemy.

5. At dawn tomorrow, the 28th, the 1st echelon
of the left column, consisting of the d/th
Infant >y Regiment (reinf), will attack the
enemy southeast of San Quintin. The 1st
echelon wdl cover the assembly of the tank
brigade in that area.

d. The tank brigade, consisting of the 4th Tank
Regiment {reinf.), the yth Tank Regiment
(reinf), and attached troops will assemble in
the area southeast of San Quintin by noon of

50 (1) There were two opinions with respect to the mission of the 48th Division: (a) That it should
concentrate exclusively on the occupation of Manila; and, (b) that it should advance a strong element to the right
bank of the Pampanga River and begin preparations for an attack against Bataan Peninsula. A cool appraisal of the
enemy situation would have revealed that serious Philippine-American resistance in the Manila area was out of the
question, but indecision with regard to these conflicting opinions was allowed to determine the disposition of the
division. It proved impossible to dispel the preconceptions, accompanied as they were by failure to recognize the
relationship between Corregidor and Bataan and their effect on the value of Manila. Philippine Operations Record,
Phase One, op. rit., pp. 115-6. (2) "A small group wished to prevent the withdrawal of MacArthur from Manila.
Most of us expected the forces to flee to Mariveles and leave the Philippines. The capture of Manila was the main

objective At that time we did not realize the value of Bataan as a defensive position." (Interrogation of Col.

Motoo Nakayama, Senior Staff Officer, (Operations), Fourteenth Army.)

51 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 131-140.

the 28th and will depart on the evening of
the same day for Cabanatuan via Lupao, San
lose, Rizal, and Bongabon.

5. After covering the assembly of the tank brigade,
the 1st echelon of the left column will leave
the San Quintin area at 0600 29 December
and advance toCabanatuan via Lupao, San Jose,
Munoz, and Baloc. The 2d echelon of the left
column, consisting of the 48th Reconnaiss met
Regiment and the 1st (less one battalion) and
8th Heavy Artillery Regiments will move out
behind the 1st echelon on the 29th, The 3d
echelon of the left column, consisting of the
2d Formosa Infantry Regiment (reinf) will
move out behind the 2d echelon on the 2<)th.

6. The right column, consisting of the 1st For-
mosa Infantry Regiment (reinf) will leave
Rosales at 0/00 29 December for Caban-
atuan via Guimba and Baloc.

On the morning of 28 December the 48th
Division began its advance from the Agno River
line. The 4th and 7th Tank Regiments, spear-
heading the advance, rolled rapidly over difficult
roads through San Quintin and San Jose,
reaching Bongabon at dusk on the 29th. The
right and left foot columns converged on
Cabanatuan through Baloc and closed up to
the right bank of the Pampanga River north of
Cabanatuan on the night 29—30 December.
Cabanatuan was on the verge of capture.

While concentrating on the main drive
toward Manila, General Homma, however,
began to feel concerned over the situation on
the right flank. Intelligence reports verified
that the enemy forces were retiring to Bataan
and Corregidor. 51 When it was reported that
General MacArthur's headquarters had with-
drawn to Corregidor, the a.r forces extended

their attacks to the island in a special effort to
knock out the nerve center. On 29 December
the 5th Air Group carried out-two heavy bomb-
ing attacks against the fortress, dropping eight
tons at 1200 hours and twelve tons at 1230
hours." The group was also given the mission
of knocking out the bridges west of Lubao, but
this was not accomplished.''' Some support
was given the ground effort in this area, how-
ever, by attacks on motorized columns moving
along the roads leading into Bataan.

Ground operations in the west were also
accelerated. At the time that Cabanatuan was
about to fall, the main strength of the Uejima
Detachment was in the Cuyapo area. At 1600
on 29 December General Homma ordered the
detachment to occupy Tarlac and Angeles in
an attempt to hinder any westward retirement
of the enemy. To aid in this operation, the
48th Division was directed to detach an element
and send it to reinforce the Uejima Detach-
ment. The division dispatched the Kanno
Detachment (3d Battalion, 2d Formosa
Infantry).

Without waiting for the Kanno Detachment
to come up, the Uejima Detachment advan-
ced on Tarlac, reaching the northern outskirts
of the town on 30 December. There it met
bitter enemy resistance, and the town was
captured only after repeated assaults in the
course of which Col. Uejima was killed. Col.
Takahashi, commander of the 8th Heavy Ar-
tillery Regiment, assumed command of the
detachment, which thereafter took his name.

It soon became clear that the Takahashi and
Kanno Detachments were not making sufficient-
ly rapid progress to check the retirement of the

52 Ibid., pp. 112-3.

53 The Japanese newspaper Tokyo Asahi on 3 January printed a news report of unknown origin claiming that
General MacArthur had been wounded in the Japanese air attack on Corregidor on 29 December.

54 (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., p. 118. (2) "In order to prevent the withdrawal
(to Bataan) we ordered air Force units to bomb the bridges along the route from Manila to Bataan, and to bomb and

strafe truck convoys on the road. . . Too few air units were assigned the task to be etfective." (Interrogation of Lt.

Col. Hikaru Haba, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Fourteenth Army.)

PLATE NO. 22

Lingayen-Cabanatuan Operation, 22 December 1941— 3 January 1942

Original Painting by Chose! Miwa.

PLATE NO. 23
Attack on. Cavite Naval Base

enemy to the west. To remedy the situation,
General Homma immediately ordered the 48th
Division to send an infantry regiment to
Guagua to seal off Bataan and Zambales pro-
vinces against further enemy withdrawals. At
the same time the Takahashi Detachment was
ordered to proceed to Porac as rapidly as possi-
ble. Meeting exceedingly stiff resistance the
detachment advanced to Bamban on 1 January.

Concurrently with these developments,
Cabanatuan had fallen on 30 December after
a short, brisk engagement. The 48th Division
on 1 January moved up to a line connecting
Bulacan, Bocaue, and San Jose del Monte and
prepared to invest Manila. In compliance with
the Army order to dispatch an element to aid
the Takahashi Detachment in blocking the
Bataan withdrawals, the Tanaka Detachment
(2d Formosa Infantry, less one battalion) was
sent west from Baliuag to Calumpit, a vital
bridge-point on the Pampanga River and a
bottleneck on the escape route to Bataan.

Before the Tanaka Detachment could reach
the bridge-site, the 7th Tank Regiment, on
the initiative of its commander, drove to
Calumpit and on 2 January occupied the
bridges after a series of sharp encounters with
enemy tank forces. The Tanaka Detachment,
arriving the same day, crossed the river and
advanced to San Fernando, which it entered
at 1830.

On the southern front the 16th Division,
encountering determined enemy resistance,

cleared San Pablo and Santo Tomas and its
advance guard reached Zapote on New Year's
Eve. The division drew up its lines from
Laguna de Bay to Cavite Harbor. Manila was
besieged.

The Fall of Manila

General Homma had hoped for a decisive
battle with the Philippine-American forces in
the central Luzon plain before Manila, and
wished to avoid battle within the capital itsejf.
Orders had therefore been disseminated to all
troops restricting their movement across the
road net encircling the city and forbidding the
bombardment of the city itself." However,
reports from reconnaissance aircraft and obser-
vation of numerous fires within the city led the
Army Commander to assume that the enemy
had evacuated the city. Anxious to rescue the
large Japanese population and restore public
order, Gen. Homma issued orders to occupy
the city. 56

On 2 January the advance guard of the 16th
and 48th Divisions entered Manila. The oc-
cupation of the city went forward efficiently, and
public order was gradually restored.' 7 Mean-
while, key outlying areas were being mopped
up. To the south, elements of the 16th
Division occupied Cavite and Batangas. To
the northwest, the Tanaka Detachment joined
the Kanno Detachment at San Fernando on
the evening of 2 January, and all that area was

55 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 124-6.

56 (1) Vital installations in Manila and Cavite, set afire by the enemy, were burning, and looting by the
native population had broken out. Ibid., p. 124. (2) Large fires were raging inside the city, and although it was
reported that the Japanese residents had been released from custody, their situation was not clear. Therefore, despite
the earlier Army order, it was decided to occupy the city. Statement by Col. Moriji Kawagoe, Chief of Staff, 48th
Division.

57 Upon entering the city, the advance guard confirmed the fact that the Japanese colony of approximately
3,500 had already been released from custody by the American military authorities upon the evacuation of General
Headquarters to Corregidor. Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who had charge of the
internment of the Japanese colony, had summoned the Japanese Consul General, Mr. Katsumi Niiro, and released the
internees to his custody on 27 December. (Statement by Mr. Katsumi Niiro, former Japanese Consul General
in Manila.)

102

cleared. The Takahashi Detachment, however,
was still mopping up around Mabalacat and
Fort Stotsenburg, ten miles short of its goal
at Porac.

With the capture of Manila only twenty-five
days after the start of hostilities, the Japanese
forces in the Philippines had gained possession
of the foremost center of American influence in
the Far East, and achieved the major objective
fixed by Imperial General Headquarters. This
swift victory, more apparent than real, gave the
Japanese public at home the impression that
the United States was not too formidable an
enemy. More important, it also led the Four-
teenth Army, which had expected a determined
defense of Manila, to underestimate the fighting
strength of the Philippine-American forces.

It was recognized that a large number of
enemy troops had succeeded in withdrawing
into Bataan. However, divergent opinions
arose in General Homma's staff as to whether
the Army's main effort should now be directed
toward the establishment of military govern-
ment or the continuation of field operations
for the purpose of destroying General Mac-
Arthur's forces. 58 One group took the view
that military government should be given first
priority and that the enemy on Bataan should
merely be contained and starved into ultimate
surrender. General Homma, however, decided
that it was best to allow the enemy no respite
and to press the attack to a swift conclusion.

Manila to Bataan

General Homma was convinced that the
enemy force which had retired into the moun-
tain fastnesses of Bataan could be easily and
rapidly crushed by Fourteenth Army with forces
then available in the Pampanga area. Having
decided to attack, he quickly implemented his

decision with orders. On the same day Manila
was entered, the 48th Division was directed to
move its main strength northward across the
Pampanga River to Bataan and pursue the
enemy down to a line running westward from
Balanga. The Takahashi Detachment, then
at Mabalacat, was ordered to advance rapidly
to Dinalupihan through Porac to cut off
further enemy withdrawals. The Tanaka
Detachment, which at this time was crossing
the Pampanga River at Calumpit, was to
drive southwest from San Fernando to
Hermosa through Lubao, Santa Cruz, and
Dinalupihan. (Plate No. 21) In support of
these operations the 5th Air Group was
ordered to attack enemy concentrations and
positions in the Bataan area.

While the 48th Division prepared to move
its main force to the battle area, the Takahashi
Detachment slowly forged ahead toward Bataan
from the north. On 3 January the detachment
attacked strong enemy defense positions at
Porac and, after a brisk engagement, finally
penetrated the enemy line on the night of the
4th. Meanwhile, the Tanaka Detachment (2d
Formosa Infantry and one battalion, 47th
Infantry) advancing from San Fernando reached
Guagua against stiffening enemy resistance.
The detachment then pushed on to Santa
Cruz on 5 January and was there relieved by
a fresh regiment (rst Formosa Infantry). On
6 January enemy resistance at Santa Cruz was
broken, and the regiment pursued the enemy
southwest, entering Dinalupihan at 1500 on
the 6th. The next day a small element was
sent forward to Hermosa, which was seized
against light resistance. On the same day the
Tst Formosa Infantry in Dinalupihan was
joined by the Takahashi Detachment, which
had taken three days to fight its way down
from Porac.

58 Interrogation of Lt. Col. Yoshio Nakajima, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Fourteenth Army.

103

While the Japanese units were engaged in
these preliminary operations against Bataan,
Southern Army Headquarters at Saigon had
reached a decision which was to profoundly
affect General Horn ma's campaign. General
Terauchi, Commander-in-Chief of the South-
em Army, had become convinced that op-
erations in the Philippines were all but
completed and that the Japanese drive in the
Netherlands East Indies could safely be put
forward a month.

Under the Imperial General Headquarters
plan for the southern operations, the 48th
Division and the 5th Air Group, the backbone
of the Fourteenth Army, were scheduled for
redeployment to Java and Burma. A large
part of the Navy's Philippines Force was also
to be diverted for the attack on Dutch East
Indies. The Eleventh Air Fleet, which
had supplied the bulk of the air strength
employed in the first phase of the Philippine
operations, had already advanced most of its
strength to bases in Mindanao and Jolo and
was preparing for the southern drive. Only
a small number of planes continued bombing
operations against Bataan and Corregidor.

On the night of 2 January, within a few
hours after he had ordered the 48th Division
to move up for the assault on Bataan, General
Homma received telegraphic orders from Gen-
eral Terauchi directing the execution of the
basic redeployment plans. 59 This directive
called for the transfer of the 48th Division to
Sixteenth Army command effective January,
and for its embarkation from the Philippines
on 1 February. The 5th Air Group was to be
relieved as soon as possible in preparation for
movement to Thailand after 14 January.

The loss of the 48th Division and the 5th
Air Group came at an inopportune time
for the Fourteenth Army. While the 1st
Formosa Infantry and the Takahashi Detach-

59 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op.

104

ment were feeling out the enemy line in the
northern Bataan area, and while the 48th
Division was assembling in the San Fernando
area for the Bataan operation, the Army staff
spent the period 4-6 January hastily writing
orders to effect the necessary reshuffle of units.

To provide for the relief of the 48th Division,
it was decided to bring down the 65th Brigade,
which had landed at Lingayen Gulf on 1
January, as quickly as possible, and relieve the
front-line units of the 48th Division in the
Hermosa and Dina'upihan areas. This relief
was to be effected on or about 8 January.
Upon arrival the brigade was to take com-
mand of the Takahashi Detachment and
advance on Balanga as soon as possible. As
soon as the brigade reached Dinalupihan, an
element was to be detached and sent to seize
the Olongapo naval base on Subic Bay.
These orders were transmitted to the 65th
Brigade on 4 January.

On 5 January the roth Independent Air
Unit was reorganized at Clark Field to replace
the 5th Air Group. This unit was assigned
all the air strength that was not scheduled to
be redeployed. On 4 January the 16 Division
was designated the occupying force for the
Manila area, and Lt. Gen. Susumu Morioka
was named defense commander. Meanwhile
the Navy, in order to provide a headquarters
for the small surface contingent that was to
remain in the Philippines, organized the
Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet under the
command of Vice Adm. Rokuzo Sugiyama,
with headquarters at Manila. This fleet was
to secure the seas around the Philippines and
cooperate with the Fourteenth Army in all
future operations.

As a result of this hasty and radical reor-
ganization, the Army and Navy commanders
in the Philippines were forced to undertake the
Bataan offensive and the occupation of the

cit., pp. l53 . J57-8.

BATAAN OPERATIONS, FIRST PHASE

LEGEND
1-27

Situotion 27 Jon

Situation 28 Jon-16 Feb

<ff^ 2-17 jaaews

Situation afttr 17 Feb
Elevation m fe*t
Oi t i « > H

1 1 ' IftLfS

si-f K-*a

CORREGIDOR i

NORTH CHANNEL

PLATE NO. 24
Bataan Operations, First Phase, Early January — 22 February 1942

islands with the following principal forces : 60

Army Forces :

Fourteenth Army

16th Division

65th Brigade

I22<J Infantry Regt. (2 bus. and t btry)
141st Infantry Regt, ( do )
S42d Infantry Regt. ( do )
6}tb Signal Unit
65th Engineer Unit
6ph Medical Unit

ytb Tank Regiment

1st Heavy Artillery Regiment

8th Heavy Artillery Regiment

One mountain artillery battalion

10th Independent Air Unit

$2d Ind. Air Company (Reconnaissance)
74th Ind. Air Company (Observation and
Liaison)

/6th Ind. Air Company (Headquarters Re-
connaissance)
3d Company, 50th Fighter Regiment
16th Light Bomber Regiment
Element, 1st Air Signal Regiment
Navy Forces:

Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet
One cruiser (Kuma, },ioo tons)
One minelayer ( Yaeyama, 1,135 tons)
31st Special Base Force
32d Special Base Force
31st, 3 2d Air Groups 6 '

Facing the shrunken forces of the Fourteenth
Army on Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor
was an enemy force which was estimated by
the intelligence staff as comprising six field
divisions and a variety of garrison units (mostly
coast artillery) with a total strength of 40,000
to 45,000 men. Aerial reconnaissance had dis-
closed prepared enemy defense positions at

several points on Bataan, principally in the
area west of Hermosa, on the eastern slopes of
Mt. Natib, and in the vicinity of Bagac. None
of these positions was believed strong, and it
was thought that they could be easily overrun. 61

Bataan, First Phase

Despite the serious reduction of the forces
at his disposal, General Homma was still con-
fident that the substantial number of enemy
troops on Bataan could be defeated by a swift
pursuit which would give them no breathing
spell in which to reorganize and entrench
themselves in strong defensive positions. Con-
sequently, the 65th Brigade had barely relieved
the forward units of the 48th Division in the
Hermosa sector, when the Army Commander,
on 9 January, ordered it to the attack.

Launching its drive from Hermosa the
same day, the brigade mam body (141st and
142nd Infantry, reinf.) advanced to the north
bank of the Calaguiman River but then stalled
in the face of unexpectedly severe enemy
counter-fire. (Plate No. 24) Meanwhile, a
separate element (one battalion, J22d Infantry,
reinf.) drove unopposed across the peninsula
to Subic Bay and seized the Olongapo naval
base against weak resistance On the same
day, 10 January, the 16th Division was ordered
to dispatch a force into Cavite Province and
occupy Temate and Nasugbu in order to cut
off Bataan and Corregidor from the south.

With the 65th Brigade temporarily checked
on the eastern side of the peninsula, General
Homma now prepared to launch a parallel
drive down the west coast. To reinforce the
1 2 2d Infantry already in the Olongapo area,

60 (1) Ibid., p. 206, Chart 7. (a) Table Showing Organizational Changes and Losses of Japanese Naval Forces,
op. cjt., p. C— 6.

61 The 31st and }2d Air Groups were organized and attached to 31st and 32d Special Base Forces from 1 February.

62 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cil., pp. 163-4.

63 Ibid., pp. 166, 174.

106

the 20th Infantry Regiment less one battalion)
of the 16th Division was ordered on 13 January
to move from Manila to the western sector,
and the combined force was placed under
command of Maj. Gen. Naoki Kimura, 16th
Infantry Group commander and designated the
Kimura Detachment.

Before the west coast drive got under way,
developments in the eastern sector took a
favorable turn. The 65th Brigade, finally
breaching the Calaguiman River line, pushed
south to the next enemy defense line west of
Abucay. Because of the strength of these
positions, General Homma adopted a plan of
maneuver which called for the brigade to
advance into the foothills of Mt. Natib and
turn the enemy left flank with an attack from
the mountainous area. The 9th Infantry
Regiment, which meanwhile was sweeping
around in a wider flanking movement to the
west, paved the way for this maneuver on ro
January by driving a deep salient in the enemy
line to a point five miles west of Balanga.

Although seriously handicapped by the
Army's withdrawal on 17 January of most of
its artillery support, 64 the 65th Brigade launch-
ed its flanking attack on 22 January and suc-
ceeded in forcing the enemy, on 24 January, to
withdraw from the Abucay positions and retire
south past Balanga under hot pursuit. The
brigade, after first moving up into the area west
of Balanga, extended the pursuit to the sector
west of Orion, where enemy resistance again
stiffened. Now handicapped more than ever

by its lack of artillery, the brigade closed up
to the new line and prepared for further action.

Meanwhile, on the west coast, a furious
battle was in progress. Between 18 and 23
January the Kimura Detachment, advancing
from Moron, met and destroyed large enemy
forces between Mt. Natib and the Mauban
area. It then pressed on towards Bagac. To
facilitate its advance, Maj. Gen. Kimura order-
ed the 2d Battalion of the 20th Infantry to
proceed by sea to Caibobo Point and effect a
landing in the enemy rear. On 23 January
the battalion was lifted at Mayagao Point, near
Moron, and moved by boat down the west
coast, but confused by darkness and a strong
tide, the main strength landed on Quinauan
Point and Agloloma by mistake, while one
element continued far south and landed at
Longoskawayan Point, near Mariveles. These
units were immediately attacked by superior
enemy forces.* On 26 January one company
of the 20th Infantry Regiment was dispatched
by boat from Olongapo with food and ammuni-
tion for the 2d Battalion. This company land-
ed on Canas Point and was immediately plac-
ed under fire by American artillery, losing most
of its boats and finally retiring to Mayagao
Point with heavy casualties. 6 ' This made the
position of the 2d Battalion even more desper-
ate. Meanwhile, the Kimura Detachment
pushed ahead and took Bagac on 25 January.

On the eastern sector the 65th Brigade
prepared for a new offensive to dislodge the
enemy forces from their positions between Mt.

64 Reasons for the Army's actions were: (t) the difficulty of using artillery in the heavily forested area; and
(2) desire to conserve ammunition for the attack on Corregidor. Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit.,
pp. 179 180.

* American Editor's Note : It is of historical interest that General MacArthur's Director of Intelligence,
Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby, became involved in this landing. On his return to Mariveles after a staff visit to Gen-
eral Wainwright's headquarters in Bagac, General Willoughby was in the vicinity of Agloloma Point at the time of
the Japanese landing. As senior officer in the area, he took command ot the sector defense forces, belonging to the
1 st Provincial Constabulary Regiment, and personally led a series of sharp counterattacks to stop the Japanese advance.
Aided by the dense forest terrain along this coast, he was able to deceive the Japanese as to his real strength until
reinforcements entered the action on the next day.

65 Ibid., pp. 209-210.

107

Samat and Orion. Army artillery units began
advancing into the area west of Balanga on 27
January, but because of jungle obstacles and
enemy counterbattery, their efforts were largely
ineffectual. The brigade nevertheless launched
a coordinated attack on the 27th, failing to
penetrate the American line. The battle lasted
for four days and was climaxed by an attempt
to take Mt. Samat on the 31st, which also
failed. This sector then quieted down and
attention shifted to the west coast, where the
Japanese force had also fallen into serious
difficulties.

The quick advance of the Kimura Detach-
ment to Bagac had encouraged Fourteenth
Army headquarters, and General Homma had
decided to exploit this success by throwing
fresh reserves into the area. On 28 January
Lt. Gen. Morioka, 16th Division commander,
joined the Kimura Detachment with two in-
fantry battalions and took command. Attack-
ing east of Bagac on the night of 29—30 Jan-
uary, the 3d Battalion, 20th Infantry, drove a
salient into the enemy line but then was pinch-
ed off and pocketed by a strong enemy coun-
terattack the following day. Attacked from all
sides, the battalion suffered heavy casualties
but hung on grimly while the J 6th Division,
attacking with the 9th Infantry and the 2d
Battalion, 33d Infantry, strove to effect its
relief.

General Morioka, with his operations stalled
along the Bagac line and two battalions ma-
rooned behind the enemy lines, decided to effect
another amphibious landing in the enemy rear.
On 2 February the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry,

landed at Canas Point and also lost the greater
part of its combat strength in a strong attack
by a superior enemy force. The entire 20th
Infantry was now threatened with destruction.

Deciding to evacuate the two battalions
trapped on Quinauan and Canas Points, Gen-
eral Morioka on 7 February dispatched a group
of landing barges from Olongapo. So intense
was enemy fire at the landing points, however,
that only 43 casualties could be evacuated. At
this point the 10th Independent Air Unit
succeeded in dropping some supplies to the
beleaguered troops, but their situation remained
desperate under heavy enemy attack.

It was now becoming increasingly apparent
that the Fourteenth Army could progress no
farther with its depleted forces. 66 The 65th
Brigade and 16th Division units had fought
bravely and well in driving the stubbornly
resisting enemy back upon the Bagac — Orion
line. The 10th Independent Air Unit and
Navy air groups day after day had carried out
bombing missions against enemy artillery,
vehicles, strongpoints, and dumps, at the same
time engaging the few remaining American
aircraft in dog-fights. Nevertheless, no attack,
however determined, seemed to be able to crack
the line which Philippine-American troops had
forged from Bagac to Orion. The possibility
of success, moreover, decreased with each attack
since front-line units were by this time seriously
understrength.

General Homma was now placed in a diffi-
cult dilemma. His intelligence indicated that
the enemy's defenses were not only strongly
manned but in great depth. 67 * The Fourteenth

66 (1) Casualites of the Fourteenth Army between 9 January and 8 February were 6984. Philippine Opera-
tions Record, Phase One, Suppl., op. cit. (2) " By this time losses, including those not reported to Army, were so
great that. . , only 2,500 rifles were available on the line." Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Maeda, previously cited.

67 General Homma's estimate of the enemy situation on Bataan at this time placed the Philippine-American
strength at two corps, one operating in the narrow west coast sector with one division and one in the east coast sector
with three divisions. The enemy troops were emplaccd in a defensive position of great depth and complex organiza-
tion extending from south of Bagac east along the northern slopes of Mt. Samat to south of Orion. An enemy map
showing the extent of the American positions on Bataan had been found in a barracks at San Fabian, and a study of

108

Original Palming by Ywhinobu Ssltakurt

PLATE NO. 25
Supply Train Marching Toward the Front

Army had no more available reserves which it
could throw in to turn the tide of battle. A
pause for reorganization and replenishment
seemed imperative, but Southern Army Head-
quarters, impatient over the delay in winding
up the Bataan campaign, was pressing for a
continuation of the attack. 6 *

Despite this latter pressure, General Momma
on 8 February ordered the temporary suspen-
sion of offensive operations in order to reorgan-
ize his forces. This could not be carried out
immediately, however, for on the r6th Divi-
sion front east of Bagac, it remained necessary
to extricate the pocketed and desperately- fight-
ing 3d Battalion of the 20th Infantry. Front-
line units of the r6th Division fought forward
to assist in piercing the enemy encirclement of
their comrades, while feint attacks were launch-
ed on other sectors of the line to keep the
enemy off balance. At the cost of further
casualties, the remnants of the 3d Battalion —
a meager 378 officers and men with the regi-
mental commander — were finally extricated on
15 February. On the 16th, General Homma
re-ordered the cessation of aggressive operations
and notified Southern Army that the attack
could not be continued. 69

On 22 February the Fourteenth Army line

was withdrawn a few miles to the north, the
enemy following up and re-occupying positions
evacuated by the Japanese forces. The fight-
ing now entered a protracted lull, during which
Army and Navy forces concentrated primarily
on tightening the blockade of southern Bataan
and Corregidor. On 27 February the Suzuki
Detachment (1st Battalion, 33d Infantry Regi-
ment, reinf.j, supported by naval troops,
occupied Calapan, on northeastern Mindoro,
thus strengthening the sea blockade of Manila

Reinforcement and Preparation

The stalemate in the Philippines was in
marked contrast to the rapid and decisive
victories won by Japanese arms on every other
front of the Pacific War. In Southeast Asia,
Malaya and Singapore had already fallen, and
Japanese troops were poised to invade Burma
and Sumatra. To the south of the Philippines,
the Japanese advance had swallowed Borneo
and the Celebes, with Java and Timor soon
scheduled to follow. In the Southwest Pacific,
a salient had been thrown out to the Bismarck
Archipelago, threatening New Guinea and
Australia.

this map confirmed the intelligence reports concerning the formidable nature of the defense line. The discovery that
Bataan was so well organized came as an unpleasant surprise to the Japanese. (1) Philippine Operations Record,
Phase One, op. cit., pp, 198-9, 227 ; (2) Interrogation of CoS. Kawagoe, previously cited.

* American Editor's Note : The organization of Bataan Peninsula for protracted defense began early in 1940,
in complete secrecy. Two officers, subsequently on duty with General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers, in Tokyo, were associated with this enterprise : Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, Chief Engineer, and Maj.
Gen, C. A. Willoughby, Director of Military Intelligence. General Willoughby was G-4 of the Philippine Department,
1939—40. Both officers remained on the staff of General MacArthur throughout the campaigns on the Southwest
Pacific Area.

68 On 4 or 5 February, Colonel Masami Ishii, Staff Officer of the Southern Army, reported to General Hom-
ma and instructed him that General Terauchi desired the attack continued. Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Maeda,
previously cited.

69 "We decided to hold the Bagac — Orion line and reorganize in preparation for the next phase of the attack.
On 16 February we informed the Southern Army through Colonel Ishii that, with our present strength, the attack
could not be continued." Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Maeda, previously cited.

70 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, Op. Cit., pp. 229-230.

110

Though embarrassing to the Fourteenth
Army, the failure quickly to eliminate Ameri-
can-Filipino resistance on Bataan at first
aroused no particular concern on the part of
Imperial General Headquarters and the South-
ern Army command, which were jubilant over
the overall success of the initial operations. 7 '
However, as the action reports from General
Homma's headquarters became more and more
pessimistic in the early part of February, Im-
perial General Headquarters began to perceive
the gravity of the situation and realized that
special measures were necessary to bolster the
Fourteenth Army.

To provide General Homma with a fresh
nucleus of infantry strength for a renewed
assault on Bataan, Imperial General Headquar-
ters on 10 February ordered immediate prepara-
tions for the redeployment of the 4th Division,
then at Shanghai, to the Philippines where it
would come under Fourteenth Army command.
It was further recognized that heavy siege
artillery, lack of which had contributed to the
failure to breach the main line, would be
necessary to assure success. Such units were
therefore ordered withdrawn from other thea-
ters, particularly China, and diverted to the
Philippines. Air forces were also to be re-
plenished by pulling back Army and Navy
air units from the southern area.

Throughout the latter part of February and
Ma rch, staff officers of Southern Army and
Fourteenth Army shuttled back and forth be-
tween Manila and Saigon and between Saigon
and Tokyo, planning and effecting the rein-
forcement operation. It was estimated that
the concentration and emplacement of large-
caliber artillery from Malaya and Hongkong
would be completed by early April, at which

time the offensive could be renewed. 7 ' Order
of battle of the forces that were being assemb-
led to reinforce Fourteenth Army for the final
Philippine operation was as follows : 71

Army Ground Forces :
4th Division

4th Inf. Gp. Ha.
8tb Infantry Regt.
3/tb Infantry Regt.
61st Infantry Regt,

4th Cavalry Regt.

4th Fteld Artillery Regt.

4th Engineer Regt.

4th Division Signal Unit

4th Transport Regt.

4th Division Medical Unit
Nagano Detachment ^Element* of 21st Div)

Hq, 2tst Infantry Group

$2d Infantry Regt. (reinf.)
Kawaguchi Detachment [Elements of 18th Div)

Hq, 35th Infantry Brig.

124th Infantry Regt.
Kawamura Detachment [Elements of $th Div)

Hq, a//> Infantry Brig.

41st Infantry Regt. (reinf.)
10th Independent Garrison Unit

Headquarters

31st through the 35th Garrison Battalions
1st Artillery Group

jtb Artillery Intelligence Regt.
1st Heavy Artillery Regt. [240mm How)
2d Independent Heavy Artillery Btry. [240mm
How-Mtz)

One battery 21st Heavy Artillery Bn. (150mm
How)

20th Independent Mountain Artillery Bn.
(/pnm-Pk)

3d Independent Mountain Artillery Regt.

(j5mm-Pk)
3d Tractor Unit

71 Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.

72 Statement by Col. Olcikatsu Arao, Staff Officer /Operations), Southern Army.

73 These reinforcements arrived in the Philippines between mid-February and early April.
Operations Record, Phase One, op. tit., pp. 232-6.

Ill

3d Mortar Bn. (120mm)

14th Independent Heavy Mortar Bn. (300mm)

2d Independent Heavy Mortar Bn. (150mm)

23d Independent Engineer Regt.

One co. 26th Independent Engineer Regt.
Army Air Forces i

60th Heavy Bomber Regt.

62d Heavy Bomber Regt.
Navy Air Forces :

18 land bombers and g fighters of the 23d Air
Flotilla*

In preparation for the coming offensive, Lt.
Gen. Homma on 3 March ordered the front
line units to move forward, drive in the enemy
outpost line, and feel out the main line of
resistance. On 12 March the 16th Division
began to advance its reconnaissance line to the
right banks of the Bagac and Gogo Rivers.
On the same day the 65th Brigade, driving in
enemy outposts, moved up to the area north of
the confluence of the Maldica and Tiawir
Rivers and to the area north of Liang. On 13
March the Nagano Detachment, which had
debarked at Lingayen on 26 February, sent an
element forward to a line Aboabo — New
Maluya — Pilar.

While these preliminary operations were in
progress, a steady stream of replacements, re-

inforcement units, and supplies was flowing
into Luzon through the Lingayen ports. The
16th Division and 65th Brigade each received
3,500 replacements to build up badly depleted
troop strength. The 4th Division began to
arrive in Luzon late in February, the movement
continuing all during the month of March.
The first 4th Division troops arrived at the
front on 13 March.

Reconnaissance of the terrain and of enemy
positions effected in early March revealed to
General Homma that lack of suitable combat
training was one of the earlier causes of failure.
To remedy this, the main force was assembled
in the rear areas a unit at a time, 75 and, using
abandoned American positions in the old
Moron — Abucay line, the troops were given an
intensive course of training in attack on fortifi-
ed areas, following artillery barrages, close com-
bat in jungles and gullies, and night attacks
against enemy positions protected by barbed
wire and emplaced in precipitous terrain. 7 *

Thus, steady progress was being made in
preparations for the all-out attack against Ba-
taan. Confident of success, 77 General Homma
on 22 March issued a preliminary order which
outlined the plan of attack as follows i 7 " (Plate
No. 26)

74 The naval air contingent arrived at Clark Field on 17 March. While remaining assigned to Eleventh
Air Fleet, these bombers and their escort fighters supported the Bataan operations of the Fourteenth Army for a
period of two weeks. The first sortie was flown 24 March. Battle Lessons of Great East Asia War, op. cit., pp. 93, 95.

75 The Nagano Detachment trained near Hermosa and the 4th Division near SamaJ. Philippine Operations
Record, Phase One, op. cit-, pp. 240-3.

76 " We knew that for the first time in our career we would be opposed by artillery and tanks— in China we
never had to worry about that. I requested flame throwers and antitank guns for the operation, but we only received
two flame throwers for the division and about two antitank guns." Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Kenzo Kitano, 4th
Division commander.

77 General Homma wrote with regard to the battle for Bataan : " During the Russo-Japanese War, Port
Arthur fell more than four months after the first general attack. Port Arthur was a permanent fortress and
considered to be impregnable, and yet it fell. All the more, there is no reason why the attack on Bataan Peninsula,
which is a field position, should not succeed. There is no reason in the world why this army cannot do what the
attacking forces did to Hongkong and the fortress of Singapore. Jungles are indeed a headache, but, with adequate
preparations, the human mind is capable of conquering the forces of nature." Philippine Operations Record,
Phase One, Suppl., op. cit., pp. 18-9.

78 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 268-71.

112

'-*"+ Eg w & m ~m [

FOURTEENTH ARMY PLAN OF ATTACK -BATAAN/ 7'

22 MARCH 1942 . >^ / f~\

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Dispositions ogonsf Alliad
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COSPEOIOOB I

PLATE NO. 26
Fourteenth Army Plan of Attack — Bataan, 22 March 1942

t. The Army will attack the enemy positions on

Bataan m the early part of April.
3. Initial positions

Nagano Detachment : advance elements
along Calungusan River line ; main
body in reserve at Abucdy.
4th Division : along Tiawir River line

from Liang to west of Pilar.
65th Brigade : Liang to the confluence of

the Maldica and Tiawir Rivers.
16th Division ; Gogo and Bagac River
line.

3. The main effort will be made on the right
flank of the 4th Division near Ms. Samat.
Exploitation from the salient thus created will
be in a southeasterly direction.

4. Units will reach their lines of departure
between 31 March-i April.

j. Initially the 16th Division will create a diver-
sion in the western sector and will then move
to the Aboabo vicinity and prepare to exploit
a breakthrough.

6. Heavy artillery and air preparations will be
conducted in close coordination with infantry
movements. Pnortty of artillery fire to the
4th Division.

On 23 March all unit commanders were
summoned to the Army command post at San
Fernando to receive instructions for the attack.
At this conference the Chief of Staff, Maj.
Gen. Takaji Wachi, 70 stressed that the battle
of Bataan had assumed great significance, and
that nothing less than overwhelming victory
was expected.

General Wachi further stressed the desires
of the Army Commander regarding the manner
of conducting the attack. Units were ordered

to plan their attacks in minutest detail. Pro-
gress was to be conservative. Units were to
select small limited objectives and overrun each
in turn, thus disintegrating the main line of
resistance. Unit commanders were particularly
warned against taking needless losses and throw-
ing the timetable off by staging reckless attacks.
The proper use of firepower was mentioned,
including the Army's plan for heavy air and
artillery preparations.

Air preparation began on 24 March and
continued without interruption for seven days. 8 "
Concentrating on enemy artillery positions,
Army and Navy bombers systematically worked
over every inch of southern Bataan from front
to rear. The latter part of March also saw the
tightening of the sea blockade by fleet units
outside Manila Bay. Army heavy artillery
units meanwhile conducted firing against Cor-
regidor and the batteries on Caballo and El
Fraile islands.

On 28 March General Homma gave the
order setting 3 April, death anniversay of
Jimmu Tenno, the first Emperor of Japan, as
the opening day of the offensive. The second
and final phase of the battle of the Philippines
was about to begin.

Bataan, Second Phase

At 0900 on 3 April the artillery opened
with a devastating preparation that lasted six
hours. This succeeded in neutralizing almost
all the enemy strongpoints and artillery bat-
teries. Front line units jumped off on schedule
at 1500. After the jump-off, air and artillery

79 On 19 February Lt. Gen. Maeda was relieved as Fourteenth Army Chief of Staff by Imperial General
Headquarters and replaced by Maj. Gen. Wachi, who arrived 1 March. Commenting on his relief General Maeda
said : " In the first place, I never approved of the attack against Bataan. I knew that there were strong defensive
positions and that a great effort would be required for its capture. I had advised that Bataan be isolated and the
remainder of the Philippines occupied. Under a blockade, Bataan would gradually weaken and fall in the natural
course of events." Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Maeda, previously cited.

80 Statement by Lt. Col. Akiyama, previously cited,

114

targets were shifted to enemy positions and gun
emplacements around Mt. Samat. The 4th
Division, making the main effort, proceeded to
envelop Mt. Samat from the left, with four
battalions disposed to the right attacking from
the vicinity of Liang and two battalions to the
left advancing up the Tala River. 8 ' (Plate
No. 27) The troops made slow, hazardous,
but steady progress through the enemy's bril-
liantly organized maze of field fortifications,
wire, minefields, and obstacles constituting the
main line of resistance. Mutually supporting
strongpoints covered the steep jungle hills, each
point organized to take maximum advantage of
the terrain. Flanks were cleverly bent back
along natural obstacles and there were many
alternate positions to lend fluidity to the
defense. But the weeks of training in rear
areas had benefited the troops, and on the first
day the enemy was driven from the forward
part of the main line of resistance. The next
morning, 4 April, air and artillery attacks were
again intensified, and by evening the main line
of resistance was penetrated in the Mt. Samat
area. 81

Meanwhile, in the west, the diversionary
operations of the 16th Division were staged as
scheduled. The division carefully avoided a
heavy engagement and limited most of its
activities to artillery firing. On the night of
4 April the division began moving to Maldica
and prepared to exploit the breakthrough.

The tactical situation continued to develop
favorably, and Mt. Samat was stormed at 1250
hours on 5 April. On the night of the same
day the Army Commander directed dispositions
for a sweeping advance to the Limay River on
the 6th. The next morning the Nagano
Detachment swung out toward the Caponilan
River and Mt. Orion, and pursued the enemy

to the southeast. The 4th Division was heavi-
ly engaged on the southeast slopes of Mt.
Samat and on the upper Tala River. Air
support was close, speedy, and effective. On
the night of the 6th, Army artillery units dis-
placed to positions at the northeastern foot of
Mt. Samat and continued to render support.

The Japanese attack had now gathered
momentum all along the line, and the enemy
was given no time in which to organize on the
reserve line of resistance. On 7 April the 4th
Division spearhead approached the Limay
River. The 65th Brigade meanwhile charged
up the Patingan River towards the northern
foot of Mt. Mariveles, and the 16th Division,
having been relieved by the 10th Independent
Garrison Unit, was completing its movement
to the Aboabo — Maldica area. The same day
General Homma fixed the exploitation line as
the southern coast of Bataan and gave orders
to pursue the enemy to Mariveles. The next
morning, 8 April, the forward elements closed
up to the Limay River.

Air reconnaissance reports reached Four-
teenth Army headquarters during this period
indicating that the enemy was retiring in the
direction of Cabcaben and Mariveles and that
there was a concentration of enemy shipping
in Mariveles, Cabcaben, and Sisiman Bays.
Anxious to prevent the enemy from effecting
a sea evacuation of the peninsula, General
Homma issued an operations order at 2200 on
8 April to effect the quick destruction of the
enemy force. In substance the order was as
follows : B *

1. The 4th Division will pursue the enemy from
the sector north of the Cabcaben — Mariveles
road towards the hills northeast of Mariveles.

2. The i6tb Division will move up on the left of
the 4th Division, take command of the Nagano

81 Interrogation of Lt. Gen, Ktcano, previously cited.

82 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 290-1.

83 Ibid., pp. 308-9.

115

BATAAN, SECOND PHASE, AND CORREGIDOR OPERATIONS

PLATE NO. 27

Bataan, Second Phase, and Corregidor Operations, Late March — 7 May 1942

Detachment, clear the area between the Cab-
caben — Mariveles road and pursue the enemy
from the area south of that road towards the
hills east of Mariveles.

3. The 65th Brigade will swing west, cross the
upper reaches of the Panttngan River and
prepare for further operations in the west
coastal area.

4. Initially the main force of the artillery will
move to positions in the area southwest of
Limay and then gradually displace to the area
north of Cabcaben. It will there support the
4th and 16th Divisions, neutralise enemy
fortress guns on Corregidor, and shell enemy
craft in Manila Bay.

5. The air units, besides continuing to render
support to the 4th and 16th Divisions, will
observe enemy movements along the west coast
and enemy shipping in Manveles, Si si man,
and Cabcaben Bays. They mil bomb and
strafe the enemy retreating along the Cabcaben
— Mariveles road, enemy shipping, and Cor-
regidor Island.

As the Japanese forces drove forward on 9
April in pursuance of this order, enemy resis-
tance finally collapsed. Tank forces of the 4th
Division charged into Mariveles at 1300.*'
The 16th Division, echeloned to the left rear,
raced along the Limay — Cabcaben — Mariveles
coastal route, reaching Mariveles that night.
On the same day the 65th Brigade captured
the summit of Mt. Mariveles. 8 *

Thus, the gallant enemy defense of Bataan,
which had won the respect of even the Japa-
nese commanders, finally ended. As the flood

of sick and battle-weary prisoners increased by
the hour, Major General Edward P. King Jr.,
American commander of the Luzon Force, sent
forward a flag of truce. Hostilities on Bataan
were finally brought to an end on ri April.
The final offensive had required about one
week less than General Homma had
expected. 86

Japanese firepower had been the key to
victory. Guns used by the Japanese forces in
the Bataan operation totaled 241, of which 133
were field and mountain artillery pieces (75mm—
1 oomm) and 108 were 120mm howitzers or
larger. About 9,000 rounds of ammunition
were expended by the Army artillery alone. 87
The Army air force dropped a total of 907
tons of bombs on Bataan and outlying areas,
563 tons of which were dropped during the
secondphase (3— 11 April). 88 Casualties among
the Japanese numbered about ^oo. 8 *

Fall of Corregidor

The Japanese forces now turned their atten-
tion to Corregidor, the historic and formidable
fortress lying at the entrance to Manila Bay.
Despite the surrender of Bataan, Corregidor
showed no signs of giving up. Toward the
end of the Bataan campaign, Army artillery
had displaced to the Cabcaben area and com-
menced to shell Corregidor. The air force had
been bombing the island almost daily. Enemy
armed boats, still active in Manila Bay, were
attacked by artillery and air forces. In spite
of this show of force, the defenders of Cor-

84 Ibid., p, 310.

85 Ibid., p. 311,

86 Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Kitano, previously cited.

87 (1) Extracted from the privare papers of Col. Arao, previously cited ; (2) Dai Niji Bataan Koryakusen Stnto
Shoho (Detailed Battle Report on Bataan Operations, 2d Phase) 1st Artillery Headquarters,
Fourteenth Army, Jun 42, Attached Chart III.

88 Philippine Air Operations, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

89 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, Suppl,, op. cit.

117

regidor appeared to be ready to make a fight
of fc*

General Homma decided to attack the for-
tress of Corregidor and if necessary to invade
Caballo, Carabao and El Fraile after the
occupation of Corregidor. The general outline
of the attack plan was formulated by 17 April,
and by that date, also, approximately 80 large
and small landing barges were stealthily slipped
into Manila Bay. Since the operation was to
be an opposed amphibious landing against a
strong permanent defense installation, the
preparations were carried forward with great
care and secrecy.

In substance the plan was as follows

1. Troops:

Corregidor Landing Force (4th DiV.)
Left Flank :

6 1 st Infantry Regt. (reinf.)
Right Flank :

4th Inf. Gp. Ha.

37th Inf. Regt.

One bn. 8th Inf. Regt. (reinf.)

2. Operational Instructions

Left. Flank : Effect landings at Infantry
Point, Corregidor* 1 at 2300, j May.
Initial objective — Malinta Hill

Right Flank: Effect landings between
Morrison and Battery Points at 2330,
6 May. Objective — complete occu-
pation of Corregidor.

3. Artillery Preparation

Infantry Point, Corregidor 2230-2300,

j May.

Battery Point, Corregidor 2300-2330, 6*
May.

Caballo Island will be neutralized.
4. Army Air Units

Bombing attacks will be made of the

batteries and installations on Corregidor

and Caballo.
j, 16th Division

Diversionary feint from the south toward

Caballo and El Fraile

While Fourteenth Army was readying its
forces for the crucial assault on Corregidor,
operations in the central and southern Philip-
pines were progressing according to plan. On
19 April the Kawaguchi Detachment, transfer-
red from Borneo, captured Cebu Island, and by
about 20 April the Kawamura Detachment had
overrun Panay.'> These two detachments then
moved to Mindanao and, together with the
Miura Detachment, embarked on a pacification
campaign throughout the island in the latter
part of April.

Back on Luzon, the forces for the Cor-
regidor offensive had completed their train-
ing in southeastern Bataan, and the necessary
shipping was assembled at Lamao and Limay.
On 28 April, General Homma, hoping to
deceive the enemy into thinking that no attack
was planned against Corregidor, staged a belat-
ed ceremonious entry into Manila. Meanwhile,
the sporadic firing of the Army artillery against
Corregidor was continued, together with bomb-

90 Fourteenth Armjr on 17 April estimated that the Corregidor garrison consisted of five coast artillery
regiments, of which two were Filipino units. Armament ranged from 155 mm to 300 mm guns. Philippine Operations
Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 328-30.

91 (1) Ibid., pp. 332-345. (2) Philippine Operations, Phase One, Suppl., op. cit., pp. 60-71.

92 The 4th Division commander justified the decision to make the initial landings on the narrow part of the
island rather than at Morrison Point on the head of Corregidor on the ground that, since only two battalions could
be lifted at one time (due to shortage of landing barges), the narrow part of the island offered the best chance of
striking a concentrated blow. It was hoped to cut the island in half in this manner. Interrogation of Lt. Gen.
Kitano, previously cited.

93 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., p. 366.

118

ing by the Army air force. 94

On 29 April, Army air forces began a furi-
ous seven day preparation on Corregidor, re-
peatedly attacking batteries, antiaircraft posi-
tions and pillboxes. Caballo and El Fraile
were also attacked during this period. On 2
May Army artillery units began three days of
preliminary firing against point targets on
Corregidor. By 5 May Corregidor was strange-
ly quiet.

On the evening of 5 May the 1st and 2d
Battalions of the 61 st Infantry Regiment (reinf.)
embarked near Limay and at Lamao. As the
boat group, moving under cover of darkness,
ran for the eastern tip of Corregidor, it was
brought under fire from the island. Due to
the darkness and a heavy inshore current in
North Channel, the boat group was carried too
far east, and the troops touched down on
Cavalry Point and just east of North Point
instead of at Infantry Point as planned.
Enemy resistance was heavy, and the force took
great casualties. The regiment pushed ahead,
however, and at 0200 gained the high ground
to the northeast of the airstrip.

At dawn a furious battle began in the narrow
neck of Corregidor around Infantry Point. Air
support was heavy with 88 tons of bombs drop-
ped on 6 May in support of the 61 st Infantry
Regiment. 95 Between rooo and 1100 hours a
strong counterattack was mounted by the
American defenders but was repulsed after
fierce fighting at close quarters. All during
that morning, worried about the situation, the
4th Division had been working on a plan to
change the landing schedule. This change
in plans was abandoned at 1330 when Lt. Gen.

Jonathan L. Wainwright, USAFFE Com-
mander since General MacArthur's departure,
appeared at the front under a flag of truce and
offered to surrender.

That afternoon General Wainwright was
transported to Cabcaben, where he entered into
surrender negotiations with General Homma.
Meanwhile, the bitter struggle continued on
Corregidor, and the 61st Infantry entered San
Jose at 1630. During the Cabcaben interview
General Wainwright could not be dissuaded
from his intention of surrendering only Cor-
regidor rather than all American forces in the
Philippines. He was therefore informed that
the attack would be continued.

On the night of 6 May following a sharp
15-minute artillery preparation, the right
flank forces embarked at Lamao as planned,
landing at 2340 slightly east of the assigned
beaches on Battery Point against no resistance. 9 *
Sweeping inland, they quickly reached the
south shore of Corregidor and, acting in con-
junction with the 61st Infantry, wiped out the
last pockets of resistance at 0830 on 7 May.
Shortly after noon, elements of the 33d Infantry
Regiment, 16th Division, occupied Carabao
and El Fraile Islands after the defenders had
raised surrender flags. Meanwhile the Caballo
Island landing force, though seriously delayed
by the necessity of beating off an attack by
enemy armed boats, also proceeded to its
objective, landed at 0030 on 7 May, and
occupied Caballo Island. This was the last
combat operation of the Philippines campaign. 97

Due to the unexpected tenacity of the enemy
defense of Bataan and Corregidor, the campaign,
originally scheduled to be completed in about

94 The Army air units dropped 365 tons of bombs on Corregidor 12 April — 5 May. Philippine Air
Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

95 Ibid.

96 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., p. 360.

97 Prisoners of war taken in these operations (Bataan and Corregidor) numbered about 83,000. Philippine
Operations Record, Phase One, Suppl, op. cit.

119

Oridinal Painting by Genkhiro Jnokuma

PLATE NO. 28
Gun Smoke Road, Corregidor

Origins! Painting by Saburo Miyamoto

PLATE NO. 29
Bataan Meeting of General Wainwright and Gen Homma

fifty days, had taken five months. It had also commanders of the Visayas and Mindanao

reauired the employment of a total, for all phases areas to deliver the orders. The Fourteenth

of the campaign, of approximately 192,000 Army commander meanwhile dispatched urgent

army and navy personnel, a figure considerably telegrams to Southern Army and Imperial

in excess of the initial strength allotment. 98 General Headquarters reporting the occupation

of Corregidor and the surrender of the Philip-
Surrender pines."

On ro May Maj. Gen. Sharp, commander
On the night of 7 May Lt. Gen. Wainwright of Philippine-American forces in the Visayas
was taken to Manila where, at 2350, he broad- and Mindanao, surrendered to the Kawamura
cast the surrender order to all American and Detachment. Following this surrender, Gene-
Filipino forces throughout the islands. Ameri- ral Sharp's staff officers, organized as truce
can staff officers were forthwith sent to the teams, aided in the peaceful occupation of the

98 Breakdown of total strength used in the Philippines Campaign, 1941-2, is as follows:
Army Ground Forces

Fourteenth Army Headquarters 1,021

Troops under direct Army command 2 8,447

Army Line of Communication troops 20,956

Shipping Units 9»33°

4th Division io.957

5th Division (Elm) 2.667

16th Division '4.674

1 8th Division (Elm) 3,622

21 st Division (Elm) 3>939

48th Division

15,663

56th Division (Elm) 4i5°°

65th Brigade 6.659

Replacements (for 16th Div and 65th Brig) 7,ooo

Total '29,435

Army Air Forces

5th Air Group 10,278

60th Heavy Bomber Regt. 497

62d Heavy Bomber Regt. 9 22

84th Ind. Fighter Squadron (Elm) 82

22d Air Brigade Headquarters 9°"

Miscellaneous Service Elements 875

Nary

Total 12,732

Third Fleet 27.846
Air Forces 10,064
Special Naval Landing Force 1,236
Main Body, Southern Naval Force 7j 12 '
3d Southern Expeditionary Fleet 3>4 8 5

Total ■ 49.752

Grand total all forces >9'.939

(Statistics compiled by 1st and 2d Demobilization Bureaus, Japanese Government)

99 An Imperial General Headquarters communique announcing the rait of Corregidor was issued on 7 May at
1910 hours. Asahi Newspaper, Tokyo, op.cit., 8 May 1942.

122

southern islands and the Visayas."" Negros,
Bohol, Leyte and Samat were occupied by the
Nagano Detachment by 25 May.

On 29 June the Fourteenth Army was re-
moved from the command of the Southern
Army and placed under the direct control of
Imperial General Headquarters, which im-
mediately issued the following orders :""

1. In order to bring an end to the Greater East
Asia War, the Imperial General Headquarters
will stabilize and secure strategic areas in the
South, assure self- sufficiency for ultimate victo-
ry; and prepare for operations to meet any
situation which may arise.

2. The Commanding General Fourteenth Army
will be responsible for the stabilisation and
security of the Philippines with the coopera-
tion of the Navy. To achieve this objective,
military government will be established im-
mediately.

With the conquest of the Philippines Japan
had extended its control over the entire area

within the initially planned perimeter of con-
quest. The strategic situation was exceedingly
bright, and it appeared that the nation had
placed itself in a virtually impregnable defense
position.

Within the limits of this perimeter Japan
had made herself master of the land, sea, and
air. The powerful blows which had been
struck against the American fleet at Pearl
Harbor, the British Navy in the South China
Sea, and against the combined Allied fleet in
the Java Sea had reduced to almost nil
the naval forces opposing the Japanese in
the southern area. 102 In Java the Sixteenth
Army had conducted a whirlwind ten-day
campaign between r— 9 March, with the result
that this richest of all prizes in the Dutch East
Indies fell to the Japanese with hardly a fight.' 03
In Burma the Fifteenth Army had ejected
General Stillwell's forces and stood at the
gateway to India.

Japan stood ready to develop a newly-won
empire.

100 Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 368-370.

101 Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Ntki M (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two), 1st De-
mobilization Bureau, Oct 46, p. 1.

102 During the first two and one-half months of the war there were no notable sea battles. On 24
January four U.S. destroyers raided Balikpapan anchorage in Borneo and sank three ships. In February and March
the Japanese sea offensive was intensified. On 27 February Japanese fleet units, which had sortied in support of the
Java operations, encountered a combined ABDA task force in the Java Sea, 60 nautical miles northwest of Surabaya.
A running battle ensued in which the Japanese, while losing no ships, sank two Allied ctuisers and two destroyers.
The remnants of the Allied fleet attempted to escape from the Java Sea through Japanese controlled exits. In this
endeavor further actions were fought on 1 March, resulting in the sinking of three more Allied cruisers and two
destroyers. Three destroyers alone succeeded in escaping. Ranryo Higashi Indo Koryaku Sakuyen ifjffiSEPIfe3&I | & ftS
(Netherlands East Indies Naval Invasion Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 49, pp. 32, 63-7.

103 Jaba Sakusen Kiroku Dai Juroku Gun jm.W^.MV^^ (Java Operations Record, Sixteenth Army) 1st
Demobilization Bureau, Aug 46, pp. 31-4.

123

CHAPTER W
THREAT TO AUSTRALIA: THE PAPUA OFFENSIVE

Invasion of the Bismarcks

Though delayed by the last-ditch resistance
of General MacArthur's forces on Bataan, the
ultimate conquest of the Philippines gave Japan
a vital link with its newly-won empire to the
south and a strategic hub for the defensive
structure planned by Imperial General Head-
quarters to guard that empire against the an-
ticipated Allied counter-offensive.' Meanwhile
Japan's forces in the Pacific forged another link
in this long-range defensive chain by a thrust
into the southeast area 1 to take Rabaul and
Kavieng, in the Bismarck Archipelago.

In framing its initial war plans, Imperial
General Headquarters had fully assumed that
the United States and Great Britain, once they
had recovered from the blows dealt them in
the first phase of hostilities, would launch
counter-offensives against the Japanese forces
in the conquered territories. The southeast
area, centering around the Australian subconti-

nent, seemed a probable starting-point for such
counter-offensive action. To strengthen the
Japanese defense perimeter in this sector, there-
fore, the Army and Navy High Commands
decided to effect the " seizure of strategic points
in the Bismarck Archipelago," under the terms
of the Army-Navy Central Agreement of 10
November 1941.'

In the initial plans, Rabaul, strategically
located at the northeastern tip of the island of
New Britain, was fixed as the main Japanese
objective. Of great potential value to the
Allies as a naval base for the protection of
communication lines to Australia, it could also
serve as a base for bomber attacks against the
key Japanese naval stronghold of Truk. Con-
versely, its control by Japan would secure Truk's
southern flank and give the Japanese Navy an
advance air base from which the sea area to
the northeast of Australia could be recon-
noitered for signs of Allied fleet activity. 4

Under the Army-Navy Central Agreement,
the invasion of the Bismarcks was jointly

1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Imperial Japanese Navy.
Duty assignment* of this officer were as follows : Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry, i Dec 39 — 1 Jun 42;
Headquarters, Combined Fleet, 1 Jun — 15 Jul 42 ; Staff Officer (Operations), Eighth Fleet, 14 Jul-24 Dec 42 ; Staff
Officer (Operations), Southeast Area Fleet and concurrently on attached staff duty with Eighth Area Army, 24 Dec
42-10 Dec 43; Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, 10 Dec 43-10 Mar 44 ;
Staff Officer (Operations), First Mobile Fleet, 10 Mar- 15 Nov 44 ; Chief, Planning Section, Imperial General Head-
quarters, Navy Section, t Dec 44-1 Jun 45 ; Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section,
1 Jun-31 Oct 45 ; Chief, Historical Research Section, 2d Demobilization Bureau, 31 Oct 45-1 Dec 46. All source
materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section, GHQ FEC.

2 The southeast area, as denned by the Japanese military, included Eastern New Guinea, the Bismarck
Archipelago, the Solomon Islands and outlying islands to the south.

3 Nampo Sakusen Riku Kaigun Chuo Kyotei ~MJj fcWMfc%L<¥?kWife (Army-Navy Central Agreement, Southern
Operations) 10 Nov 41.

4 Statement by Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquar-
ters, Navy Section.

124

assigned to the Army's South Seas Detach-
ment and the Navy's South Seas Force (Fourth
Fleet) as a secondary mission to be carried out
after the occupation of Guam. 5 Accordingly,
after Guam was successfully seized on 10
December 1941,* the Fourth Fleet, under com-
mand of Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inouye, con-
centrated at Truk to complete invasion prep-
arations, and on 4 January the South Seas
Detachment under Maj. Gen. Tomitaro Horii
was alerted at Guam. 7

In view of Rabaul's obvious importance to
the Allied defense of Australia, which became
more precarious as the areas to the north fell
under Japanese control, Imperial General Head-
quarters anticipated that an invasion attempt
would meet with reprisal by Allied naval
forces. Intelligence reports indicated that these
forces in southern Australian waters consisted
principally of two heavy cruisers and four light
cruisers of the British Navy, reinforced by two
American light cruisers. The Navy also esti-
mated that American carrier and cruiser
strength in the Hawaii area might be diverted
to the Southwest Pacific.

On the other hand, it was known that
Allied defense installations at Rabaul had been
negligible, and enemy garrison strength weak.
Assuming that the Allies had not yet had suf-
ficient time to deploy additional forces to the
area, it was estimated that the South Seas

Detachment would encounter not more than
1,500 Australian ground troops and, at the
maximum, ten aircraft.

In preparation for the invasion operations,
Navy shore-based air forces at Truk began an
air offensive against Rabaul on 4 January,
using 16 medium bombers and nine flying
boats in the initial strike. 8 Thereafter air
attacks were carried out continuously and, when
the actual invasion got under way, were ex-
tended to include Salamaua, on the east coast
of New Guinea.

The South Seas Detachment, composed of
the 144th Infantry Regiment reinforced, 9 left
Guam on 14 January aboard a transport
convoy escorted by units of the Fourth Fleet.
In addition to the escort force, two separate
surfaces forces and a submarine force of six
ships covered the operation against possible
enemy fleet reaction. (Plate No. 30) The
first of the surface forces was a powerful task
force composed of the main body of the First
Air Fleet, i. e. the carriers Akagi, Kaga, Zuikdku
and Shokaku (all participants in the Pearl
Harbor strike), two battleships, two heavy
cruisers, one light cruiser and nine destroyers,
under command of Vice Adm. Chuichi
Nagumo. The second was a scouting force
of four heavy cruisers (6th Cruiser Division)
under Rear Adm. Aritomo Goto. The subma-
rine force was assigned to patrol the southern

5 A force composed principally of the South Seas Detachment and the Fourth Fleet will invade Guam and
Rabaul. With the completion of these operations, the South Seas Detachment will move to Palau, and the Navy will
assume responsibility for the defense of these areas. Army-Navy Central Agreement, op. rit.

6 Cf. Chapter V, South Seas and Southern Operations.

7 An Imperial General Headquarters order dated 4 January 1942 ordered the South Seas Detachment to " invade
the Bismarck Archipelago in cooperation with the Navy as soon as possible after the middle of January." Nanto
Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono Ichi Nankai Shitai no Sakusen j%" iji^lllif^- 'llei^iS^O— ^^^^©f^Ilt (Southeast Area
Operations Record, Part I : South Seas Detachment Operations) tst Demobilization Bu reau, Sep .;'>. p. y,

8 In order to prevent premature Allied discovery of the invasion plans, air attacks were not begun until 4
January. By this date preparations were virtually complete.

9 Reinforcements included one mountain artillery battalion, and one company each of cavalry, engineers,
transport troops, and field antiaircraft artillery. Aggregate strength of the Detachment was 4,886 officers and men.
Nankai Shita, Sakumei Tsu*un Sbowa Jushicbi-nen Mig^#4MB8 BHHS* (File of South Seas Detachment Operations
Orders, 42) Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section. Order No. 4, Embarkation Table of
the South Seas Detachment.

125

approaches to the St. George Channel, sepa-
rating New Britain and New Ireland.

About noon on 20 January, 86

the Akagi, Kaga, Zuikaku and Skokaku delivered
heavy strikes against Rabaul, followed up on 21
January by surprise raids by 75 planes of the
Zuikaku and Shokaku on Lae, Salamaua, and
Madang, on the east New Guinea coast. The
two surface forces (minus the Akagi and Kaga,
which had already been detached from the
operation) then stood by north of New Britain
to await possible counterattack by enemy
naval forces. Meanwhile, the invasion convoy
entered Rabaul Harbor on schedule at 2300
on 22 January. Beginning at midnight, a
single Allied plane dropped parachute flares
over the convoy anchorage for three hours
consecutively, but no active interference ma-
terialized. The South Seas Detachment land-
ed at daybreak on 23 January, encountering
only weak resistance at the Vunakanau airfield,
which was occupied by noon of the same day.

Simultaneously with the Rabaul landing,
two companies of special naval landing force
effected the bloodless occupation of Kavieng,
on the northwest coast of New Ireland.'"
Mopping-up operations continued on New
Britain, New Ireland and adjacent islands until
the end of January, and by 5 February the
South Seas Detachment on New Britain had
posted its troops north of a line from the
Warangoi River to the Keravat River, then

its attention to the construction of

defense installations throughout the Rabaul
area. On 9 February additional naval landing
force was put ashore at Surumi, on the south
coast of New Britain, and the small adjacent
island of Gasmata in order to strengthen the
outer defenses of Rabaul.

Within a week of the initial landing, the
Rabaul airstrip was operational, and on 30
January the first unit of nine Zero fighters flew
in from Truk. Early in February approxi-
mately 20 medium bombers arrived at the
Vunakanau airfield, ro miles southwest of
Rabaul, and by the end of the month the
entire complement of the 4th Air Group of the
24th Air Flotilla — 48 medium bombers, 48
fighters and 12 flying boats — was based in the
Rabaul area."

Advance to New Guinea

Although the seizure of advance bases in
the Bismarcks represented the maximum south-
eastward penetration to which the Army' 1 and
Navy High Commands felt able to commit
themselves pending the outcome of the initial
major operations, the staff of the Fourth Fleet,
based at Truk, had strongly urged during the
early planning stage that, in order to secure
Rabaul, it would also be essential to occupy
strategic points beyond the Bismarcks, princi-
pally Tulagi in the Solomons, and Lae-Sala-
maua in New Guinea.' 1 This recommendation
did not obtain sufficiently strong backing from

10 The Kavieng occupation force consisted of two companies of trie Maizuru 2d Special Naval Landing
Force, totalling 500 men. The convoy left Truk on 20 January under direct naval escort of two light cruisers and
three destroyers. Bisumaku Soromon Shato Joriku Sakusen Z.^? — 9 ,V o ■=& i^gf ]£, K^f^'S (Landing Operations in
the Bismarck and Solomon Islands) 2d Demobilization Bureau, May 46, pp. 7-12.

u Sources covering the Rabaul operation are : (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part I, op. cit., pp. 3-14.
(2) Landing Operations in the Bismarck and Solomons Islands, op, cit., pp. 5-17.

12 There was no clear plan to the effect that the South Seas Mandated Islands and the vicinity of Rabaul
should constitute the first line of defense, but they were vaguely considered as such. The Army avoided large-scale
intervention in the Navy's sphere of defense responsibility (to the east of Borneo and Lesser Sunda Islands), and
Army strength in the Rabaul area was kept down to a minimum. (Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattoci, Chief, Op-
erations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.)

13 "The Fourth Fleet, following the naval war games of 10-13 September 1941, expressed the opinion that,

126

Combined Fleet headquarters to win inclusion
in the plan of first-phase operations, but it
nevertheless was adopted as a tentative item of
future Navy action conditional upon over-all
war developments.' 4

By late January 1942 these developments,
especially the crippling blows dealt to Allied
fleet and air power, had increased the optimism
of the High Command to such an extent that
the Navy, with the virtually unopposed seizure
of the Bismarcks, took the initiative in urging
a further advance to bases in the Solomons
and southeastern New Guinea, including not
only Lae and Salamaua but Port Moresby, on
the Gulf of Papua. The principal reasons
advanced in support of this plan were :

1. Acquisition of air bases in the Solomons and
Papua areas would vitally strengthen Japan's strategic
defense position, giving the Navy the advantage of
expanded aerial reconnaissance over waters in which
enemy naval forces must maneuver for a counter-offen-
sive from the southeast.

2. Seizure of such bases would deprive the Allies
of key positions for a counter attack, and could be
effected at the cost of committing a relatively small
number of troops.'*

j . Japanese control over these areas would intensi-
fy pressure on northeastern Austrdlia and hinder its
use as a base of Allied (particularly air) operations.

Extension of the Navy's offensive plans to

take in Port Moresby, only a little over 300
miles across the Torres Strait from the north-
east tip of Australia, was largely in recognition
of the decisive importance of air power, which
had again been amply demonstrated by the
success of Japan's opening military operations.
Port Moresby was considered a potentially
important base for Allied air operations, and
its seizure for Japanese use was regarded as
essential to avert a prolonged aerial stalemate
in the southeast area, which would tax Japan's
limited aircraft production resources.' 6

On 29 January an Army-Navy agreement
embodying the main lines of the Navy's recom-
mendations was reached in Tokyo, and the
Army and Navy Sections of Imperial General
Headquarters dispatched implementing orders
to the South Seas Detachment and the
Combined Fleet. These orders, which were
identical in substance, read in part ;

1. Operational objectives: To invade strategic
points in the Solomon Islands and the eastern part of
British New Guinea in order to cut communications
between these areas and the Australian mainland, and
to neutralize the waters north of Eastern Australia.

2. Operational plan: The Army and Navy
will jointly invade the Lae and Salamaua areas as soon
as possible, while the Navy independently (or jointly
if warranted) will invade Tulagi and capture air bases.
If possible, the Army and Navy will invade Port

regardless of whether or not Japan desired to stage a positive offensive in the southeast, it would be necessary to
occupy Surumi and Gasmata (on the southern coast of New Britain), Lae and Salamaua (eastern New Guinea) and

Tulagi (in the Solomons), if only to defend Rabaul and effect routine air reconnaissance Again, on 8 January,

after thoroughly studying the plans for the Rabaul operation, the Fourth Fleet dispatched a radio to the Combined
Fleet stating, " The occupation of Rabaul and Kavieng alone will not improve the situation on the southeastern front
unless followed by an invasion of eastern New Guinea." (Statement by Rear Adm. Shikazo Yano, Chief of Staff,
Fourth Fleet.)

14 Part IV of Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1, 5 Nov. 41, listed eastern New Guinea,
Fiji and Samoa as areas to be either " occupied or destroyed as speedily as operational conditions permit " after the
conclusion of first-phase operations, cf. n, 27, Chapter V.

15 The Navy estimated that Allied offensive strength could not be fully developed before the end of 1042, and
that until then only meager forces and limited material would be thrown against the Japanese on the southeastern
front. Hence, a further campaign in the New Guinea and Solomons areas would not require the commitment of
large Japanese forces.

16 Statement by Rear Adm. Yano, previously cited.

127

PLATE NO. 30
Conquest of E. New Guinea, Bismarcks, and Solomons, 1942

Original Painting by Kenicbi Nakamura

PLATE NO. 31
Japanese Landing Operations

Moresby after the invasion of Lae and Salamaua.

j. Strength to he employed; Army — South
Seaf Detachment ; Navy — a force consisting princi-
pally of the 4th Fleet.

4. Outline of operations: To he drawn up
jointly by the commanders of the assigned Army and
Navy units.

}. Land defense : The Navy to be responsible
for Tulagi and the Lae-Salamaua area, the Army to
be responsible for Port Moresby. 1 ''

At this stage, no large concentrations of
Allied troops had. been observed in eastern
New Guinea, and the number of enemy planes
operating in the area was likewise known to be
small.' 8 It was estimated that only two compa-
nies and one machine-gun platoon of Aus-
tralian garrison troops were present in the
Wau, Lae and Salamaua areas. The local
operational agreement concluded between the
South Seas Detachment and Fourth Fleet com-
mands on 16 February, therefore, assigned
only the 2d battalion of the 144th Infantry
Regiment, plus one mountain artillery battery
and other smaller units, to the Salamaua oper-
ation," while a naval landing force of approxi-
mately battalion strength was designated to
occupy Lae. 20 The invasion convoy was al-
lotted a naval escort of one light cruiser, six
destroyers, one minelayer and one seaplane
tender, commanded by Rear Adm. Sadamichi
Kajioka, and an additional supporting force of

four heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and two
destroyers, commanded by Rear Adm. Goto.
It was agreed that the Navy's 4th Air Group,
based at Rabaul, would provide the air support
for these operations. 11

Leaving Rabaul on 5 March, the invasion
convoy skirted the south coast of New Britain
and reached the scheduled landing points on
the Huon Gulf on the night of 7 March,
without incident. The landing forces went
ashore early on 8 March, capturing Lae and
Salamaua, with their adjacent airfields, against
almost no opposition. 11 Mopping-up and
unloading operations progressed without inter-
ference until the morning of 10 March when
approximately 60 American carrier planes and
16 bombers attacked the Japanese naval and
transport ships at anchor and the Lae and
Salamaua airfields. Considerable damage was
sustained, 13 but there were no further large-
scale Allied air attacks on this area until May.

From 12 March, naval landing force took
over the defense of Salamaua, releasing the
South Seas Detachment units which had car-
ried out the landing operation. Naval units,
according to plans, remained in charge of the
defense of the entire Lae-SaiL.maua area, and
all elements of the South Seas Detachment
returned to Rabaul on 15 March. H Small
enemy forces, organized in guerrilla units, con-
tinued to operate from interior bases in the

17 Daikaishi Dai Yonjushichigo ■JcMffiffiVB + 'teffl (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 47) 29
jan 42. (Text of Imperial Genera! Headquarters Army Order No. 596, 2 Feb 42 was identical in substance.)

18 "Enemy air forces were situated in eastern New Guinea and Australia. .. .and elements continued small-
scale raids against the Rabaul area." Niyugimya Katgun Sakusen =■ ^ — — "^if*?!^^ (New Guinea Naval Opera-
tions) 2d Demobilization Bureau, May 46, p. 5.

19 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part I, op. cit., pp. 16-8.

20 New Guinea Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 4.
2t Ibid., pp. 3-4.

22 (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part I, op. cit., pp. 19-20. (2) New Guinea Naval Operations,
op. cit., p. 7.

23 Losses were : A converted cruiser, one converted minelayer, one Army transport and a minesweeper sunk ;
one cruiser, two destroyers, one seaplane tender, one minelayer, and one minesweeper damaged. Personnel killed :
126 Navy, 4 Army. Personnel wounded: 240 Navy, 5 Army. Ibid., pp. 7-9.

24 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part I, op. cit., p. 21.

130

vicinity of Mubo, southwest of Salamaua, and
Gabmatsung, west of Lae. Occasional raids
were carried out on Japanese sentry posts
around Lae and Salamaua, but were not made
in substantial force until late June. 1 '

Although the Fourth Fleet, concerned over
the gradual reinforcement of Allied air strength
in Australia, had planned to carry out the
scheduled operations against Port Moresby and
Tulagi immediately after the capture of Lae
and Salamaua, intervening developments forced
a postponement. The Fourth Fleet was now
without carrier support, 16 and when an Ameri-
can Task Force suddenly appeared in the wa-
ters southeast of the Solomons about 20 Feb-
ruary, the naval command at Truk decided that
amphibious operations as far as Port Moresby
and Tulagi supported only by the Navy's
shore-based air strength in the Rabaul area
would be too risky. 17 These operations were
consequently deferred until the Combined Fleet
could again dispatch carrier elements to the
southeast area.* 8

The Fourth Fleet nevertheless proceeded on
its own initiative to carry out limited operations
against the Admiralties and northern Solomons
for the purpose of bolstering Rabaul and paving
the way for the Tulagi invasion. On 30—31
March Navy forces landed in the Shortland
Islands and at Buka and Kieta, on Bougain-

ville. The Hermit Islands, Lorengau in the
Admiralties, and Talasea on the north central
coast of New Britain, were occupied on 7-8
April. 19 (Plate No. 30)

Plans Against Australia

While the Port Moresby and Tulagi in-
vasions were in abeyance, discussions between
the Army and Navy High Commands on the
whole issue of future operational policy regard-
ing Australia came to a head. These discus-
sions had been initiated by the Navy as early
as February, following the invasion of the
Bismarcks, but had produced no concrete
results owing to a sharp divergence of opinion
with the Army.

On the basis of its estimate that the United
States Fleet would not recover from its Pearl
Harbor losses quickly enough to assume the
offensive in the Western Pacific before the end
of 1942, the Navy, particularly the staff of the
Combined Fleet, contended that Japan should
not switch to a defensive policy of merely
holding on to its already-established gains.
A reversion to negative policies based on the
original war plans, it was argued, would nul-
lify Japan's eatly victories and invite a prolong-
ed stalemate in which America's growing ma-
terial strength would spell Japan's defeat. 30

25 On 29 June 1942 approximately 200 Australian troops attacked Japanese positions at Salamaua, followed on
1 July by a night raid on Lae by a force of about 100. Japanese naval garrison forces repulsed these attacks, suffer-
ing losses of 18 killed and 18 wounded. Ntyuginia Shuyo Sakusen = ^ - = -*-£igifj=I& (llg fll-t"t*f) (Major New
Guinea Naval Operations 1942) Combined Fleet Headquarters, 1943, p. 8. Cf, Vol. I, Southwest Pacific Series:
Campaigns of Mac Arthur in the Southwest Pacific, Chapter III, references to the Kanga Force.

26 The carrier force of the First Air Fleet, dispatched Co the southeast area in January to support tht Rabaul
and Kavieng operations, was withdrawn immediately after the conclusion of the operations.

27 At that time the Fourth Fleet could not find any suitable place for advance air base for the operations.

28 Owing to the successive commitment of the Combined Fleet's carrier forces in the Java (February-March)
and Indian Ocean (early April) operations, this could not be done until the end of April. Nanto Homen Kaiguit Saku-
sen Sili^flfilW^ft-lle (Southeast Area Naval Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Jan 47, Vol. I, p. 1.

29 Landing Operations in the Bismarck and Solomon Islands, op. cit., pp. 1—3.

30 " A return to negative policies, involving marking time without active operations while our enemies increase
their fighting strength, would in effect render futile all our military successes, and Japan would place herself in the
position of waiting for her enemies to attack without any special advantage to herself Time is the most import-

131

In support of this thesis, the Fourth Fleet
command at Truk pointed to the gradually
increasing flow of American war materiel, es-
pecially aircraft, to Australia, warning that this
clearly indicated Allied intent to build up the
subcontinent as a powerful counter-offensive
base. Were this intent allowed to materialize,
the Navy's existing defense line from eastern
New Guinea to the Bismarcks and northern
Solomons might prove inadequate to check an
Allied counter-thrust. 11 Consequently, the
Navy insisted that Japan's wisest course lay in
remaining actively on the offensive in the south-
eastern area, with the ultimate objective of
attacking Australia itself.

In addition to these strategic considerations,
the Navy proponents of an Australian invasion
also advanced the political advantages to Japan
of knocking Australia out of war and the added
economic strength which would be gained
through the acquisition of Australian wool,
wheat, fertilizers and other resources. 11

The dominant section of the Navy thus
demanded a complete change-over from the
original defensive concept of the southeastern
front to one in which it would become a
stepping-stone to further expansion. The Army
Section of Imperial General Headquarters,
however, strongly opposed over-extension of
army commitments in that area and rejected
the proposed invasion of Australia as a reckless
undertaking far in excess of Japan's capabili-
ties." Ground force strength required for
such an operation was estimated at 12 combat
divisions, which would strip other fronts con-
sidered more important by the Army. Also,
Japan's available shipping, the Army contend-
ed, was unequal to the logistical task of
transporting and supplying a force of such
size. 34

As a result of adamant Army objection, the
idea of a direct assault on Australia died in
the discussion stage." However, the Navy's
insistence upon positive action to check the

ant factor in the war. We must make every effort to shorten the duration of hostilities, though resolving ourselves
to face a protracted struggle if need be." (Extracted from the private papers of Rear Adm. Matome Ugaki, Chief
of Staff, Combined Fleet.)

31 Statement by Rear Adm. Yano, previously cited.

32 Statement by Rear Adm. Tomiolca, previously cited.

33 The Navy insisted on the capture of the Bismarck Archipelago. . . .because it contained a strategic area —
Rabaul. Since it was very important from the Navy's standpoint, we decided to take the Bismarcks. Next, the
Navy insisted that we capture Port Moresby, in eastern New Guinea. The Navy insisted on taking the Bismarcks
and Port Moresby because they would be of great importance in the future, when America might attack with a large
navy. Actually, the Army did not want to go into those areas because of the great distances and the problem of
supplies. But the Navy asserted that they were necessary for strategic reasons, so we took the Bismarcks. The
Army also agreed to take Port Moresby, but the campaign was unsuccessful. There was also this problem : the
Navy wanted to take Port Darwin in Northern Australia. They insisted that we take it because the American Navy
would use it as a base from which to attack Moresby and the Bismarcks. The Army, on the other hand, claimed that
military operations against Australia would be difficult from the point of view of supplies. I absolutely refused to

agree to the operation (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Shintchi Tanaka, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial

General Headquarters, Army Section.)

34 Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.

35 While the discussions on Australia were still under way in Tokyo, the Dutch East Indies Force of the
Combined Fleet, based at Amboina (Ceram), took the initiative in carrying out a series of landings on Western
(Dutch) New Guinea, and units of the Eleventh Air Fleet carried out aerial reconnaissance of Port Darwin and Horn
Island (off Cape York). The landings, effected between i and 20 April, were made at Fakfak, Babo, Sorong, Manok-
Wari, Momi, Nabire, Seroei, Sarmi and Hollandia. At the time, the strategic importance of Merauke was not re-
cognized, and no landing was envisaged there. (1) New Guinea Naval Operations, op. cit., pp. 10-1. (2) Statement by
Capt. Yasuji Watanabe, Staff Officer (Operations), Combined Fleet. Cf. Vol. I, Southwest Pacific Series: Campaigns
of MacAnbur in the Southwest Pacific, Chapter III, reference to construction of Allied air base at Merauke.

132

growth of Allied strength in the southeast
area 1 * led the Army to concur finally, by 28
April, in a compromise plan envisaging the
occupation of strategic points in New Cale-
donia, the Fiji and Samoa Islands, to be
carried out following execution of the deferred
invasions of Port Moresby and Tulagi. As
further steps to strengthen the Japanese stra-
tegic position and disrupt the flow of American
supplies to Australia, the Navy had already
ordered intensification of submarine warfare in
the Pacific and Indian Oceans,* 7 and planned
the early seizure of Nauru and Ocean Islands,
west of the Gilberts. 38

Preparations by the Fourth Fleet and South
Seas Detachment for the Tulagi and Port
Moresby invasions were already complete, and
the start of the operations waited the impend-
ing arrival at Truk of a supporting Task Force
dispatched by the Combined Fleet, including
the 5th Carrier Division (Zuikaku and Sbokaku)

and the 5th Cruiser Division.**

Through the subsequent conquest of New
Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa, in particular, the
Navy planned to establish air and submarine
bases which would enable it to command both
air and shipping routes from the United States
to eastern Australia. Special emphasis was to
be placed upon stopping the ferrying of Ameri-
can aircraft to Australia via the South Pacific,
and the destruction of tankers transporting fuel
supplies. It was estimated that such a block-
ade, if effective, would retard, if not prevent,
Australia's development into an Allied offen-
sive base. 4 "

Before any concrete operational plans were
worked out for the New Caledonia-Fiji-Samoa
invasions, however, Imperial General Head-
quarters on 5 May issued orders for the prior
execution of operations against Midway and
the western Aleutians.' 1 ' This crucial decision,
which swayed the whole future course of the

36 Japanese intelligence estimated that Allied front-line air strength in the Australia-Papua area had increased
to approximately 200 planes by April, with 30-50 aircraft of all types maintained at Port Moresby. Meanwhile, it
was assumed that the American Task Force (which appeared southeast of the Solomons in February) was still in the
Australian area, operating in conjunction with a battleship and two to three heavy cruisers of the British Fleet. (State-
ment by Comdr. Kazuo Doi, Staff Officer (Operations), Fourth Fleet.)

37 Intensification of Japanese submarine operations had already been ordered by Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Directive No. 60, issued 1 March 1942. Under this order, the bulk of Japan's underseas fleet (32 submarines
of the Advance Force in the Pacific, and 24 submarines of the Southern Force in the Indian Ocean) was assigned to
the disruption of enemy surface traffic, particularly in the areas east and west of Australia, (i) Daikaishi Dai Rokuju go
~%Mfa%s^O%%. (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 60) 1 Mar 42. (2) Statement by Capt. Tatsu-
waka Shibuya, Staff Officer (Operations), Combined Fleet.

38 Occupation of Nauru and Ocean Islands had first been ordered by the Navy Section of Imperial General
Headquarters on 27 February 1942. The Combined Fleet assigned this mission to the Fourth Fleet, and the initial
plans called for the execution of the operation in May, in conjunction with the seaborne attack on Port Moresby.
These plans were not carried out, and the islands were not finally occupied until August 1942, (1) Sangoketi Kaisen
Gaiyo MW&WftMM. (Summary of Coral Sea Battle) Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye, pp. 3, 4, 6, 7, (2) Southeast Area
Naval Operations, op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 2, 3, 11.

39 The Zuikaku and Shokaku, accompanied by the 5th Cruiser Division, arrived at Truk 29 April. Joint staff
conferences of the Fourth Fleet and South Seas Detachment, held at Truk, had completed the operational plans by 17
April.

40 Some high-ranking Army and Navy circles thought that an air and sea war of attrition against Australia
might even force that country out of the war, without the necessity of an actual Japanese invasion. (Statement by
Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited.)

41 The invasions of Port Moresby and Tulagi, and also of Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia, were agreed
upon by the Army and Navy Operations Sections of Imperial General Headquarters in April. Immediately after
this agreement was reached, the Navy Section proposed the invasion of Midway, and this proposal was subsequently
included. (Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.)

133

war, was again taken at the strong insistence of
the Combined Fleet and further influenced by
the Doolittle raid on Tokyo of 18 April 1942. 42
Although the decision to invade Midway
and the Aleutians meant the deferment of the
New Caledonia-Fiji-Samoa operations, joint
staff planning for these operations continued,
culminating in the issuance on 18 May of
Imperial General Headquarters Army and
Navy Section orders, which directed the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, and the
Commanding General, Seventeenth Army, to :

. . . .carry out the invasions of New Caledonia and
the Fiji and Samoa Islands, destroy the main enemy
bases in those areas, establish operational bases at
Suva and Noumea, gain control of the seas east of
Australia, and strive to cut communications between
Australia and the United States."

On the same day that these orders were
issued, the Seventeenth Army, with a nuclear
strength of nine infantry battalions, was acti-
vated in Tokyo under command of Lt. Gen.
Haruyoshi Hyakutake, 44 and the Combined
Fleet assigned the Second Fleet (with attached
carrier forces) and Eleventh Air Fleet to the
operations.* 5 The New Caledonia invasion

force was to assemble at Rabaul in the latter
part of June, and the Fiji-Samoa forces at Truk
in early July, Dependent upon Combined
Fleet commitments, the operations were tenta-
tively scheduled for the first part of July.* 6

Abortive Sea Advance on
Port Moresby

With the arrival of the 5th Carrier Division
and 5th Cruiser Division at Truk on 29 April,
the long-delayed seaborne invasion of Port
Moresby at last got under way. Speed was
essential because the Combined Fleet now
planned to use these units in the subsequent
Midway operation.

The final operations plans set the time of
landing at dawn on 10 May, with the main
South Seas Detachment forces to go ashore
south-east of the Pari Mission and other ele-
ments (one battalion plus) to effect a secondary
landing near the Barute Mission. (Plate No.
32) These forces were to attack the Kila Kila
airfield and the Walter Peninsula immediately,
while the beachheads were being secured by
a battalion of the Kure 3d Special Naval

42 Midway and the Aleutians had been included among the possible future operations enumerated in Part IV
of Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1, 5 Nov 41. (Cf. n. 36, Chapter V) From February 1942,
the Combined Fleet began advocating definite plans for a Navy invasion of Midway, but the Navy Section of Impe-
rial General Headquarters did not concur. Following the B-25 raid on Tokyo from the American aircraft carrier
Hornet on 18 April 1942, Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, again insisted on the
Midway invasion, and the plan was finally adopted by the Army and Navy Sections of Imperial General Headquarters.
"The Combined Fleet obtained the concurrence of the Navy Section, Imperial General Headquarters, by insisting
that, if Midway were not occupied, the possibility of repeated American air raids could not be minimized, and the
Combined Fleet would not accept responsibility for them." (Statement by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited.)
" The Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, was surprised to learn of the Navy's proposal to carry out the
Midway operation, but since participation of only one Army regiment was requested, it agreed to cooperate." (State-
ment by Col. Hattori, previously cited.)

43 Daikairei Dai Jukyugo ^fg-fri^+^lfi (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 19) 18 May 42.
(Text of Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 633, 18 May 42, was identical in substance.)

44 Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono Ni Dai Jushichi Gun no Sakusen T&WjMftWl jtl&WO— SN*£ft&>ftyR
(Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II : Seventeenth Army Operations) Vol. I, pp. 5-7.

45 Ibid., pp. 12-3. It was also planned to activate the Eighth Fleet to participate in the operations and take
over the defense of the islands after their occupation.

46 Statement by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited.

134

Force. 47

A source of some concern during the plan-
ning of the operations was the fact that the
six Army transports assigned to carry the South
Seas Detachment were old ships with a maxi-
mum speed in convoy of only 6.5 knots, which
meant increased vulnerability to enemy air at-
tack.'' 8 To minimize this danger, the naval
escort, which consisted of only the 6th Des-
troyer Squadron (six destroyers, one light
cruiser) with five minesweepers and one
minelayer, was reinforced by the addition of a
support force comprising the aircraft carrier
Shobo and the 6th Cruiser Division (four heavy
cruisers, one attached destroyer) under com-
mand of Rear Adm. Goto. This released the
5th Carrier Division {Zuikaku and Sbokaku) and
the 5th Cruiser Division (three heavy cruisers
and seven attached destroyers), under command
of Vice Adm. Takeo Takagi, to operate as a
striking task force against any enemy naval
units which might attempt interference.

As a further move to strengthen air support,
seizure of the Deboyne Islands, east of Papua,
was scheduled prior to the Port Moresby in-
vasion, with the object of employing them as
a seaplane base from which to support the later
landing. 4 * The Deboyne operation was assign-
ed to a force commanded by Rear Adm. Kuni-
nori Marumo, consisting of the 18th Cruiser
Division (two light cruisers), with 12 seaplanes,
two gunboats and two minesweepers.' In ad-
dition, two submarines were dispatched to
positions in the Coral Sea, and four others
were dispersed along the eastern coast of Aus-

tralia to await the probable emergence of an
enemy fleet.

On 25 April the 25th Air Flotilla based at
Rabaul v began attacks against northeastern
Australia. Three days later, part of its strength
moved up to the Shortland Islands to expand
its radius of action. The Tulagi invasion,
scheduled as a prelude to the operation against
Port Moresby, was successfully accomplished
on 3 May, the Shobo support force covering
the invasion.

On 4 May, after Vice Adm. Inouye, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Fourth Fleet, had trans-
ferred his headquarters to Rabaul from Truk,
the Port Moresby invasion force sailed from
Rabaul. The same day, the Zuxkaku and
Sbokaku, en route from Truk, received reports
of an American carrier-plane attack on the
Tulagi beachhead and convoy anchorage. They
proceeded southward at top speed but were
unable to spot the American carriers due to
bad weather.

At 0930 on 6 May, however, a navy search
plane reported an enemy task force, including
a carrier and two other large units believed to
be battleships, moving south 450 miles from
Tulagi. Later in the day a radio report was
intercepted from an Allied patrol plane to the
effect that the Deboyne landing force and the
Port Moresby invasion convoy had been spot-
ted. The Japanese Task Force and convoy
escort were alerted to prepare for action, but no
change in the invasion schedule was ordered.

Both the Japanese and American naval
groups were now committed to an engagement.

47 (1) Mo Sakusen ni kansuru Riku Kaigun Kyatei Oboegaki ijcfcl®, = |sfl X Aft fCTfSJ&fglff (Memorandum on
the Army-Navy Agreement Regarding the " Mo " [Port Moresby] Operation) 25 Apr 42, p. 2. (2) File of South
Seas Detachment Operations Orders, op. cit., pp. 12—13.

48 The participating naval landing troops were transported aboard six naval auxiliary vessels.

49 Summary of Coral Sea Battle, op. cit., p. 7.

50 The Deboyne Islands were occupied on 5 May, but seaplanes operated from the islands only until the
following day, when the entire invasion force withdrew. Landing Operations in the Bismarck and Solomon Islands,
op. cit., pp. 41—2.

51 The 25th Air Flotilla, newly organized on 1 April to include the 4th Air Group, replaced elements of the
24th Air Flotilla in the Rabaul area on 14 April. Summary of the Coral Sea Battle, op. cit., p. 4.

135

Early on 7 May, a Japanese scout plane
reported the American Task Force only 163
miles from the Japanese carrier group. The
Battle of the Coral Sea had begun. (Plate
No. 32) All the attack planes of the Zuikaku
and Shokaku (18 figthers, 36 bombers, 24
torpedo planes) took off at 0610 for an attack,
but at 0640 another scout plane reported sight-
ing the enemy force approximately 150 miles
southeast of the Louisiade Archipelago, in-
dicating that the first report had been erroneous
(the destroyer Sims and tanker Neosho had
been reported as the " enemy Task Force "),
The Japanese carrier planes, which could not
be recalled, attacked these ships, sinking the
Sims and setting fire to the Neosho, which
pilots reported abandoned by its crew.

Meanwhile at 0550 on 7 May, three B-17S
flew over the Port Moresby invasion transports,
and at 0700, the Port Moresby invasion trans-
ports, with the Deboyne force and part of the
escort and support lorces, began withdrawing to
the northwest. The 6th Cruiser Division and
6th Destroyer Squadron broke off from the
convoy to maneuver for a night attack on the
enemy fleet in conjunction with the task force
closing in from the southeast.

At 0900, 75 planes from the American Task
Force struck at the Shoho group escorting the
Port Moresby invasion convoy. Concentrated
torpedo and bombing attacks sank the Shoho
at 0930. At this time the Japanese Task
Force was still about 250 miles distant from
the American carrier group.

The Zuikaku and Shokaku, though unable
to launch a further daylight attack on the
sent up 27 torpedo and dive bombers

manned by crews skilled in night-fighting to
search for the enemy carriers. 5 " These planes,
however, were suddenly attacked by American
fighters emerging from the clouds, and with
darkness approaching they abandoned the
search. Heading back to the carriers, the dive
bombers passed directly over the enemy force
but could not attack since they had already
jettisoned their bombs."

At dawn on 8 May, a scout plane again
located the American force (now reported to
include two carriers and one large unit, probab-
ly a battleship) on a bearing of 205 degrees
235 miles from the Japanese carriers. The
Zuikaku and Shokaku immediately launched all
69 of their attack planes, which contacted the
enemy group at 0920. Despite fierce antiair-
craft fire and fighter opposition, the Japanese
planes damaged the Lexington so severely that
it subsequently was abandoned and sunk by
American destroyers.' - "

Simultaneously, the Japanese Task Force
underwent heavy attack by waves of enemy
carrier planes from 0850 to 1020. The Shokaku,
receiving three direct hits and eight near misses,
caught fire and was unable to launch or receive
planes, forcing the Zuikaku to accommodate all
returning Japanese aircraft. By 1300, when the
last plane was accommodated, it was found that
only 24 fighters, nine bombers and six torpedo
planes remained out of the total original com-
plement of 36 fighters, 36 bombers and 24
torpedo planes, including both attack planes
and fighters assigned to defense.

Due to these heavy losses and the fact that
the Port Moresby invasion convoy was now
without carrier protection, Vice Adm. Inouye

52 33 bombers and n fighters of the 25th Air Flotilla attacked the American group from Rabaul on 7 May,
claiming one battleship sunk and another damaged. Dat Too Sento Senkun (Koku) Dai Sampen iZ'USMk MWKttSr)
Wi=-Wi (Battle Lessons of the Great East Asia War — Air, Vol. Ill) Navy Battle Lessons Analysis Committee (Air
Division), pp. 76-83. These claims were subsequently proven false.

53 Ibid,, p. 80.

54 At the time the Japanese ascertained only that the Lexington had sunk. Details of the sinking were not
known to them until after the war.

136

PLATE NO. 32
Battle of the Coral Sea, 4— n May 1942

ordered the Task Force at about 1500 on 8 May
to suspend the attack and head north. All
units had turned about, when it was further
learned that the Port Moresby landing had been
postponed and the invasion convoy ordered
back to Rabaul.

Vice Adm. Inouye's passive tactics, how-
ever, drew swift disapproval from Admiral
Yamamoto, Combined Fleet Commander-in-
Chief, who radioed orders "to make every
effort to annihilate the remnants of the enemy
fleet." The Task Force consequently turned
south again and sought to re-establish contact,
without success, until sundown on 10 May.
The tactical advantage had been lost, and the
Task Force withdrew. 55

The Coral Sea battle, the world's first duel
between aircraft carriers, had not resulted in a
decisive naval victory for either side. However,
Japanese plans for the speedy occupation of
Pott Motesby suffered a serious setback. With-
out high-speed transport and the support of
powerful carrier forces, a new attempt at sea-
borne invasion could not be undertaken. 56 The
Combined Fleet, already committed to the
Midway operation in June, could not spare its
carrier forces and advocated postponement of
any further attempt until July. 57 Consequently,
on 9 May, Imperial General Headquarters issu-
ed an army order stating :

The South Seas Detachment shall come under the
command of the Commanding General, Seventeenth
Army, which will be organized shortly, and will carry

out the invasion of Port Moresby during the first part

Plans for a Land Offensive

If the Battle of the Coral Sea upset the
Japanese plan to tighten the encirclement of
Australia, the disastrous defeat suffered at
Midway 59 in the succeeding month of June
1942 dealt Japanese naval power a crippling
blow that abruptly redressed the balance at sea
in favor of the United States Fleet. Apart
from the failure of the invasion attempt itself,
the loss of the Combined Fleet's four carrier
mainstays — the Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu
— against the sinking of a single American
carrier, the Yorktown, meant the precipitate
collapse of the hitherto superior Japanese carrier
position and, consequently, of the combat
strength of the Combined Fleet.

This disaster, the full extent of which was
not revealed to the Japanese public, had swift
repercussions on the southeast area front. On
11 June, four days after the Midway battle
ended, Imperial General Headquarters ordered
a two months' postponement of the New
Caledonia-Fiji-Samoa operation, previously
scheduled for early July, and one month later
the operations were cancelled completely. 60 At
the same time attention forcibly shifted from a
direct amphibious assault on Port Moresby,
now deemed impracticable, to a possible land
drive from the east coast of Papua across the

55 General sources covering the Coral Sea battle are: (1) Landing Operations in the Bismarck and Solomon
Islands, op. cit., pp. 36-42. (2) Summary of the Coral Sea Battle, op, cit. (3) Battle Lessons — Air, Vol. Ill, op.
cit. (4) Private papers of Capt. Mineo Yamaoka, Senior Staff Officer, 5th Carrier Division.

56 This opinion was expressed in a Fourth Fleet radio dispatch to Combined Fleet headquarters, 9 May 42.
(Private papers of Rear Adm. Ugaki, previously cited.)

57 Ibid.

58 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part I, op. cit., p. 26.

59 The Midway invasion force, with Admiral Yamamoto in command, left the Inland Sea on 29 May. The
invasion date was set at 7 June. The Midway sea battle, like the Coral Sea battle a clash of air power without direct
surface contact, began on 5 June (Japan time), continuing until the 7th.

60 Daikairei Dai Niju-go sftdtt^HK^HK (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 20) 11 Jul 42.
(Text of Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 657, 11 Jul 42 was identical in substance.)

138

Owen Stanley Range.

The severe losses in carriers and aircraft
suffered in the Midway battle, indeed, only
served to increase the importance placed by the
Army and Navy High Commands upon the
capture of Port Moresby. More than ever,
possession of this base was considered necessary
to wrest from the Allies air control over the
vital Coral Sea area, and to check the mount-
ing threat of enemy air power not only to the
Japanese outposts in eastern New Guinea but
to the key stronghold of Rabaul itself. 61

Simultaneously with the postponement of
the New Caledonia-Fiji-Samoa operations,
Imperial General Headquarters ordered the
Combined Fleet and the Seventeenth Army
(activated 18 May) to drop temporarily any
plans for a second seaborne assault on Port
Moresby and instead to begin formulating
plans for a possible land drive. To facili-
tate this planning, elements of the Seventeenth
Army 62 were to occupy a section of the east
coast of Papua along the Mambare River as a
base for reconnaissance. 63 This was designated
as " Research Operation Ri-Go."

The Fourth Fleet, convinced that any future
land or sea operations in the direction of Port
Moresby required the establishment of air bases

in eastern Papua, immediately began surveying
the area to locate possible sites. On the basis
of this survey, it was estimated that the airfield
at Buna, about 60 miles south of the Mambare
River mouth, could be expanded into a major
base. Immediately thereafter, aerial photo-
graphic reconnaissance was made of the land
route leading from Buna across the Owen
Stanley Range to Port Moresby, and the Seven-
teenth Army, after conferring with the Fourth
Fleet, ordered the South Seas Detachment on
t July to prepare for a reconnaissance operation
in the Buna-Kokoda sector to determine its
suitablility as a staging area for a major land
drive against the Allied base. The order stated:

The Army will carry out the necessary reconnais-
sance for a land attack against Port Moresby. The
South Seas Detachment commander will land a force
in the vicinity of Buna ; this force will advance rapidly
to the pass over the Owen Stanley Range south of
Kokoda and reconnoiter roads for an overland advance
on Port Moresby by the main body of the Detachment.
A report of this reconnaissance will be made as soon
as possible. 6 *

Preparations for the movement of the recon-
naissance force to Buna were still in progress
when Imperial General Headquarters, going
beyond the terms of its initial order, issued

61 A primary objective after the deployment of naval air strength to Rabaul had been to gain air supremacy in
the Port Moresby area, and the seizure of Lae and Salamaua had been a step toward this objective. From March to
July, Japanese naval planes (24th, later 25th Air Flotilla) kept up steady bombing attacks on Port Moresby, reaching
a peak of 20 raids during May in which 403 planes were used. Allied losses as a result of these raids were constantly
replaced, however, and after July improved anti-aircraft defenses at Port Moresby made the attacks more difficult.
Low-altitude bombing became impossible, and the bombing level was raised to about 20,000 feet.

62 Order of battle and disposition of assigned units of the Seventeenth Army as oi 1 July were as follows :
Commanding General (Lt. Gen. Haruyoshi Hyakutake) and Army Headquarters at Davao (moved to Rabaul 24 July) ;
South Seas Detachment at Rabaul ; Kawaguchi Detachment (35th Infantry Brigade), Aoba Detachment (elements
of 2d Division, previously in Java), 41st Infantry Regiment (Yazawa Force), and 15th Independent Engineers
at Davao, in the southern Philippines. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 6-7,
18-20, 41.

63 The Imperial Generat Headquarters Army Directive of 12 June stated: The Commanding General, Sev-
enteenth Army, in cooperation with the Navy, shall immediately formulate plans for the capture of Port Moresby by
employing a land route from the east coast of New Guinea and, to facilitate this planning, will occupy a section
along the Mambare River with elements of the Army. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

64 Ibid., pp. 21-3.

139

a new order on n July stating that "the Seven-
teenth Army, in cooperation with the Navy,
shall at the opportune time capture and secure
Port Moresby, and mop up eastern New
Guinea."* 5 This order made it clear that
Imperial General Headquarters was no longer
thinking in terms of a purely exploratory opera-
tion but had virtually decided upon an overland
invasion of Port Moresby, 66 for which the Buna
landing force was to act as a probing spearhead.
Reflect ing this step-up in plans, Lt. Gen.
Hyakutake issued the following order at Davao
on 18 July ;

The Army, in cooperation with the Navy, will
promptly effect the capture of Port Moresby and
strategic points in eastern New Guinea. The South
Sedi Detachment will speedily land at Buna, push
forward on the Buna — Kokoda road, and capture Port
Moresby and adjacent airfields.* 7

Four days prior to this order, Maj. Gen.
Horii, Commanding the South Seas Detach-
ment at Rabaul, had ordered the Yokoyama
Advance Force to prepare for the Buna land-
ing and subsequent operations. This force,
under command of Col. Yosuke Yokoyama,
was made up of the 15th Independent En-
gineers, who had gained fame in the Malayan
jungles, and the 1st battalion of the 144th In-
fantry, veterans of the Guam and Rabaul cam-

paigns. After landing at Buna, the force's
principal missions were to push to the south-
western slopes of the Owen Stanleys, secure a
perimeter along this range, reconnoiter and
improve roads, and build up supply depots in
preparation for a drive on Port Moresby by
the main body of the South Seas Detachment,
to be landed later. 68

Although the mission of the Advance Force
was no more than exploratory reconnaissance,
this remained necessary to later operations since
the Japanese possessed virtually no information
regarding the Papua interior. Military topo-
graphic surveys were non-existent, and hydro-
graphic charts, containing data of little value
to land operations, were the only operational
maps available. Knowledge of terrain, climatic
conditions and prevalent diseases was also
lacking. The Yokoyama Advance Force there-
fore planned to undertake its advance relying
largely upon native guides.

Aerial photographs taken by naval recon-
naissance planes of the Buna-Kokoda-Moresby
route and distributed to the Army units con-
cerned were the most important contribution
to pre-operation planning. These photographs,
however, revealed only fragments of the jungle-
hidden trail, and the information gleaned from
them was pitifully inadequate. 6 * For example,

65 Ibid., p. 24.

66 At this stage the Combined Fleet informed the newly activated Eighth Fleet that Port Moresby, even if taken
by a land advance, would be difficult to hold and of dubious strategic value unless heavy equipment, including
antiaircraft and naval defense guns, not transportable over the Owen Stanley Range, were moved in by sea. To
accomplish this, the Combined Fleet proposed new amphibious operations around the southeastern tip of New
Guinea as a step toward setting up a coastal supply route over which high-speed transport vessels might operate.
(Statement by Vice Adm, Gunichi Mikawa, Commander-in-Chief, Eighth Fleet.)

67 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 29-32.

68 Ibid., pp. 41-2.

69 Later staff analysis of the New Guinea operations freely acknowledged the tack of careful preliminary
reconnaissance as a contributory cause of Japanese failure. One of these studies stated : " Before the start of any
operation, reconnaissance and investigation must be made in detail. Study of terrain and communication routes
from military geographies and aerial photographs is of vital importance. It is preferable to rely upon Army rather
than Navy planes for reconnaissance for land operations. The Navy, because of its special characteristics, lacks the
proper experience to estimate and reconnoiter routes and terrain." Lessons from New Guinea Operation*, Japanese
document translation published in ATIS Enemy Publication No. 285, 18 Jan 45, p. 3.

141

the orders to the Yokoyama Advance Force
directed that the road north of the Stanley
Range be improved for motor, or at the very
least, for wagon traffic, and the road to the
south of the range for pack-horse and if pos-
sible wagon traffic. Actually, the Buna-Moresby
"road" was nothing but a native trail which
alternately ran through jungle swamps and
over precipitous mountains, Throughout the
entire campaign the use of vehicular transport
was out of the question. 70

Landing at Buna

The final operational plans agreed upon be-
tween the South Seas Detachment and Fourth
Fleet commands at Rabaul called for the exe-
cution of the Buna landing with a strength of
about 3,600 Army and Navy personnel. The
Yokoyama Advance Force, comprising 1,002
men of the 15th Independent Engineers, 855
men of the 1st battalion, 144th Infantry, a
mountain artillery battery (200 men) and serv-
ice units was to embark on two Army transports,
while a third transport, the Kinryu Mam, was
to carry a company of the Sasebo 5 th Special
Naval Landing Force (about 300 men) and
the 1 5th Naval Construction Unit {about 800
men). The naval landing orce was assigned
the mission of securing the beachhead and the
Buna Village area, and the construction unit
was to begin immediate enlargement of the
airfield.

The Rabaul-based 25th Air Flotilla, with

60 fighters and 48 bombers under its command,
was ordered to provide air cover for the opera-
tion, while the r8th Cruiser Division (two light
cruisers) under Rear Adm. Koji Matsuyama,
with three destroyers and other smaller units,
was assigned as naval escort. The landing
was scheduled for 21 July.

On 20 July the convoy weighed anchor from
Rabaul, undergoing an attack by American
B-r 7 bombers during the run across to New
Guinea. The Kinryu Maru sustained slight
damage from five near misses but was able to
continue in convoy to the Buna anchorage,
where the invasion force arrived on schedule
at 1600 on the 21st. The naval landing force
went ashore three miles northwest of Buna at
1730, while the Yokoyama Advance Force
began disembarking at Basabua, a short dis-
tance farther to the northwest, at 1900. No
resistance was encountered, and within \^ hours
of the landing, Buna Village and the airfield
were securely in Japanese hands. 7 '

Simultaneously with the Buna landing, the
82d Naval Garrison Unit holding Lae and
Salamaua^ launched attacks on the Australian
strongpoints at Gabmatsung Mission, about 18
miles west of Lae, and Mubo, about 15 miles
southwest of Salamaua. The operations had
been decided upon to put a stop to increasing
guerrilla activities in these areas and were also
timed to serve as a feint covering the Buna
landing. At Gabmatsung the Australians
promptly withdrew south of the Markham
River, and the Japanese discontinued the action

70 " At the beginning of the present action ( New Guinea Operations), both the Army and Navy were defective
in the interpretation of aerial photographs and estimated that roads would permit the passage of practically all motor
vehicles, . . .We found many errors. Many places in the jungle (steep slopes, swampy ground, and narrow sections
of road) were not seen in the photographs. Therefore, in mountain areas, particular care is necessary in photographic
interpretation." Ibid., p. 3.

71 (i) Southeast Area Operations Record. Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 41. { ') New Guinea Naval Opera-
tions, op. cit., p. 16.

72 The 82d Nival Garrison Unit had approximately 1,300 troops and was under command of Cotndr. Kashin
Miyata. The attacks of Gabmatsung and Mubo were begun on 21 July by forces ot one company each. Major New
Guinea Naval Operations, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

142

on 22 July, returning to Lae. At Mubo, how-
ever, the Japanese attack force encountered
resistance by about 200 Australian troops, who
inflicted some losses before retreating to the
south. The Japanese returned to Salamaua
on 23 July, ending the operation."

Meanwhile, at the Buna beachhead, the
Japanese landing forces underwent heavy air
attack on 22 July by approximately 100 Allied
planes, including B-17's, B-26's and P-39's.
These attacks continued daily thereafter, in-
flicting damage to one transport and a destroyer
of the invasion convoy. Despite these attacks,
additional troops were successfully put ashore
from a destroyer on 26 July, and from two
transports, a light cruiser and a destroyer on
29 July, but the unloading of war materials
ended in failure. 74

Due to the steady intensification of Allied
air attacks, however, the transport of reinforce-
ments to Buna became rapidly more perilous.
On 30 July the transport Kotoku Maru had to
be abandoned after receiving hits in a strike by
eight Flying Fortresses. On 31 July, another
transport en route to Buna under naval escort
was forced to turn back to Rabaul due to air
attack."

Advance to Kokoda

Initial reports to Seventeenth Army head-
quarters by the Yokoyama Advance Force were
optimistic. Immediately after the landing, a
spearhead patrol of company strength set out

along the trail to Kokoda, meeting only
sporadic resistance from a small Australian
force about 100 strong, which retreated before
them. After dispersing these remnants, the
patrol advanced as far as Oivi Hill, about nine
miles east of Kokoda, where it was shortly
joined by the main body of the Yokoyama
Advance Force. Launching an attack on the
night of 28 July, the Force routed the Austra-
lian 39th Battalion and moved into Kokoda at
dawn on 29 July, occupying the nearby airfield
at noon the same day. 7 *

Although the capture of Kokoda was effected
earlier than anticipated, the advance had not
been without hardship. The Yokoyama Advance
Force, in its rapid drive along the arduous jun-
gletrail, had shed all excess equipment and ra-
tions, and when it reached Kokoda, the problem
of bringing up food and ammunition assumed
prime importance. To the rear, the engineers
doggedly worked to widen and improve the
trail and could not be spared to move supplies.
This vital task therefore had to be undertaken by
elements of the naval construction unit, which
was engaged m improving the Buna airfield.

Final Plans Against Moresby

On the basis of the early reports sent in by
the Yokoyama Advance Force, Lt. Gen. Hyaku-
take, whose headquarters had now moved
to Rabaul, hastily advised Imperial General
Headquarters that an overland attack on Port
Moresby was feasible and recommended adop-

73 Native reports at this time claimed that the Australians, in anticipation of further attacks, had moved farther
inland, setting fire to installations at their Wau, Bulolo and Bulwa air bases. Ibid., pp. 7-8.

74 In connection with the Buna landing, the Fourth Fleet dispatched two submarines to points off Townsville
and Port Moresby to hinder the transport of troop reinforcements from Australia.

75 Major New Guinea Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 25.

76 A radio dispatch from Col. Yokoyama to Maj. Gen. Horii, South Seas Detachment commander, reported
that the Yokoyama Advance Force " reached the vicinity east of Kokoda on the morning of 28 July. Defeated an
enemy force of about 1,200 men and attacked Kokoda the same night. Kokoda occupied at dawn 29 July." South-
east Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 41-2.

143

f*--HNK**A~^te&3*fl4MQ#g ft a f ill a

Original P*intinB by Uiaburo Hum

PLATE NO. 34
Hardships of the Troops in the Owen Stanleys

tion of definite plans to move the main forces
of the Seventeenth Army across the Owen
Stanleys to effect the capture of this important
base. 77 The Army and Navy Sections of
Imperial General Headquarters thereupon drew
up the main lines of an operational plan,
issued in the form of orders to the Combined
Fleet and the Seventeenth Army on 28 July.
The essential portion of these orders read :

4. Outline of Operations

a the main force of the Army will capture

the Buna-Kokoda road area extending to Port Moresby
and the airfields adjacent to Port Moresby as rapidly
as possible.

b. ... .if necessary, to facilitate the operation,
elements of the Army will land in the vicinity of Port
Moresby from the tea at an appropriate time.

c. The Navy will destroy enemy air power in
the Port Moresby area and sweep enemy vessels from
the northern Coral Sea to protect the amphibious
forces. It will cooperate closely with all land operations.

d. Concurrently with the attack upon Port
Moresby and subsequent to its capture, other strategic
points in eastern New Guinea will be occupied. The
capture of islands and strategic points along the north
shore will be effected by Special Naval Landing
Forces, and the Army will be responsible for other
areas*

Upon receipt of these orders, the Eighth
Fleet 79 and Seventeenth Army immediately
began working out the details of the final plan
reaching agreement on 31 July, The essential
points of the plan were as follows :

t. The main bodv of the South Seas Detachment,
reinforced by the 41st Infantry Regiment, to land at
Buna on 7 August, move up along the Buna-Kokoda
road and join the Yokoyama Advance Force for further
operations toward Port Moresby.

2. One battalion of the 33th Infantry Brigade,
reinforced by a special naval landing force, to move
toward Port Moresby by sea, using as transport seven
patrol boats and a few destroyers, and effect a landing
to the east of Port Moresby in coordination with the
final phase of the South Seas Detachment land drive*
Naval forces to occupy Samarai, at the south-
eastern tip of New Guinea, as speedily as possible and
establish a seaplane base.

4. The 8 2d Naval Garrison Unit in the Lae-
Salamaua area to launch a feint attack toward IVau
as cover for the Port Moresby operation.

5. The Navy to assure the protection of troop
convoys to Buna, support the amphibious operations
around the southeast tip of New Guinea, and provide
necessary air cover by naval air units. 6 '

These plans were ready to be put into
execution when last-minute delay in the com-
pletion of the Buna airfield, followed by the
sudden landing of American marines on
Guadalcanal on 7 August, forced a postpone-
ment of the scheduled date for the debarkation
of the South Seas Detachment main body at
Buna until r6 August. It was estimated that,
by that date, preparations for the recapture of
Guadalcanal would be complete, and sufficient
air strength would be available to cover the
Buna landing operations.

77 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit., Vol. I. p. 15.

78 Daikaiski Dai Hyakujugo-go ^cJ®ta^H'"t"S3lfe {Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 115) 28
Jul. 42. (Text of Imperial General Headquartes Army Directive No. 1218, 28 Jul 42 was identical in substance.)

79 The Eighth Fleet, according to original plan, was to be activated for participation in the New Caledonia-
Fiji-Samoa operations. When these operations were cancelled following the Midway Battle, the activation was delayed
until 14 July, when it was carried out with the object of replacing the Fourth Fleet as the Navy's operating force in
the Southeast area. (The Fourth Fleet was then assigned only to defense of the mandated islands and the Gilbert and
Wake Islands areas.) The Eighth Fleet formally took over on 27 July, when its headquarters reached Rabaul.

80 This amphibious force was to time its departure to follow the break-through of the South Seas Detachment
to the southern side of the Owen Stanley Range. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. L p, 39.
It was estimated that this would occur by the end of August.

81 Ibid., pp. 34-9.

145

Up to 7 August, when the American inva-
sion of the Solomons began, the total number
of Japanese troops and naval personnel put
ashore at Buna for the Port Moresby operation
approximated 7,430.*" Of these, 430 were
naval landing troops, and 2,000 naval construc-
tion personnel. The remaining 5,000 represent-
ed the original Yokoyama Advance Force plus
reinforcements and replacements sent in subse-
quent to the 21 July landing.

Fighting on Guadalcanal

A radio dispatched to Eighth Fleet head-
quarters in Rabaul at 0530 on 7 August report-
ed both Guadalcanal and Tulagi 8 ' under heavy
enemy naval and air bombardment. From the
strength and make-up of the enemy naval
force — two aircraft carriers, one battleship,
three cruisers, 15 destroyers and 30 to 40 trans-
ports — it was evident that landings were con-
templated.

The Japanese forces on Guadalcanal at that
time numbered only 250 naval garrison troops
and two construction units of about 1,600,
stationed near Lunga Point. 84 Before com-
munications ceased, the Eighth Fleet received
a report that they were retreating into the
interior after engaging the enemy landing
forces. Meanwhile, on Tulagi, the Japanese

naval garrison of approximately company
strength was believed annihilated.

Despite the success of the American land-
ings, Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo
took the optimistic view that the operation was
nothing more than a reconnaissance in force,
and that, even if it were the beginning of a
real offensive effort, Japanese recapture of
Guadalcanal would not be excessively difficult. 8 '
Reports were lacking from the Japanese forces
on the spot, and the situation was vague. 86

On the other hand, Admiral Yamamoto,
Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet,
regarded the American counterthrust more
seriously and promptly appointed Vice Adm.
Nishizo Tsukahara, Commander of the

Eleventh Air Fleet, as Commander of the
Southeast Area Force, a new intermediate fleet
command. 8 ' First priority was given to the
recapture of Guadalcanal, and all available
ships and planes were assembled for an im-
mediate and decisive counterattack.

While the 25th Air Flotilla threw all its
operational strength 88 into a series of damaging
air assaults, the Eighth Fleet's most powerful
combat ships, under personal command of
Vice Adm. Gunichi Mikawa, Eighth Fleet
Commander-in-Chief, sailed from Rabaul at
1430 on 7 August to attack the enemy ves-
sels off Guadalcanal. In this attack (Plate

82 On 6 August three transports sailed from Rabaul under naval escort, carrying reinforcements for Buna. With
the Guadalcanal attack, however, their fighter cover was diverted to the Solomons, and the convoy returned to Rabaul.
Japanese losses thus far in transporting troops to eastern New Guinea were one transport lost and one transport and
three escort vessels damaged. New Guinea Naval Operations, op. cit., pp. 16-18.

83 Following the occupation of Tulagi in May 1042, it was found that a portion of Guadalcanal Island was
equally suitable for the construction of an air base, and the Fourth Fleet dispatched two naval construction units
on 1 July to undertake this project. By 3 August, one airstrip and a dummy field had been roughly completed.
(Statement by Rear Adm. Yano, previously cited.)

84 Extracted from the private papers of Rear Adm. Masao Kanazawa, Commander, 8th Base Force.

85 Southeast Area Naval Operations, op. cit. Part I, p. 5.

86 Statement by Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief, 2d Bureau (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army
Section.

87 Southeast Area Naval Operations, op. cit. Part I, p. 6.

88 Operational strength at this time was: 39 fighters, 32 land-based attack planes, 16 bombers.

146

PLATE NO. 35
First and Second Battles of Solomon Sea, 8-9 & 24 August 1942

No. 35), carried out on the night of 8 Au-
gust," 9 heavy losses were inflicted on the Allied
convoy force, and although the marine beach-
head remained intact, active reinforcement
efforts did not immediately develop.

The absence of further American attempts
to send in troops was interpreted by Imperial
General Headquarters as confirming the first
estimate that a major offensive was not develop-
ing,* and that recapture of Guadalcanal could
be speedily achieved. Accordingly, on 13
August, a new operational directive was issued
for the southeast area, stipulating that elements
of the Seventeenth Army should be dispatched
immediately to recapture Guadalcanal and
Tulagi, and that "the invasion of Port Moresby
shall be speedily carried out in accordance with
previous plans." 9 '

In order to seize the tactical opportunity
before the enemy foothold on Guadalcanal
could be consolidated, the Army General Staff
advised employment of small forces which could
be swiftly moved to the scene of action by
destroyers, rather than an attempt to transport
the Seventeenth Army's larger uncommitted
units — the 35th Inf. Brigade at Palau, and
Aoba Detachment at Davao. 9 * The Ichiki

Detachment 9 ' of approximately regimental
strength, which had been placed under Seven-
teenth Army command on ro August for
use on Guadalcanal, was already at Truk.
Hence it was decided to use this detachment
plus a naval landing force in the initial
recapture attempt.

Embarking from Truk on six destroyers, the
main strength of the Ichiki Detachment landed
on 18 August at Taivu Point, while a force of
naval troops landed simultaneously at Lunga
Point. The Ichiki Detachment launched a vig-
orous attack on the airfield area but were driven
back in retreat west of the Tenaru River, Col.
Ichiki himself having been killed. Not only
had the attempt failed, but on 21 August it
was confirmed that American planes had
begun to operate from Henderson Field, while
increasing numbers of troop reinforcements
were landing from transports. Abruptly the
situation darkened.

On 1 g August, the day following the land-
ing of the Ichiki Detachment main strength,
the Seventeenth Army had issued new orders for
the immediate advance to Guadalcanal of the
remainder of the detachment plus the 35th Inf.
Brigade, 94 whose Commanding General (Maj.

89 This naval engagement was known to the Japanese as the " First Battle of the Solomons." The American
designation is the " Battle of Savo Island."

90 About this time an intelligence report from Moscow to the effect that, owing to heavy losses, the Americans
were contemplating withdrawal from Guadalcanal, reached the Navy General Staff. This report was relayed to the
Southeast Area Force in a radio sent 16 August by Rear Adm. Shigeru Fukudome, Chief, First Bureau (Opera-
tions), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section.

91 Daikdishi Dai Hyakuniju-gp ^[fffifigff^+lfc (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 120) 13
Aug. 42. (Text of Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 1235, 28 Jul 42 was identical in substance).

92 A radio dispatch from Lt. Gen. Moritake Tanabe, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, to the Command-
ing General, Seventeenth Army, on 12 August, stated : " The scope of operations for the recapture of strategic points
in the Solomon Islands will be decided by the Army Commander on the basts of his estimate of the enemy situation.
The Army General Staff believes that it is feasible to use the 35th Infantry Brigade and Aoba Detachment if the situation
demands. However, since tactical opportunity is a primary consideration under existing conditions, it is considered
preferable, if possible, to recapture these areas promptly, using only the Ichiki Detachment and Special Naval Landing
Forces." Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 52.

93 This detachment was originally assigned to the Midway invasion, after the failure of which it was held at
Guam until its assignment to Seventeenth Army on to August. It then moved to Truk.

94 Under earlier plans for the Port Moresby campaign, a battalion of the 35th Inf. Brigade was to make an
amphibious landing east of Moresby. Cf. section on Final Plans Against Moresby.

148

Gen. Seiken Kawaguchi) was assigned to com-
mand all Army and Navy forces in the
Guadalcanal-Tulagi area." As the transport
groups carrying these forces moved south from
Truk, powerful naval screening forces, includ-
ing three carriers (Zuikaku t Shokaku, Ryujo),
swept around the eastern side of the Solomons
to divert and crush enemy naval and air forces.
In the ensuing Second Battle of the Solo-
mons, 56 fought on 24 August, damage was
sustained on both sides, the Ryujo going down
under heavy attack by carrier and land-based
aircraft. The transport convoy, which also
underwent attack by enemy land-based bomb-
ers, was forced to turn back, and the reinforce-
ment attempt failed.

In view of these developments, Imperial
General Headquarters began to show increased
concern over the Guadalcanal situation and,
on 31 August, issued orders giving first priori-
ty to the recapture of the Solomons. In
accordance therewith, efforts were pushed by
the Seventeenth Army and Southeast Area
Force Commands to get in reinforcements in
preparation for a general offensive. Little by
little, between 30 August and 7 September,
night runs by destroyers and landing barges
succeeded in putting ashore the remainder of
the Ichiki Detachment and the entire 35th
Brigade. In all, a total of about 5,200 troops
were transported by this means subsequent to
the enemy landing of 7 August. 97

Despite the limited strength of these forces,
plans were laid for the start of a general

95 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 64.

96 Referred to in American accounts as the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.

97 Nanto Homen Kaigun Sakusen W&S&tifoWtW. (Southeast Area Naval Operations) 2d Demobilization
Bureau, Oct 46. Vol. I, p. 16.

98 (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 62-3, 96-8. (2) Southeast Area Naval
Operations, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 17-19, 21-2.

99 The new plan called for the commitment of the Seventeenth Army's Aoba Detachment, previously
scheduled for use in the New Guinea operations, together with the main body of the 2d Division, transferred from
Java. Every effort was to be made to land heavy artillery for the support of ground operations, but if sufficient heavy
weapons could not be transported, naval units were to lay down a bombardment of enemy positions to pave the way
for the general attack. (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Pan II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 96-8. (2) Southeast
Area Naval Operations, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 21-2.

offenstve on 1 1 September. The 35th Brigade
was to launch a surprise attack on the Ameri-
can perimeter guarding Henderson Field, while
a powerful naval force made up of the Eighth
Fleet supported by elements of the Second and
Third Fleets was to move directly up to the
Lunga anchorage to cut off both possible
reinforcements and enemy retreat." 8

Owing to delay in bringing up artillery
support and maneuvering all forces into po-
sition through the jungle, the general offensive
did not begin until 2000 on 13 September.
As the 35th Brigade troops pressed forward,
they met increasingly severe resistance by the
entrenched marines, and heavy losses finally
forced them into retreat. Following this de-
bacle, Maj. Gen. Kawaguchi decided to reas-
semble all the Japanese forces on the west bank
of the Matanikau River. (Plate No. 37)

Despite two failures, the High Command
still remained determined to recapture Guadal-
canal at any cost. Preparations were conse-
quently begun for the dispatch of still further
reinforcements, upon the arrival of which an-
other general offensive was to be attempted."

Build-up of Forces in New Guinea

In spite of the American invasion of the
Solomons, the over-all strategic plan decided
upon by Imperial General Headquarters on
28 July for the capture of Port Moresby re-
mained unchanged during August. The Seven-
teenth Army, although obligated to furnish

149

fcV,^ R-M«W&fc»ofiU£M-Q$lE * £ £ 1 Mil*- 1-1

Original Painting by KenEchi Nilcsmun

PLATE NO. 36
Army-Navy Cooperation on Guadalcanal

PLATE NO. 37
Operations on Guadalcanal, August — November 1942

troops in support of Navy attempts to recap-
ture Guadalcanal and Tulagi, was not relieved
of its prior New Guinea commitments, and a
radio from Imperial General Headquarters on
8 August instructed that the Port Moresby
campaign be vigorously intensified insofar as
the local naval situation permitted. Voicing
concurrence with this directive, Lt, Gen. Hya-
kutake, in a report to Imperial General
Headquarters on 9 August, stated :

Of the three enemy- held point i of Port Moresby,
Rabi (Milne Bay) and Tulagi, Port Moresby occupies
the most important strategic position. Furthermore,
the Army is already engaged tn offensive operations
to bring about its capture.

Since the Yokoyama Advance Force is already
pushing forward into the Owen Stanley Range, it
is believed that the most effective plan at the present
time is to throw the main body of the South Seas
Detachment into this drive and thus seal the fate of
the enemy. This is particularly necessary in the light
of the present situation, notably the daily increase of
enemy power in this sector.

As regards the Solomons, the best method of assisting
the Navy in the Tulagi area is to effect the recapture
of strategic points as rapidly as possible, using the nee-
essary forces from the 35th Inf. Brigade. The Army
is therefore directing its operations along these lines. 100

The operational policy indicated in this
exchange of views was formally confirmed by
the Imperial General Headquarters directive of
13 August, which ordered that the operations
against Port Moresby be carried out as already

planned. The Navy's support of these ope-
rations, however, was inevitably limited by the
channeling of its primary effort into the
recapture of the Solomons, an area of more
immediate Navy concern.

Under the 13 August directive, preparations
for the scheduled movement of the main
strength of the South Seas Detachment to
New Guinea were speedily brought to com-
pletion. On the night of 13 August, three
transports loaded with construction personnel,
equipment, and supplies safely negotiated the
crossing to Buna, where at the same time the
finishing touches were being put on the
enlarged airfield in preparation to receive
fighter planes of the 25th Air Flotilla assigned
to protect the landing area.""

The convoy carrying the South Seas De-
tachment headquarters and the remaining two
battalions of the 144th Infantry Regiment
reached the Basabua anchorage, northwest of
Buna, at 1730 on 18 August without under-
going enemy air attack. Three days later, on
the night of 21 August, the 41st Infantry
Regiment (placed under South Seas Detach-
ment command), less its rst Battalion, also
debarked safely at Basabua and immediately
joined the general movement of the Detach-
ment toward Kokoda. Virtually the entire
strength of the South Seas Detachment was
now deployed in New Guinea for the final
assault on Port Moresby.""

100 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 49-50.

:oi By 22 August nine fighters had flown in from Rabaul and begun operating from the Buns airfield.
After completion of the South Seas Detachment debarkation operations, however, the entire fighter unit was
withdrawn on 23 August to be used in the Guadalcanal campaign.

102 (1) The 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, and remaining rear echelon units of the South Seas Detach-
ment landed in the Buna area on 2-3 September, completing the movement. Southeast Area Operations Record,
Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 84-7. (2) The total strength of Japanese forces thus far sent to Buna for the Papuan
campaign was now approximately 14,000, broken down as follows :

South Seas Detachment (original strength) 4.400

41st Infantry Regt. (5th Division) 3^33

47th Antiaircraft Bn. (less one btry.) 265

15th Independent Engr. Regt. 1,002

152

Attack on Milne Bay

While the main forces of the South Seas
Detachment moved up to throw their weight
into the drive across the Owen Stanleys, the
Eighth Fleet, in compliance with the Imperial
General Headquarters directive of 13 August,
turned its attention to that phase of the joint
Army-Navy operational plan which called for
an amphibious landing to the east of Port
Moresby in coordination with the land attack
from the north.

It was apparent, in view of increasing Allied
air strength in northern Australia and the
Port Moresby area, that such an amphibious
operation would have little chance of success
unless an intermediate base at the southeastern
tip of Papua were first acquired as a staging
point for troops and supplies and as an air
base for covering the movement of amphibious
forces. The operational agreement of 31 July
had merely called for the seizure of Samarai
as a Navy seaplane base, but to cope with
mounting Allied air power the Eighth Fleet
now deemed it essential to acquire a base
adequate for land-based planes. It therefore
decided in favor of an amphibious assault on
Rabi, strategically located on the north shore
of Milne Bay.

According to Japanese intelligence, approxi-
mately 30 Allied fighter planes were already
based in the Milne Bay area, operating from
the Rabi airfield and new airstrips constructed

to the west. It was also assumed that Allied
defenses had been strengthened considerably,
since there had been a noticeable augmentation
of transport activity to that area from Aus-
tralia. Nevertheless, it was believed probable
that the area was not yet strongly held, and
the Eighth Fleet proceeded to plan its attack
without taking effective measures for prelim-
inary reconnaissance. This omission was
furthered by the current concentration of naval
air strength in the operations to reinforce
Guadalcanal.

The operation was to be a two-pronged
assault, with the main force landing in the
vicinity of Lehoa, about five miles east of Rabi,
while a second force was to land at Taupota,
seven miles northeast of Rabi on the shore of
Goodenough Bay. (Plate No. 38) Two special
naval landing forces were assigned to the
main landing, and 353 men of the Sasebo
5th Special Naval Landing Force, then at
Buna, to the secondary landing at Taupota. los
The latter were to move by landing barge
down the coast from Buna and after debarking
were to cross over the Stirling Mountains to
take the enemy from the rear in conjunction
with the frontal assault of the main force.

The Eighth Fleet plan called for the launch-
ing of the Milne Bay operation immediately
upon the expected recapture of Guadalcanal
by the Ichiki Detachment, which effected a
counter-landing on 18 August. A report of
the detachment's failure reached the Eighth
Fleet Commander, Vice Adm. Mikawa, aboard

Additional supporting elms attached from Army 2,600
Total Army troops 10,400
Special naval landing troops 812
Naval construction units 2,857
Total Army and Navy 14,069
There were no further reinforcements or replacements until the middle of November 1942. Cf. Chapter VIII. (Above
statistics compiled by the writer and by Maj, Kengoro Tanaka, Staff Officer (Operations), Eighteenth Army, on
the basis of all available documentary and other sources.)

103 The Taupota landing was decided upon because it was feared that the forces for the main landing on
Milne Bay were insufficient. At the time no other naval landing troops were available to the Eighth Fleet.

153

PLATE NO. 38
Landings on Milne Bay, August — October 1942

His flagship during the subsequent operations
to move in the 35th Brigade. However, still
confident that the recapture of Guadalcanal
would be effected at an early date, Vice Adm.
Mikawa dispatched orders to the 18th Cruiser
Division, held at Rabaul in readiness for the
Milne Bay operation, to begin execution of
the attack plan without awaiting the outcome
on Guadalcanal.

The forces assigned to the main landing
sailed from Rabaul on 24 August, undergoing
a light attack by about ten Allied planes as
they neared Milne Bay on the afternoon of the
25th. The convoy, which entered the Bay
late on the 25th, included two transports
carrying 8ri naval landing troops'" 4 and 363
personnel of the 10th Naval Construction
Unit, all under command of Comdr. Shojiro
Hayashi. Two light cruisers, five destroyers
and two submarine-chasers

escort.

The Lehoa landing was carried out with
reasonable ease at 2150 on 25 August. The
next morning, however, Allied planes suddenly
attacked the beachhead, destroying a large
part of the food and ammunition supplies
which had been unloaded. As the landing
force began moving forward toward the Rabi
airfield, its main objective, enemy air strikes
increased in intensity, making daylight move-
ment impossible. Advancing by night over
unknown terrain, the troops floundered through
jungle swamps to reach the eastern edge of the
airfield on the night of 27 August. Here they

met such unexpectedly savage resistance by the
Allied troops defending the airstrip that, at
dawn on the 28th, it was decided to retire into
the jungle and await reinforcements.

At 2100 on the 29th, 769 additional naval
landing troops under' 05 Comdr. Minoru Yano
landed slightly to the west of Lehoa and joined
the initial force in a second advance on Rabi,
which began at 2330 the same night. A diary
account portrayed the optimistic mood in
which the Japanese moved up for the attack :
29 August : Waited in the jungle at Milne Bay.
The concerted attack has been ordered. . . .All of us
are in good spirits. . . .Nothing but serving the
Emperor. , . .We make our sortie, all hopeful of

success

.06

On the following day, however, constant air
attacks again pinned down the Japanese ad-
vance in the jungle, but with nightfall the
attacking force succeeded in advancing to the
eastern perimeter of the airfield, where it again
met withering fire from the Australian defend-
ers. Beginning at daybreak on 31 August,
Allied tactical aircraft joined in the battle, and
Japanese Navy fighters, hurriedly dispatched
to the scene, were unable to gain air control.' 07

Eighth Fleet headquarters, recognizing
the need of sending further reinforcements,
alerted a newly-arrived naval landing force at
Rabaul, but on 2 September, just as prepara-
tions began for their embarkation, Allied
reinforcements were put ashore at Giligili,
threatening the Japanese force from the rear.
A radio dispatched to Eighth Fleet headquar-

104 These comprised 613 men of the Kure 5th Special Naval Landing Force and 198 men of the Sasebo 5th
Special Naval Landing Force.

105 These comprised 568 men of the Kure 3d Special Naval Landing Force and 201 men of the Yokosuka 5th
Special Naval Landing Force.

106 Extract from diary of a member of the Milne Bay landing force. (ATIS Current Translations No. 4, 25
Nov 42, p. 35.)

107 A company commander of the Kure 3d Special Naval Landing Force recorded in his diary : " We
have to take constant cover in the jungle. We cannot send up any smoke at all, for if detected by the enemy, we
can't escape bombing and machine-gun strafing. . . . We are soaking wet from head to foot and so uncomfortably
cold that we are at our wits' end." (Ibid., p. 11.)

155

ters reported : " Situation most critical. We
shall defend key position to the last man."' 08

It was now evident that the piecemeal com-
mitment of small naval forces would not
retrieve the situation, and that the circumstances
called for large-scale army reinforcements. Ac-
cordingly, agreement was reached between the
Eighth Fleet and Seventeenth Army to dispatch
the Aoba Detachment, approximately 1,000
strong, to relieve the hard-pressed naval force
at Milne Bay. However, the situation at
Guadalcanal made it impossible for this plan to
be put in to effect despite the above local Army-
Navy agreement. Consequently the naval
forces were ordered to avoid major action and
resort to delaying action.

Relentless Australian counterattacks, how-
ever, soon produced a situation in which it was
clear that the battle was irretrievably lost. On
4 September, the Eighth Fleet issued orders
for the withdrawal of all forces from Milne
Bay, and the Seventeenth Army subsequently
relieved the Aoba Detachment of its reinforce-
ment mission, assigning it instead to Guadal-

canal." 19

Evacuation of the naval landing forces by
one light cruiser and three patrol boats began
on 5 September and was carried out with rea-
sonably satisfactory results. Of the 1,943
troops landed on 25 and 29 August, 1,318
were eventually withdrawn." All of the sur-
vivors, however, were incapable of further
combat due to sickness, wounds or battle
fatigue, a testimonial to the bitter hardships
they had been through. 11 '

A contributory cause of the failure at Milne
Bay was the fact that the planned rear attack
from Taupota never materialized. The naval
landing force assigned to this operation had
sailed from Buna on 24 August aboard seven
landing barges, but while temporarily an-
chored off the shore of Goodenough Island,
the group underwent a concentrated Allied air
attack which destroyed all seven barges, to-
gether with their radio equipment." 1 Suffering
from near-starvation and malaria, the survivors
remained stranded on the island for two
months, twice making desperate efforts to con-

108 Southeast Area Naval Operations, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 15.

109 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 88.

110 Major New Guinea Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 15.

in Some members of rear-guard units and isolated groups could not be evacuated and were left in the area
to find their way through the jungle back to Buna. The horrible suffering experienced by these men was told in a

diary picked up by the Allied forces, which read : " 30 Aug. Beginning of the retreat into the mountains with a

grenade splinter through my right hand rotting of the feet makes it difficult to walk. . . .sleeping in the moun-
tains with the rain falling almost incessantly. It is harder to bear than death. 15 Sep. Our troops have not arrived
for 14 days. I have been waiting patiently, but I am beginning to lose consciousness. . , .potatoes. . . .potatoes. , . .my
wife. . . .my mother. 22 Sep. Engaged a large enemy force, . . .lost all our weapons and have only the clothes we wear.

Nothing to eat 25 Sep. I have fever and am nearly unconscious but holding on. 26 Sep. Our forces haven't

arrived yet. . . .no use waiting. . . .I'm mad 28 Sep. I detest rain. . . ." (This is the last entry.) Extract from

diary of 3d Class Petty Officer Morita, Yokosuka 5th Special Landing Force. (ATIS Current Translations No.

2, II NOV 42, p. 17.)

ti2 ^n unidentified member of the Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing Force recorded the details of the
attack in his diary, as follows ; " At 1 1 30 we anchored at the mouth of a certain river. A single enemy plane flew
over. We were making up enough food to last for three meals and were scheduled to sail at 1530, when at about
1230 ten enemy fighters came over and attacked both the landing craft and our troops with machine-gun fire and
bombs. The seven landing craft caught fire simultaneously. We fought back, but what could we do against fighter
planes ? Eight dead, six badly wounded, 30-40 slightly wounded. With all the landing craft destroyed by fire, our
future movement is a problem. We should retire immediately, but without radio we have no means of communication,
so the only thing we can do is wait for assistance." (ATIS Current Translations No. 14, t8 Jan, 43, p 4.)

156

tact the Japanese forces at Buna by sending
messengers across to the New Guinea coast by
canoe.

When approximately 300 Allied troops be-
gan landing on the eastern and southern shores
of Goodenough Island on 23 October, the
plight of the Japanese unit became still more
serious, although it retained sufficient strength
to repulse the enemy landing force in the
southern shore sector." 5 Finally, using two
landing barges which had been sent in response
to its appeals to Buna, the unit withdrew to
Upurapuro, on adjacent Fergusson Island,
where it was picked up on 26 October by the
cruiser Tenryu and evacuated to Rabaul." 4

With the collapse of the Milne Bay invasion
attempt and the steady deterioration of the
situation on Guadalcanal, Japanese hopes on
the southeast area front now centered on the
advance of the South Seas Detachment, which
had forged its way over the Owen Stanley
Range almost within striking distance of Port
Moresby.

Owen Stanleys Offensive

After capturing Kokoda on 29 July, the
Yokoyama Advance Force pressed forward into
the Owen Stanley range on 7 August, meeting
almost continuous resistance by a force of
about 200 Australian troops. (Plate No. 39}
From about 20 August there was a marked
intensification of Allied air reconnaissance,
followed by severe bombing and strafing attacks
against the advancing Japanese column. On

26 August the Yokoyama Advance Force ran
into stiff opposition by an enemy force of es-
timated battalion strength on the heights near
Isurava, and as soon as the first elements of the
South Seas Detachment, newly-arrived from
the Buna beaches, were able to move up to
the front line, the battle was joined.

Due to stubborn enemy resistance and diffi-
culties encountered in moving up supplies
over the steeply mountainous and jungle-
covered terrain, the initial attacks failed to
dislodge the Australians from their strong
position, and the advance was stalled until the
arrival on 27 August of the 2d Battalion of
the 41st Infantry, led by the regimental com-
mander, Col. Kiyomi Yazawa. On the 29th
the 144th Infantry threw its full strength into
a combined frontal assault and enveloping
attack around the enemy's right flank, suc-
ceeding after eight hours of bitter fighting in
overrunning the Australian outer perimeter
and part of the main enemy positions, but only
at the cost of heavy casualties. On 30 August
the 2d Battalion of the 41st Infantry success-
fully enveloped the enemy's left flank by a
difficult advance over the mountains, and by
the 31st the Australians were encircled and
defeated with heavy losses. On 1 September
the South Seas Detachment forces entered
Isurava."'

Despite its own heavy casualties, the South
Seas Detachment was heartened by its success
and pushed on beyond Isurava, its progress
becoming ever more difficult as it penetrated
deeper into the Stanley Range. The hardships

113 Major New Guinea Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 16.

114 When the unit was ready to board the rescue ship, its commander, Comdr. Tsukioka, addressed the men
as follows : " We are all thin with lack of food, but when we board the ship, do not show a haggard countenance.
There is a saying that the Samurai displays a toothpick even when he has not eaten. This is an example worth
emulating at the present time." (ATIS Current Translations No. 14, op. cit., p. 6.)

115 Details of the Isurava action are as related to the writer by Maj. Mitsuo Koiwai, commander, 2d Battal-
ion, 41st Infantry Regiment, one of the few surviving officers of the South Seas Detachment. Maj. Koiwai stated
that two companies of the 144th Infantry's 2d Battalion, which carried out the flank assault on 29 August, lost the
majority of their officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned.

157

PLATE NO. 39
Owen Stanley Penetration, 21 July — 26 September 1942

of the advance were graphically recorded in
this passage from a soldier's diary:

The road gets gradually steeper. Bushes cover the
countryside. Cicadas and birds are singing. We
are in a jungle area. The sun is fierce here. One
party of troops crawled up and scaled the mountains
and continued its advance. Troops are covered wtth
dirt and sweat so much that it ts difficult to tell one
man from another. We make our way through a
jungle where there are no roads. The jungle is beyond
description. Thirsty for water, stomach empty. The
pack on the back is heavy. My arm ts numb like a
stick. My neck and back hurt when I wipe them
with a cloth. No matter how much I wipe, the sweat
still pours out and falls down like crystals. Even when
all the water in your body has evaporated, the sun of
the southern country has no mercy on you. The
soldiers grit their teeth and continue advancing, quiet
as mummies. No one says anything unnecessary.
They do not even think but just keep on advancing
toward the — front. . . .

" Water, water ! " all the soldiers are muttering to
themselves Those who believe in miracles are whisper-
ing, "I want water, I want water." We reach for
the canteens at our hips from force of habit, but they
do not contain a drop of water. Yet the men still
believe in miracles. The fierce sun makes them sleepy.
The weeds and trees are snatching a peaceful sleep
under the burning sun. . . .The sound of the enemy
planes and our marching seem to lull us to sleep. The
men sleep while they walk and sometimes bump into
trees. Enemy planes fly over the jungle and repeatedly
attack." 6

After suffering from the intense heat of the
lower altitudes, the troops, as they climbed
toward the summit of the Stanley Range, now
began to suffer from the frigid nights and icy
rains, against which their tropical battle-dress
gave little protection. Still more serious was
the appearance of shortages of rations and

ammunition, partially resulting from a tendency
among the foot-weary troops to lighten their
packs during the gruelling advance. So alarm-
ing was the situation that Maj. Gen. Horit, in
a special order issued i September, enjoined
strict measures of economy:

Although the loss of time caused by the difficulties
of the range and by enemy action had been foreseen,
we are concerned at the small quantity remaintng of
the ammunition and provisions originally carried.
Although economy precautions were previously order-
ed, these directions have regrettably not yet driven
home, perhaps owing to continued action and prolong-
ed marches. All unit commanders and officers, of
whatever rank, must exercise the most painstaking
control and supervision, so that every bullet fells on
enemy and every grain of rice furthers the task of the
Detachment, They must also see that full use is made
of captured ammunition and provisions.'*'

Indeed, the problem of supply was the most
critical one facing the Japanese forces pushing
toward Port Moresby. It was now recognized
that roads capable of accommodating vehicular
traffic were non-existent. At best, in the
jungle, troops could follow the native trails,
tangled with undergrowth, but in the moun-
tains these trails narrowed down to nothing
more than forgotten tracks clinging precariously
to the sides of cliffs, or vanishing perpen-
dicularly into steep canyons.

In the course of its advance, the South Seas
Detachment carved 20,000 steps in the moun-
tainsides to facilitate its march, yet at the end
of the operation it was still impossible to use
even pack horses south of Isurava. Rains held
up all transport for days at a time. Moreover,
in good weather, Allied air attacks soon reach-
ed a degree of intensity which made it

116 Extract from diary of an unidentified soldier, belonging to a unit of the South Seas Detachment.
(ATIS Current Translations No. 64, 13 Jul 43, pp. 7—8.)

117 Directions Regarding Economy in the Use of Ammunition and Provisions, South Seas Detachment Hq.,
1 Sep 42. (File of Nankai Shttai Operations Orders, 16 Aug-if Oct 42, ATIS Enemy Publications No. 33, 12 Aug 43,
p. 10.)

159

impossible to move men or supplies during
daylight hours.""

In addition to the obvious fact that the
South Seas Detachment was outstripping its
supply lines, Seventeenth Army headquarters
in late August recognized the unwisdom of
attempting a headlong advance on Port Mores-
by without regard for the progress of the
parallel operation at Milne Bay, which was to
pave the way for a coordinated amphibious
assault. The situation at Milne Bay was
critical, and plans were being formulated to
send in the Aoba Detachment to turn the tide
of battle. Dependent upon the success of this
operation, it was planned to move part of the
main strength of the 2d Division, scheduled
to be transferred from Java, to the area for the
projected amphibious assault on Moresby." 9

Pending the execution of these plans, the
Seventeenth Army decided to slow the advance
of the South Seas Detachment so as to conserve
and build up its combat strength for the final
push from the Owen Stanleys. Accordingly,
on 28 August, the following order was received
by Maj. Gen. Horii from Seventeenth Army
headquarters at Rabaul :

Should the South Seas Detachment succeed in
destroying the enemy in the Owen Stanley Range and
reach the strategic area on the south side of the range,
elements of the Detachment will secure this line, while

the main body of the Detachment will concentrate
north of the range to prepare for subsequent operations.
The advance beyond this line will be by separate
order.'™

Meanwhile, in Tokyo, the thinking of Im-
perial General Headquarters had also under-
gone a marked change since its 13 August
directive calling for swift execution of the Port
Moresby campaign " in accordance with pre-
vious plans". The failure of the initial
attempts to recapture Guadalcanal, which in-
dicated that the American foothold was con-
siderably stronger than at first estimated, led
to a shift of emphasis to the Solomons, where
Imperial General Headquarters now foresaw the
probable necessity of committing a large por-
tion of Seventeenth Army strength previously
intended for New Guinea.

The Army Section of Imperial General
Headquarters therefore reached the decision
that the strength of the Seventeenth Army
should not be further expended in New Guinea
until the recapture of the Solomons was
assured. In accordance with this decision, a
radio to the Seventeenth Army on 29 August
explicitly directed that the South Seas Detach-
ment halt its advance at the southern edge of
the Owen Stanleys,' " and on 31 August a
formal Imperial General Headquarters directive
stipulated that major operations in New Guinea

1 18 The importance of the supply problem in causing the failure of the land drive on Port Moresby was stressed
in subsequent Army staff studies analyzing the New Guinea operations. One of these studies staled: "This operation
has been greatly influenced by insufficient transport. Inability to move supplies seriously diminished front-line combat
strength. Transport activity decreased because it was impossible to move by day, and halts were unavoidable after
rains. The difficulty of transporting supplies by pack-horse increased, and the number of horses decreased. When
men were used, only small quantities could be carried because of the large number of sick and the difficulty of
negotiating the mountain inclines. Also, the carriers themselves consumed half of the provisions they carried while
on the way." (lessons From New Guinea Operations, Jul 42-Apr 43 , ATIS Enemy Publications No. 285, 18 Jan. 45, pp.
13-14.)

110 The 4th Infantry Regiment of the 2d Division was already contained in the Aoba Detachment. The main
body of the Division {16th and 29th Infantry Regiments) was assigned to the Seventeenth Army on 29 August and
completed its movement from Java to Rabaul on 29 September, by which date its commitment on Guadalcanal had
been decided. Under the tentative plans formulated in August, one portion of its strength was to be used in the
' bious operation against Moresby, while the remainder was to reinforce the South Seas Detachment land drive.

120 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 85-6.

121 Ibid., p. 86.

160

would be held in abeyance pending the clean-
up of the Solomons. The latter order stated :
After the recdpture of the Solomons is nearly
complete, naval forces will be diverted to the New
Guinea area. Naval air units will destroy enemy air
strength in this area, enabling the land attack forces
to proceed southward from the Kokoda sector. The
Army, in cooperation with the Navy, will support the
land attack with an amphibious operation near Port
Moresby to capture the airfields in its vicinity.' 11

This order came as a severe blow to the
South Seas Detachment. In particular, it
meant that the Detachment could continue to
expect no naval air support of its operations.
Although Navy fighters had operated briefly
from the Buna airstrip to cover the landings of
the main Detachment forces, they had soon
been diverted to Guadalcanal, with the result
that Allied aircraft dominated the skies over
New Guinea, hammering constantly at the
Japanese ground troops as they advanced and
disrupting their supply lines to the rear.

Nevertheless, the troops on the Isurava front,
encouraged by their successes of late August,
pushed on toward the summit of the Stanley
Range with the main body of the 41st Infantry
spearheading the advance. On 1 September
the 41st vigorously attacked the Australian
position at Camp Gap, held by a force of ap-
proximately battalion strength, and succeeded
in taking it by 0400 the following day. At
dawn on 3 September, Eora was penetrated
after three separate charges. The 41st Infantry
drove on, meeting scattered opposition from the
Australians who retreated to still another de-
fense position estimated to be at the summit of
the range. Throughout 4 September the 41st
Infantry prepared for the assault, which was
launched after nightfall. By 0200 5 September,

the summit was in Japanese hands.

In the fighting from Camp Gap to the
summit, the 41st Infantry had lost 44 killed
and 62 wounded, but it had also inflicted con-
siderable losses on the Australians, whose
combat strength was estimated to be greatly
reduced. Large amounts of abandoned stores
were found during the advance from Camp Gap,
and it was noted that the Australians were no
longer using the main road in their retreat.

At this juncture a sudden intensification of
Allied air strikes against the Buna area, coupled
with intelligence reports of the presence of
American air borne troops in Australia, led to
fears that the enemy might be contemplating
amphibious or airborne landings in that area in
order to cut off the South Seas Detachment
from the rear. To meet this threat, the Seven-
teenth Army on 8 September ordered Maj.
Gen. Horii to reassemble the 41st Infantry
Regiment at Kokoda, and a further order on 14
September directed that one battalion of the
41st Infantry be stationed near Buna to assure
the defense of that area.

Meanwhile, the 144th Infantry Regiment,
which had relieved the 41st at the front on 5
September, pushed off from the summit in the
wake of the retreating Australians. Morale
was high with the goal of the Moresby plain
not far away, and the men advanced thinking
of the ancient battle of Hiyodorigoe, famed in
Japanese history and legend." 5

On a hill south of Efogi, the 144th Infantry
encountered its first stubborn opposition from
the Australians, who were supported by heavy
mortar fire. Sustaining considerable losses, the
regiment was held up for three days until 8
September, when enemy resistance was finally
overcome. After the battle, a company com-

i2Z Daikaisbi Dai Hyakunijushichi-gp ^C!@-f=^^@" ~H — t?^S (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No.
1 27) 31 Aug 42. (Text of Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 1246, 31 Aug 42, was identical in
substance)

123 The battle of Hiyodorigoe was fought in 1184 A. D., when Yoshitsune, leading the Genji forces, attacked
the Heike forces from the mountains to their rear.

161

Original Painting by Goro Tsurut* Photogrjph by U.S. Anny Sigcul Corps

PLATE NO. 40
Takasago Unit Fighting Through Owen Stanleys

mander recorded in his diary :

Damage inflicted on this company seems heavy.
Wounded men are still uncollected. They are
groaning with pain, but we are unable to render any
assistance. Corpses are piled high as a result of
yesterday's battle. It is a tragic sight. 11 *

Despite its heavy casualties, the regiment
moved forward past Efogi, meeting scattered
resistance from an Australian force in the hills
south of the Nauro River and then advancing
to attack strong enemy positions on a hill south
of Ioribaiwa. " Climbing breath-taking hills
and wading through muddy swamps " ,2 > to
reach Ioribaiwa, the exhausted troops, after
close-quarter fighting and severe losses to both
sides, finally penetrated the enemy position at
1530 on 16 September.

That night the troops, footsore and spent,
could see searchlight beams from one of the
Allied airstrips around Port Moresby, and they
knew that only one more ridge separated them
from the Moresby plain. But the 144th, like
the 41st, had paid a heavy price for its gains.
Battle casualties were high, with little means
of transporting the wounded back the trail to
base hospitals. Malaria was rampant. The
men's nerves were shattered by constant enemy
air attacks. Above all, rations were exhausted,' 36
and the troops near starvation. Just after the
capture of Ioribaiwa, an officer wrote :

17 September : Selected camping ground. We
are to wail here until the middle of next month before
further operations. Not a grain of rice left. Each
unit gathered about a two days' supply of food which

had been scattered about. . . .Dreamed all night of
lost subordinates.

18 September : . . . .transportation of rations report-
ed to be difficult. How will we live in our present
condition without any food ? In another few days
we will have to eat roots or tree-bark. . . .Heard
distant rifle shots, slept and dreamed of home.

19 September : Inspected tents and noticed the
scarcity of food. Entire company turned out to
forage for food. Thirteen malaria, six diarrhoea
and five other patients are getting worse. No
medicines have arrived. Went to battalion headquar-
ters to report the food situation and requisition
supplies. Returned empty-handed. Wonder what
General Headquarters is doing. Patients will die,
and we will soon starve. How can we fight against
this?' 27

In view of the exhausted, semi -starved condi-
tion of its troops, aggravated by the completely
inadequate trickle of supplies from the rear, the
South Seas Detachment would hardly have
been capable of further offensive action had it
been called upon to continue the advance. How-
ever, with the capture of Ioribaiwa, it had ful-
filled its restricted mission of pushing the enemy
from the Owen Stanleys and establishing a
foothold at the southern edge of the range.
Now, its task was to consolidate its position,
regroup its forces and prepare for the final drive
on Port Moresby to be launched as soon as the
American thrust into the Solomons had been
overcome. On 20 September, Maj. Gen. Horii
set forth the Detachment's future mission in the
following message of instruction to all troops
under his command :

124 ATIS Current Translations No, 29, 28 Apr 43, p. 56,

125 Ibid.

126 Upon leaving Buna, the troops had been issued rice rations sufficient, on the basis of the normal ration,
for only eight days. These rations, however, were to last for 16 days, allowing only half the normal ration per day.
Later during the advance the allowance was further reduced to a maximum of one go (0.3 pint), or one-sixth the
normal daily ration. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 88.

127 ATIS Current Translations No. 29, op. cit., p. 59.

163

It is now over one month since this Detachment left
Rabattl and took over from the Yokoyama Advance
Force, which had put up a brave fight prior to our
arrival. We first reduced the strong position at
Isurava, and continued on, crushing the enemy's resist-
ance on the heights north of Isurava, at the Gap,
Eora, E/ogi, etc. Repeatedly we were in hot pursuit
of the enemy. We smashed his final resistance in
the fierce fighting at Ioribaiwa, and today we firmly
hold the heights of that area, the most important point
for the advance on Port Moresby.

For more than three weeks during that period,
every unit forced its way through deep forests and
ravines, and climbed scores of peaks in pursuit of the
enemy. Traversing knee-deep mud, clambering up
steep precipices, bearing uncomplainingly the heavy
weight of artillery ammunition, our men overcame
shortages of supplies and succeeded in surmounting
the Stanley Range. No pen or words can depict
adequately the magnitude of the hardships suffered.
From the bottom of our hearts we appreciate these
sacrifices and deeply sympathize with the great numbers
killed and wounded.

We realize that the enemy on Tulagi and Guadal-
canal has not yet been annihilated. We have not
yet won back the Samarai and Rabi air bases. But
the Detachment will stay here and firmly hold its
position in order to perfect its organization and
replenish its fighting strength. We will strike a
hammer-blow at the stronghold of Port Moresby.
However, ahead of us the enemy still crawls about.
It is difficult to judge the direction of his movement,
and many of you have not fully recovered your
strength. I feel keenly that it is increasingly important
during the present period, while we are waiting for
the opportunity to strike, to strengthen our positions,
reorganize our forces, replenish our stores, and recover
our physical fitness.

Now, all must bear in mind the vital situation
and the role of the Detachment m the South Pacific,

and your increasingly heavy responsibilities. Streng-
then your morale, replenish your vigor, and prepare
for battle. When next we go into action, the unit
will throw in its fighting power unreservedly.'*

Retreat from the Owen Stanleys

Pursuant to Maj. Gen. Horii's message of
instructions, the South Seas Detachment pre-
pared to consolidate its hard-won positions on
the southern slopes of the Stanley Range and
simultaneously regroup its forces for the later
assault on Moresby. However, crucial develop-
ments on other sectors of the southeast area
front outdated this plan even before its execu-
tion began.

On Guadalcanal, the first general offensive of
the 35th Inf. Brigade on 13 September had failed,
and the Seventeenth Army was now preparing
to commit its remaining reserves — Aoba De-
tachment and main strength of the 2d Divi-
sion, previously intended for the final campaign
against Moresby — in a second general offensive
in October. At the same time, in New Guinea,
Japanese supply difficulties became more acute,
and there were mounting indications that Gen-
eral MacArthur planned early landings in the
Buna area, which would, if successful, seal the
fate of the South Seas Detachment and doom
the entire Port Moresby invasion plan. 13 *

Faced by this new situation, Seventeenth
Army headquarters saw no alternative but to
divert a substantial portion of South Seas De-
tachment strength back to the Buna area to
counter enemy landing attempts. Consequently,
on 23 September, the following order was dis-
patched to Maj. Gen. Horii :

& On the basts of intelligence reports it appears

128 ATIS Current Translations No. 2, n Nov 42, p. 23.

129 Japanese intelligence indicated a marked reinforcement of Allied strength in New Guinea after the begin-
ning of September. Approximately 10,000 Australian troops (2d Division) and 2,000 American infantry and marines
were estimated to be in the Port Moresby area, while the transport of ground troops to the Milne Bay — Samarai area
also showed a sharp increase. This, coupled with stepped-up air reconnaissance over the Buna area, pointed to the
strong possibility of a landing attempt in that area. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp.
87, 184.

164

that the enemy is contemplating new landings in eastern
New Guinea and the Solomons.

2. The Army will continue its preparations for
the recapture of Guadalcanal, and at the same time
will readjust its front in the South Seas Detachment
area and strengthen defenses in the yicinity of Buna.

3. The Commanding General, South Seas
Detachment, will reassemble his main strength in the
Isurava-Kokoda sector, secure bases for future offen-
sive operations, and reinforce defenses in the Buna
vicinity. For this purpose, a force composed princi-
pally of the 41st Infantry Regiment will be dispatched
without delay to the Buna sector, where it will smash
enemy invasion plans and, in particular, secure the
vicinity of the airfield. Further, one element of the
Detachment will endeavor to hold a position on the
southern slope of the Stanley Rjnge.')"

Two main points of operational policy were
clear from this order. The first was that the
Seventeenth Army intended to suspend positive
operations in the Owen Stanleys sector until
Guadalcanal had been recaptured. The second
was that the Army still desired to hold the
Isurava-Kokoda sector, north of the Owen
Stanleys, as a staging area from which to mount
an ultimate attack on Port Moresby ; but its
major concern was now to secure the vital Buna
area against threatened enemy attack, if neces-
sary at the cost of relinquishing the vantage
points gained by the South Seas Detachment
almost within striking distance of Port Moresby,

Maj. Gen. Horii and his staff, conscious of
the sacrifices paid to win possession of these
vantage points, doubted the wisdom of relin-
quishing them. However, the Army order to
move the 41st Infantry Regiment, which now

composed the main combat strength of the
Detachment,'*' immediately back to the Buna
area, rendered it necessary to pull the Detach-
ment front line back from Ioribaiwa to a point
closer to Isurava and Kokoda. After a night-
long staff conference, Maj. Gen. Horii on 24
September ordered the weakened remnants of
the 144th Infantry to begin the withdrawal to
Eora." 1

On the 25th, headquarters personnel, supply
and hospital units began moving to the rear,
followed on the 26th by the combat troops,
who withdrew under constant mortar fire from
enemy positions. Active pursuit by the Aus-
tralians did not begin immediately, however,
and no enemy ground attack was received until
the 144th Regiment had pulled back to the area
south of Eora. (Plate No. 42) There, the 2d
Battalion, with a mountain artillery battery and
engineer company attached [henceforth desig-
nated as the Stanley Detachment) took up a
strong position near Eora and covered the
withdrawal of the remaining elements of the
regiment. The latter completed their move-
ment to Kokoda by 4 October.

Meanwhile, the 41st Infantry Regiment,
less the 2d and 3d Battalions, had left Kokoda
on 25 September arriving in Buna on 28
September, at which time the 3d Battalion
rejoined the Regiment and by 4 October the
Regiment had taken up defensive positions in
the Buna-Gona-Giruwa area. The 2d Battal-
ion remained at Kokoda with the main strength
of the 144th Infantry to serve as a reserve force.
These new dispositions were substantially

130 Ibid., p. 184.

131 The 41st Infantry Regiment had been held in reserve at Kokoda since its relief by the 144th on 5 September.
As of 20 September, it had over 1,700 effectives, whereas the 144th Regiment, after fighting to Ioribaiwa, was down
to less than one-half its original strength of 2,932.

132 The conference on the Seventeenth Army order lasted from 1700 on 23 September until 0400 the next day.
Some members of Maj. Gen. Horii's staff strongly opposed withdrawal on the ground that the supply situation was no
better in the Kokoda area, and even favored pressing on toward Port Moresby in the hope of capturing enemy food
supplies. (Statement by Maj. Koiwai, previously cited.)

165

Original Painting by Awuahir© Kobayaluv*

PLATE NO. 41
Looking at Port Moresby from Owen Stanleys

PLATE NO. 42

Withdrawal from the Owen Stanleys, 25 September — 27 November 1942

confirmed by a Seventeenth Army order on 30
September, which directed Maj. Gen.Horii ;

/. To secure an offensive base near Isurava and
a defensive base m the Buna area with elements of
the South Seas Detachment.

2. To employ his main strength in improving
the Giruwa-Kokoda road for vehicular transport, and
the Kokoda-Isurava trail for pack-horse transport, by
the end of October.

3. To complete improvement of the Kokoda
airstrip into an operational air base.'**

However, beginning early in October, Aus-
tralian attacks on the position held by the
Stanley Detachment at Eora mounted in severi-
ty. Mercilessly pounded by enemy mortar
fire and constant attacks from the air, the unit
suffered extremely heavy casualties, and its
position was rapidly becoming untenable. On
14 October, to save the Detachment from an-
nihilation, Maj. Gen. Horii ordered the 144th
Regiment less 2d and 3d Battalions back to
the front, from which they had been withdrawn
only ten days earlier. Even after these troops
had reached Eora, however, the situation was so
critical that the 3d Battalion ot the 144th Reg-
iment and 2d Battalion of the 41st Regiment,
still in reserve at Kokoda, was ordered to
prepare to cover the further withdrawal of all
front-line forces by 25 October.

Already forced to withdraw to a new position
north of Camp Gap on 21 October, the Stanley
Detachment again attempted to make a stand,
only to sustain further Australian attacks which
steadily mounted in ferocity. The defense of
the Gap soon became so precarious that Maj.
Gen. Horii, on 24 October, ordered the main
body (1st and 3d Battalions) of the 41st Infantry

guarding the Buna-Gona area, to move up to
the front again for the purpose of relieving the
battered Stanley Detachment. Two days later,
on 26 October, a further order by Maj. Gen.
Horii conceded the probable necessity of a
retreat as far as Oivi, relinquishing Kokoda to
the enemy. The order stated ;

The enemy in the Stanley Detachment area has
an approximate strength of two battalions. After
the 144th Infantry Regiment fell back to Eora, fresh
enemy troops appear to have come up. Their trench
mortars are active. The Stanley Detachment, al-
though endeavoring to improve its position, has had
to fight over a long period, transporting supplies under
great difficulty, and with inadequate rations its fighting
strength is at its lowest.

The Detachment will exert the utmost effort to
hold firmly its present position, but if this is impos-
sible, it will withdraw after dusk on 28 October at
the earliest. It will withdraw in the direction of
Oivi, delaying the enemy advance as long as possible,
especially in the sector between Isurava and Deniki.'^

Two days following this order, a Seventeenth
Army dispatch on 28 October advised an even
further withdrawal to the east bank of the
Kumusi River, but Maj. Gen. Horii and his
staff rejected this as unwise on the ground that
the low terrain east of the Kumusi was unfavor-
able both for defense and as the starting-point
of future offensive operations.

In accordance with Maj. Gen. Horii's order
of 26 October, the Stanley Detachment and the
1st and 3d Battalions of the 144th Infantry
hastily pulled out of their position near the
Gap on 28 October, the 2d Battalion of the
41st Infantry covering their withdrawal. The
plan was now to establish a strong north-south

133 Southeast Area Operations Record. Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 185.

134 On 14 October, a non-commissioned officer of one of the companies of the Stanley Detachment recorded
in his diary that he had become acting company commander after its four officers had all been killed or wounded.
The company had only four out of 17 non-commissioned officers left, and was down to a total strength of 42 men out
of its normal strength of 178. (ATIS Current Translations No. 15, 22 Jan 43, p. 22.)

1 35 South Seas Detachment Operations Order, 26 Oct 42. File of Nankai Shitai Operations Orders, ATIS Enemy
Publications No. 39, 1 Sep. 43, p. 6.

168

defense line at Oivi, with the 41st Infantry on
the right flank around Oivi itself and the 144th
Infantry on the left flank slightly to the south,
guarding a secondary trail from Kokoda to
the Buna area. South Seas Detachment head-
quarters was to be at Goran, approximately
three miles east of Oivi.' 1 '

All dispositions were complete by 2 Novem-
ber, when the 41st Infantry's 2d Battalion fell
back to Oivi, joining the 1st and 3d Battalions
which had moved up from the Buna-Gona area.
The Stanley Detachment and most of the re-
maining strength of the 144th Infantry mean-
while took up their left-flank position to the
south of Oivi. The stage was set for battle.

The Australian forces now split into two
elements, the first advancing on Oivi in a frontal
assault while the second swept to the south in
a flanking movement, launching a surprise dawn
attack on 5 November against the 144th Infan-
try position. Driven back by the unexpected
weight of the enemy assault, the 144th began
retreating eastward on 9 November, crossing
the Kumusi and heading toward Buna. The
Australian force then wheeled swiftly northward
to attack the 41st Regiment from the rear and
cut off its retreat at Gorari.

Caught between the closing Australian
pincers and cut off from contact with the 144th
Regiment, the 41st, together with South Seas
Detachment headquarters, found itself under
heavy fire and facing imminent danger of encir-
clement. On 10 November Maj. Gen. Horii
decided to withdraw toward the Kumusi under
cover of a daring night attack against the eastern
prong of the enemy pincers at Gorari to open
a retreat passage. Preparations for a full-scale
attack could not be completed in time, however,
and a preliminary attack by two companies on
the night of the 10th failed to breach the enemy
positions. Maj. Gen. Horii then ordered the

136 At the time, Gorari was mistakenly referred
to the east.

41st Regiment to cross Oivi Creek, skirt around
the northern enemy flank, and recross the creek
farther to the east to get back on the trail to
Buna. The withdrawal began at 0900 on ix
November.

Although the Japanese troops successfully
crossed to the north bank of Oivi Creek on the
nth, heavy rains on the afternoon of that day
flooded the creek to such an extent that attempts
to recross to the south bank after skirting
around the enemy at Gorari proved unsuccess-
ful. Maj. Gen. Horii and his troops therefore
continued to retreat along the north bank of
Oivi Creek toward its juncture with the Kumusi
River. They still had not succeeded in effect-
ing a crossing when the approach of pursuing
Australian troops on 13 November forced them
to turn northward and flee along the trackless
west bank of the Kumusi toward Pinga.

As the Japanese troops approached Pinga,
the sound of gunfire was heard from across the
river in the direction of Gona, and it was feared
that the anticipated Allied landings had already
taken place. Maj. Gen. Horii, gravely concern-
ed over the situation, decided to attempt to
reach the Buna area by canoe down the Kumusi.
Setting out on 19 November with a staff officer
and a runner, he succeeded in reaching the
mouth of the river, and from there the canoe
headed down the seacoast toward Buna. When
directly off Gona, a sudden squall arose and
capsized the canoe. Attempting to swim ashore,
both Maj. Gen. Horii and his staff officer were
drowned.

The 41st Infantry Regiment at Pinga, under
the regimental commander, Col. Kiyomi Ya-
zawa, had meanwhile built rafts, crossed the
Kumusi River and started overland toward Gona.
Losing many additional men and abandoning
a large part of their weapons and equipment in
the difficult overland trek, the depleted rem-

by the Japanese as Ilimo, which lies a few miles farther

169

nants did not reach the Gona area until 27
November.'"

The 144th Regiment, after its hasty retreat
from the Oivi sector on 9 November, withdrew
northeastward toward Giruwa. Most of its
remaining troops reached the Giruwa area by
17 November, only two days before strong
American and Australian forces suddenly at-
tacked from the sector south of the Buna

airstrip.

Without time in which to reorganize its
command and regroup its scattered, demoralized
and weakened forces, the South Seas Detach-
ment was now called upon to resist a powerful
Allied pincers assault which threatened to wrest
from the Japanese forces their last remaining
foothold in Papua.

137 Statement by Maj. Koiwai, previously cited.

170

CHAPTER VIII
DEFENSE OF PAPUA

Eighth Area Army Activated

With the sudden reversal of Japanese for-
tunes in New Guinea and the parallel failure of
the second general offensive mounted by the
Seventeenth Army Guadalcanal, Imperial
General Headquarters for the first time began
to assess the full gravity and implications of the
situation which was developing on the southeast
area front."

It was evident that the Seventeenth Army,
its major forces already expended in the futile
attempts to retake the Solomons, 2 could not
cope with the added menace presented by
General MacArthur's thrust against the Japa-
nese right flank in Papua. To repulse these twin
Allied drives and pave the way for ultimate
resumption of the offensive toward Port
Moresby, a drastic reorganization of command
and an immediate reinforcement of fighting

strength were imperative.

Therefore, on 16 November, Imperial Gen-
eral Headquarters ordered the activation of the
Eighteenth Army to take over the conduct of
operations in New Guinea, restricting the
operational sphere of the Seventeenth Army
exclusively to the Solomons. Both armies were
simultaneously placed under a new theater
command designated as the Eighth Area Army,
and Lt. Gen. Hitoshi Imamura, Commanding
General of the Sixteenth Army in Java, was
ordered to Rabaul to assume command.
These command dispositions were to become
effective on 26 November.

Upon activation, the Eighth Area Army
consisted of the Seventeenth Army, the newly
activated Eighteenth Army, the 6th Division,
21st Independent Mixed Brigade, and 12th Air
Brigade. Elements of the 5th Division were
also assigned on 20 November. On 27 Novem-
ber, the Army's 6th Air Division* commanded

1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Comdr. Masataka Chihaya, Imperial Japanese Navy. Duty
assignments of this efficer were as follows : Antiaircraft Gunnery Cfficer, battleship Musashi, 15 Sep 41 — 10 Oct
42; Staff Officer (Operations), nth Battleship Division, to Oct- 30 Nov 42; Staff Officer, Third Section (Military
Preparations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, 20 Jan— 1 Jul 43 ; Naval War College, 1 Jul 43 — 5 Mar
44 ; Staff Officer (Operations), Fourth Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 15 Mar 44 — 18 Jan 45 ; Staff Officer (Operations),
Combined Fleet, 1 Feb — 1 May 45 ; Staff Officer (Operations), General Navy Command, concurrently attached to
headquarters, First and Second General Armies, 1 May - 6 Sep 45. All source materials cited in this chapter are located
in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 The second general offensive on Guadalcanal began with a night attack on the airfield on 24 October 1942.
The American positions were penetrated, but the 2d Division sustained heavy casualties and was unable to hold its
gains. A second attack was ordered for the night of 25 October, but cculd not be carried out due to strong American
counterattacks, although one brigade on the Japanese left flank carried out an abortive suicide assault. At 0600 on
26 October, orders were issued to suspend the attack and withdraw. NcMo Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono Ni : Dai

Jushichi Gun no Sakusen rN&^BifW.u : 8W < SP'f-fl IS (Southeast Area Operations Record. Part II:

Seventeenth Army Operations) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Sep 46, Vol. I, pp. 166-73.

3 Strength of the 6th Air Division at its activaticn was : 54 light bombers, 84 fighters, and 9 reconnais-
sance planes. Subsequent assignment of additional units brought the division up to its maximum operational strength
at the end of May 1943, when it had 77 light bombers, 114 fighters, and 26 reconnaissance aircraft, a total of 217
planes. Losses reduced this strength to 165 aircraft at the end of June, and 99 aircraft as of 26 July 1943. Nanto
Homen Koku Sakusen Kiroku (Southeast Area Air Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau,
Sep 46, pp. 6, 24.

171

by Lt. Gen. Giichi Itahana was activated and
placed under the Commander-in-Chief, Eighth
Area Army, to be used in support of both
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Army operations.
To command the new Eighteenth Army in
charge of New Guinea operations, Imperial
General Headquarters appointed Lt. Gen.
Hatazo Adachi, then chief of staff of the North
China Area Army. At the date of its activation,
the Eighteenth Army's combat forces comprised
only the remnants of the South Seas Detach-
ment, the 41st Infantry Regiment, the 15th
Independent Engineers Regiment and some
small units, all badly battered in the Owen
Stanleys campaign. On 20 November, however,
elements of the 65th Brigade 4 in the Philippines
were transferred to Eighteenth Army by Impe-
General Headquarters order. This was

followed by an Eighth Area Army order on
26 November, placing the major portion of the
21st Independent Mixed Brigade,' as well as
one infantry battalion and one mountain
artillery battery of the 38th Division, 6 under
Eighteenth Army operational control.

Parallel with this regrouping and replenish-
ment of forces, Imperial General Headquarters
on 18 November issued an operational directive
to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Eighth
Area Army and the Combined Fleet, clarifying
future objectives on the southeast area front.
The directive continued to give priority to the
recapture of the Solomons, but at the same
time it called for a strengthening of Japanese
bases in New Guinea with the ultimate objec-
tive of resuming the offensive toward Port

Moresby and sweeping the Allies from Papua.
Essential points of the directive were as follows:

/. The Army and Navy will cooperate in hastily
reinforcing and equipping air bases in the vicinity of
the Solomon Islands for employment in subsequent
operations, and will devote special attention to streng-
thening air defenses in this iector, Army forces on
Guadalcanal will immediately secure key positions in
preparation for offensive operations, while recovering
their strength. The Navy, during this period, will
use every means at its disposal to check enemy rein-
forcements to the Solomons and will cooperate with
the Army in curbing enemy air activity. The Army
and Navy will intensify air operations as they extend
their air bases and, when enemy air strength has been
neutralized, will seize the opportunity to transport
reinforcements to Guadalcanal for the Army's offensive.

2. After these preparation; have been completed,
the Army, in cooperation with the Navy, will recap-
ture the airfield on Guadalcanal and annihilate the
enemy forces on that island. At the earliest oppor-
tunity, Tulagi and other key positions in the
Solomons will also be occupied.

3. During the operations in the Solomons, the
Army and Navy wdl secure strong operational bases
at Lae, Salamaua and Buna, will strengthen air
operations by extending and fitting out air bases, and
will prepare for future operations. The Army, in
cooperation with the Navy, will occupy Madang,
IVewak and other strategic areas. Preparations for
future operations in the New Guinea area will em-
brace every feasible plan for the capture of Port
Moresby, Rabi, and the Louisiade Archipelago. 7

Reaching Rabaul on 22 November after a
hasty air journey from Tokyo," Lt. Gen. Ima-

4 These elements included the Brigade headquarters, the 141st Infantry Regiment, and half of the brigade's
service units.

5 The 2tst Independent Mixed Brigade, previously on guard duty in French Indo-China, was transferred to
Rabaul in November. (For composition, cf. n. 28)

6 The 38th Division had been assigned to Seventeenth Army on 17 September, for use on Guadalcanal. Initial
elements were transferred to Guadalcanal in early November. Cf. p. 177.

7 Daikaishi Dai Hyakugojukyu-ga kMltt'tt rT3i"f-jLs!£ (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 159)
18 Nov 42. Army directive was identical in substance.

8 Lt. Gen. Imamura flew via Truk, where he conferred with Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the
Combined Fleet, regarding future Army-Navy cooperation in the southeast area. On 24 December, an Imperial Gen

172

these areas are most strategically located, and absolute
control of them is necessary to cut lines of communi-
cation between the United States and Australia and
thus disrupt the enemy s plans. For this very reason,
the United States and Great Britain, taking advantage
of their abundant resources, have been conducting a
full-scale counteroffensive for the past four months
in order to recapture these bases. . . .

hi view of the over-all war situation, the first
objective of the Army is to secure a strong position
in eastern New Guinea. However, this is only in
preparation for further advances in the future. . . .1
call upon you men of high fighting spirit to display
the tradition of the glorious Imperial Army on the
battlefield. Do your utmost to fulfill the trust and
meet the desires of His Majesty the Emperor.'"

The Eighteenth Army commancl, now ready
to function, turned its immediate attention to
the situation at Buna. In the interim, while
preparations to effect the new command ar-
rangements were being completed, emergency
measures to reinforce the imperilled Buna
garrison had temporarily checked the Allied
onslaught, but the outlook remained dark and
unpromising.

Situation in Buna Area

When Allied troops suddenly launched their
attack from the coastal sector immediately south
of Buna on 19 November, they caught the
Japanese forces almost totally unprepared to
meet an assault from this new direction. One
cause of this unprepa redness was the fact that
the swift Australian advance from the Owen
Stanleys had forced the South Seas Detachment
to throw its full strength into an effort to stop
that advance. Another was the failure of Japa-

eral Headquarters order created a Full-fledged Southeast Area Fleet command paralleling the Eighth Area Army. The
newly activated Southeast Area Fleet took command ot the existing Southeast Area Force, temporarily established by
the Combined Fleet,

9 Nanto Hotnen Sakusen Kiroku Sono Shi i Dai Hachi Homengun no Sakusen ftf & fti fcHilSlt&^IS ! ?f?Ai'
[Al'4£(Offci}$ (Southeast Aiei Operations Record, Part IV : Eighth Area Army Operations) 1st Demobilization Bureau,
Aug 46. pp. 5-6.

10 A message to the troops dated 26 Nov 42 by Lt. Gen. Adachi, Eighteenth Army Commander. ATIS Spot
Report No. 45, 6 Jan 43.

mura swiftly established his headquarters and
on 26 November, the date set for the entry into
effect of the new command arrangements, issued
his first order setting forth the operational
objectives of the Eighth Area Army in accord-
ance with the Imperial General Headquarters
directive. The order stated :

t. The operational objectives of the Eighth Area
Army, in conjunction with the Navy, are to recapture
the Solomon Islands and to prepare for future
operations in New Guinea by holding intact key
strategic positions in that area. For this purpose,
elements of the Army will secure strategic points in
eastern New Guinea and carry out preparations for
later operations, while the mam strength of the
Army will first secure key positions on Guadalcanal
and prepare for an offensive to destroy the enemy
forces on that island. The main forces of the
Combined Fleet will cooperute in these operations.

2. The Seventeenth Army will expedite prepara-
tions for the forthcoming offensive on Guadalcanal,
which will commence about the middle of January.

3. The Eighteenth Army, in cooperation with
the Navy, will secure key positions in the vicinity of
Buna and prepare for future operations. Orders in
regard to these preparations will be nsued separately. 9

Lt. Gen. Adachi, arriving at Rabaul on 25
November to assume command of the Eight-
eenth Army, immediately established his head-
quarters and, on 26 November, issued his first
message to Eighteenth Army troops :

The eastern New Guinea and Solomon Islands
areas are vitally important not only for the immediate
protection of the strategic southern areas which we
occupied at the beginning of the Greater East Asia
War, but also for the security and defense of japan
Proper. Therefore, it is necessary for us to secure
these areas as the first line of defense. In addition,

173

nese intelligence to discover the gradual and
carefully concealed infiltration of enemy troops
up the east coast of Papua.

As early as September, Seventeenth Army
headquarters at Rabaul had foreseen the possi-
bility of an Allied amphibious or airborne
attack in the Buna area and had consequently
ordered the South Seas Detachment, then at
the farthest point of its advance on Port Mores-
by, to readjust its front northward and divert
part of its strength to secure Buna. Two bat-
talions of the 41st Infantry had accordingly
taken up positions in the Buna — Gona — Giruwa
area early in October, but, as the Australians
pushed the South Seas Detachment back into
the Kokoda area, these units were recalled to
the front for the final abortive effort to hold the
Australians." The entire Buna — Gona area
was thus left temporarily unguarded except
by approximately 2,500 Army and Navy
combat effectives and some 1,200 labor
personnel.' 1

The failure of Japanese intelligence to dis-
cover until too late the presence of Allied forces
in the coastal area below Cape Endaiadere per-

mitted the enemy to achieve a large measure of
tactical surprise. 1 ' The Army and Navy com-
mands in Rabaul obtained their first warning
of an impending attack on Buna from the south
on 16 November, when a lookout post on the
southeast of Buna reported " what appeared
to be three masts." This report was imme-
diately interpreted as indicating initial Allied
landing operations, and Eleventh Air Fleet
headquarters in Rabaul ordered naval aircraft
to carry out a strike on the enemy ships the
same day in order to check the landings.
Thirty-eight planes went out on the sortie, and
five of the six ships were reported sunk or set
afire. Nevertheless, it was estimated that ap-
proximately 1,000 enemy troops had succeeded
in getting ashore.'*

Aware of the serious weakness of the Japa-
nese forces then available to meet an attack on
Buna from the south, Seventeenth Army sub-
ordinate staff officers in Rabaul had meanwhile
made hasty arrangements with the local Navy
command for the immediate transport of rein-
forcements to Buna.'* The situation was so
obviously urgent that the Navy promptly divert-

j 1 Cf . Chapter VII.

12 Principal combat units in the Buna-Gona area as of 15 November, with their approximate strengths, were:
Buna naval garrison, 900; 15th Independent Engineer Regiment, 450 (out of initial strength of 1,003 which landed at Buna
in July 1942) ; 47th Antiaircraft Battalion (less one battery), 250 ; miscellaneous troops, 850. In addition to the above,
there were approximately 2,500 Army and Navy combat incffectives and medical corps personnel in Giruwa. Labor units
were : naval construction unit, 500 ; Army road construction unit, 700-800. (i) Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono San :
Dai Juhochi Gun no Sakuxn Sjfc#liiff s lUc'ifc&«H : sff+A^Of^«S (Southeast Area Operations Record Part III:
Eighteenth Army Operations) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Sep 46, Vol. I, pp. 33-5. (2) Statement by Lt. Col.
Kengoro Tanaka, Staff Officer (Operations), Eighteenth Army.

13 This intelligence failure was primarily due to the almost complete absence of aerial reconnaissance over the
coast of Papua. The Army had only an insignificant number of reconnaissance aircraft operating in the southeast
area at this time, and the Navy's air reconnaissance from bases on New Britain was largely directed toward ascertain-
ing enemy fleet movements in the Solomon Sea, particularly the Guadalcanal area.

14 Dai Toa Senso Keika Gaiyo ^1^3516 WliiSftS^j (Greater East Asia War Summary) Combined Fleet Head-
quarters, 1 Oct 42 — 14 Aug 43, p. 48.

15 In the absence of the Seventeenth Army Commander and Chief of Staff, both of whom were on Guadalcanal,
Col. Yadoru Arisue, senior Seventeenth Army staff officer in Rabaul, acted on his own initiative in dispatching these
reinforcements, inadequate communications preventing reference of the matter to Army headquarters on Guadalcanal.
Several days later, a radio report came through from the Army Commander, Lt, Gen. Hyakutake, directing chat rein-
forcements be sent to Guadalcanal in view of the critical situation there. However, the reinforcement operation to Buna
was already near completion. (Statement by Col. Ichiji Sugita, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Seventeenth Army.)

174

ed several destroyers from Guadalcanal supply
operations, and in three separate transport runs
carried out on 17, 18 and 21 November, a total
of 2,300 troops, including one battalion of the
229th Infantry Regiment of the 38th Division,
was successfully landed at Basabua anchorage,
near Gona.' 6 It was hoped that these reinforce-
ments would be sufficient to assure the holding
of the Buna-Gona area, at least temporarily.

Topographically, this area was not favorable
to the establishment of a strong defensive per-
imeter. The coastal plain between Cape En-
daiadere and Gona was flat, traversed by belts
of jungle swampland which broke up the outer
Japanese defense positions into separate com-
partments and hindered the maneuvering of
troops. Transverse movement was limited to
the few passable native trails which ran along
the coast.

Shortages of personnel and materials had
also hampered the construction of defensive
fortifications. The strongest of these were im-
provised cover trenches reinforced with coco-
palm logs and oil drums filled with earth.
After rains these trenches turned to quagmire,
forcing the troops to fight waist deep in water.

The Japanese defense positions were concen-
trated principally in three strategic sectors : (1)
Gona — Basabua, protecting the anchorage gen-
erally used for troop and supply debarkation ;
(2 J Sanananda — Giruwa, constituting the core
of the defensive positions; and (3) Buna — Cape
Endaiadere, guarding the left flank and the

Buna airstrip.' 7 The Sanananda— Giruwa de-
fenses were laid out in depth, with the rear
positions near the coast, a so-called " central
position " about two miles inland on the Sana-
nanda—Soputa track, and an outer position
about one mile farther inland, at a point identi-
fied by the Japanese as South Giruwa, where
an east-west trail crossed the Sanananda— So-
puta track. In the Buna sector, strong defensive
positions in depth were set up southeast of the
airstrip, below Cape Endaiadere, and south of
Buna village, with secondary positions at Buna
Mission and in the headquarters area northwest
of the airstrip. (Plate No. 43)

As of 16 November, when the Allied threat
to Buna from the south first became known,
none of these sectors was strongly manned. In
the Buna sector, most immediately threatened,
were naval landing troops and an Army anti-
aircraft battery totalling about 1,000. ,s How-
ever, by 19 November, when the enemy attack
began, these forces had been bolstered by the
first reinforcements rushed from Rabaul, i. e.,
the 3d Battalion (reinf.) of the 229th Infantry
(1,000 men) and 500 replacements for the 144th
Infantry, South Seas Detachment. Col. Shige-
nori Yamamoto, who arrived with these rein-
forcements to take over command of the 144th
Infantry, was instead placed in command of all
Army forces in the Buna sector, while the
naval forces remained under command of Capt.
Yoshitatsu Yasuda.' 9

In the Giruwa sector, Col. Yosuke Yoko-

16 These troops were: 3d Battalion, 229th Infantry, and one mountain artillery battery (total, 1,000); two
replacement groups for the South Seas Detachment (total, 1,300). (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part HI, op.
cit. Vol. I, pp. 25-7. (2) Niyu Gtnia Shuyo Sukusen : Showa Jusbicbi Net) a> » — » Ti$jJ1=KHnfSH"-t^ (Major
New Guinea Operations), 1942, Combined Fleet Headquarters, pp. 55-6.

17 Improvement of the Buna airstrip for operational use in support of the Owen Stanleys offensive was completed
in August 1942, However, due to the diversion of the bulk of naval air strength to the Solomons following the Amer-
ican invasion of Guadalcanal, it was never effectively used. Southeast of the airstrip, across Senimi Creek, another
strip was built as a dummy field for air defense purposes. This strip does not figure in Japanese operational records,
but is referred to in American accounts of the Buna campaign as the " New Strip ".

18 (1) Major New Guinea Operations, op. cit., p. 36. (2) Statement by Lt. Col Tanaka, previously cited.

19 (1) Major New Guinea Operations, op. cit., p. 35. (2) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op.
cit., pp. 25-6.

175

yama, 15th Independent Engineers Commander
and ranking officer in the absence of Maj. Gen.
Horn,- 10 had meanwhile assumed the direction
of battle preparations. By 17 November the
disorganized remnants of the 144th Infantry,
totalling less than 1,000 officers and men, had
found their way back from the Oivi battle and
were ordered to halt their retreat to reinforce
the weakly-manned outer defense position at
Southern Giruwa. In the central position to
the north were combat elements aggregating
about 1,000/' By 23 November, the latter had
been reinforced by 800 fresh South Seas De-
tachment replacements shipped from Rabaul,
and by 29 November most of the surviving
strength of the 41st Infantry had moved forward
from the Napopo area, northwest of Gona, to
further strengthen the central position." Al-
most no combat forces were stationed in the
rear area around Sanananda and Giruwa. 1 '

Most weakly defended of the three principal
sectors was the Gona— Basabua area on the
right flank. This was held only by about 700
service and labor unit personnel, principally
engaged in road construction, at the time of the
initial Allied attacks

First Phase of Fighting

The enemy assault on the Japanese defenses
in the Buna — Gona area began with almost
simultaneous thrusts at four points on the outer
perimeter both east and west of the Giruwa
River. The main weight of the attack appeared
to be directed against the left flank in the Buna
sector, where one enemy force attacked the
Japanese positions between Senimi Creek and
the sea on 19 November, followed within a few
days by a separate drive against the defenses
directly south of Buna guarding the approach
along the Buna — Soputa track. To the west
of the Giruwa River, the Australian forces,
which had closed in from the Oivi area after
defeating the South Seas Detachment, simul-
taneously attacked the Japanese right flank
anchor at Gona and the 144th Infantry posi-
tions at South Giruwa. (Plate No. 43)

Despite a shortage of heavy weapons, 3 ' the
combined Army and Navy force defending the
Buna sector successfully repulsed the initial
enemy attacks directed at both the perimeter
east of Senimi Creek and the strong positions

20 After Maj. Gen. Horii's death in late November while trying to get back to the Giruwa area from the Oivi
battlefront, Col. Yolcoyama temporarily assumed command of the South Seas Detachment. Maj. Gen. Kensaku Oda
arrived at Giruwa on 19 December from Rabaul to assume command as Maj. Gen. Horii's successor. Southeast Area
Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol I, pp. 26 and 43.

2t These were composed of the following: 15th Independent Engineer Regt. (350); part of 47th Antiaircraft
Battalion (250) ; unattached troops (450). (Statement by Lt, Col- Tanaka, previously cited.)

22 (1) The survivors of the 41st Infantry and remnants of other units, after a difficult overland retreat from
the Oivi battle sector, reassembled in the Napapo area by 27 November. The regimental commander, Col. Kiyomi
Yazawa, with the bulk of these survivors, began moving to Giruwa by boat on that date. Southeast Area Operations
Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, p, 24. (2) Exact strength figures for the regiment as of this date are lacking, but
on the basts of best available evidence, only a few hundred troops succeeded in getting back to the Napapo area.
(Statement by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.)

23 Personnel in the rear area comprised a naval construction of 500 men, about 2,500 hospital patients and
medical corps personnel, and 200 unattached troops. During the subsequent fighting, several hundred hospitalized
personnel were incorporated in combat units and served at the front. Ibid.

24 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 35.

25 At the time of the Allied attack, the Buna defense forces had only three mountain artillery guns, three anti-
tank guns, five antiaircraft guns, one triple-mounted 25 mm. machine-gun, and three 13 mm. machine-guns. Major
New Guinea Operations, op. cit., p. 36.

176

one mile south of Buna Village in the so-called.
Triangle area. 16 The naval garrison troops,
thus far not engaged in battle, were fresh and
commanded by an officer specially trained in
land warfare. 27 The 3d Battalion, 229th In-
fantry, which had moved up to the Buna front
immediately after its arrival from Rabaul on
17 November, was a crack unit, eager for
battle. Occupying positions which took every
possible advantage of the difficult terrain, these
forces fought stubbornly, further aided by the
fact that the enemy had not yet been able to
bring up heavy equipment. Until early De-
cember the situation on this front remained
stalemated.

To the west, the Australian frontal attack
against the 144th Infantry positions at South-
ern Giruwa, launched about 20 November,
was also successfully checked. However, on
24 November, enemy elements succeeded in
infiltrating around these positions to drive a
wedge between South Giruwa and the cent-
ral position to the north. An attempt to
eliminate this wedge by a force of battalion
strength, dispatched from the central position,
failed, and by early December all communi-
cation with the hard-pressed Japanese force in
Southern Giruwa had been cut off.

On the right flank, the heterogenous Japa-
nese force defending theGona Basabua sector,
hastily reinforced on 19 November by an in-
fantry unit sent from Giruwa, succeeded in
repelling Australian advance elements which
penetrated the area on 20 November. On 26
November additional reinforcements arrived,

but the weak defending forces were soon bottled
up, and an attempt at a rescue made by 41st
Infantry troops from the central Giruwa posi-
tion proved unavailing. Hemmed in on all
sides and suffering heavily from intense artillery
bombardment, the Gona force nevertheless con-
tinued to resist. By early December it appeared
doomed to annihilation unless fresh attempts
to send in reinforcements from Rabaul, then al-
ready under way, succeeded in bringing immedi-
ate relief.

Reinforcement Attempts

Upon the entry into effect on 26 November
of the new command dispositions ordered by
Imperial General Headquarters for the south-
east area, Eighth Area Army Commander Lt.
Gen. Imamura promptly ordered the Eight-
eenth Army to dispatch strong reinforcements
to the Buna area in order to swing the tide of
battle in favor of the Japanese forces. The
21st Independent Mixed Brigade, 28 only recent-
ly arrived in Rabaul from Indo-China, was
assigned this mission by Eighteenth Army
order, and preparations were hastily completed
for its shipment to New Guinea aboard de-
stroyers allotted by the Navy's Southeast Area
Force.

Making the first reinforcement attempt, four
destroyers left Rabaul on 28 November carry-
ing Maj. Gen. Tsuyuo Yamagata, brigade
commander, with the headquarters and a por-
tion of the brigade strength. Despite air cover
provided by sue Navy fighters, enemy B-i7's

26 Ibid., pp. 37-8.

27 Capt. Yoshitatsu Yasuda, commander of the Buna naval garrison, was known in the Japanese Navy as an
expert in land warfare, having received training with the Army. (Statement by Capt, Toshikazu Ohmae, Staff Officer
(Operations), Southeast Area Fleet.)

28 The 21st Independent Mixed Brigade was composed of the 170th Infantry Regiment, one artillery battalion,
one antiaircraft battery, one tank company and one engineer company. Upon arrival in the Buna area, the brigade
commander, Maj. Gen. Yamagata, was to assume command of all Army forces in the Buna — Giruwa area, grouped
together under the designation, Buna Detachment. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol.1, pp.
37-9-

177

PLATE NO. 43
Buna — Gona Operation, November — December 1942

attacked the convoy north of Dampier Strait
on the morning of the 29th, and two of the
destroyers sustained damage, forcing the convoy
to turn back to Rabaul. 29

On 30 November a second attempt was
launched. The convoy of four destroyers,
again carrying the brigade headquarters, the 3d
Battalion of the 170th Infantry Regiment, and
signal units, totalling in all 720 officers and
men, this time took a course skirting south of
New Britain, with a reinforced air escort of 13
planes. Despite sporadic enemy air attacks,
the convoy safely reached the anchorage near
Gona on the evening of 1 December.

At this point, however, Allied planes launch-
ed an attack of such intensity that it was
impossible for the troops to board landing craft,
and the destroyers were obliged to move on to
the mouth of the Kumusi River, 18 miles
northwest of Gona. Here, with enemy planes
still dropping flares, 425 of the troops succeed-
ed in transferring to landing craft, but in the
movement to the shore they became dispersed
and landed at widely-separated points between
the Kumusi River mouth and Gona. The
remaining 295 troops could not be landed and
returned with the destroyers to Rabaul. iQ

It was 6 December before Maj. Gen. Yama-
gata was able to reassemble his scattered forces
and move them into a concentration area about
two miles west of Gona. From this point he
ordered his troops forward in an attempt to
break the Australian envelopment of Gona,
but the enemy lines held, and the fighting
entered a stalemate. With succor so near and
yet unable to reach them, the Japanese forces
in Gona were finally overwhelmed on 8 De-
cember, only a handful of survivors escaping

by sea or through the jungle to the Gtruwa
area. 1 '

Meanwhile, a third reinforcement convoy of
five destroyers had set out from Rabaul on 7
December, carrying additional elements of the
21st Independent Mixed Brigade. This time,
however, vigilant enemy planes spotted the
ships after they had barely emerged from the
St. George Channel, a few hours out of Rabaul.
Under severe attack, the convoy was forced to
put back into port immediately.

With the Japanese defenses in the Buna
sector also beginning to crack under intensified
enemy pressure, it was now more imperative
than ever to move the remaining strength of
the 21st Brigade to the battle area without
delay. Hence, on 12 December, a fourth and
final reinforcement attempt by destroyer was
begun. Five ships with an escort of nine
fighters left Rabaul on that date, taking a
roundabout course to the north of the Admi-
ralty Islands in an attempt at deception. De-
spite this maneuver, the convoy underwent
heavy bombing as it neared its destination.* 1

With the Gona— Basabua anchorage al-
ready under enemy control, the mouth of the
Kumusi had been fixed as the landing point.
However, already behind schedule due to the
intense air attacks, the destroyers put in at the
mouth of the Mambare River, 40 miles short of
the goal, and disembarked the troops before
dawn on 14 December. The 1st Battalion of the
170th Infantry, one company of the 3d Battal-
ion, the regimental gun company and 25th
Field Machine Gun Company, aggregating 870
troops, were successfully put ashore." Between
18 and 25 December, these troops moved
southward along the coast by small craft and

29 Major New Guinea Operations, op. cit., pp. 56-7.

30 (1) Ibid., p. 55. (2) Yamagata Heidan Troop Transport Plan. ATIS Current Translations No. 16, 25 Jan
43. p. 27.

31 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 41.

32 Major New Guinea Operations, op. cit,, p. 56.

33 Southeast Area Operations Record, Pare III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 42-3.

179

joined the 21st Brigade units already in the
Napapo area west of Gona.

Owing to steadily increasing Allied air domi-
nation of the sea approaches to the Papuan
coast, no further attempts to dispatch reinforce-
ments to the Buna area by destroyer were
undertaken. Only two of the four attempts
made between 28 November and 14 December
had been halfway successful, and the effort had
cost damage to four destroyers of the dwindling
naval forces in the southeast area. 34

Fall of Buna

The stalemate which had prevailed on the
Buna sector front since the initial enemy attacks
in late November finally ended on 5 December,
when powerful offensives were launched by the
American forces against both the Senimi
Creek — Cape Endaiadere position and the
Buna Village area. (Plate No. 43) In the
former sector, the enemy again failed to breach
the strong outer perimeter," but, on the right
flank, enemy troops which had gradually in-
filtrated past the Japanese strongpomts in the
Triangle area toward Buna Village succeeded
in driving a wedge to the sea between the vil-
lage and Buna Mission, at the same time
capturing some of the positions on the southern
perimeter of the village. By 14 December,
the small defending force of Army troops and
naval construction personnel in Buna Village
had been overcome.* 6

On 18 December the enemy again struck
with renewed vigor at the Triangle area on the
right flank, and the Senimi Creek — Cape
Endaiadere line on the left. The troops in
the Triangle area, resisting fierce bombardment
by enemy mortars and artillery, again held their
positions. However, on the left flank, a power-
ful assault, spearheaded for the first time by
tanks, broke through the Japanese defenses
in the coastal sector and drove a salient north-
ward past Cape Endaiadere. 37

The Japanese naval unit defending the
Senimi Creek bridge-crossing southeast of the
airstrip was now forced to pull back to the
airstrip defenses, where it prepared to make a
suicide stand.* 8 Enemy tanks were soon
brought across the creek to support the ground
troops' assault, and the Japanese defenses slowly
gave way in heavy fighting. By 26 December
the last naval antiaircraft battery emplaced
near the central portion of the strip was wiped
out after firing its last remaining rounds of
ammunition against oncoming enemy tanks. 39
Three days later, on the right flank, the Japa-
nese positions in the Triangle area were finally
overcome, and enemy elements, in another
drive to the sea, cut off the Buna garrison
headquarters, northwest of the airstrip, from
Buna Mission.

In view of the increasingly critical situation,
the Eighteenth Army Commander at Rabaul
had already dispatched urgent orders to Ma].
Gen. Yamagata on 26 December, directing

34 Major New Guinea Operations, op. cic, pp. 55-7.

35 On 9 December fierce enemy shelling of the Japanese positions in the Senimi Creek area knocked out one
mountain gun and smashed a number of bunkers. The positions were restored during the night, however, and
successfully held. Ibid., p. 38.

36 {1) Ibid., p. 38. (2) Papuan Campaign, compiled by the Military Intelligence Division, U.S. War
Department, p. 43.

37 Daily Operations Log of Tsuktoka Unit (Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing Force) Headquarters, 5 Oct —
24 Dec 42. ATIS Current Translations No. 27, 19 Apr 43, p, 15.

38 Diary of 1st Class Seaman Masaji Konagaya, Yokosuka 5th Special Naval Landing Force, 9 June — 23
Dec 42. Entry for 19 December states : " No. 3 Sentry Post withdrawn to the airdrome. The Tsukioka Unit intends
to resist to the last." ATIS Current Translations No. 60, 3 Jul 43, p. 18.

39 Major New Guinea Operations, op. cit., p. 39.

180

him to move the 21st Brigade troops, still
held up west of Gona, to Giruwa by sea and
from there launch an attack toward Buna to
relieve the Japanese forces cut off in that
sector.'' It seemed improbable, however, that
Buna itself could be saved. Hence, on 28
December, the Army and Navy commands at
Rabaul ordered the withdrawal of all forces
from the Buna sector to join in the defense of
Sanananda — Giruwa.

Between 27 and 29 December, Maj. Gen.
Yamagata with a relief unit of one battalion
(reinf.) 4 ' successfully moved from Napapo to
Giruwa by small landing craft. After setting
up his headquarters at Giruwa, Maj. Gen.
Yamagata placed the relief detachment under
command of the 41st Infantry regimental com-
mander, Col. Yazawa, and on 31 December
ordered it to move up for an attack on the
enemy left flank above Buna. 42

Even before the relief unit had started, how-
ever, Maj. Gen. Yamagata's headquarters re-
ceived a report from the Buna front to the effect
that, on 1 January, enemy troops, spearheaded
by six tanks, had penetrated into the isolated
headquarters area northwest of the airstrip.
There, the Army and Navy commanders of
the Buna garrison forces, Col. Yamamoto and
Capt. Yasuda, were reported leading the last
handful of survivors of the headquarters per-
sonnel in a suicide stand.'' 5 (Plate No. 44)

The Yazawa relief unit, still hoping to rescue
the Japanese troops holding out in the Buna

Mission area, started its movement from Giru-
wa on 2 January. Upon reaching Siwori Creek
on the night of the 4th, the unit was held up
by a bloody encounter with about 300 enemy
troops, but it pushed on across the creek to a
point about one mile west of Buna, where by
8 January it had received a total of a few
hundred Army and Navy personnel, the sole
survivors of the force which had so ably
defended the Buna sector. The relief unit
then fell back under constant enemy harass-
ment to the Konombi Creek line, where it
occupied positions for the defense of Giruwa. 14
While the rescue operation was in progress,
the last Japanese positions in the Buna Mission
area had fallen to the enemy. The battle for
Buna was at an end.

Sanananda-Giruwa

With the final collapse of Japanese resistance
in the Buna sector, the full weight of the
Allied assault immediately shifted to the front
west of the Giruwa River, where the Japanese
still clung tenaciously to a five-mile strip of
coast extending from Konombi Creek, above
Buna, to Garara, west of Cape Killerton. The
nerve-center of the Japanese defenses was situ-
ated in the vicinity of Sanananda Point and
Giruwa, on the coast, protected on the inland
side by the already isolated outpost at Southern
Giruwa and the so-called central position be-
tween Southern Giruwa and the coast.

40 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 44.

41 Nisht Operations Order A No. 39, issued 27 December at Napapo. ATIS Current Translations No. 29, 28
Apr 43, p. 15-

42 Nishi Operation No. 44, issued 31 December at North Giruwa. ATIS Current Translations No. 29, op.
cit., pp. 15-6.

43 The adjutant of the naval garrison force, on orders from Capt. Yasuda, made his way out of the encircled
headquarters position on the night of 1 January and eventually reached Giruwa to report on the final situation. Col.
Yamamoto and Capt. Yasuda planned to lead the surviving Army and Navy personnel in a suicide attack on 2 January.
Major New Guinea Operations, op. cit., p. 37.

44 Diary of Maj. Nojiri, commander, 1st Battalion, 170th Infantry Regiment, 2 Dec 40-15 Jan 43. ATIS
Current Translations No. 29, op. cit., pp. 18-9.

181

Oiignul Painting by Ttugujt Fujiu

PLATE NO. 44
Fate of Yasuda Force on New Guinea Front

The condition of the Japanese forces holding
this area was now desperate in the extreme.
The flow of supplies from Rabaul had been
stopped with the exception of small amounts
of provisions and ammunition brought to the
mouth of the Mambare River by submarine
and thence moved to Giruwa by small landing
craft under cover of night. By the end of the
first week in January, all food supplies had
been exhausted, and the troops were eating
grass and other jungle vegetation. Deaths
from tropical diseases exceeded battle casualties,
Enemy artillery fire and air bombardment had
razed the protective jungle covering around the
Japanese bunkers and trenches, and rains
flooded these positions as fast as they could
be drained.'"

Enemy air supremacy over the battle area
was virtually complete. During the first phase
of the Buna fighting, Japanese naval air units
based on New Britain had carried out a series
of effective attacks against the enemy advance
air base at Dobodura and against Allied supply
shipping, but by mid-December control of the
air had definitely passed to the Allies. The
arrival in Rabaul at about this time of the 6th
Air Division, the first Army air unit to be
dispatched to the southeast area, came too late
to exert much effect. 46 Enemy observation
craft flew unhindered over the Japanese posi-

tions, increasing the effectiveness of artillery
fire to a point of deadly accuracy.

By late December, Imperial General Head-
quarters in Tokyo had reluctantly recognized
the inevitable pattern of defeat that confronted
the Japanese forces both in eastern Papua and
on Guadalcanal. Therefore on 23 December,
Imperial General Headquarters modified its 18
November directive and placed the decision of
withdrawal from the Buna area to the discretion
of the local commander, dependent upon the
local situation. However, Imperial General
Headquarters placed such great significance on
the evacuation of Guadalcanal that it was not
until the Imperial conference of 31 December
that its final decision was reached. On 4
January, therefore, an order was dispatched to
Lt. Gen. Imamura, Commander of the Eighth
Area Army, and to Admiral Yamamoto, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, -17
directing the first major withdrawal of Japa-
nese troops since the sartt of the Pacific War.
The order stated :

/. In the Solomons area, the fight to recapture
Guadalcanal will be discontinued, and the Army will
evacuate its forces immediately. Henceforth, the
Army will secure the northern Solomons, including
New Georgia and Santa Isabel, and the Bismarck
Archipelago.

45 Maj. Kempo Tajima, South Seas Detachment staff officer, in a statement on the condition of the Japanese
forces in the Giruwa area prior to evacuation, wrote : Japanese officers and men presented a gruesome sight. Their
skin had turned pale, their eyes were sunken, their clothing was in shreds, and only a few wore shoes. The sword

alone was a heavy burden for those who carried them The hospital was filled with dead and wounded, and

hundreds of corpses were left on the ground uncollected It was difficult even to obtain a few sheets of paper on

which to write orders, and communications were so disrupted that it was frequently impossible to transmit messages
by field telephone. (Statement by Maj. Kempo Tajima, Staff Officer, South Seas Detachment.)

46 (1) On 26-27 December a fighter unit of the 6th Air Division made its first sorties over the Buna area in
support of the naval air forces. Southeast Area Operations Record, Pari III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 50—1. (2) No Army
air strength had previously been sent to the southeast area since operations in this area were primarily the Navy's
responsibility. After the enemy reinvasion of Guadalcanal, however, the Navy requested the dispatch of Army air
units for employment in the Solomons. The Army Section of Imperial General Headquarters at first declined on
the ground that this would seriously weaken air operations on the Burma and China fronts, but as the Guadalcanal
situation worsened, the High Command finally agreed to dispatch the 6th Air Division to Rabaul. (Statement by Col.
Takushiro Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

47 Daikaishi Dai Hyakuhachijmchi-go icM s tlik> fl'A-f"— (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No.
t8i) 23 Dec 42.

183

2. In the New Guinea area, the Army will
immediately strengthen its bases of operation at Lae,
Salamaua, Madang and Wewak. The strategic area
north of the Owen Stanley Range will be occupied,
and thereafter preparations will be made for opera-
tions against Port Moresby. The forces in the Buna
area will withdraw to the vicinity of Salamaua, as
required by the situation, and will secure strategic
positions there.*

Studying the situation at Rabaul, Lt. Gen.
Imamura decided to delay the issuance of im-
plementing orders for two reasons. First, he
thought that the situation was not so grave as
to warrant an immediate evacuation. Second,
it was essential to delay relinquishment of the
Giruwa area until reinforcements, then prepar-
ing to leave Rabaul, had reached Lae-Salamaua
and strengthened that area against possible
Allied attack.

Meanwhile, however, the final disintegration
of the Japanese forces on the Giruwa front was
already beginning. On 12 January, three days
after its last food supplies had been exhausted,
the isolated Japanese force in Southern Giruwa,
unable to communicate with rear headquarters,
launched an independent break for freedom
through the enemy lines. Heading southwest
into the jungle, the troops found their way to
the Kumusi River, and thence retreated north-
ward. A small number of survivors reached
the Japanese positions at the mouth of the
Kumusi in the latter part of January.

Finding the resistance before them ended,
the Australians quickly moved up the Soputa—
Sanananda track and joined the enemy force
already blocking the track to the north in an
assault on the Japanese central positions. (Plate
No. 45) At the same time, elements swung
around to the west of these positions in a flank-

ing movement, one force advancing to the coast
to capture the Japanese right flank outpost at
Garara on 13 January, and another cutting in
from the west to split the central positions from
South Seas Detachment headquarters near
Sanananda Point. The force which took Garara
immediately drove eastward along the coast,
capturing Wye Point on 15 January.

While the Australians closed in from the
south and west, the American forces pushing
up the coast from Buna launched an attack on
the Japanese forces, left flank along Konombi
Creek on 12 January. Here, the remaining
strength of the 1st Battalion, 170th Infantry,
put up a determined fight which held up the
enemy advance until about 20 January. 49

On 13 January, following the landing of 51st
Division reinforcements at Lae, Lt. Gen. Ima-
mura ordered Eighteenth Army to begin the
evacuation of the Japanese forces from Giruwa.
In compliance with this order, Lt. Gen. Adachi,
Eighteenth Army Commander, dispatched an
immediate order to Maj. Gen. Yamagata, com-
manding all forces in the Giruwa area, directing
that the evacuation be carried out as follows :

t. The Buna Detachment Commander will
abandon his present positions and divert his troops
as follows :

a. Diversion of the main force will commence
about 25 January and end about 29 January.

b. The main force of the 21st Independent
Mixed Brigade will assemble in the Mambare
area, and one element of the brigade in the
Zaka — Morobe area.

c. Main strength of other units will be
dispatched to Lae, and the remainder to Salamaua*

Although 25 January was fixed as the start-
ing date of the general evacuation, the rapid
closing of the Allied pincers on Giruwa and the

48 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 52.

49 Nojiri Battalion Order, issued 20 Jan. ATIS Current Translations No. 32, 1 May 43, p. 10.

50 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 59-61.

184

increasing disorganization of the Japanese forces
led Maj. Gen. Yamagata to advance the date
to 20 January.' 1 Communications were so dis-
rupted that it was only with great difficulty that
the withdrawal order was transmitted to the
units in the front lines. Japanese forces holding
inland positions along the Sanananda-Soputa
track were instructed to withdraw independent-
ly by land to the mouth of the Kumusi River,
while troops in the coastal sector around
Giruwa, including Buna Detachment headquar-
ters, were to evacuate by sea.

With destroyer movement impossible due to
Allied air domination of the Solomons Sea and
the Papuan coast, the sea evacuation had to be
carried out by small landing craft. A number
of these was dispatched from Lae but had only
reached the mouth of the Kumusi River by 20
January, when the evacuation was scheduled to
take place. On the night of io-2oJanuary a total
of only 250 personnel, including Maj. Gen.
Yamagata, the headquarters staff and casualties,
was successfully evacuated aboard landing craft
already available in the Giruwa area.**

The Japanese remnants along the Sana-
nanda— Soputa track meanwhile succeeded in
breaking through to the west, heading for the
assembly point at the mouth of the Kumusi
River. Although favored by slow enemy
pursuit, the battleworn, half-starved survivors
experienced extreme hardship moving through
the jungle, and many stragglers were left along
the route of retreat. (Plate No. 46)

On 18 January two companies of the io2d

Infantry Regiment, 51st Division, had been
dispatched by landing craft from Lae to cover
the withdrawal of the troops evacuated from
Giruwa. One of these companies landed at the
mouth of the Mambare, while the other reached
the mouth of the Kumusi on 24 January, there
helping to repulse an attack by enemy troops
pushing up from the Gona area.

By 7 February a total of approximately 3,400
survivors of the bloody Buna— Gona campaign
had assembled at the mouth of the Mambare
River." At the time of the evacuation order,
Lt. Gen. Adachi's plan had been to hold the
Mambare River line as an advance offensive
base, using the 21st Brigade forces withdrawn
from the Giruwa area. It was now obvious,
however, that the decimated remnants of the
Giruwa forces were unequal to any further
combat mission, and the intervening failure of
the Japanese offensive against Wau made it
necessary to retract the first line still farther to
the Mubo — Nassau Bay area. Eighteenth
Army therefore ordered the troops assembled
at the mouth of the Mambare to continue their
withdrawal by sea to Lae and Salamaua. This
movement was completed early in March.*

The loss of the Buna-Gona area rang down
the curtain on the sue months long Papuan
campaign, which in September 1942 had seen
the South Seas Detachment with Port Mores-
by almost in its grasp. Between the initial
landing at Buna in July 1942 and the end of
the Buna— Gona battle in January 1943, a total
of approximately 18,000 to 20,000 troops had

51 Maj. Gen. Yamagata estimated that it would be impossible to prevent the Japanese forces from falling into
a rout if the evacuation were delayed beyond 20 January. (1) Statement by Lt. Col. Tanalca, previously cited. Col.
Tanaka at this time was Eighteenth Army staff officer attached to Buna Detachment Headquarters.) (2) Nishi
Operations Order Nos. 65 and 66. ATIS Current Translations No 32, op. cit., pp. 24-5.

52 Between 12 and 18 January, :,ooo hospital patients had already been successfully evacuated. In the final
evacuation, Maj. Gen. Kensaku Oda, newly-appointed Commanding General of the South Seas Detachment, was
killed. (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 59. 60 and 63 (2) Statement by Lt. Col.
Tanaka, previously cited.

53 Ibid., p. 67.

54 Between April and June, most of the troops evacuated from Giruwa were shipped back to Rabaul for
recuperation and reorganization. The 21st Independent Mixed Brigade was deactivated at Rabaul, and the South
Seas Detachment and 41st Infantry remnants were transferred to other theaters.

185

PLATE NO. 45
Buna — Gona Operation, January 1943

— : ~ —

WITHDRAWAL FROM BUNA AND WAU TO SALAMAUA-LAE

■ T ULIMIfT

f 3-3^XC_tJlLlW»»3K

Londed Loe 3 Mar and absorbed

Buna arid Okabe Dets

JANUARY- MARCH 1943

' T >IH!CHHI>»

~3\i5 t*«a HiT

HUM

•' e\ y 24 Mo.

Assembled Ok " * *

Buna Oat assembled
about 20 Mar

//</0rV fft/L/ r

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From Raboul

LEGEND

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Assembled 'w _K

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i Okotn Del comeienced
4 retreat 14 Fa b

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Allied torpedo boat attacks

CUvalion tn l*tt
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I
I

7 f* *%

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t
t
I

- + - T

NEW GUINEA

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»' unr rnMl ■ ^

'1100. /

SOLOMON SEA

2-7**8367 {*«S## 3.40O)
2-1 IX 'J 3-10 >i£U«ig
7 Feb, assembled (strength 3,400).
II Feb-IO Mar, withdrew.

Buno.De'

n ; ^ / V 1 X 1 lM

PLATE NO. 46

Withdrawal from Buna and Wau to Salamaua-Lae, January — March 1943

been thrown into the Owen Stanleys drive and
the subsequent effort to stop the Allied counter-
offensive. About 15,000 had been lost in the
whole campaign." Of this number, the bitter
fighting in the Buna— Gona area alone had
cost between 7,000 and 8,000 lives, of which over
4,000 were killed in battle and the remainder
succumbed to disease.'" Despite this costly
effort, Papua had been lost, and with it the
strategic area north of the Owen Stanley Range,
the key to Port Moresby.

Strengthening of Bases in New Guinea

While the Japanese forces in Papua were still
carrying on their stubborn but hopeless fight
to retain possession of the vital Buna-Gona
area, hasty action was being taken by the Eighth
Area Army and the Combined Fleet to reinforce
the general Japanese strategic position in New
Guinea through the seizure of new bases on
the northeast New Guinea coast and on both
sides of the Vitiaz Strait.

By its directive of 18 November 1942, Im-
perial General Headquarters had recognized the
necessity of building up the New Guinea flank
against General MacArthur's advance by estab-
lishing bases in the vacuum areas to the rear of
the vulnerable Japanese advance outposts at
Lae-Salamaua and Buna. The Eighth Area
Army had therefore been ordered, as one of its
initial missions, to effect the early occupation
of Madang, Wewak and other strategic points."

By early December, when plans and prepara-
tions for execution of this mission were under

way, the increasing probability that the Buna-
Gona area could not be held made it doubly
essential to effect an immediate strengthening
of Japanese defenses to the north. The Eighth
Area Army and Southeast Area Fleet com-
mands therefore decided to supplement the
occupation of Madang and Wewak with the
simultaneous seizure of Finschhafen, on the
Huon Peninsula, and Tuluvu, on western New
Britain, both of which were considered neces-
sary to safeguard Japanese control of the Dam-
pier and Vitiaz Straits and thus strengthen the
defense of Lae— Salamaua.

Although the initial characteristic of these
plans was defensive, they were also designed to
lay the groundwork for the ultimate resumption
of the offensive by the Japanese forces in New
Guinea, after the American assault on the
Solomons had been successfully parried. Em-
phasis was placed upon the development of
operational air bases at Tuluvu, Wewak and
Madang, and Wewak was to be transformed
into a big rear supply base for the support of
future operations.

On 12 December, Lt. Gen. Imamura, Eighth
Area Army Commander, assigned the mission
of occupying Madang, Wewak and Tuluvu to
the Eighteenth Army, placing under its com-
mand for this purpose three newly-arrived
infantry battalions of the 5th Division' 8 and the
31st Road Construction Unit. Under final
Eighteenth Army plans, two infantry battalions
were allotted to the occupation of Madang, one
to Wewak, and the 31st Road Construction
Unit (less two companies) to Tuluvu. M The

55 Cf . Vol. I, SWPA Scries : MacArthur's Campaigns in the Southwest Pacific, p. 96, GHQ SWPA Communique
No. 271, 8 Jan 43.

56 Statement by Lt. Col. Tanalca, previously cited.

57 Cf. text of Imperial General Headquarters directive, already quoted on p. 159.

58 Transfer of three battalions from the 5th Division, then operating under Sixteenth Army command in the
Dutch East Indies, to Eighth Area Army was effected by Imperial General Headquarters order. These battalion* were
taken from the nth, 21st and 42d Infantry Regiments. (Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.)

59 (1) Major New Guinea Operations, op. cit., pp. 45-7. (2) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III,
op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 172-4-

188

occupation of Finschhafen, by local Army-Navy
agreement, was assigned to a small force of
special naval landing troops.*"

Naval convoys carrying the Madang and
Wewak occupation forces sailed from Rabaul
on 16 December, while a surface support force
including one aircraft carrier headed south from
Truk to cover the operation. The Wewak
force reached its destination without mishap on
18 December, but the Madang force underwent
both air and submarine attack off the New
Guinea coast, the escort flagship Tenryu sinking
as a result of torpedo hits and one converted
cruiser carrying troops receiving bomb damage.
Despite these attacks, the convoy continued to
Madang and unloaded its troops early on 19
December*'

While the Madang and Wewak operations
were in progress, the Tuluvu occupation force
completed its movement from Rabaul aboard a
single destroyer on 17 December. 61 The Fin-
schhafen force left Kavieng, New Ireland, on
two destroyers the following day, executing a
successful landing on 19 December. 6 ' Work
began immediately at the occupied points to
prepare airstrips for operational use and set up
base installations.

Immediately upon completion of these new
occupation moves, the Eighth Area Army turn-
ed its energy to the urgent problem of streng-
thening the defenses of the Lae-Salamaua
area, now seriously jeopardized as a result of the

deteriorating situation on the Buna-Gona front
to the south. This area was tenuously held
by a naval garrison force of 1,300 men, which
had never been able to do more than secure
the immediate vicinities of Lae and Salamaua
against enemy guerrilla forces. At Wau, 30
miles southwest of Salamaua, the Allied forces
possessed a strategically located base of opera-
tions, with an airfield capable of accommodating
at least light planes.

On 21 December, Lt. Gen. Imamura ordered
the Eighteenth Army to strengthen its strategic
position for future operations " by securing
important areas to the west of Lae and Sala-
maua." 64 A further order on 28 December
directed the immediate dispatch of troops to
the Lae— Salamaua area, and on 29 December
Lt. Gen. Adachi, Eighteenth Army Command-
er, ordered the Okabe Detachment, composed
of one reinforced infantry regiment of the 51st
Division, 6 * to proceed from Rabaul to Lae. The
missions assigned to the detachment were speci-
fied as follows ;

/. The detachment, in cooperation with the Navy,
will land m the Lae area, and a portion of its strength
will secure that area.

2. The main strength will immediately advance
to Wan, and elements to Salamaua, in order to secure
those areas and establish lines of communication.

5. The detachment will thereafter be responsible
for the land defense of the Lae-Salamaua area, and

60 The Finschhafen force was one company (270 men) of the Sasebo Jth Special Naval Landing Force.
Major New Guinea Operations, op. cit., p. 48.

61 Ibid., p. 46.

62 Greater East Asia War Summary, op. cit., p. 73.

63 Major New Guinea Operations, op, cit., pp. 48-9.

64 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 88-9.

65 Maj. Gen. Tooru Okabe, 51st Infantry Group Commander, was placed in command of the detachment.
Detailed composition of the force was as follows: 51st Inf. Gp. Hq. , I02d Infantry Regt.; 2d Battalion (less
one company) 14th Field Artillery Regiment ; one engineer company ; one transport company : and one field anti-
aircraft machine-gun company. The 51st Division had reached the Rabaul area early in December from South China,
and was placed under Eighteenth Army command. ( 1 ) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp.
95-6; (2) Mam Operations Order A No. 270, 1 Jan 43. ATIS Bulletin No. 260, 27 Jul 43, p. 1.

189

it will also carry out preparations for offensive opera-
tions against the Buna area. 66

Five transports carrying the Okabe Detach-
ment sailed from Rabaul on 5 January with a
surface escort of five destroyers. On 6 January,
enemy B-i7*s spotted the convoy as it proceeded
through the Bismarck Sea, and the transport
Nichiryu Maru, carrying most of the 3d Batta-
lion, i02d Infantry Regiment, caught fire and
sank after receiving a direct bomb hit.* 7
Though badly battered, the remainder of the
convoy proceeded on to Lae, where it arrived
on 7 January and began discharging troops
and supplies under continuous Allied air
attack.

Despite efforts to break up the enemy air
assault by fighters which had moved forward
from Rabaul on 7 January to operate from Lae,
bombing of the anchorage became so severe on
the 8th that unloading had to be discontinued
and those ships which were still navigable sent
back to Rabaul. 68 With the exception of the
troops aboard the Nichiryu Maru, all personnel

but only half of the supplies
unloaded. 6 *

Gen. Okabe decided to proceed according to
plan and immediately ordered the detachment
to prepare to move against Wau. The general
plan of attack called for the main strength of
the detachment to move by landing craft to
Salamaua, and from there advance on Wau via
Mubo, Waipali, and the mountain track
through Biaru. (Plate No. 47) This route
was chosen in preference to the easier track
leading from Mubo along the
Valley, which offered little 1
air attack. 70

Amphibious movement of the detachment
from Lae to Salamaua was completed between
10 and 16 January. Two days before its com-
pletion, on 14 January, the advance echelon of
the attack force, composed of the ist Battalion,
i02d Infantry (reinf.), had already moved out
of Salamaua on the first leg of its advance
toward Wau. Maj. Gen. Okabe, with detach-
ment headquarters and the main body of the
attack force, followed on 16 January. Total
effective strength of the force as it started out
from Salamaua was approximately 3,000 officers
and men. 7 *

First enemy ground reaction developed as
the advance echelon moved south from Mubo
on 16—17 January. In the vicinity of Waipali,
a small enemy force of about 40 men, equipped
with mortars, oflered light resistance, retiring

The Wau Offensive

Notwithstanding this initial setback, Maj.

66 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. oo- 1.

67 Escorting destroyers rescued 739 of the 1,100 troops aboard. Most of these returned to Rabaul, but some
disembarked at Lae and were kept there as a supply depot unit. Ibid,, p. 97.

68 A second transport, the Myoko Maru, was so badly damaged by Allied bombing that she had to be beached
to prevent sinking.

69 All medical supplies were lost with the sinking of the Nkhiryu Maru. Report on Medical Situation during
the Wau Operation. ATIS Current Translations No. 73, 10 Aug 43, p. 6-C.

70 Three alternative routes had been considered by Eighteenth Army headquarters during the preliminary plan-
ning, but final decision was left to Maj. Gen. Okabe and his staff to be made after arrival at Lae. These routes were :
Lae — Markham Point Wampit^BuIolo— Wau ; Salamaua— Misim — Wau ; and Salamaua^Mubo— Wau. (State-
ment by Lt. Cot. Tanaka, previously cited. )

71 Only seven of the io2d Infantry Regiment's 12 infantry companies participated, since two companies of
the 3d Battalion were lost with the Nichiryu Maru, two companies (2d and 8th) were dispatched south to cover the
withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Giruwa, and one company was assigned to garrison duty at Mubo. (Statement
by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.)

190

PLATE NO. 47
Wau Offensive, January — February 1943

southward after a brief encounter. 7 ' The
advance echelon then pushed on to the south-
west, the steadily increasing difficulty of the
mountainous terrain slowing its rate of progress
at times to less than three miles a day. It was
27 January before all units of the attack force
had finally assembled at Hill 5500, about six
miles northeast of Wau, whence the attack was
to be mounted.

From the vantage point of Hill 5500, Wau
and its adjacent airfield were clearly visible and
appeared to be within a few hours' march of the
assembly area. Maj. Gen. Okabe, estimating
enemy strength at no more than 400 and
anxious to gain the advantage of surprise,
immediately ordered the i02d Infantry regi-
mental commander to launch the attack on the
night of the 27th. 71 The final attack plan called
for the regiment's right wing (2d Battalion, re-
inf.) to strike at the airfield defenses from the
east and northeast, while the left wing (1st
Battalion, reinf.) was to launch the main attack
from the southeast. Both attacks were scheduled
to begin at 0100, 28 January, and all objectives
were to be occupied by dawn. 7 *

Right and left wings began moving into
position for the attack at dusk on 27 January.
A small enemy patrol encountered two miles
south of Hill 5500 was rapidly dispersed, but
progress through the unknown jungle terrain in
darkness was so slow that, even by dawn, nei-
ther force had reached its scheduled attack
position. Movement was stopped until late
afternoon of the 28th to guard against attack
by enemy aircraft. During the evening, as the
advance resumed, a further encounter with an
enemy elements delayed progress, and the
morning of the 29th found the attack columns
still bogged down in the jungle.

A sharp increase in enemy fighter activity
kept the Japanese troops pinned down again
until the night of the 29th, when both columns
pressed forward once more. Again the advance
was so slow that, by dawn of 30 January, the
left wing force was still about two and a half
miles from the airfield. Meanwhile, the enemy
was profiting from the delay to fly in reinforce-
ments.

Deciding that any further delay might spell
failure, Maj. Gen. Okabe personally took
command of the left wing force and ordered it
forward on the night of 30 January to attack the
southwest perimeter of the airstrip. The attack
failed, however, as the assault units, moving up
in the darkness, suddenly ran into fierce auto-
matic weapons fire from enemy positions and
were thrown into confusion.

Meanwhile, on the right flank, the 2d Bat-
talion had launched an attack on the morning
of 30 January and succeeded in capturing a
segment of the enemy positions at the northeast
corner of the airfield. Due to severe losses,
however, the battalion was unable to hold its
ground and fell back east of the airfield to
reorganize. The strength of both 1st and 2d
Battalions was now badly depleted. Average
company strength was down to 50 in the 1st
Battalion, and 40 in the 2d. Artillery units
were at one-third and engineer units at one-half
of normal strength. 75

The reinforced enemy troops in Wau, with
heavy air support, now launched a counterof-
fensive, which resulted in sharp fighting just
southeast of the airfield. By 4 February, the
i02d Infantry was threatened with encirclement,
and on the 6th Maj. Gen. Okabe ordered all
units to retire to a concentration area two and
a half miles east of the airfield to reorganize.

72 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 113.

73 Ibid., pp. 15-6.

74 io2d Infantry Regiment Operations Order, 27 Jan 43. ATIS Current Translations No. 27, Op. ci

75 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 119.

192

On the same day, ten Japanese fighter planes
sent from New Britain attacked the Wau air-
field in an effort to curb enemy air activity, but
the effort could not be maintained and conse-
quently failed to improve the situation ap-
preciably. 7 *

On 12 February, Maj. Gen. Okabe ordered
a further withdrawal to a provisions storage
dump about a mile and a half to the rear.
The troops, on short rations since an early stage
of the advance from Salamaua, had exhausted
their food supplies during the protracted cam-
paign and were now existing on wild potatoes
(taros) and a small amount of captured enemy
provisions.

With its hopes of taking Wau completely
shattered, the Okabe Detachment on 13 Febru-
ary received orders from the Eighteenth Army
command at Rabaul to abandon the attempt
and withdraw its forces to Mubo and the
Nassau Bay area. The withdrawal began on
the 14th and was completed in ten days without
enemy pursuit. Out of 3,000 troops which
had set out from Salamaua for the Wau offen-
sive, only 2,200 survivors returned to Mubo.
More than 70 per cent of these, moreover, were
suffering from malaria, malnutrition, dysentery
and other diseases, and were unfit for combat
duty. 77

The failure of the attempt to take Wau had
serious consequences for the Japanese situation
in New Guinea. Not only had the major

strength of the Okabe Detachment been ex-
pended in futile fighting, but the Eighteenth
Army's plans to strengthen the flank defenses
of the Lae-Salamaua area were seriously
unhinged.

Evacuation of Guadalcanal

While the Eighteenth Army in New Guinea
was being forced to pull back its front line to
the Lae-Salamaua area following the loss of
Papua and the failure of the Wau offensive, a
withdrawal on a much larger scale and of
considerably greater difficulty was being carried
out from Guadalcanal, in the Solomons, under
the Imperial General Headquarters directive of
4 January.' 8

Following the collapse of the second general
offensive on Guadalcanal in late October 1942,
the Seventeenth Army and Southeast Area
Naval Force had continued efforts to move in
reinforcements for a new offensive planned for
January . 7 " Initial elements of the 38th Division
were successfully transported by destroyers from
the Shortland Islands in early November, but
the main reinforcement effort in mid-November
met disaster when Allied planes sank or set
afire all but four of eleven transports en route
from Bougainville. 8 " In a series of accompany-
ing surface actions between 11 and 15 Novem-
ber, moreover, the Japanese naval forces lost
two battleships, one cruiser and three destroyers,

76 Eighth Area Army headquarters ordered the air attack on Wau only with extreme reluctance, since all
available Army and Navy aircraft on New Britain were needed to support the current withdrawal operations from
Guadalcanal. The Wau sortie was ordered, however, in view of reports from Maj. Gen. Okabe indicating the serious
situation of his forces. (Statement by Col. Sugita, previously cited.)

77 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 127-8, 131.

78 Cf. text of 4 January directive, quoted on p. 169.

79 The decision in favor of a new offensive in January was strongly influenced by reports regarding the damage
inflicted on the American naval forces in the Santa Cruz sea battle of 26 October. These reports claimed a heavy
blow to enemy carrier strength, which it was thought would facilitate the movement of large-scale reinforcement to
Guadalcanal. (Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited.)

80 The four transports which reached Guadalcanal were damaged by bomb hits and had to be beached to permit
unloading of troops. Nanto Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono Ichi $ MJj\&HH' l $feWi&'£>— (Southeast Area Naval Opera-
tions, Part I) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Jun 49, p. 40.

193

PLATE NO, 48
Sea Battle 111 South Pacific

Oriffiml Painting by JConwwike Timun

Photograph by U. S, Army SigniJ Corp*

PLATE NO. 49
Suicide Unit Bidding Farewell to Commanding General Sano

with three cruisers and three destroyers heavily
damaged. 81

With aerial supremacy over the southern
Solomons already in Allied hands and the
combat effectiveness of the naval forces
reduced by ship losses, Imperial General
Headquarters reluctantly decided that the
fight to retake Guadalcanal must be aban-
doned and all Japanese forces withdrawn. 8 * The
directive of 4 January accordingly ordered the
Eighth Area Army and Combined Fleet to
make immediate preparations for the with-
drawal.

Evacuation of approximately 18,000 troops
still exchanging fire with the enemy from the
immediate vicinity of an enemy airfield was a
formidable task which required careful planning
and preparation. Land-based naval air units
on New Britain were weakened by extended
combat. Carrier aircraft strength, seriously
depleted in the Santa Cruz sea battle, had not
yet been replenished, and the withdrawal opera-
tion involved risking virtually all the remaining
destroyer forces of the Combined Fleet.

Despite these handicaps, the Eighth Area
Army and Southeast Area Fleet jointly worked
out plans which called for the employment of
all available aircraft in a sustained offensive
designed to neutralize enemy air and sea
strength long enough to permit seaborne
evacuation operations. Following a preliminary
series of night raids, mass daylight attacks were
to begin from about 28 January. The ground
forces were to begin gradual withdrawal to
embarkation points from 25 or 26 January, and
the evacuation itself was to be effected by
in three separate runs on

of 31 January, 3 and 6 February .* s The plans
called for participation of 212 Navy and 100
Army aircraft, predominantly fighters, while 22
destroyers and several submarines were made
available by the Navy.* 4

Night raids bysmall numbers of Navy aircraft
on Henderson Field began on 21 January and
continued almost without interruption until the
end of the month. The first mass daylight
attack was staged on 25 January by 91 Navy
planes, followed on the 27th by Army fighters
of the 6th Air Division. On 29 January naval
aircraft reported inflicting heavy damage on an
enemy naval force, including cruisers and
battleships, between San Cristobal and Rennell
Islands. 85

Due to the appearance of the enemy naval
force, the evacuation schedule was retarded one
day, the first evacuation taking place on the
night of 1—2 February, Eighteen destroyers
drew in at Kaminbo, on the northwestern tip

4,940 troops who were put ashore the following
day in the Shortland Islands. One destroyer
sank upon hitting an enemy mine near
Kaminbo, while another was damaged by air
attack and had to withdraw-
On 2 February 56 Navy planes carried out
another heavy strike on Henderson Field to
keep enemy air power neutralized. The second
evacuation followed on the night of the 4th,
when 17 destroyers took aboard and carried to
the Shortland Islands 3,902 troops. In this
operation one destroyer was hit by an enemy
bomb and forced out of action.

In the final evacuation on 7 February, 1,730
troops were removed from the island, bringing

81 Ibid., 38-40.

82 This decision was formally made in the Imperial conference on 31 December 1942, (Statement by Col. Jo-
ichiro Sanada, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.)

83 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 12.

84 Southeast Area Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 51-2.

85 Ibid., pp. 55-6.

196

the total number of troops evacuated to 10,572."*
Including damage sustained by one destroyer in
this operation, total naval losses for the whole
evacuation amounted to only one destroyer
sunk and three damaged.* 7

With the termination of the fight for Gua-
dalcanal, the Solomons area entered a period
of temporary quiescence, during which both
sides prepared for the next phase of battle.
The Japanese front line was withdrawn to New
Georgia and Santa Isabel Island. These were
only lightly garrisoned by about three infantry
battalions and a few antiaircraft units, and
airfields were still in process of construction.
To remedy this situation, the Southeast Area
Fleet, in the latter part of February, directed
the Eighth Fleet to move two units of the 8th
Combined Special Naval Landing Force to
Munda as a preliminary reinforcement meas-
ure. 88 In April these were augmented by ele-
ments of two infantry regiments (13th Inf. Regt.,
6th Division, and 229th Inf. Regt., 38th Divi-
sion), and on 3 May all Army forces in the
New Georgia area were combined in a newly-
activated Southeast Detachment under the
operational command of the Eighth Fleet.* 9

Ground defense of the northern Solomons
was left in the hands of the Seventeenth Army.
Army headquarters was established on Bou-
gainville, and the 6th Division, already moved
to Bougainville in January, was newly placed
under Seventeenth Army command. The
battered units evacuated from Guadalcanal were
gradually moved back to Rabaul, where the 38th

Division was reorganized for defense of New
Britain. The 2d Division and 35th Infantry
Brigade were transferred to other theaters.*

Menace of the B-17's

Various factors were responsible for the
parallel setbacks suffered by the Japanese forces
in Papua and the Solomons, but the most
important of these was the gradual loss of air
supremacy over the areas of battle to the Allies.

At the time of the American invasion of the
Solomons in mid-summer of 1942, the outcome
of the battle for aerial supremacy still hovered
in the balance. Japanese naval aircraft based
at Rabaul, chiefly Zero fighters and land-based
medium bombers, were still able to operate with
a certain degree of effectiveness over Papua and
the Solomons, where the Allies did not yet
possess superiority in numbers of aircraft.

However, Allied plane strength in the south-
east area soon began to increase at a rate with
which the Japanese could not keep pace.
Numerical superiority passed to the hands of the
enemy, and in addition, his ability swiftly to
construct and expand forward bases increased
the effectiveness of his air forces. Similar
Japanese efforts to develop forward air bases,
though they made some progress, were retarded
by shortages of manpower and equipment, with
the result that sorties were still being flown
chiefly from Rabaul in the fall of 1942. The
distances involved seriously curtailed the effec-
tiveness of the air effort over Papua and the

86 Exact number of troops evacuated from Guadalcanal is difficult to determine due to the contradictions found
in available wartime documents. Figures used in this chapter are as accurate as can be determined from the existing
documents. (1) Situation Report (Summary) of the Seventeenth Army, p. 4. (2) Report to the Emperor (Draft)
by the Seventeenth Army Commander, p, 17. (3) The Number of Troops Retreating to Erventa. Extracted from
the Private Papers of Col. Haruo Konuma, Staff Officer (Operations), Seventeenth Army.

87 Southeast Area Naval Operations, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 56-7.

88 These units were the Kure 6th Special Naval Landing Force and the Yokosuka No. 7 Special NavaJ Landing
Force. Nanto Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono Nt ~&~M'Jj[ti\MWi'fM££>— (Southeast Area Naval Operations, Part II)
2d Demobilization Bureau, Jun 49. pp. 6 and 14.

89 Maj. Gen. Minoru Sasaki was appointed to command the Southeast Detachment and arrived on Kolombangara
Island 31 May to take command. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 105-6.

90 Ibid., pp. 98-9.

197

Solomons. 9 '

In the Solomons, it was pnr
enemy's expanding carrier-borne air forces
which captured control over the Guadalcanal
battlefield and thwarted Japanese reinforcement
attempts. In the battle for Papua, a major
factor was the long-range B-17 bomber. From
the autumn of 1942, these powerful craft in-
tensified their attacks on Japanese troop and

seas, and by December were carrying out
regular night raids on Rabaul itself.

In an attempt to elude B-17 attack, Japanese
vessels on transport and supply missions began
moving as much as possible at night or in bad
weather, but enemy radar equipment made
even such movement risky. Japanese destroy-
ers, despite their speed and maneuverability,
often could not elude the extremely accurate
bombing of the B-17's, and escort fighters
offered little protection.* 2 The Zero fighter,
armed with two 20- millimeter automatic can-
non, was then a relatively powerful craft, but
repeated engagements indicated that two or
three Zeros still were no sure match for a
single B-17. 5 " Attempts to develop new fighter
types capable of combatting the B-17's were
only partially successful. 91

The gradual loss of the air campaign over
the Solomons and eastern New Guinea under-
lined the urgent necessity of infusing fresh air
strength into the southeast area. This in turn
demanded accelerated mass production of air-
craft and training of air crews in the homeland.
During the bitter battle for Guadalcanal, the
Navy had poured in a large portion of its
available land-based air strength, but this had
been so rapidly expended that the Japanese air
potential in the southeast area actually showed
little or no increase.** The Army's 6th Air
Division, though activated in November to
reinforce the naval air forces in the southeast
area, did not begin operating from Rabaul

canal and Buna campaigns were already virtu-
ally lost.

To alleviate one of the major handicaps
which had reduced the effectiveness of the
Japanese Air forces in these campaigns, the
Army and Navy commands at Rabaul began
early in 1943 to concentrate special effort on
the construction of new air bases and the
reinforcement of air defenses in northeast
New Guinea and western New Britain. At
Wewak, Madang and Tuluvu, lack of airfield
construction personnel and equipment neces-

91 The strips at Lae and Buna, though improved for operational use, were inadequate and subject to frequent
enemy air attack. In the Solomons, construction of bases in the Buin area on Bougainville and on New Georgia had
not been completed until after the Allied invasion of Guadalcanal. (Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited.)

92 During the one-month period from 15 November to 15 December 1942, B-i7"s sank one destroyer carrying
troop reinforcements to Buna and damaged six others. By 15 December all destroyer movement to the Buna area had
to be abandoned. Greater East Asia War Summary, op. cit., pp. 45-72.

93 At Rabaul it was extremely rare for a B-17 to ke &ot down either by antiaircraft fire or defending fighters.
Vice Adm. Masao Kanazawa, 8th Naval Base Force Commander, recorded that he first saw a B-17 s bot down over
Rabaul on 9 August 1942, and that all personnel were " wild with joy." Extracted by the writer from personal papers
of Vice Adm. Kanazawa.

94 In the spring of 1943, the new Gekko {Mt) night fighter, armed with a fixed machine gun mounted at an
angle of about 30 degrees to the fuselage axis, was pitted against the B-17, but it was only partially effective in checking
night raids on Rabaul. (Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited.)

95 Between the American invasion of Guadalcanal in August and the end of 1942, nearly 800 naval planes were
expended in the Solomons campaign. Approximately one-third of this total represented carrier-borne aircraft. (Statis-
tical data compiled by 2d Demobilization Bureau, Liquidation Division.)

198

Origin*! Painting hy Manjtto Trrauchi

PLATE NO. 50
Troops at Work, Southern Area

skated imposing this task on infantry troops
equipped only with picks and shovels.

As of the beginning of March 1943, Japa-
nese first-line air strength in the southeast area
aggregated approximately 200 Navy and 100
Army planes. 96 These were operating mainly
from three airfields in the Rabaul area, from
Buin on southern Bougainville, and from
Kaviengon New Ireland. There were two Japan-
ese airstrips at Kavieng, four in the Solomons,
three in northeast New Guinea, and two
(besides the Rabaul strips) on New Britain.

At this same period, Japanese intelligence
estimated enemy air strength in the Guadal-
canal area at about 230 first-line planes, chiefly
of small types, and about 200, including a large
proportion of heavy bombers, operating in
Papua. 97 Allied aircraft were believed operating
from five or six airstrips on Guadalcanal, two
at Milne Bay, four or five in the Buna area,
and six at Port Moresby.

Eighteenth Army Reinforcement

Although the Imperial General Head-
quarters decision of 4 January to abandon
Guadalcanal did not formally state that, hence-
forth, New Guinea would be considered the
decisive battlefront, it had, in fact, already
begun to shift the major Army effort to New

Guinea,

On 23 December, a week prior to the Im-
perial conference decision to evacuate Guadal-
canal, Imperial General Headquarters had
ordered the transfer of two fresh divisions — the
20th from Korea and the 41st from North
China — to the southeast area front, principally
for use in the Solomons. 9 ' Before either
division had sailed, however, the evacuation
decision intervened, and plans were immediate-
ly altered to move both divisions to New
Guinea under Eighteenth Army command. 9 *

In addition to the 20th and 41st Divisions,
Imperial General Headquarters between Janu-
ary and April 1943 ordered the dispatch to
New Guinea of large numbers of service-troop
reinforcements, principally antiaircraft, engi-
neer, road construction, shipping and land
transport units.' 00 The 6th Air Division,
already in the Rabaul area, was to deploy part
of its strength to New Guinea and was to be
strengthened by the dispatch of additional
planes and air crews, together with airfield
construction units, base personnel and large
amounts of materiel. The total number of
troops to be moved to New Guinea under the
reinforcement program amounted to about
100,000.""

On the basis of this projected augmentation
of forces, the Eighteenth Army drew up new

96 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 140.

97 Ibid.

98 The 20th Division was assigned to Seventeenth Army, while the 41st was assigned directly to Eighth Area
Army. Ibid., p, 218-9.

99 Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.

too Principal service units additionally assigned to Eighteenth Army during this period were as follows ; 6th
Independent Antitank Battalion ; 50th, 56th, part of 58th, and 6ist-63d Antiaircraft Battalions ; 38th-4ist Independ-
ent Antiaircraft Batteries ; 25th and 29th Independent Antiaircraft Machine-Cannon Companies • 4th Engineer Head-
quarters ; 8th, 30th, 33d, 36th and 37th Independent Engineer Regiments ; 3d, 21st Mortar Battalions ; 35th-38th, 40th,
44th, 48th Road Construction Units ; 3d, 4th Field Transport Headquarters ; 39th, 42d Motor Transport Battalions;
225th, 263d, 290th, 291st, 302d, 304th Independent Motor Transport Companies; isM2th and i6th-i8th Special
Independent Motor Transport Companies ; 3d Independent Transport Regiment ; 5th, 9th Shipping Engineer Reg-
iments ; ist- 4 th, 6th, 7th Independent Searchlight Companies. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit.
Vol. I, pp. 223-8.

101 Statement by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.

200

operational plans which called for immediate
strengthening of the Lae-Salamaua area a-
gainst anticipated Allied attack, and also for
long-range measures to develop rear bases and
transport routes in preparation for future offen-
sive operations. The principal steps envisaged
were i'" 2

/. Dispatch of the main strength of the 51st
Divison from Rabaul to the Lae-Salamaua area as
soon as possible, with the 20th Division to go to
Madang, and the 41st Division to IVewak.

2. After its arrival at Madang, the 20th Division
to move toward Lae, constructing a supply road via
the Finisterre Range, the Ramu and Markham Rtver
valleys. The 41st Division to advance from IVewak
to Madang at a later date.

3. Special emphasis to be placed on building up
troop strength and materiel in the Lae—Salamaua
area, rapid construction of an intermediate base at
Madang, and development of land and sea communi-
cations linking Lae-Salamaua with Madang and
rear supply bases at IVewak and in the Palau Islands.

For Japan's heavily taxed naval and shipping
resources, the movement from Japan Proper,
the Continent and other distant areas of the
large volume of troops and materiel newly
allotted to New Guinea was a big undertaking
and could not be accomplished overnight.
However, by the end of February 1943, the
major strength of the 20th and 41st Divisions
had been safely transported to Wewak, ,OJ and
remaining elements of the 20th Division and
various supporting troops were moved to the

Hansa area during the succeeding months of
March, April and May. After March, Allied
air attacks on Japanese ships unloading or at
anchor, especially night bombing raids, inter-
fered increasingly with transport operations.

Although the movement of the bulk of
Eighteenth Army's newly-assigned strength to
rear areas in New Guinea was thus successfully
accomplished, efforts to carry out the more
urgently required reinforcement of the Lae-
Salamaua area proved extremely costly. Eighth
Area Army and Southeast Area Fleet head-
quarters fully realized the risk involved in
attempting to ship troops directly to Lae in
view of Allied air preponderance over the
Dampier Strait area. Nevertheless, it was
finally decided that this risk must be taken
since an alternate plan of shipment to Madang
and subsequent movement by land or by land-
ing craft along the coast to Lae would run the
greater risk of failing to get the troops to Lae
in time to meet expected Allied attack.

Preparations were therefore completed in the
latter part of February for the immediate ship-
ment from Rabaul of the main strength of the
51st Division,' 04 elements of which (Okabe
Detachment) were already in the Lae—Sala-
maua area. Lt. Gen. Adachi, Eighteenth Army
Commander, decided to accompany the move-
ment in order to establish the Army command
post at Lae. To lessen the danger of enemy
air interference, plans were made to carry out
preliminary neutralization strikes against Allied

102 Statement by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.

103 Major elements of the 20th Division embarked from Pusan, Korea, on 12 January aboard eight Navy
transports escorted by two light cruisers and five destroyers. These reached Wewak on 19 January. The 41st Division
sailed from Tsingtao, North China, in three echelons, the first of which left on 12 February. AH three echelons
reached Wewak between 20 and 28 February, disembarking a total of 13,700 troops. Southeast Area Naval Operations,
Part II, op. cit., p. 5.

104 The shipment was to include the following: 51st Division Headquarters; 115th Infantry Regiment; two-
thirds of 14th Artillery Regiment ; two-thirds of 51st Engineer Regiment ; service elements. These totalled about 6,900
troops. Only 51st Division units remaining in Rabaul were the 66th Infantry Regiment (less 3d Battalion), 51st
Cavalry Regiment, and a few service units. (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 147-152.
(2) Statement by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.

201

air bases in the Buna and Port Moresby areas,
but these were prevented by adverse weather.
Despite this upset in plans, the Army and
Navy commands at Rabau! decided that move-
ment of the 51st Division could not be post-
poned, and consequently the convoy of eight
troops transports, with a surface escort of eight
destroyers, sailed from Rabaul on the night of
28 February."" 1 About 100 Army and Navy
were assigned to provide air escort.

Battle of the Bismarck Sea

Moving at its best speed of seven knots,
the convoy was passing through the Bismarck
Sea north of Cape Hollman on 1 March, when
it was spotted by large enemy planes. ( Plate
No. 51) These did not attack but observed
the convoy's movements, and at 0805 the
following day about ten B-17's launched the
first strike on the slow-moving ships. The
Kyokusei Maru, with about 1,500 troops aboard,
was set afire by a direct hit and had to be
abandoned, later sinking at a point northeast
of Cape Gloucester. About 800 troops were
safely transferred aboard the destroyers, Yuki-
kaze (carrying the 51st Division Commander,
Lt. Gen. Hidemitsu Nakano) and Asagumo,
which proceeded toward Lae ahead of the
convoy. After safely disembarking the sur-
vivors at Lae, these destroyers sped back and
rejoined the convoy early on 3 March.

Meanwhile, the rest of the convoy, after
changing its course for a brief period during
the afternoon of 2 March, again headed for
Lae, receiving a further attack during the eve-
ning, in which the naval transport Nojima

sustained slight damage. The convoy negotiat-
ed the Vitiaz Strait during the night and had
reached a point 30 nautical miles southeast of
Cape Cretin, on the Huon Peninsula, when
about 40 B-17's and 60 other enemy aircraft
attacked at 0800 on 3 March. The convoy
fighter escort numbered 26 planes at the start
of the attack and was later reinforced by 14

The Japanese fighters, anticipating a high-
altitude attack, were flying at considerable
height and were taken by surprise when the
enemy bombers swept in from all directions to
deliver their attacks low over the water. Enemy
medium bombers employed a new skip-bomb-
ing technique of deadly effectiveness. The
Japanese ships, thinking that they were under
torpedo-plane attack, attempted evasive action
without success, and after about an hour of
severe bombing, all seven remaining transports
were afire and sinking, as well as three escort
destroyers. One of these destroyers, the Toki-
tsukaze, had aboard the Eighteenth Army com-
mander and part of his staff.' 07

Four of the five remaining destroyers, after
picking up as many survivors as possible before
afternoon of the 3rd, withdrew northward in
order to escape further attack. In this move-
ment, contact was lost with the fifth destroyer,
which presumably lagged behind and was sunk
by enemy bombs. As soon as darkness fell,
three of the four destroyers which had retired
northward returned to the scene of battle and
continued rescue operations until just before
dawn of the 4th, when they headed back to
Rabaul and Kavieng. The Bismarck Sea battle,
as serious a defeat for the Japanese as it was a

105 Troop transports were the Kyokusei Maru, Otgawa Maru, Teiyo Maru, Shinai Maru, Aiyo Maru, Taimei Maru,
Kembu Maru, and naval transport Nojima. Destroyer escort was made up of the following : Tokitsukaze, Arashio,
Yukikaze, Asasbio, Uranami, Shikinami, Sbirayuki, and Asagumo. (t) 51st Division Order No. A-59, 23 Feb 43, Annex
2: (2) Lae Transport Escort Operations Order No. t, 26 Feb 43. Both published in ATIS Enemy Publication
No. 7, Part I, Bismarck Sea Operation, February March 1943, 8 Apr 43, pp. 18-A and 75-A.

to6 The slow speed of the convoy made it especially vulnerable to enemy air attack.

107 The Army commander was among those picked up and taken back to Rabaul.

202

PLATE NO. 51
Battle of Bismarck Sea, 2—4 March 1943

brilliant victory for Allied air power, was over.

Out of slightly over 6,900 troops badly
needed for the defense of Lae-Salamaua, 3,664
had been lost. Only about 800 troops had
actually reached Lae, while 2,427 survivors
were brought back to Rabaul. Supplies and
heavy equipment aboard the transports had
gone down with the burning ships, and all
survivors with the exception of those which
reached Lae by destroyer had lost even their
small arms.' 08

With the Bismarck Sea disaster, the Army
and Navy commands in the southeast area
were forced to relinquish all hope of sending
troops or supplies directly to Lae by regular
transport vessels or by destroyers. Henceforth,
ships could proceed only as far as Finschhafen,
whence troops or supplies destined for Lae had
to move overland or by small landing craft.
The first transport run to Finschhafen was
carried out on 20 March by four destroyers
carrying approximately one reorganized bat-
talion of the 115th Infantry Regiment, 51st
Division. Two further attempts were made on
2 and 10 April to transport 66th Infantry
units, but on both occasions enemy air attacks
forced the destroyer convoys to turn back
before reaching Finschhafen.

With destroyer movement even as far as
Finschhafen rapidly becoming perilous under
the menace of Allied air power, resort was

made to transport by small landing craft, which
moved only at night along a chain of bases
from Tuluvu, on northwest New Britain, to
Lae. The loading capacity of these small craft
was generally between five and ten tons, but
by using approximately 200 of them, it was
possible to transport more than 3,000 troops
and a considerable amount of supplies from
Rabaul to Lae over a period of about four
months. 109 Later, a similar transport system
was established along the New Guinea coast
linking Hansa and Madang with Finschhafen
in order to facilitate the movement of 20th
and 41st Division troops to Lae. Submarines
were also used extensively after March to move
medical supplies, rations, and vital equipment
to the Lae area from New Britain."

Although these makeshift measures were
partially effective, the ever increasing difficulty
of transporting troops and supplies by sea in
the New Guinea area strengthened the demand
for developing overland transport routes link-
ing Lae with rear bases at Madang and Hansa.
Already at the end of January, Eighteenth
Army had ordered the 20th Division to under-
take construction of a road from Madang to
Lae via the Mintjim-Faria Divide in the Finis-
terre Range, and the Ramu and Markham
River Valleys.'" Work actually was not begun
until April, however, and the difficulties en-
countered were so much greater than anticipat-

108 Foregoing account of the Bismarck Sea battle is based on the following sources : (i) Greater East Asia War
Summary, op. cit., pp. 142-50. (2) Statements by Comdr. Nikichi Handa, Staff Officer (Signal), Lae Transport
Escort Force and Capt. Ohmae and Col. Sugita, previously cited. (Col. Sugita, accompanying the Eighteenth Army
headquarters, was aboard the destroyer Tokitsukaze, sunk on 3 March.)

109 Two alternative routes were used between Tuluvu and Lae : (1) Tuluvu — Busching —Finschhafen — Lae;
and (2) Tuluvu— Umboi — Sio — Finschhafen — Mange — Lae. The landing craft were able to complete each leg of
their voyage during ten hours of darkness each night, remaining inactive during the day to escape enemy air attack.
Southeast Area Operations Record, Pan III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 259-61.

110 From March to September 1943, submarines made 81 supply runs from Rabaul to Lae. Major New Guinea
Operations, op. cit., p. 30.

111 A survey of the projected Madang Lae road, carried out between late December and early February by
units stationed at Madang, found that construction of a road suitable for motor traffic would require four to five
months using a labor force of 3,000 men. Even before the survey was completed, however, Eighteenth Army had
decided that the project must be undertaken at any cost. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. I, pp.
188, 191 and 199.

204

ed that by July the road had been completed
only as far as Mablugu, 40 miles from Madang.
Allied aircraft also hampered the project by
bombing the supply base at Erima and bridges
to the south.

Shift of Emphasis to Papua

The virtually complete destruction in the
Battle of the Bismarck Sea of the 51st Division
forces counted upon to hold the Lae-Salamaua
area against anticipated Allied attack shocked
Imperial General Headquarters into realization
of the extremely tenuous situation on the
Japanese right flank in the southeast area.
This served as a decisive reason for a vital
revision of joint Army-Navy operational policy,
whereby first priority was definitely shifted
from the Solomons area to New Guinea.

The terms of the revised policy were stipu-
lated in a new Army-Navy Central Agreement
on Southeast Area Operations, issued by Im-
perial General Headquarters as an operational
directive to the Eighth Area Army and Com-
bined Fleet on 25 March 1943. This directive
stated:" 1

/. Operational Objective : To establish a strong
strategic position by occupying and securing key
points in the southeast area,

2. Operational Plan :

a. Army and Navy forces, acting in complete
coordination, will concentrate their main effort on
operations in New Guinea and will secure opera-
tional bases in that area. At the same time,
defenses will be strengthened in the Solomon Is-
lands and the Bismarck Archipelago, key points
will be secured, and future enemy attacks will be
crushed at the opportune time.

b. New Guinea Operations:

(/) Strategic points in the Lae-Salamaua
area will be held against enemy airborne,

ground or sea attack. The Army and Navy
will take all necessary measures to maintain
supplies to this area and increase the combat
strength of the forces there.

(2) Air operations will be intensified, and
enemy air strength destroyed as far as possible.
Every effort will be made to check increased
enemy transport, especially along the east coast
of New Guinea, and at the same time to provide
thorough protection of our <mi supply routes.

(3) Army and Navy forces will cooperate
in immediately strengthening air defense instal-
lations, air bases and supply transport bases in
New Guinea and New Britain, Efforts will
also be made, principally by Army forces, to
complete the construction of necessary roads and

the accumulation of military supplies.
New operational bases will be developed in
New Guinea and western New Biitain.

(4) Troop strength in the Lae-Salamaua
area will be reinforced, and various military
installations improved. Preparations will sub-
sequently be made for the resumption of opera-
tions against Port Moresby.

j. Air Operations:

a. In order to facilitate general operations, the
Army and Navy will speedily reinforce their air
strength and expand air operations on a large scale.

b. Special effort will be made to increase the
effectiveness of these operations by close cooperation
between Army and Navy Air forces.

Under further stipulations governing air
operations, missions of the Army Air forces
were restricted principally to the New Guinea
area, while the Navy Air forces, in addition to
supporting New Guinea air operations, remain-
ed primarily responsible for defense of the
Bismarck Archipelago and solely responsible
for air operations in the Solomons. Army air
strength in the southeast area was to be step-
ped up to 240 aircraft of all types by September
1943, and Navy air strength to 357 planes,
exclusive of carrier-borne aircraft, by the end
of June."*

speed

112 Daikaishi Dai Nihyakujusan-go AiftJcr^nW+HSS (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No.
213) 25 Mar 43. (Imperial General Headquarters Army Section directive was couched in identical terms.)

113 Ibid.

205

To implement the Imperial General Head-
quarters directive, Lt. Gen. Imamura, Eighth
Area Army Commander, summoned a confer-
ence at Rabaul on 12 April, attended by the
commanders of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Armies, the 6th Air Division, and units
under direct Area Army command. At this
conference, the following Area Army order
was issued, specifying the missions of the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Armies and 6th
Air Division :'* 4

t. In cooperation with the Navy, the Area Army
will endeavor to achieve the following objective: In
the New Guinea area, to consolidate its strategic
position and carry out preparations for subsequent
offensive operations. In the Solomons and Bismarck
Archipelago, to consolidate and strengthen present
positions.

2. The Seventeenth Army, in cooperation with
the Navy, will conduct operations in the Solomons
area in accordance with the following :

a. The Army will assume responsibility for
the defense of the northern Solomons. It will
consolidate and, as far as possible, strengthen
existing positions.

b. In matters pertaining to operational prepa-
rations, the Army will direct Army units operating
under Navy command in the zone of naval respon-
sibility in the central Solomons. . . .

3. The Eighteenth Army, in cooperation with
the Navy, will conduct operations in the New Guinea
area in accordance with the following :

a. The Army will first secure the strategic
sectors of Lae and Salamaua, and by assuring the
flow of supplies to these sectors, establish a firm basis
for strengthening the Army's strategic position. To
facilitate these objectives, the Army will speedily
formulate plans for the establishment of overland
and coastal supply routes linking Madang and
western New Britain with the Lae area.

b. To strengthen transport and supply opera-
tions, line of communications and naval transport
bases will be established and improved at important
points along the eastern New Guinea coast west of
Madang. Air bases will also be established as
required.

c. Along with the consolidation of the Army's
114 Extracted from personal memoranda of Col. £

strategic position as outlined above, all positions
will be strengthened and preparations made for
future operations.

4. The 6th Air Division will gradually advance
its bases of operation to eastern New Guinea and, in
cooperation with the Navy, will undertake the follow-
ing missions.

a. Destruction of enemy air power in the
eastern New Guinea area.

b. Provision of direct air cover for water
transport in this area.

c. Direct support, when required, of Army
ground operations.

d. Constant reconnaissance of enemy land
and sea communication routes in the eastern New
Guinea area, and attacks on these lines whenever
opportune.

e. Defense of Rabaul.

f. Ferrying of supplies to the front by air,
whenever necessary.

Although the Imperial General Headquar-
ters directive of 25 March and Eighth Area
Army's implementing order clearly shifted the
weight of the Japanese military effort in the
southeast area to New Guinea, actually this
shift was difficult to accomplish. By 12 April
when the Area Army order was issued, trans-
port by destroyer from New Britain to Finsch-
hafen had already become impossible, and the
only means of moving men and supplies to
Lae was slow and arduous transport by sub-
marine and small craft. Moreover, the combat
effectiveness of Japanese forces already stationed
in sectors of New Guinea within range of Allied
air power was gradually being worn down even
before these forces were engaged in actual
fighting.

Under these circumstances only the air forces
were capable of taking offensive action on the
New Guinea front. In order to deter the build-
up of enemy strength and to assist the attempts
to reinforce advance positions, Admiral Yama-
moto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined
Fleet, promptly ordered the Navy Air forces to
launch an all-out offensive directed principally
at enemy bases in Papua. In addition to 72
;ita, previously cited.

206

land-based medium bombers, 27 carrier dive-
bombers and 86 fighters of the Eleventh Air
Fleet, the Third Fleet was ordered to partici-
pate in the operation with 54 carrier dive-
bombers, 96 fighters and a number of carrier
torpedoplanes." 5

The offensive began under the command
of Admiral Yamamoto on 7 April with a
powerful strike by 71 dive-bombers and 157
fighters against enemy naval and transport
shipping at Guadalcanal, in the Solomons.
Air action reports claimed damage to one
cruiser, one destroyer and 8 transports, in
addition to 28 enemy planes shot down. Japa-
nese losses were 21 planes.

Target of the second attack on 11 April was
Allied shipping at Oro Bay, south of Buna.
Seventy-two fighters and 22 carrier dive-
bombers operating from Rabaul participated in
the attack, action reports claiming three trans-
ports and one destroyer sunk. Under cover
of this attack, two destroyers carrying reinforce-
ments and supplies completed successful runs
between Rabaul and Tuluvu.

On 12 April the offensive continued with a
heavy raid on Port Moresby by 131 fighters
and 43 land-based medium bombers. These
blanketed the airstrips with bombs, damaged
numerous ground installations, and claimed
the sinking of a transport anchored in the
harbor. Twenty-eight enemy planes were
reported shot down or destroyed, against the
loss of seven Japanese aircraft.

The final attack was delivered on 14 April

against Milne Bay, with 149 fighters and 37
land medium bombers taking part in the sortie.
According to the action reports, ten transports
in the bay were either sunk or damaged, and
44 enemy planes were shot down against a
Japanese loss of only ten aircraft." 6

Despite the highly effective results of the air
offensive, the Navy Air forces were not capable
of continuing sustained attacks on so large a
scale. Japanese naval leadership, moreover,
suffered a severe blow four days after the Milne
Bay attack, when Admiral Yamamoto was
killed on an inspection flight from Rabaul to
Buin. The Admiral's plane, escorted by nine
fighters, was nearing Buin on 18 April when
about 24 American fighters suddenly attacked.
Admiral Yamamoto's plane crashed in the
jungle north of Buin, while a second plane
carrying his Chief of Staff, Vice Adm. Matome
Ugaki, crash-landed at sea." 7 Admiral Mine-
ichi Koga later was appointed to fill the post of
Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

On 19 April, five months after its activation,
the Eighteenth Army finally transferred its
headquarters from Rabaul to Madang in order
to enable Lt. Gen. Adachi, Army Commander,
to assume personal direction of operations in
the New Guinea area. Preparations for the
defense of Lae — Salamaua were dangerously
behind schedule, and speedy action was im-
perative to meet the threat of a new northward
thrust by General MacArthur's forces.

The next stage of the battle for New Guinea
was about to begin.

115 Greater East Asia War Summary, op. cit., p. 174.

116 Data on air attacks from 7 to 14 April extracted from (t) Greater East Asia War Summary, op. cit., pp.
174-184. (2) Southeast Area Naval Operations Part II, op. cit., p. o-to. American Editor's Note: Official Allied
sources covering these attacks give the following data, cited for comparison against Japanese claims : 7 April raid on
Guadalcanal : participating aircraft, 50 bombers, 48 fighters ; 39 shot down ; no report of American plane losses or
damage to ships. 1 1 April raid on Oro Bay : 40/45 bombers and fighters ; 17 shot down, 16 probables ; three ships
damaged. 12 April raid on Port Moresby: 45/50 bombers, 50 fighters; 17 shot down, 10 probables; four Allied
aircraft destroyed, 14 damaged; fuel ands upply dumps destroyed, buildings damaged. 14 April raid on Milne Bay:
61 bombers, 30 fighters; 15 shot down, 9 probables; one ship sunk, four damaged; fuel dump destroyed.

117 Extracted from the personal diary of Vice Adm. Matome Ugaki, Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet. (Vice
Adm. Ugaki sustained severe injuries in the crash-landing.)

207

CHAPTER IX

FIGHTING WITHDRAWAL TO WESTERN NEW GUINEA

Southeast Area Situation, June 1943

Despite steadily intensified efforts through
April and May to strengthen Japanese defenses
in New Guinea and the central Solomons in
preparation for the next phase of hostilities,
the strategic and tactical situation which con-
fronted the Japanese command in the southeast
area at the beginning of June 1943 remained
distinctly unfavorable.' (Plate No. 52)

All along a front of approximately 1,200
miles extending from Lae and Salamaua in
Northeast New Guinea, through Tuluvu and
Gasmata on New Britain, to Bougainville, New
Georgia and Santa Isabel in the Solomons,
Japanese forces were thinly spread and on the
defensive. Reinforcement and supply of the
critical points along this extended front were
severely hampered by expanding enemy control
of the air and sea.

By June it appeared probable that an Allied
not be long delayed. Eighth
intelligence reports indicated that
enemy forces, estimated at three to four divi-
sions in eastern New Guinea and three divi-
sions in the southern Solomons, were rapidly
being made ready for a new offensive effort.

Air bases in the Buna area and on Guadal-
canal were being improved and expanded.
Enemy planes not only were intensifying their
attacks on Lae— Salamaua and on Japanese
supply shipping in rear-area ports, but were
sowing mines in Japanese-held coastal waters
in the Solomons and extending their patrol
radius to within close proximity of the Equator. 1
Enemy naval forces were boldly attacking
Japanese outposts in the central Solomons,
subjecting shore defenses to artilleiy bombard-
ment.

On the New Guinea flank, the key Japanese
positions at Lae and Salamaua, guarding the
southern land approach to the Dampier Strait,
were expected to be the next major objectives
of General MacArthur's forces. These posi-
tions already were threatened by reinforced
enemy troops in the Wau area directly to the
southwest, and increasing enemy activity in
this sector indicated the probability of an early
attack on the outer defenses of Salamaua. At
the same time, infiltration of enemy forces into
the Bena Bena and Mt. Hagen areas far to the
northwest, where they were developing airfields,
created a serious potential menace to Japanese
rear bases at Madang, Hansa and Wewak.*

In the central Solomons, it was estimated

Thi:
assignments

fficer, cf. n,

wily preparec
. 1, Chapter

chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Col. Ichiji Sugita, Imperial Japanese Army. For duty
of this officer,
Section Files, GHQ FEC.

VI. All source materials cited in ths chapter are located in G-2 Historical

2 Enemy air strength in June 1943 was estimated at about 350 planes in the Guadalcanal area, and another 350 in
eastern New Guinea. (1) Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono San : Dai Juhacbi Gun no Sakusen MT^-hM MMftSSlMCOS I
f^-f- A^E^jf^uHe (Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III: Eighteenth Army Operations) 1st Demobilization
Bureau, Sep 46. Vol. I, pp. 130-4.1, 156-7. (2) Nanto Homen Koku Sakusen Kiroku r4f i^^Sltt'Sf^ife (Southeast
Area Air Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Sep 46, p. 14.

3 Aerial reconnaissance of toe Bena Bena and Hagen areas in the middle of June revealed the existence of seven
large enemy airfields, two of which were still under construction, two medium fields, and three small dispersal strips.
Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 5-6.

208

that the enemy's next offensive would be
directed against Japanese outposts in the New
Georgia group. Allied forces were believed
likely to attempt initial landings in the vicinity
of Wickham, on southern New Georgia, to be
followed by later assaults on Munda and
Kolombangara. Both in the Solomons and in
eastern New Guinea, Eighth Area Army
estimated that enemy attack preparations would
reach completion by the end of July and that
major offensives might be launched in either
or both sectors at any time between August
and December. 4

To meet the mounting threat of enemy
attack on these widely separated fronts, Eighth
Area Army and the Southeast Area Fleet
continued to press the reinforcement of Japa-
nese garrisons in the face of steadily increasing
transport difficulties By mid-June, landing
barges operating by night along the coastal
route from Rabaul had successfully transported
to Lae the main strength of the 66th Infantry
Regiment, 51st Division, while elements of the
80th Infantry Regiment, 20th Division, were
being moved from Madang by similar means.
The 65th Brigade, transferred to Rabaul from
the Philippines, was meanwhile moved to
Tuluvu, on western New Britain, and the 51st
Transport Regiment, 51st Division, was dis-
patched to Manus Island, in the Admiralties,
to begin construction of an airfield.

In the Solomons area, concurrent steps had
been taken to reinforce the naval garrisons
charged with defense of the New Georgia
group. The 229th Infantry Regiment, 38th
Division, two battalions of the 13th Infantry
Regiment, 6th Division, and part of the 10th
Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment
were moved to New Georgia and Kolom-
bangara, while the 3d battalion of the 23d
Infantry Regiment, 6th Division, was dispatched
to Rekata, on Santa Isabel.

Although substantial numbers of troops had
thus been advanced to the forward areas by
dint of slow but persevering effort over a period
of months, the fighting effectiveness of these
forces was inevitably reduced by logistic diffi-
culties. Large-scale Allied air operations
against supply lines severely cut down the
amount of rations and forage reaching the
front-line forces, necessitating urgent steps to
achieve local self-sufficiency. 6 Shortages of
food and medical supplies swelled the average
proportion of ineffectives due to malnutrition
and disease to as high as 40 per cent in front-
line combat units. 7

Owing to new developments in the tactical
situation facing the Eighteenth Army in New
Guinea, in particular the build-up of enemy
strength in the Wau area and the preparation
of advance Allied air bases in the vicinity of
Bena Bena and Mt. Hagen, Eighth Area Army

4 Estimate of enemy situation and intentions given in preceding paragraphs is based on memoranda-notes kept
by the writer, at that time Staff Officer (Intelligence Bureau), Imperial General Headquarters. Additional data on the
enemy air situation based on reference given in n. 2.

5 In addition to enemy interference, shortage of transport shipping was a major difficulty. Combined shipping
available to both Eighth Area Army and Southeast Area Fleet at this time was broken down as follows : Large trans-
ports, 15; small transports, 40; powered sailing vessels, 80 ; fishing boats, 180; powered sampans, 235; large landing
barges, 400; collapsible boats, 100. (1) Writer's memoranda-notes; (2) Statement by Capt, Toshikazu Ohmae, Staff
Officer (Operations), Southeast Area Fleet.

6 Goals fixed for the end of 1943 were total self-sufficiency in the Solomons and New Britain, at least 50 per
cent self-sufficiency for the Madang and Wewak areas in New Guinea, and 25 per cent for other New Guinea areas.
Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono Shi: Dai Hachi Homen Gun no Sakusen jfc^/iiq fc$|f!i$&®13 i MAjilMW-tO
feWc (Southeast Area Operations Record, Part IV: Eighth Area Army Operations^) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Jul
49, pp. 100-1.

7 Writer's memoranda-notes.

209

PLATE NO. 52
Japanese Dispositions in New Guinea and Solomons, June 1943

on 20 June made some revisions in its general
operations plan of 12 April. By virtue of these
revisions, missions allotted to the various
forces under Area Army command were newly
specified as follows : 8

/. Eighteenth Army : To effect the rapid com-
pletion of strong defensive positions in the Lae-
Satamaua area, to prepare for a new offensive against
enemy forces in the Wan sector, to plan operations
for the capture of enemy airfields in the Bern Bena
and Mi. Hagen areas, to hasten completion of airfields
at IVewak and Hansa , and to speed up construction
of the Madang—Lae road.

2. Seventeenth Army : To accelerate defensive
preparations of the 6th Division on Bougainville.

j. Brigade : To complete construction of

the airfield at Tuluvu on Cape Gloucester.

4. 6th Air Division: To begin immediate at-
tacks on the enemy airfields under construction in the
Bena Bena and Mt. Hagen areas and on the already
existing enemy airfield at Wau ; to attack Buna and
enemy small craft moving along the New Guinea
coast*

In collaboration with the Eighth Area Army's
revised plan, the Southeast Area Fleet continu-
ed to allot a portion of the Eleventh Air Fleet's
land-based aircraft to support army air ope-
rations in New Guinea, particularly against
enemy surface transport and amphibious con-
voys. The major mission of the Eleventh Air
Fleet, however, remained to conduct air ope-
rations in the Solomons area, operating both
from Rabaul and from an advance base at
Buin, on southern Bougainville." 5 Ground
defense of Munda, Kolombangara and Santa

Isabel, in the central Solomons, was also a
navy responsibility, the Eighth Fleet exercising
operational command over both army and navy
units garrisoned there.

The Eighteenth Army command at Madang,
in compliance with the new Area Army plan,
immediately took steps to speed operational
preparations on the Lae— Salamaua front and
simultaneously began formulating concrete
plans for an attack against the enemy airfields
in the Bena Bena and Mt. Hagen areas. On
23 June, when the Deputy Chief of Army
General Staff visited Madang to confer with
the Eighteenth Army Commander, a prelimi-
nary plan envisaging the start of operations
against Bena Bena in September had been
elaborated, and a request was submitted for the
allotment of an additional division, plus sup-
porting troops, to carry out the operation."

Meanwhile, on the Mubo front southwest
of Salamaua, Lt. Gen. Hidemitsu Nakano, 51st
Division commander, had already initiated a
local offensive designed to forestall apparent
enemy plans for a move against the Japanese
defenses. On 20 June the newly-arrived 66th
Infantry Regiment launched a coordinated
attack from Mubo toward Guadagasa 1, but
soon ran into difficulties due to the unexpected
strength of the enemy positions. Despite heavy
casualties, the regiment penetrated the for ward
positions and, on the night of 20 June, entered
the secondary enemy defense line, where severe
hand-to-hand combat took place. Again,
losses were so heavy due to enemy superiority
in automatic weapons that, on 22 June, the

8 (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 1-3. (2) Southeast Area Operations
Record, Part IV, op. cit., pp. 84-93.

9 For strength of 6th Air Division, cf. n. 3, Chapter VIII.

10 At this time the Eleventh Air Fleet had an operational strength of approximately 300 planes of all types.
Nanto Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono Ni i4f 1tl%$iMty-flr-fj(-£<?JIl (Southeast Area Naval Operations Part II) id Demo-
bilization Bureau, Feb 47, pp. 14-5, 18-9, 26.

El The Eighteenth Army plan envisaged employing the main strength of the 20th Division against Bena Bena,
Kainantu and the Mt. Wilhelm area, and elements of the 41st Division against the Mt. Hagen area. Ground opera-
tions were to be preceded by air attacks to neutralize enemy air bases, and use of airborne troops was also contemplated.
All objectives were to be occupied within two to three months from the start of operations in early September. South-
east Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 10-12.

211

attack was called off on the verge of success,
and the 66th Infantry retired to Mubo. Its
short-lived offensive had cost about 200 men."

Without sufficient power to strike a decisive
blow at any point on the southeast area front,
the Japanese forces could do little but brace
themselves to meet impending Allied attack.
That attack came a full month in advance of
the critical period forecasted by Eighth Area
Army headquarters.

Defense of Salamaua

On 30 June the Allied forces struck with a
two-pronged offensive launched simultaneously
against Salamaua, in New Guinea, and Ren-
dova Island, in the central Solomons. ,J By
striking earlier than the Japanese command
had anticipated and at both places simulta-
neously, the enemy not only achieved tactical
surprise but again divided the Japanese effort,
particularly forestalling the concentration of 6th
Air Division and Eleventh Air Fleet strength
at either point of attack.

On the New Guinea front, the first wave of
enemy troops, estimated at about 1,000, began
landing at Nassau Bay, ten miles south of
Salamaua, at 0330 on 30 June.' 4

53) The suddenness of the attack caught the
51st Division forces guarding Salamaua oft
balance, with their main strength disposed to
meet increasing enemy pressure on the Mubo
and Bobdubi fronts, to the southwest and west
of Salamaua. The only force in the immediate
area of the enemy landing was the Nassau
Garrison Unit, made up of the 3d Battalion,
I02d Infantry Regiment, with a reduced
strength of only a few hundred troops.''

After offering brief resistance to the first
enemy elements put ashore, the Nassau Gar-
rison Unit, on division orders, withdrew north-
ward on 1 July, while the 3d Battalion, 66th
Infantry was ordered forward to help stem the
enemy advance from the beachhead. Mean-
while the 6th Air Division launched a series
of attacks on the beachhead area, destroying
or damaging a large number of enemy landing
craft, although at the cost of relatively high
plane losses.' 6 Despite these attacks, the enemy
continued to put ashore additional troops and
equipment.

Enemy forces now became active on the
extreme right flank of the Salamaua defense
perimeter, in the Bobdubi sector. To meet
this simultaneous threat, Lt. Gen. Nakano
ordered forward two battalions under command

12 Ibid., pp. 24-5.

13 The Japanese had no knowledge of the simultaneous Allied landings on Kiriwina and Woodlark Islands, in
the Trobriand Group, and for several months were unaware that they had been occupied.

14 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 27-8.

15 (1) Ibid., pp. 26-30. (2) Order of battle of the Japanese forces in the Lae-Salamaua area at the time of
the Nassau Bay landing was as follows :

2d Bn, 21st Infantry Regt.
1st Bn, 80th Infantry Regt.
15th Independent Engr. Regt.
30th Independent Engr. Regt.
5th Independent Hvy Arty Bn.
One antiaircraft battery

51st Division

Division Headquarters

66th Infantry Regt.

io2d Infantry Regt.

115th Infantry Regt.

14th Fid. Artillery Regt.

51st Engineer Regt.
7th Naval Base Force

Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing Force

82d Naval Garrison Unit

(Statements by Lt. Col. Kengoro, Tanaka, Staff Officer (Operations), Eighteenth Army and Capt. Ohme, previously cited.)
16 Strikes were flown on 1, 3 and 11 July. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 30.

212

of Maj. Gen. Chuichi Murotani, 51st Infantry
Group Commander.' 7 This force, immediately
upon its arrival at the front, was engaged in
heavy fighting.

The Eighteenth Army command now decid-
ed that the decisive battle must be fought at
Salamaua since loss of that base would render
Lae, to the north, untenable. After returning
to Madang on 7 July from an urgent air trip
to the Salamaua front, Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi
ordered the 238th Infantry Regiment of the
41st Division, which had moved up to Madang
from Wewak, to advance to Lae via Finsch-
hafen in order to reinforce the 51st Division.' 8

Despite depleted strength and an acute
shortage of ammunition, the 51st Division
meanwhile fought desperately to defend Sala-
maua. By 10 July, however, 66th Infantry
troops defending Mubo and the left flank
coastal sector north of Salus were in serious
danger, and Lt. Gen. Nakano decided to
tighten his defenses by pulling back to a new
semicircular line of positions running from
Bobdubi through Komiatum and Mt. Tambu
to Boisi, on the coast.'* This line gave the
51st Division commanding positions along the
heights skirting the Salamaua basin and guard-
ing the approach routes from south and west.
During the latter part of July, these positions
were organized into a main line of resistance,
but as the weight of the enemy assault increas-
ed, it became doubtful whether even this line
could be held.

On about 20 July, 50 large enemy landing
craft and four transports anchored in Nassau
Bay and off Salus, indicating further reinforce-

ments. The Allied troops began attacking in
waves at close intervals, allowing the combat-
weary Japanese forces no time to rally between
assaults. Mortar and artillery bombardment
of the Japanese positions became incessant, and
enemy long-range guns began shelling Sala-
maua itself. In the Bobdubi sector, enemy
troops succeeding in taking scattered strong-
points and poured reinforcements into the
gaps. The fighting entered a bitter hand-to-
hand phase, in which Japanese offensive action
was limited to daring night infiltration raids
behind the enemy lines. 10

Alarmed at the unfavorable trend of the
fighting, Lt. Gen. Adachi again flew to Sala-
maua on 2 August and, after studying the
situation, ordered the 51st Division to further
contract its over-extended front. Under this
Army order, the 51st Division commander on
15 August ordered his troops to relinquish the
Komiatum — Mt. Tambu — Boisi positions and
fall back to a line from Bobdubi to Lokanu. 1 '
The new dispositions were effected by 23
August, but the line was still too long, the
positions had not been previously prepared,
and despite the arrival from Madang of the
first reinforcements of the 238th Infantry
Regiment, troop strength was still inadequate
at all points. Nevertheless, Lt. Gen. Nakano
ordered a final stand to be made on the new
line. In a message to troops on 24 August,
he declared :

The mission of our division is to hold Salamaua
without yielding a single foot of ground. Our existing
positions constitute the very last line of defense. . . J"
The simultaneous operations on the Sala-

17 These units were the ist Battalion, 8oth Infantry (20th Div.), which had recently arrived from Madang, and
the 1st Battalion, 66th Infantry. Maj. Gen. Murotani had replaced Maj. Gen. Okabe as 51st Infantry Group
Commander.

18 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 32-3, 104.

19 Ibid., pp. 37-8.

20 Ibid., pp. 46-7.

21 Ibid,, pp. 56-7.

22 Ibid., pp. 67-8.

213

PLATE NO. 53
Salamaua — Lae Operations, June— September 1943

maua front and in the central Solomons had
meanwhile strained available Japanese air re-
sources to the limit. Under an Eighth Area
Army — Southeast Area Fleet joint agreement
reached at Rabaul on 4 July, the 6th Air
Division was used temporarily to strengthen
the central Solomons area where a chance
of a successful counterattack was foreseen.
Combat losses and fatigue as a result of
incessant activity seriously weakened the 6th
Air Division, leaving no margin of strength
for employment in the planned Bena Bena
— Hagen operations. 13

In mid-July, therefore, Imperial General
Headquarters transferred the 7th Air Division
from Ambon, in the Dutch East Indies, to the
southeast area, and Fourth Air Army Head-
quarters was established to command all army
air units operating under Eighth Area Army/ 4
First elements of the division arrived at Wewak
on 25 July and, despite unfamiliarity with the
New Guinea terrain, began operating immedi-
ately against enemy airfields in the Bena

23 In June Imperial General Headquarters and Eighth Area Army were still planning to execute the plan for
ground operations against the Bena Bena and Hagen areas. Daihonyei Rikugun Tosui Kiroku fcSJ&¥MfllI)ii'dl$ (Impe-
rial General Headquarters Army High Command Record) ist Demobilization Bureau, Nov 46. p. 153.

24 Composition of the Fourth Air Army on 28 July was as follows :

6th Air Division (2 light bomber regts., 1 hvy bomber regts., 2 fighter regts., 1 rcn. regt., 1 rcn. sq,
7th Air Division (1 light bomber regl., 2 heavy bomber regts., 2 fighter regts., 2 rcn. sq.)
14th Air Brigade (2 fighter regts.)
1st Parachute Group

Reconnaissance, photographic and transport elements.
Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 18-9, 50-2.

25 In a report to Eighth Area Army on 1 August, the Eighteenth Army Commander stated his opinion that the
projected Bena Bena — Hagen operations should be treated as secondary to the defense of Lae-Salamaua and the
Huon Peninsula area. Finschhafen was to be treated as the most important area. Ibid., pp. 13-8.

26 Although enemy air attacks on the Wewak area were naturally anticipated, the scale and suddenness of the
17 August raid took the Japanese defenses completely by surprise. Defensive precautions were relaxed at the time of
the attack. (1) Interrogation of Col. Kazuo Tanikawa, Staff Officer (Operations), Eighth Area Army. (2) Southeast
Area Air Operations, op. cit., p. 45.

27 Henceforth the Japanese army air force was obliged to adopt negative strategy and defensive tactics, involv-
ing a general retreat to rear-line airfields. Air support of ground operations was severely curtailed, and the schedule
of surface transport movement was completely thrown off owing to the impossibility of providing air escort for convoys.
(1) Interrogation of Col. Kazuyoshi Obata, Staff Officer (Supply), Eighteenth Army. (2) Southeast Area Operations
Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 249-50.

215

Bena-Hagen areas and the upper
Valley. After 1 August, however, in view of
the greater urgency of the situation on the
Salamaua front, the division shifted its primary
effort to that area. 1 '

The step-up of the Japanese air effort on the
New Guinea front was not long in evoking
severe enemy retaliation. On 17 August air-
fields in the Wewak-But area were subjected
to a surprise attack by enemy aircraft, far
surpassing in scale and intensity any previous
air assaults/ 6 Destruction of 100 aircraft in
this single attack cut down by more than half
the total serviceable plane strength of the
Fourth Air Army and rendered the enemy's
margin of air superiority so decisive that all
phases of the Japanese military effort in New
Guinea were severely affected/ 7

On the Salamaua front, the loss of air
support immediately resulting from the Wewak
raid further compromised the already perilous
position of the 51st Division. Enemy bombing
and strafing of the Japanese positions intensi-

fied, and movements of troops and supplies
became virtually impossible.* 8 The 51st Divi-
sion, now facing greatly superior enemy forces, 1 *
nevertheless continued to hold stubbornly to its
last defense line against continued heavy pres-
sure on both right and left flanks.

Toward the end of August, this pressure
slackened to some extent, and it appeared that
the enemy had shifted his attention from Sala-
maua itself and was massing his strength in the
Gabensis — Warn pit area, west of Lae, with the
objective of gaining control of the Markham
Valley. This shift in direction of the Allied
effort, coupled with a marked increase in the
movement of surface transport off the eastern
New Guinea coast to the south of the Huon
Gulf, pointed to the strong probability that
another amphibious operation was about to be
set in motion without awaiting the final reduc-
tion of Salamaua.

Attack on Lae

During the latter part of August, Imperial
General Headquarters closely studied the dete-
riorating situation on the New Guinea front
and decided upon a new change in operational
policy. It was now clear that there was scant
hope of holding the Lae— Salamaua area for
development as a future counteroffensive base.
Therefore, on 30 August, a new Army-Navy
Central Agreement was formulated, under the
terms of which merely a holding action was to
be fought at Lae and Salamaua to cover the
establishment of new defense positions guard-
ing the Dampier Strait. An Eighth Area
Army order directing this change was transmit-
ted to the Eighteenth Army on 2 September.

of the local agreement were

as follows :*•

/. Units in the Lae — Salamaua area will meet
the attacking enemy with present local strength and
attempt a holding action. In the meantime, defenses
in the Dampier Strait region will be quickly strength-
ened.

2. The Army and Navy will use every means
available to insure supply and replacements to the
Lae-Salamaua area. To this end, effort shall be
made to provide at least an amount equal to August
shipments.

3. If the situation makes it absolutely imperative,
Army and Navy units in the area will be transferred
to the rear at the opportune time. The Eighteenth
Army commander will direct this operation and will
endeavor to move his forces to the Finschhafen area.

4. The Army and Navy will station strong units
on Umboi Island and on both coast f of the Dampier
Strait insofar as supplies permit, thereby strengthening
the defense of the strait and giving all possible protec-
tion to surface transportation in the area.

Before any concrete tactical plans could be
drawn up to implement the new policy, how-
ever, the enemy launched his long-anticipated
move against Lae. On 3 September Allied
aircraft heavily attacked Lae and Cape Cretin
on New Guinea, and Tuluvu and Rabaul on
New Britain. On the morning of the follow-
ing day, a large enemy convoy moved into
Huon Gulf and, after devastating air and naval
gunfire preparation, effected troop landings
between Hopoi Mission and the mouth of the
Busu River, about twenty miles east of Lae.

While the amphibious landings were in
progress, enemy parachute troops were dropped
near Nadzab, 20 miles west of Lae up the
Markham Valley, on 5 September. As these
two forces began converging on Lae from east
and west, enemy troops on the right bank of
the Markham River began advancing down-

28 Ibid., pp. 66-7.

29 Enemy strength at the beginning of August was estimated at 15,000, Ibid., p. 68.

30 (1) Ibid., pp. 105-8. (2) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part IV, op. cit., 124-3.

216

stream, from Gabensis. The enemy's plan,
now rapidly unfolding, appeared to aim at
bottling up the defenders of Lae by a three-
way assault and sea blockade. 3 '

By 7 September it was estimated that one
enemy division had been put ashore over the
Huon Gulf beaches, Ji while reports from the
Markham Valley front indicated that large
numbers of Allied transport planes were using
the airstrip at Nadzab to ferry in reinforcements.
On the basis of this air transport activity and
the number of vessels at Buna, Nassau Bay and
in Huon Gulf, it was estimated that the enemy
build-up would approximate two divisions.

In view of the overwhelming superiority of
the attacking forces and pursuant to the deci-
sion to fight merely a holding action in the
Lae-Salamaua area, the Eighteenth Army
Commander, Lt.Gen.Adachi, ordered the forces
defending Lae and Salamaua to contract their
lines and prepare for future retirement north-
ward along the southern flank of the Finisterre
Mountains and the Ramu River Valley, or
through the Saruwaged Range if the former
route could not be used. Evacuation of Sal-
amaua was to be effected immdiately.

Pursuant to the Army order, Lt. Gen. Naka-
no immediately proceeded to evacuate litter
patients and heavy weapons to Lae by water.
On the night of 6 September, one battalion of
the io2d Infantry and Sasebo 5th Special Naval
Landing Force were transferred to Lae by water
to reinforce the extremely weak defense of the
Lae area. It was imperative that the 5 1st Divi-

sion hold the Lae area, at least temporarily, in
order to secure its withdrawal route north.
East of Lae, defensive positions were taken up
along the Busu River. To the west, the enemy
force advancing from Gabensis was heavily
engaged near Markham Point, while the par-
achute and airborne troops pushing down the
left bank of the Markham River from Nadzab
were engaged at Yalu. Aware of the gravity
of the situation, many officers and men left their
beds at the Lae Field Hospital and joined their
comrades at the front.

Meanwhile on 1 r September the main body
of the 5 1st Division began its withdrawal and,
by 14 September, had closed on Lae.

Augmented by the troops withdrawn from
Salamaua, Army and Navy forces in the Lae
area now numbered approximately 9,085 , includ-
ing miscellaneous service elements. These
troops, however, were in poor condition to
conduct an effective defense. The units from
Salamaua were battleweary and understrength
from nine weeks of continuous combat. The
Lae garrison itself was weakened by a heavy
proportion of ineffectives due to prolonged food
shortages and sickness. Rations then available
in the area were sufficient to last for about two
weeks, and all outside supply had ceased with
the enemy landings in the Hopoi area."
Therefore, the 51st Division commander,
now in command of all Army and Navy
forces in the Lae area, prepared to withdraw
the Lae forces to the north coast of the Huon
Peninsula.

31 At the time of the Allied landing on 4 September, Japanese forces in the Lae area were commanded by Maj.
Gen. Shoge, 41st Infantry Group Commander. Maj. Gen. Shoge had been sent to Lae by Eighteenth Army order to
take command of garrison and logistical support elements in the Lae vicinity from 30 July, thus releasing the 51st
Division commander to direct the defense of Salamaua. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol.
U > PP- 74-7-

32 Numbers of Allied transports employed in the landing operation were reported as follows: 4 September,
approximately 66; 5 September, 7; 6 September, 7; 7 September, 2, Ibid,, pp. 78-9.

33 Supplies sent to Lae by submarine during July amounted to 150-200 tons, or about one-third of the required
amount. In August the volume was increased to 500 tons, but with the Allied landing at Hopoi on 4 September, all
supply shipments ceased. Ibid., pp. 150-2.

217

PLATE NO. 54
Navy Supplying Army Personnel by Submarine

Fighting in the Central Solomons

Concurrently with the Eighteenth Army's
defense of the right flank bastion of the south-
east area line at Lae-Salamaua, Japanese
forces on the extreme left flank strove to parry
the twin Allied thrust into the central Solo-
mons.

As a result of the crippling sea, air and
ground losses suffered in the Guadalcanal cam-
paign, general operational policy for the Solo-
mons area had been modified in favor of defen-
sive, delaying tactics designed to hold up the
enemy's advance on the key Japanese base at
Rabaul." The southeast area command antic-
ipated that the next Allied blow would fall
against the weak Japanese defenses in the New
Georgia area, and after April efforts were redo
ubled to reinforce these defenses as far as
transport facilities permitted. ! *

As in New Guinea, August-December was
estimated as the critical period during which the

Allies might begin a new offensive. However,
in June, there was a sharp increase in enemy
activity. Aircraft persistently conducted low-
altitude reconnaissance and photographic mis-
sions throughout the Solomons. Japanese
shore defenses on Munda and Kolombangara
were subjected to severe air and naval bombard-
ment attacks, and powerful enemy fleet units
were observed moving in the waters west of
Guadalcanal.

Although these signs pointed to a possible
attack earlier than previously estimated, it was
difficult to forecast the exact spot at which the
enemy would strike. Wickham anchorage, on
the southeastern tip of New Georgia Island,
continued to be regarded as the most probable
point of attack. Therefore, when an enemy
invasion force of six transports and escorting
surface units suddenly began landing operations
on Rendova Island, west of New Georgia, on
30 June, almost complete tactical surprise was
achieved.' 6 (Plate No. 55)

Only Japanese troops on Rendova were a

34 Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono Ni : Dm Jushichi Gun no Sakusen flfft^BfftlQ ifl'tifeon: ^+±:W-<^>^^(
(Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II : Seventeenth .Army Operations) ist Demobilisation Bureau, Sep 46,
Vol. II, pp. 94-7.

35 On 30 June 1943 order of battle of Japanese forces in the forward areas of the Solomons was as follows:

New Georgia Area ("including Kolombangara) :
Southeast Detachment

Detachment Headquarters

13th Infantry Regiment (less one bn.)

229th Infantry Regiment

2d Bn., 10th Independent Mt. Arty. Regt.

One antiaircraft artillery group
8th Combined Special Naval Landing Force

Headquarters

Kure 6th Special Naval Landing Force

Yolcosulca 7th Special Naval Landing Force
Santa Isabel Island :

7th Combined Special Naval Landing Force

Kure 7th Special Naval Landing Force

One bn., 23d Infantry Regiment
The major part of the Army units listed above were drawn from the 6th Division on Bougainville and the 38th Division
at Rabaul. The main strength was disposed in the vicinity of Munda, on New Georgia. (Statements by Lt. Col. Shiro
Hara, Staff Officer (Operations), Eighth Area Army and Lt. Col. Yoshiharu Kamiya, Staff Officer, Southeast Detachment,
and Capt. Ohmae, previously cited.)

36 (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part 11, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 115. (2) "We had estimated an Allied
landing somewhere in the New Georgia group, but did not actually anticipate a landing at Rendova on 30 June. . . ."
Interrogation of Col. Tanikawa, previously cited.

219

small security detachment, which was swiftly
overwhelmed and annihilated. Meanwhile,
naval air units immediately launched repeated
attacks on the enemy beachhead and invasion
shipping with 106 aircraft, but encountered such
strong opposing air cover that plane losses
became prohibitive. Additional enemy troops
were put ashore on i July, and on 2 July
American heavy artillery emplaced on Rendova
began shelling Munda airfield, on New
Georgia.

In complete control of Rendova, the enemy
proceeded to dispatch small amphibious forces
to the nearby islands of Roviana and Aum-
baaumba, lying in the narrow channel between
Rendova and Munda, and followed up almost
immediately by moving an advance force across
Roviana Lagoon to land on the mainland of
New Georgia. On 2 July, realizing that a major
enemy offensive was in the making, the South-
east Detachment and the 8th Combined Special
Naval Landing Force concluded a joint local
agreement placing all army and navy ground
forces defending Munda under operational
command of Maj. Gen. Minoru Sasaki,
Southeast Detachment commander.' 7

While Maj. Gen. Sasaki took initial steps
to bolster Munda's defenses,* 8 another step in
the Allied invasion plan unfolded. On 4 July
enemy marines landed at Rice Anchorage on
the northwest coast of New Georgia, about 15
miles from Munda, and before resistance could
be organized, drove swiftly to the vicinity of

Bairoko on 10 July. 19 With Munda thus
threatened from two directions, Maj.Gen. Sasaki
decided to make the main defensive effort on
the right flank. The 2d Battalion, 45th Infan-
try Regiment, newly arrived from Bougainville,
was ordered to Bairoko to fight a holding action
against the marines. Meanwhile, the 13th In-
fantry was moved forward from Kolombangara
to Munda to bolster the main line already
defended by elements of the 229th Infantry.

On 15 July the Southeast Detachment forces
launched a coordinated attack on the Munda
front in an attempt to turn the enemy flank,
but repeated assaults failed to make headway,
and the attack ended in failure. Thereafter,
tightening enemy control of the air and sea
made it increasingly difficult to move in rein-
forcements even from nearby Kolombangara,*"
and the fighting power of the Japanese forces
steadily declined under heavy attack by Ameri-
can aircraft, artillery and armor. By 31 July,
the units defending Munda airfield were stand-
ing on their final defense line.

In view of the evident hopelessness of
continued resistance on New Georgia, Maj.Gen.
Sasaki on 7 August ordered the gradual with-
drawal of the forces defending Munda to
Kolombangara. The 13th Infantry, covered by
rear-guard actions fought first at Munda and
then on Baanga Island, 4 ' successfully effected
its withdrawal. On the left flank around
Bairoko, fighting continued until 19 August,
when the 2d Battalion, 45th

37 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 116-7.

38 On 4 July the 3d Battalion, 229th Infantry Regiment, was moved from Kolombangara to Munda. This unit,
which as the Kenmotsu Battalion, had been virtually annihilated in the Buna campaign, had been reconstituted and
refitted in Kolombangara.

39 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 118-9.

40 Despite these difficulties, the Eighth Fleet, by an all-out and costly effort, succeeded in moving several rein-
forcement groups to the New Georgia area. The total troop strength transported amounted to about five infantry
battalions. Ibid., pp. 104-6.

41 An aggressive rear guard action was fought on Baanga Island by the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment,
between 11 and 22 August. The battalion then retired to Arundel Island, where it continued to resist the enemy
advance until ordered to evacuate in mid-September. Ibid., pp. 131-5.

220

evacuated to Kolombangara, thence moving on
to Gizo Island. 41

The main strength of the New Georgia
defenders was now added to the forces available
for the defense of Kolombangara, and Maj.
Gen. Sasaki began an immediate reorganization
of his troops with a view to launching an early
counteroffensive. American troops, however,
were already on Arundel Island, just across a
narrow, mile-wide channel from the mainjapan-
ese base at Vila, on southern Kolombangara.
While fighting continued there and on Baanga,
an enemy amphibious force on 15 August
suddenly seized Vella Lavella Island, 17 miles
northwest of Kolombangara, 4 ' thus threatening
the Japanese defenses from a new direction.

In view of these unfavorable developments
in the tactical situation as well as critical supply
difficulties, Eighth Fleet Headquarters on 15
September ordered the evacuation of all Army
and Navy forces from Kolombangara. 44 The
withdrawal operation was begun immediately,
with barges and destroyers serving as the chief
means of transport. American fleet units,
which were then actively patrolling the waters
west of the island, subjected the movement to
extreme danger, but despite this menace the
bulk of the Southeast Detachment and naval
forces on Kolombangara were successfully evac-
uated to Bougainville and Rabaul. 4 '

Evacuation of Lae and Ram 11
Valley Operations

At the same time that the Japanese forces
were preparing to withdraw from Kolombangara,
marking the end of the campaign in the central
Solomons, the 51st Division and attached forces
on the distant New Guinea front were pulling
out of the besieged Lae area on the first stage
of a difficult and costly retreat toward the north
coast of the Huon Peninsula.

The Eighteenth Army plan had directed
the 51st Division commander to route the
withdrawal along the southern slopes of the
Finisterre range, through Kaiapit, and into the
upper Ramu Valley. 46 To cover the withdrawal,
a force composed of the 78th Infantry Regiment
(reinf.), under the command of Maj. Gen.
Masutaro Nakai, 20th Infantry Group Com-
mander, was ordered to launch operations up
the Ramu Valley and into the upper Mark-
ham Valley. 47 (Plate No. 56)

However, the situation west of Lae and the
open terrain made it impossible to use the Ramu
Valley withdrawal route. Enemy forces occu-
pied both banks of the Markham River, and the
units which had landed at Nadzab on and after
5 September were squarely astride the road of
escape. Lt. Gen. Nakano therefore elected to
use a steep mountain trail, reconnoitered in
April, which led north from Lae, up the Busu

42 Ibid., p. 136.

43 Ibid., pp. 136-7.

44 Ibic1 -. P- '44-

45 The Southeast Detachmenr was subsequently dissolved, and the units which had been attached from the 6th
and 38th Divisions rejoined their parent organizations. Ibid., pp. 153-4.

46 This route, leading over the low saddle of the Marlcham-Ramu divide, is the natural route of access from
the Lae— Salamaua area to Madang. The area in the divide is the largest area free of forest cover on the New Guinea
mainland, and is passable for all types of transport throughout the year, with the exception of certain small localities
which become boggy during the rainy season. The highest point along this terrain corridor is not more than 900 feet
above sea level.

47 Composition of the Nakai Detachment was as follows ! 20th Infantry Group headquarters J 78th Infantry
Regiment (less elements;; 1st Battalion, 26th Field Artillery Regiment; miscellaneous service units. Southeast Area
Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol II, pp. 158, 275-6.

221

PLATE NO. 55
New Georgia Operation, June — October 1943

PLATE NO. 56
Ramu Valley Operation, September — November 1943

River Valley, and then ascended the precipitous
and dangerous Saruwaged Range. The initial
objective was Kiari, on the north coast of the
Huon Peninsula.

The Lae forces began evacuating on 12
September, and although the disengagement
was rendered difficult by enemy attacks, the last
unit of the 51st Division cleared Lae by early
morning of 16 September. Materiel that could
not be taken due to the condition of the trail
was destroyed, and only rations, light equip-
ment and a few heavy weapons were carried.

The first echelon of the retreating forces had
only proceeded as far as Yalu, nine miles
northwest of Lae, when it was attacked by a
strong Australian force operating out of Nad-
zab. The withdrawal route had to be hastily
altered to avoid the Yalu vicinity, and enemy
aircraft heightened the difficulty of movement
by daily bombing and strafing. After negotia-
ting the densely wooded Atzere Range, the
column was again held up at the Busu River
while engineers, using timber cut from the
jungle, bridged the deep, swift-running stream.

The route now led into limestone foothills,
heavily timbered and interspersed with deep
gorges carved by mountain streams. On 25
September, the column reached Kemen, a
native village on the upper reaches of the Busu.
Here the trail mounted into the formidable
Saruwaged Range studded with peaks towering
13,000 feet above sea level.

Short of rations and clad only in tropical
battle dress, the 51st Division troops began the
ascent. At night the cold was so intense that
sleep was almost impossible, even with a blazing

fire. Each soldier had left Lae with only two
weeks rations. These were exhausted before the
division was well into the mountains, and the
weakened troops had to negotiate the lofty
Saruwaged Range on a diet of potatoes and
grass. 4 * After the descent from the mountains
into the steaming valley of the Kwama River,
the retreating troops obtained some rations,
which had been brought up the trail from Kiari
by other units, but now tropical fevers took an
increased toll.

What remained of the first echelon arrived
in Kiari on 5 October, and by the middle of
the month the concentration of the main body
was completed. Wounds, dysentery, malaria,
and malnutrition had claimed almost 2,600
lives. Those who survived were barely fit for
duty, and practically all artillery pieces and
heavy weapons had been destroyed during the
retreat to prevent their falling into enemy
hands. Under these circumstances, rest, re-
organization, and refitting were urgently need-
ed. However, only part of the division was
ordered to proceed immediately to a rest camp
at Bogia Harbor, near Hansa Bay, while the
remainder was dispersed along the coast be-
tween Sio and Gali to guard the rear of the 20th
Division, already heavily engaged in the
Finschhafen area.'"

While the withdrawal from Lae was in
progress, the Nakai Detachment carried out its
scheduled diversionary operations in the upper
Ramu Valley. The detachment started out
from the military road terminus at Kankirei ,n
on 12 September with the objective of seizing
Kaiapit and thenadva ncing into the Markham

48 Ibid., pp. 152-3.

49 Ibid., pp. 155-6.

50 The native trail from Bogadjim on Astrolabe Bay to Dumpu debouched into the Ramu Valley at a defile
which the Japanese designated as Kankirei (fC^^). In April the 20th Division had begun improvement of the trail
into a military road, which was to be extended all the way to Lae. (Cf . Chapter VIII) A prodigious amount of energy
was poured into the construction of the road, but by late August the 20-foot wide all-weather surface had only reached
a point ten miles north of Dumpu. About 5 September the bulk of the 20th Division troops engaged in the project
was diverted to strengthen the defenses of Finschhafen. Intermittent construction continued until 30 September, when
the project was finally abandoned. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kengoro Tanaka, previously cited.)

224

Valley. Encountering no enemy opposition
on the upper Ramu, the detachment advance
guard reached Kaiapit on 18 September. There
it encountered an Australian force in unexpect-
ed strength operating from the lower Markham
in the direction of Kainantu. During the early
morning of 18—19 September, the detachment
attacked but failed to dislodge the Australians
from their positions, and Kaiapit remained in
enemy hands. 5 '

At this juncture, important changes in the
general tactical situation resulted in a revision
of plans. Since the 51st Division was not
retiring along its originally scheduled route, the
Eighteenth Army Commander decided that it
would serve little purpose to keep the Nakai
Detachment on the offensive in the Kaiapit area.
More vital, the enemy landing at Finschhafen
on 22 September made it imperative for Eight-
eenth Army to shorten its lines and prepare to
defend the important Madang base. With
virtually no reserves available in that vicinity,
Lt. Gen. Adachi decided to pull back the
Nakai Detachment and hold it in strategic
positions for the defense of Madang.

The detachment was therefore ordered to
withdraw immediately to Dumpu and establish
strongpoints in the vicinity of Kankirei and
Hill 910. Its mission was to prevent the enemy
from entering the Mintjim Valley corridor lead-
ing to Madang, and near conduct local counter-
attacks against enemy units advancing through
the grasslands of the upper Ramu. The
detachment's retirement near Dumpu was com-
pleted by 5 October. Enemy troops followed
close behind and, on 6 October, launched an
attack on Dumpu, successfully infiltrating some
of the detachment advance positions. Lt. Gen.
Adachi, visiting the front at this time, ordered
the detachment to begin immediately its
displacement to the previously selected posi-

tions at Kankirei and Hill 910.

Although these positions gave the detach-
ment command of the main approaches to
Madang, the Eighteenth Army Commander
also became concerned over the possibility that
the enemy forces from the Ramu Valley might
slip around the detachment's left flank and
penetrate to the coast, either across the Finis-
terre Range and into the valley of the Nankina
River leading to Saidor, or into the upper
reaches of the Kabenau River leading to Kons-
tantin Harbor. Either eventuality would seri-
ously endanger Madang. Consequently, small
elements of the detachment were ordered up the
Nankina and Kabenau Rivers to block these
avenues of approach.' 1

Meanwhile, the enemy forces in front of the
Kankirei and Hill 910 positions staged sporad-
ic, small-scale attacks, which were successfully
repulsed. The threat to Madang appeared at
least temporarily ended.

New Strategic Defense Zone

The steadily quickening succession of reverses
to which Japanese arms had been subjected
during 1943 on virtually every sector of the far-
flung Pacific front finally culminated, at the end
of September, in a sweeping and fundamental
revision of Imperial General Headquarters'
long-range strategy for operations in the Pacific
theater.

The setbacks sustained in General Mac-
Arthur's area were a major factor in precipita-
ting this decision. The initial losses of Guadal-
canal in the Solomons and Buna— Gona on
New Guinea, though considered serious, had
not been regarded by Imperial General Head-
quarters as irretrievable. However, the subse-
quent loss, within the space of a few months,
of the vital Lae-Salamaua area as well as

51 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 277-9.

52 Ibid., pp. 286-7.

225

major Japanese strategic outposts in the Central
Solomons, forcibly impressed upon the High
Command that the southeast area was not being
subjected to a more harassing or secondary
attack. General MacArthur's objective was
now recognized as the complete disintegration
of the Japanese position south of the Mandated
Islands.

Developments on other sectors of the P;
front also influenced the shift in
General Headquarters strategy. In the North
Pacific, Japanese troops had been forced to
evacuate Kiska in July. In the Central Pacific,
a powerful attack had been carried out by
American carrier aviation against Marcus Is-
land, 1,100 miles from Tokyo. Wake, tCwaja-
lein, Majuro and other key Japanese-held
islands in the Marshalls were also struck, and
American shipping was moving through the
water of the Ellis Archipelago. Thus, a new
enemy thrust appeared imminent in the Central
Pacific parallelling the MacArthur drive from
the southeast area.

In view of these major threats and Japan's
declining military and naval strength, solidifica-
tion of the inner defenses of the Empire had
become imperative. Imperial General Head-
quarters, in particular, was aware that the
national strength was no longer adequate to
conduct operations in the southeast area on a
large scale, and that Japanese troops must in the
future avoid the terrific drain involved in con-
stantly pitting weak ground contingents against
stronger, better-equipped and more adequately
supplied enemy forces. The swift build-up of
decisive enemy superiority in the air also
underlined the folly of such of

Moved by these considerations, the Army
Section of Imperial General Headquarters had
for some time urged that a strategic line deline-
ating Japan's " absolute zone of national de-
fense " be fixed, behind the periphery of which
air and ground strength could be replenished
and marshalled for decisive battle. If this
meant excluding the southeast area bastion of
Rabaul, now almost in the front line, the Army
stood ready to draw the perimeter line west of
that locality. 53

Of such fundamental importance was the
decision on this issue that, on 30 September,
the fourth Imperial Conference held since the
start of the war was convoked to sanction the
agreement finally reached between the Army
and Navy. 5,1 Under this agreement, the per-
imeter delimiting the absolute defense zone was
drawn from Western New Guinea to the
Mariana Islands via the Carolines. (Plate
No. 57) This perimeter was to be strongly
manned and fortified so as to deny the enemy
further gains and to provide a bastion behind
which forces could be gathered for offensive
blows. Defense preparations behind that line
were to be completed by the spring of 1944."

The positions held by the Eighth Area Army
and Southeast Area Fleet in Northeast New
Guinea, the Bismarcks, and the Northern
Solomons now constituted the outpost line in
the southeast area, while the Second Area
Army was to be transferred to New Guinea to
take charge of operations along and behind
the new national defense zone in Western New
Guinea. Imperial General Headquarters clearly
recognized the necessity of vigorously maintain-
ing the outpostsand holding the enemy at bay

53 (1) Statement by Lt. Col. Noburake Takayama, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters,
Army Section. (2) The problem of the national defense zone had been under discussion in the Army Section of
Imperial General Headquarters for some time. (Statement by Col. Sei Matsutani, Chief, 20th Group (Coordination),
Imperial General Headquarters, Army Sectiion.)

54 (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cic, pp. 174-5. (2) Statement by Col.
Takushiro Hattori, Secretary to the War Minister.

55 Details of the Army-Navy Central Agreement of 30 September, together with the implementation thereof
by Second Area Army, are dealt with in Chapter X.

226

PLATE NO. 57

Japan's National Defense Zone, September 1943

positions to the west were being prepared.
With this in mind, the i 7 th Division was
dispatched from Shanghai to Rabaul to rein-
force the troops manning the forward wall.

On the basis of Imperial General Head-
quarters directives, Eighth Area Army revised
its operational plans. General Imamura and
his staff were of the opinion that the soundest
tactics to accomplish the Area Army's mission
of strategic delay were to conduct determined
counterattacks against all Allied attempts to
pierce the outpost line. The major critical
areas to be defended were the Dampier Strait
region, particularly Finschhafen and Cape
Gloucester, and Bougainville in the northern
Solomons.

Within the framework of the Area Army
plans, instructions were issued to the subordi-
nate commands. The Eighteenth Army in
New Guinea was ordered to occupy and defend
a line along the Finisterre Range, with emphasis
on the Dampier Strait coast near Finschhafen.
In order to cover the right flank and assist in
the main mission of guarding the west coast of
the Dampier Strait, a strong force was to operate
in the Ramu Valley, and all enemy attempts to
cross the Finisterre Range were to be repelled.
The 51st Division was to retire west of Madang
and continue its reorganization.

On New Britain, the Matsuda Detachment
(65th Brigade, re inf.) operating under Area
Army control was charged with strengthening
the eastern defenses of the Dampier Strait,
particularyl Umboi Island and Cape Glouce-
ster. 56 The airfields at Gasmata, on southern
New Britain, and on Los Negros Island

in the Admiralties were garrisoned with
smaller detachments, whose mission was to
destroy enemy landings aimed at seizing the
airfields.

On the left flank in the Solomons, the
Seventeenth Army was being strengthened for
the defense of Bougainville. The chief units
stationed there were the 6th Division and the
4th South Seas Garrison Unit,' 7 while part
of the 17th Division, was to come under
Seventeenth Army control upon its arrival
from China. The 38th Division was in the
Rabaul area and on New Ireland.* 8

At this time the Fourth Air Army, consis-
ting mainly of the 6th and 7th Air Divisions,
was operating from widely scattered bases,
mainly in Eighteenth Army territory. It was
now ordered to operate principally from bases
between Madang and Hollandia in support of
planned operations. Eighteenth Army and
the 65th Brigade were to have priority in call-
ing for air support, and the primary mission
was to destroy all enemy landing attempts in
the Dampier Strait region."

In support of Army operations along the
outpost line, the Southeast Area Fleet planned
to utilize available surface and air strength
to disrupt enemy convoys en route to landing
areas, while supply to the Dampier Strait region
was to be assured by the use of
Naval ground forces were also to
at important points along supply and transport
routes to insure the smooth functioning of
shore activities such as communications, steve-
doring, repair, and base defense.*

Even before detailed plans for the new dis-

battalions, a field

56 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 123-4.

57 The 4th South Seas Garrison Unit consisted of Garrison Headquarters, three infa
artillery battery, one signal company, and a tank company.

58 (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 123-4. ( 2 ) Southeast Area Operations
Record, Part IV, op. cit., p. 200.

59 Ibid., pp. 156-8.

60 In addition to these activities the Combined Fleet was watching for a propitious moment to stage a show-
down battle with the American Fleet outside the perimeter of the defense line in the Southeast Area. Such an operation
was planned, but the opportunity never arose to set the plan in motion. Meanwhile, Japanese naval air strength was
slowly whittled down. (Interrogation of Vice Adm. Shigeru Fukudome, Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet.)

228

positions were completed, however, the enemy
made an initial breach in the outpost line by
an assault on the Finschhafen area.

Dampier Strait Defense : Finschhafen

Ever since the initial Japanese advance into
eastern New Guinea, the 60 mile wide Dampier
Strait lying between the western tip of New
Britain and the Huon Peninsula had been of
vital importance to Japanese sea communica-
tions between the main southeast area base at
Rabaul and the New Guinea fighting front.
The majority of troop and supply convoys
dispatched to Buna and subsequently to the
Lae-Salamaua area had moved via this narrow
sea passage, and as General MacArthur's forces
pressed northward, it was apparent that control
of the strait would be a major Allied strategic
objective in order to pave the way for further
amphibious moves toward Western New
Guinea.

Finschhafen, commanding the strait from the
west, was the key point in the Japanese scheme
of defense. Prior to the loss of Lae and Sala-
maua, troops moving forward from Rabaul and
Madang had usually been routed through
Finschhafen, which served as a stopping point
and staging area. One of the best developed
localities in New Guinea, the town controlled
an area containing two excellent anchorages:
Finschhafen itself and Langemak Bay.

While the battle for Salamaua was still in
progress, the Eighteenth Army commander
foresaw the danger of an attack on the Finsch-
hafen area and took steps to reinforce the weak
garrison forces, which then consisted only of a
small number of naval landing troops, some

army shipping units, and groups of replace-
ments destined for Lae. Army units in the
area were under command of Maj. Gen. Eizo
Yamada, 1st Shipping Group commander.

To strengthen these inadequate forces, Eigh-
teenth Army on 7 August ordered the main
strength of the 80th Infantry Regiment, 6 ' 20th
Division, and one battalion of the 26th Field
Artillery Regiment to proceed from Madang to
Finschhafen. Subsequently, on 26 August,
the 2d Battalion of the 238th Infantry Regi-
ment, 41st Division, which had already ad-
vanced to Finschhafen on its way to Lae to
reinforce the 51st Division, was ordered to
remain at Finschhafen under Maj. Gen. Yama-
da's command. 62 The Army forces in the area
were assigned the mission of reconnoitering
and organizing the ground in preparation for
a possible enemy landing. 63 Defensive organi-
zation of the coastal areas around the mouths
of the Mongi, Logaweng, and Bubui Rivers
and on Point Arndt was undertaken by Army
units, while the naval garrison of about 500
men was given responsibility for the defense of
Finschhafen proper. 64

The enemy attack against Lae on 4-5 Sep-
tember removed all doubt that Finschhafen
would soon be in the front line of combat. Eigh-
teenth Army therefore immediately took ad-
ditional steps to make the area as strong as
possible within the limits of the supply and
manpower situation. By this time the 20th
Division had been relieved of its mission on
the Madang— Lae road construction project
and was ordered forward to reinforce Finsch-
hafen. On 10 September the main body of the
division 6 ' under command of Lt. Gen. Shigeru
Katagiri left the Bogadjim area in eighteen

61 Less 1st Battalion and 5th Company.

62 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 117,

63 Ibid., pp. 112-4.

64 Ibid., pp. 163-4,

65 Elements making up the main body of the 20th Division were : Division headquarters ; 79th Infantry Regi-

229

march serials to move by overland routes to
Finschhafert. By 21 September, however, the
division, without horses or vehicles to facilitate
its movement over the difficult trail, had only
reached Gali and still had almost 100 miles to
cover. The division actually was not scheduled
to reach Finschhafen until 10 October. In the
event of a prior enemy attack, Eighteenth Army
hoped that the Yamada force, which had ample
time to organize the ground, would be able to
hold the Satelberg area, so that when the 20th
Division main body arrived, it could be assem-
bled for an immediate counterattack.

At dawn 22 September, a large enemy convoy
appeared off Point Arndt and after heavy air
preparation commenced troop landings. Maj.
Gen. Yamada immediately issued orders for
the concentration of his main force on Satelberg
Hill to prepare for counteroffer ive action.
The 3d Battalion, 80th Infantry was dispatched
as a sortie force to attack the enemy beach and
reconnoiter the front in preparation for a full-
scale counterattack.

At this critical moment much depended on
the rapidity with which Japanese air units could
mount large-scale attacks against the enemy
amphibious forces. The 7th Air Division,
though charged with this responsibility, was
under orders to fly cover for a convoy in-bound
to Wewak on 23 September* 6 and hestitated to
go out in force against Finschhafen, leaving
the convoy unprotected. Fourth Air Army
quickly ended this indecision by ordering the
division to attack the Finschhafen landings,

but bad weather prevented missions on the
23d and 24th. Meanwhile, however, planes
of the Eleventh Air Fleet, flying from Rabaul,
were able to take off and conducted heavy strikes
on 22, 24 and 26 September against enemy
shipping in the Finschhafen area.

Upon receiving confirmation of the enemy
landing in the Point Arndt area, Lt. Gen. Ada-
chi, aware that the success or failure of the
defense of Finschhafen area would decisively
influence the fate of the Dampier Strait region,
ordered the Yamada force to launch an im-
mediate attack against the enemy beachhead.
(Plate No. 58) Meanwhile, the 20th Division
began a race with time across the mountain
trails from Gali to Finschhafen.

At Finschhafen Maj. Gen. Yamada and his
small force faced a difficult situation. A force
of approximately 1,000 enemy troops was ap-
proaching the north bank of the Mape River, 67
and at Point Arndt a follow-up convoy was
landing an estimated 5,000—6,000 additional
troops with tanks and heavy artillery. 68 On
26 September, another force of approximately
500 enemy troops, which had advanced along
the coast from the Hopoi landing area east of
Lae, appeared in the vicinity of Cape Cretin,
six miles south of Finschhafen. Air support
of the Yamada Force was meanwhile limited to
two Army aircraft a day. The enemy had

was preparing it for use. 69

Pursuant to Eighteenth Army orders, the
Yamada Force on 26 September launched a

ment; 26th Field Artillery Regiment (less two battalions) ; 20th Engineer Regiment ; 33d Independent Engineer Reg-
iment ; 20th Division special troops. The Nakai Detachment was operating in the Finisterre Mountains under Eigh-
teenth Army control. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kengoro Tanaka, previously cited.)

66 Dai Sbtcki Hiko Sbidan Kimitsu Sakusen Nisshi Dai M-go f$tW(7M\%WftiftW¥&B—ffi (Top Secret Op-
erations Diary No. 2, 7th Air Division) Jul — Dec 43, pp. 59-60.

67 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 165,

68 The Navy stationed four submarines off Cape Cretin in order to intercept the enemy reinforcement convoys,
but the Allied ships succeeded in running the blockade. Southeast Area Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., pp. 57-8.

69 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 167.

230

74 vy/x-7^«^figl

OPERATIONS IN FINSCHHAFEN AREA

SEPTEMBER -DECEMBER 1943

■

LEGEND

<~> m±mmnwm

Position prior to Allied landing
First ottdck (16 Oct)
Second attack (22 Nov)

£1«vorion in i«»f

e < « | • "I

\ — -"ST

... \l ^ — —

Nov -6 Dec

sc \

\«*i8N>), \ At' 28

20 D S ib^nN -[ f Vi^A 3 '

20th Div reached Solelberg 1 1 Ocf^'^^ t"p. ■. J

\ * J/

* *\ ~—

Sugino Unit

17 Oct

Oct -Occupied

i* * » K

Naval Unit

» * ■» » (W

AMStHAK Ut

Landing pomt for
reinforcements
since Oct

in »iw (80l imnKj-

Yomodd Force (80th Inf ft a shipping unit)-
Concentroted ot Salelberg Hill late Sep

in il

" » » -a

PLATE NO. 5 8

Operations in Finschhafcn Area, September— December 1943

coordinated attack from the Satclberg Hill area
in the direction of Heldsbach Plantation, the
8oth Infantry Regiment in the assault. The
objective was to reduce the enemy beachhead
before further reinforcements could be brought
ashore. A heavy engagement ensued in the
area between Satelberg and the sea. Mean-
while, in Finschhafen, the naval garrison of
about 300 men and a company of the 2d Bat-
talion, 238th Infantry, comprising the defense
force of the town, were surrounded on 27 Sep-
tember. This force withstood five days of
ferocious enemy attack but was finally over-
whelmed on 2 October. With the fall of
Finschhafen, the Allied force could now turn
its full attention to the main strength of the
Yamada force operating east of Satelberg. The
attack of the 80th Infantry had been halted
short of its goal, and the regiment, now on the
defensive, was engaged in heavy fighting in
the vicinity of Satelberg Hill. During this
period the enemy began using the Finschhafen
airstrip.

On the morning of 11 October, the command
post of the 20th Division was established on
Satelberg Hill, and Lt. Gen. Shigeru Katagiri
took command of all forces in the Finschhafen
area. After four days spent in assembling the
newlyarrived troops, the division launched a
surprise attack early in the morning of 16
October through Jivevaning in the direction
of Katika. After heavy fighting, the enemy
force was cut squarely in two, and 20th Division
units reached the sea at Katika the next day.
On the same day, 17 October, the Sugino Boat
Unit landed in the enemy rear at Point Amdt
and threw the opposing forces into disorder. 7 "

The situation was now highly favorable.
As a result of the successes of 16-17 October,
the 79th Infantry Regiment swarmed along the
coast in full force, overrunning enemy positions
and capturing large quantities of weapons and
ammunition, as well as trucks fully loaded with
rations and medical supplies. Prospects for
the early recapture of Finschhafen were momen-
tarily bright. However, in the Heldsbach area,
the enemy line suddenly stiffened, and the
regiment was forced to deploy. On 20 Oc-
tober the Allied force was reinforced from the
sea, 7 ' and a new and ferocious battle ensued
around Point Arndt. Since neither side seemed
to be able to break the deadlock, the fighting
temporarily slackened while both sides prepared
new blows.

Because of the supply situation, Lt. Gen.
Katagiri recognized the importance of quickly
reorganizing his units and resuming the attack
in order to gain a quick decision. On 31
October the Army Commander, Lt. Gen. Ada-
chi, arrived at the 20th Division command
post and studied the situation. Enemy strength
was estimated at one division, confronting the
Japanese forces along a winding front extending
from the north bank of the Song River south
to Logaweng Hill via Jivevaning. 71 Lt. Gen.
Adachi ordered a renewal of the attack with
the objective of seizing the mouth of the Song
River in a series of limited objective operations.
In order to prevent enemy landings in the Japa-
nese rear, the 2d Battalion, 79th Infantry was
dispatched north on 6 November under orders
to reconnoiter as far as Lakona and strengthen
coastal defenses. Meanwhile, although the
division was on one-third rations and short of

70 The Sugino Boat Unit, composed of the 10th Company (155 men) of the 79th Infantry, carried out counter-
landings with four landing barges. This unit, catching the enemy completely by surprise, destroyed three antiaircraft
guns, four artillery pieces, ten machine guns, two automatic cannons, twenty automatic rifles, and two ammunition dumps.
Four hundred casualties were inflicted on the Allied force. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II,
p. 175.

yi Ibid., p. 176.

72 Ibid., p. 180.

232

ammunition, 75 Lt. Gen. Katagiri set the date
for the new attack at 23 November.

While the 20th Division was preparing its
new assault, the Allied forces were pouring
ashore reinforcements and supplies. 74 On 16
November, a full week before the scheduled
attack date, a coordinated enemy drive suppor-
ted by a large-scale air strike was launched
against the Satelberg position. The struggle
that followed was one of the heaviest battles
fought in the southeast area. Units of the
6th Air Division turned out in force and gave
unusually heavy support to the ground effort."
Beginning on 23 November, heavy meeting
engagements developed north of the Song River
as the Allied force drove toward Bonga and
Wareo. On Satelberg Hill, the 80th Infantry,
which had been subjected to ten days of sus-
tained air and ground attack, terminated its
heroic defense on 26 November and withdrew
beyond Wareo on division order. In spite of
its failing troop strength and scanty store of
provisions, the 20th Division on 30 November
launched a counterattack to ease the pressure
on Wareo and Bonga. This desperate attempt
failed, and on 8 December, under renewed

enemy assaults, Wareo fell. A week later the
enemy entered Lakona after shattering the
determined resistance of the 79th Infantry.

It was now clear that the Finschhafen base
was irretrievably lost and that the 20th Division
lacked sufficient combat strength to renew the
offensive, 7 * Accordingly, on 17 December,
pursuant to directives from General Imamura
at Rabaul, Eighteenth Army ordered the divi-
sion to withdraw behind the Mesaweng River,
adopt delaying tactics, and hold out in the Sio
area. 77 The retirement behind the Mesaweng
began on the night of 19 December. Along
the coast, the 2d Battalion, 79th Infantry,
conducted delaying actions on successive posi-
tions all the way from Wandokai to Kalasa.
The main body of the 20th Division closed
into Kalasa on 29 December. 78 Thus, in two
and a half months, the opening battle in the
defense of the Dampier Strait had resulted in
disaster.

Bougainville

While the 20th Division was still conduc-
ting its gallant but unsuccessful defense of the

73 (1) Ammunition levels of the 20th Division at this time were as follows : Type 94 mountain guns, 135
rounds ; Type 41 mountain guns, 78 rounds ; Infantry guns, 36 rounds ; Mortars, 102 rounds ; Demolitions, 436
kilograms. (2) After reaching Satelberg Hill the 20th Division received practically no supplies from rear areas. From
1 October the ration was about 6 shaku (about 1/5 pint) of staple food per day. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part
III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 185-7, 191-2. (3) " We have been without rations for a month. . . .We have eaten bananas,
stems and roots, bamboo, grass, ferns, and, in fact, everything edible up to the leaves of the trees." Diary of Officer
(tank not given) Kobayashi, 80th Infantry Regiment Headquarters. ATIS Current Translations, No. 106, 20 Mar
44. pp. 35-6.

74 The enemy had the following assault shipping at Finschhafen: 6 November, 30 transports ; 12 November,
72 transports ; 15 November, 3 transports and 22 landing barges. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III,
op. cit. Vol. II, pp. . 185-6,

75 On 23 November enemy positions in the vicinity of Jivevaning were bombed by 44 aitcraft, and on
26 November, 47 planes hit enemy positions in and around Finschhafen. The 7th Air Division had already returned
to Ambon early in November to aid in the establishment of the new national defense line. (1) Ibid., pp. 199-200.
(2) Southeast Area Air Operation Record, op. cit., p. 60.

76 The total casualties of the 20th Division were 5,761 or 45 per cent of the total strength. The units hardest hit
were the 80th Infantry (59 per cent losses) and the 20th Engineers (66 per cent losses). Southeast Area Operations
Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 219-20.

77 Ibid., pp. 214-6.

78 The advance guard of the enemy forces advanced to the Sio vicinity by 6 January 1944. Action at this time,
however, was limited to light skirmishes. Ibid., pp. 218-9, 3*3-

233

west coast of the Dampier Strait, the enemy
forces in the Solomons again unleashed a new
assault. This time the target was Bougainville,
left flank strongpoint of the Eighth Area Army
line and strategic key to Rabaul.

Following determination of the new national
defense zone at the end of September, Eighth
Area Army had notified Lt. Gen. Haruyoshl
Hyakutake, Seventeenth Army Commander,
on 7 October that the army's primary mission
was to organize and strengthen the defenses of
Bougainville. Under this directive Lt. Gen.
Hyakutake immediately concluded a local
operational agreement with the Eighth Fleet,
formulating joint plans to meet an eventual
enemy landing in the Bougainville area.
Execution of these plans had barely gotten
way when, on 27 October, enemy forces
on Mono Island, due south of
Bougainville, and five days later followed up
with the main landing effort in the Cape
Torokina area, on the northern side of Empress
Augusta Bay. (Plate No. 59J Since the terrain
on the western side of Bougainville was so low
and damp as to render it relatively unsuitable
for attack operations, Seventeenth Army had
not anticipated a landing in the Empress
Augusta Bay area, and the only force there was

79 Eighth Area Army also did not regard an enemy landing in the Empress Augusta Bay area as likely.
"The first real surprise maneuver after 1 arrived at Rabaul occurred when the enemy landed on Cape Torokina
. . . .Because we thought the poor topographical features of this area would hamper enemy landing operations, we did
not anticipate a landing. . . .and were not adequately prepared." (Interrogation of Lt. Col. Matsuichi lino, Staff Officer
Inteilcgence, Eighth Army Army.)

80 Order of battle of the Japanese forces on Bougainville on 1 November 1943 was as follows :

Headquarters, Seventeenth Army
6th Division

Elements of 17th Division
4th South Seas Garrison Unit
15th Antiaircraft Artillery Group.
17th Signal Unit
ad Shipping Group
Miscellaneous elements.
Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 160-4.

81 This force was later placed under command of Maj. Gen. Shun Iwasa, 6th Infantry Group commander, and
designated as the Iwasa Detachment. Ibid., p. 172-3.

a small observation unit. 70 This was speedily
overwhelmed, and the enemy began a slow
advance inland.

The command post of the Seventeenth Army
and the bulk of the forces on Bougainville were
at this time in the Erventa area, on the
southeast tip of the island. 8 " Here, they were
disposed to cover the shores of Tonolei Harbor
and the Buin area, where the Navy had a
base and also the largest operational airfield
in the Solomons.

Confronted by the enemy landing on Em-
press Augusta Bay, Lt. Gen. Hyakutake im-
mediately dispatched the 23d Infantry Regiment
(less 1st Battalion) of the 6th Division to the
Torokina area by overland routes. 8 ' Mean-
while, the 2d Battalion of the 54th Infantry
Regiment, 17th Division, which had arrived at
Rabaul, was ordered to undertake an amphibi-
ous operation directly against the enemy beach-
head. The Eleventh Air Fleet, newly reinforced
by 173 carrier-based aircraft, prepared to render
strong support to these operations.

While the 23d Infantry moved overland
toward Empress Augusta Bay, six destroyers
carrying the 2d Battalion, 54th Infantry sailed
from Rabaul on 2 November, covered by a
naval support force of four cruisers and six

234

PLATE NO. 59
Bougainville Operation, November 1943 — March 1944

destroyers."* The destroyer transport group
turned back when the convoy, soon after leav-
ing Rabaul, was spotted by enemy planes, but
the naval support force continued to the south-
east with the object of engaging the American
naval force off Bougainville in night combat.
At 0050 on 2 November, the enemy force was
encountered off Empress Augusta Bay, and a
sharp gunfire and torpedo action ensued, in
which both sides sustained damage. The Japa-
nese force retired at dawn, having lost the
cruiser Sendai and destroyer Hatsukaze? 1

Covered by intensified air action, the de-
stroyer transport group again sortied from
Rabaul and, on 7 November, executed the
planned counterlanding about five miles north
of the enemy beachhead at Cape Torokina.
Subsequent efforts by this force and the over-
land attack force failed, however, to dislodge
the enemy, who by this time had deepened the
beachhead to about six miles and prepared an
airstrip.* 4 The action settled down into a
stalemate, which was to continue for the next
five months.

Dampier Strait Defense : New Britain

Along with the Finschhafen area on New
Guinea, the western end of New Britain had
been recognized by the southeast area command
since the end of 1942 as a strategic defense
sector of vital importance to the security of
Rabaul and the maintenance of Japanese con-
trol over the Dampier Strait. The airfields
developed on Cape Gloucester commanded the
eastern side of the strait, while Tuluvu, on
Borgen Bay, was important as a staging and

transhipment point for units moving forward to
the New Guinea front. In the summer of
1943, these and other key points on western
New Britain were secured by the 65th Brigade,
51st Reconnaissance Regiment, one Naval Gar-
rison Unit, and various shipping units.

In September, as the fighting in New
Guinea moved closer to the Dampier Strait
region, Eighth Area Army placed the 65th
Brigade Commander, Maj. Gen. Iwao Matsuda,
in command of all forces in western New
Britain and ordered him to strengthen the de-
fenses of the area. In compliance with these
orders, Maj. Gen. Matsuda organized these
forces as the Matsuda Detachment and began
welding the widely-scattered garrisons in west-
em New Britain into a cohesive defense system.

On 5 October, the situation at Finschhafen
impelled General Imamura to take further
action to strengthen the forces in western New
Britain. Units of the 17th Division, newly
arrived at Rabaul, were ordered to that area,
and the division commander, Lt. Gen. Yasushi
Sakai, was placed in overall command of oper-
ations in defense of the east coast of the Dam-
pier Strait. The Eighth Area Army order to
17th Division stated : 8 '

Under the 17th Division Commander, the tyth
Division {less elements), the Matsuda Detachment
and the Gasmata Garrison Unit will secure strategic
areas in western New Britain and destroy the enemy.
Operations will be based on the following policy :

1. Emphasis wilt be placed on operations in the
strategic area east of Dampier Strait and Gasmata
area. All forces will be concentrated to destroy the
enemy on the sea or beaches.

2. The strategic areas near Tuluvu and Buschmg

82 (1) Southeast Area Naval Operations, op. cit. Vol. Ill, p. 14. (2) Southeast Area Operations Record,
Part IV, op. cit., pp. 170-6.

83 Southeast Area Naval Operations, Part III, op. cit., pp. 14-5.

84 (1) Ibid., pp. 19-21. (2) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 172-3.

85 Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono Shi Furoku Dai Ichi Setbu Niyuburiten To Dai Jushichi Shidan no Sakusen
ffi$^llf^Ife,ir]i*^«CgPM^-HSlS-^-~7'y x ySfEi-t^ffl«ft» (Southeast Area Operations Record, Part
IV, Supplement No. 1: 17th Division Operations in Western New Britain) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Jul 49, pp. 3-14.

236

will be secured to destroy the enemy.

j. Gasmata will be garrisoned with three infantry
and one field artillery battalions. Cape Merkus wdl
be secured with one infantry battalion.

4. Transportation and supply facilities in the
rear areas and on the sea will be maintained.

Detailed defense plans elaborated on the
basis of this order called for the disposition of
forces at key points, chiefly Talasea, Borgen
Bay-Cape Gloucester, Busching, Cape Mer-
kus, and Gasmata. Owing to jungle and
mountain barriers as formidable as those on
New Guinea, the deployment of troops to these
areas had to be carried out by water movement
under the constant menace of enemy air attack.
The main lift for units of the 17th Division
was provided by destroyers and landing barges,
using the night transport methods instituted in
the spring of 1943. Although these movements
were accomplished, the maintenance of supply
lines to the western outposts remained a serious
problem.

Toward the end of November, indications
began to point even more strongly to an early
Allied attack on New Britain. On 20 Novem-
ber enemy air forces began a two-day series of
attacks on Gasmata, using 100 aircraft. 86
Throughout late November and early Decem-
ber air attacks were also accelerated against the
Cape Gloucester airfields. Enemy torpedo boats
were active in the coastal waters of New Britain,
and hostile submarines were sighted almost
daily." 7 Blinking lights offshore at night, re-
ported by coast observers, warned that enemy
agents were being landed." 8 At Tuluvu, daily

air raids continued until 17 December.

At 0200 15 December, a naval seaplane on
routine reconnaissance reported sighting a small
enemy amphibious convoy standing into Cape
Merkus. The Merkus Garrison Unit, consis-
ting of only two companies, immediately went
to battle stations and prepared to meet a lan-
ding. (Plate No. 60) As the enemy formations
approached the shore, the garrison force took
them under heavy automatic weapons fire and
sank 13 landing craft. 89 At dawn naval air
units joined in the defense, inflicting extensive
damage on the enemy invasion convoy. Despite
these initial successes, enemy troops continued
to come ashore, and intense gunfire from war-
ships standing offshore forced the garrison
troops to withdraw inland, fighting a delaying
action as they withdrew.

Lt, Gen. Sakai, from the 17th Division
command post at Gavuvu, took immediate steps
to counter the Allied thrust. All garrisons from
Gasmata to Cape Gloucester were ordered on
the alert against further enemy landings, and
plans were laid to counterattack the Merkus
beachhead. The Komori Detachment (1st
Battalion, 81st Infantry, reinf.) then moving
overland from the vicinity of Kirige to join the
Merkus Garrison Unit, was directed to expedite
their movement. The Tobushi Detachment (1st
Battalion, 141st Infantry, reinf.) moved amphib-
iously from Busching to execute a coun-
terlanding on Cape Merkus. 9 " The Komori
Detachment, with the Msrkus Garrison Unit,
advanced as far as the enemy positions on the
Merkus Peninsula and began the attack on 28

86 Statement by Lt. Col. Shoji Ohta, Staff Officer (Supply), Eighth Area Army.

87 Intelligence Bulletins of the Matsuda Detachment for 7, 9, and 11 December 1943. ATIS Current Transla-
tions No. 103, 2 Mar 44. p. 94

88 Intelligence Bulletins of the Merkus Garrison Unit for 21 and 29 November 1943. ATIS Current Transla-
tions No. 105, 15 Mar 44. pp. 50, 55.

89 File of Minutes of Officers' Meetings, kept by Col. Sumiya, 53d Infantry Regiment commander, Matsuda
Detachment. ATIS Current Translations No. 106, 20 Mar 44. p. 29.

90 (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part IV, op, cit., pp. 205-6. (2) Southeast Area Operations Record,
Part IV, op. cit. Supplement No. 1, pp, 17-21.

237

December. On the following day, the Tobushi
Detachment joined the Komori Detachment
and futile attacks were repeated for several days
but all efforts fallen." Throughout this period
naval air units operating from Rabaul and 6th
Air Division planes operating chiefly from
Wewak carried out repeated assaults on the
enemy ships supplying the beachhead, inflicting
substantial damage but also taking severe
aircraft losses. 9 *

Lt. Gen. Sakai estimated that the Merkus
landing was not the main enemy effort, and his
suspicions were soon confirmed. From 19 De-
cember, Japanese positions on and around Cape
Gloucester were subjected to heavy daily air
attack. On 20 December a reconnaissance
plane reported that a large concentration of
enemy transports and other assault shipping
had rendezvoused in Buna Bay.'* On 25 De-
cember a large enemy convoy was spotted mo-
ving northward in the direction of Dampier
Strait, and the Matsuda Detachment, respon-
sible for the defense of the Borgen Bay— Cape
Gloucester area, was promptly ordered to battle
stations.

At 0400 on 26 December, the defenses skir-
ting the Cape Gloucester airfield and Silimati
Point were subjected to devastating naval gun-
fire preparation, followed by heavy air strikes. At
dawn enemy troops began landing at two points,
the main force going ashore northwest of Sili-
mati Point and a smaller contingent debarking
just west of the Cape Gloucester airfield.^ Maj.
Gen. Matsuda immediately began deploying
his troops to meet this two-pronged attack,

which obviously aimed at the encirclement of
the airfield area. The nearest unit to the mam
enemy landing was the 2d Battalion, 53d In-
fantry, which was quickly ordered to launch
local counterattacks pending commitment of
the main strength.

On the morning of the landings, naval air
units from Rabaul and Kavieng went out in
strength to smash the enemy convoy. Hostile
fighter cover over the beach was so thick, how-
ever,thatthe results were inconclusive, although
the enemy's transport formation was dispersed.
At twilight the attack was renewed with more
success, several enemy ships receiving heavy
damage. Japanese plane losses in these and
subsequent operations, the air raids on Rabaul,
and the appearance of enemy carriers in the
waters east of New Ireland prevented the naval
air units from carrying out further operations.
By early January the number of serviceable
aircraft other than fighters available for opera-
tions in New Britain had dwindled to approx-
imately 24 navy medium attack planes, 8 navy
bombers, and no army bombers at all.'" From
this time on, the air forces were unable to
influence the decision at Cape Gloucester.

On the ground, fierce fighting took place for
possession of the airfield area. Every effort to
defend this locality by the Matsuda Detach-
ment proved unavailing, and the detachment
was forced to evacuate its positions. Maj. Gen.
Matsuda, however, had concentrated his main
strength, consisting of the 53d, 141st Infantry
and the 51st Reconnaissance Regiments, on
commanding ground in the area southwest of

91 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part IV, op. cit. Supplement I, pp. 22-7.

92 (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part IV, op. cit., pp. 108, 212-3. ( 2 ) Southeast Area Naval
Operations Part III, op. cit., pp. 43-5.

93 Enemy shipping at Buna was reported as follows: Medium-sized transports, 17; small transports, 60;
landing craft, 20; destroyers, 8. ATIS Current Translations No. 106, p. 28.

94 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part IV, op. cit., p. 207.

95 (1) Ibid., pp. 212-4. (*) Nanto Homen Kaigun Koku Keikano Gaikyo Sono Go ^1&'%W&W-fiL'£i0i§<D
J5E (Outline of Southeast Area Naval Air Operations, Part V) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Nov 42, pp, 15-7.

239

Silimati Point. Though cut off from all rein-
forcement and supply, and with no air support
and very little artillery, this force on 3 January
launched a counterattack against the American
troops advancing along the west side of Borgen
Bay and succeeded in carrying Sankaku Yama
(•HUlll)' 6 , a prominent terrain feature overlo-
oking the beach. The hill could not be held,
however, due to mass enemy artillery fire and
air bombardment, and the Japanese were forced
to withdraw.

After this effort failed, further resistance on
Cape Gloucester was out of the question, and
the Matsuda Detachment was ordered to with-
draw toward Talasea. The Dampier Strait
campaign thus ended on 24 January 1944,

at Finschhafen. The main route of advance to
the national defense zone in Western New
Guinea now lay open to the enemy.

Saidor

The situation which confronted the Eigh-
teenth Army at the end of 1943 was dark indeed.
The bitter loss of Finschhafen, coupled with the
enemy advance into the upper Ramu Valley,
had virtually opened the way for an assault by
General MacArthur's forces on the nerve-center
of Eighteenth Army resistance at Madang.
Sio, on the northeast corner of the Huon Penin-
sula, remained the only important defense area
between Madang and the enemy forces driving
up the coast from Finschhafen. At Sio, the
20th Division, seriously weakened in the

Finschhafen campaign, was reassembling its de-
pleted forces in preparation for a new defensive
stand. The 51st Division, consisting largely
of combat ineffectives, was also spread out to
the west of Sio waiting to move to the rear for
rest and refitting. 97

The enemy was not slow to take advantage
of this favorable situation. Striking swiftly in
a new amphibious operation, Allied forces on
the morning of 2 January 1944 landed in the
vicinity of Saidor, about halfway between Sio
and Madang.** (Plate No. 61J Eighteenth
Army, although it had feared a new enemy
landing somewhere along the north coast of
the Huon Peninsula, 9 " was powerless to combat
it. With the enemy at Saidor, the Army
strength was split squarely in two,

in the Sio Area.

In view of the weakened condition of these
units and the urgent need of bolstering the thin
defenses of Madang, the Eighth Area Army
headquarters in Rabaul relieved the Eighteenth
Army Commander of further defense of the Sio
area. The Eighteenth Army Commander, who
was then at Sio, directed their withdrawal past
the Saidor beachhead to the Madang area.

In compliance with the Area Army order,
Lt. Gen. Adachi ordered the 20th and 51st
Divisions to proceed as quickly as possible to
the Madang area, and placed Lt. Gen. Nakano,
Commander of the 51st Division, in over-all
command of forces east of Biliau, including the
20th Division. Lt. Gen. Adachi then left by
submarine for Madang, where the 41st Divi-

96 This hill had been subjected to extremely severe air bombardment and naval gunfire concentrations prior to
the enemy landings. It was known to the Americans as Target Hill.

97 In late December, owing to the seriousness of the situation, Lt. Gen. Adachi made a trip from Madang to
Ktari to direct the dispositions of the 20th and 51st Divisions for the defense of the Sio area. Southeast Area
Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 240-1, 247-8.

98 Ibid., pp. 247-8, 301, 323.

99 The usual signs of a forthcoming enemy attack were all present during the latter part of December. Enemy
PT boats were active along the coast, and there was a marked acceleration of air activity against Madang and the

240

sion, moved forward from Wewak, was charged
with organizing the defenses of the area pending
the arrival of the 20th and 51st Divisions.

Lt. Gen. Nakano now tackled the problem of
evacuating his command past the expanding
enemy beachhead at Saidor, Two routes were
chosen, one running fairly close to the coast
and the other following the ridge-line of the
Finisterre foothills. 100 The 20th Division was
to take the coastal route, while the 51st, together
with some naval units, was to use the route
inland. The first echelon was scheduled to reach
Madang on 8 February, and the entire move-
ment was to be completed by 23 February.
To divert the enemy at Saidor, eight infantry
companies of the Nakai Detachment, under
command of Maj. Gen. Nakai, were ordered
to withdraw from the Ramu Valley front and
advance down the coast from Bogadjim to
threaten the enemy beachhead.""

The first echelon of the retiring 20th and
51st Division forces left Sio on schedule. At
the last minute, however, the withdrawal plan
was modified in favor of moving both divisions
via the inland route. The covering operations
of the Nakai force were carried out according
to plan, and the Nakano group successfully
negotiated the withdrawal without encountering
enemy resistance. Illness and starvation, how-
ever, took a heavy toll along the difficult retreat
route. At the end of December the combined
strength of the 20th and 51st Divisions had
about 14,000.

reached Madang by 1 March.' *

While the withdrawal was in progress, the
Nakai force engaged the American troops at-
tempting to break out of the Saidor beachhead
toward Madang. To forestall this move, the
force deployed along the Mot River line in the
vicinity of Maibang and Gabumi. Enemy
attempts to cross the river, although supported
by heavy artillery fire, were repelled, and the
line held firm until 21 February when the force,
having completed its mission of covering the
Nakano group withdrawal, retired to Bogadjim.

On the Ramu front, the enemy had mean-
while taken advantage of the reduced strength
of the Japanese forces. On 19 January, the
Australians, operating out of Dumpu, launched
a determined attack on the Kankirei positions
and, by 27 January, took possession of Kankirei.
The Nakai force returned to Bogadjim just
in time to bolster the line and prevent the
Australians from advancing down the Mintjim
River to join forces with the Americans coming
up from Saidor.

Madang was now extremely vulnerable to
attack. The condition of Japanese air units
did not permit reliance on air power to protect
the town. The 41st Division and the Nakai
Detachment were forced to spread their strength
from the Finisterre Mountains to Astrolabe
Bay and up through Alexishafen to Mugil.
Thus dispersed, these units could not give
adequate protection to Madang, even with the
cooperation of the Ninth Fleet.' 01 The tide of

100 The mountain route had already been reconnoitered and afforded the least danger of encountering enemy
patrols. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 335-9.

101 Seven infantry companies of the Nakai Detachment remained in the Kankirei area on the Ramu front,
under command of the 78th Infantry Regiment commander. Since mid-October the detachment had successfully
checked all enemy attempts to penetrate the Ramu Valley line toward Madang. In early December the enemy attempted
to flank the Japanese line on the right by sending an Australian infantry battalion to Kesawi, but on 8 December the
Nakai Detachment attacked and drove the enemy back to Dumpu. Ibid., pp. 289-96, 343-4, 360-2.

102 Ibid., p. 355.

103 The Ninth Fleet was activated in the eastern New Guinea area and consisted of a small number of surface
vessels. Southeast Area Naval operations, Part III, op. cit., p. 38.

241

PLATE NO. 61

Ramu Valley and Saidor Operations, December 1943 — February 1944-

PLATE NO. 62
Defense of Admiralties, February — March 1944

battle was moving irresistibly westward."*

Isolation of Rabaul

While the enemy forged steadily ahead in
New Guinea, his forces already entrenched on
Bougainville in the Solomons and on western
New Britain itself created an ever-growing
threat to the heart of Japanese power in the
southeast area at Rabaul. On Bougainville,
Seventeenth Army succeeded in containing the
enemy beachhead but was unable to oust the
invading forces. In the Cape Gloucester area
on New Britain, the situation was still darker.
The Matsuda Detachment, down to less than
half its combat strength, faced starvation or
annihilation at the hands of the superior enemy.
On 23 January 1944, Eighth Area Army or-
dered Lt. Gen. Sakai to move immediately all
troops from western New Britain to the area
east of Talasea, thereby easing the supply prob-
lem and tightening the defenses of Rabaul.

In February the southeast area situation
underwent a further radical change as a result
of new developments in the Central Pacific.
On 1 February an American amphibious force
invaded Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall
Islands. On 17 February a large enemy carrier
task force struck at Truk, the main Japanese
naval base in the mandated islands, and on the
following day American troops landed on
Eniwetok, westernmost island in the Marshall

To cope with this new threat, naval air
units at Rabaul were immediately ordered to
Truk, leaving Rabaul virtually without air pro-
tection and depriving the forces throughout

eastern New Guinea, New Britain and the
Solomons of most of their air support. Sea
traffic practically ceased. Eighth Area Army,
increasingly concerned over the defense of
Rabaul and nearby New Ireland, ordered the
17th Division on 23 February to move im-
mediately to reinforce eastern New Britain. ,D '

The buttressing of Rabaul's shrinking de-
fenses had barely gotten under way when the
Allied forces, in a new surprise move of con-
summate boldness and far-reaching strategic
consequences, invaded Los Negros Island, in
the Admiralties, 365 airline miles northwest of
Rabaul and 250 miles farther into Japanese-
held territory than the deepest previous pene-
tration by amphibious forces.

Strategically located on the main supply
route to Rabaul, the Admiralties also served
as an intermediate air stop between Rabaul
and rear bases in Northeast New Guinea.
By June 1943, the 51st Transport Regiment
had almost completed one airfield at Lorengau,
on Manus Island, and was beginning construc-
tion of a second at Momote Plantation, on Los
Negros. Thereafter the strategic importance
of the islands increased steadily as the Eigh-
teenth Army front line on New Guinea was
pushed rapidly backward and western New
Britain fell under enemy control.

Eighth Area Army, in December 1943,
ordered one infantry regiment reinforced by one
field artillery battalion, to strengthen the defense
oi the Admiralties. However, the ships
carrying the first echelon of these forces were
attacked en route and forced to turn back, with
the result that reinforcement attempts from
Palau were given up. On 23 January Eighth

104 General Adachi's plans in early March were as follows : The 41st Division was to station itself in the
sector between Madang and Mugil and prepare to attack any enemy landing in the sector east of Hansa. The Nakai
Detachment was to be relieved and rejoin the 20th Division. The 20th Division was to recuperate at Hansa and
prepare the defenses of that area. The 51st Division, when relieved by the 20th at Hansa, would immediately leave for
Wewak to reorganize and defend that area. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 6-7.

105 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part IV, op. cit., pp. 224-5.

244

Area Army ordered the 2d Battalion of the 1st
Independent Mixed Infantry Regiment, sta-
tioned on New Ireland, to move to the Admi-
ralties. A week later the 1st Battalion, 229th
Infantry, 38th Division was also ordered to
proceed from Rabaul to the Admiralties by
destroyer. All forces in the Admiralties
were placed under Col. Yoshio Ezaki, 51st
Transport Regiment commander, with the
missions of securing Los Negros Island with
its vital airfield"*, and preventing the enemy
from seizing and establishing airfields on
Manus, Pak and Pityilu Islands. Fourth Air
Army was to cooperate in the defense of the
Admiralties in the event of an enemy landing

Defensive dispositions in the Admiralties
were based on the anticipation that an Allied
landing attempt would probably be made
somewhere along the shore of Seeadler Harbor
or the eastern and southern shores of Los
Negros. (Plate No. 62) Hyane Harbor, on the
opposite side of Los Negros, was not considered
a likely landing point due to its smallness and
the danger to which enemy movement through
the narrow harbor entrance would be subject.

The defending forces on Los Negros were
taken by surprise, therefore, when a small
enemy invasion force, following a brief but
intense naval gunfire preparation, began lan-
ding on beaches inside Hyane Harbor at 0815
on 29 February, striking directly at Momote
airfield. The 1st Battalion, 229th Infantry,
defending the airfield sector, was slow in reac-
ting but, on the night of the 29th, launched a
counterattack which failed to dislodge the

beachhead. On 1 March a small number of
aircraft attempted to support the ground de-
fense but were driven off by strong enemy air
cover. A further counterattack launched at
1700 the same day was broken up by enemy
artillery.

On 2 March the enemy, heavily reinforced
from the sea, gained possession of the airfield.
Col. Ezakt now planned a pincers attack from
north and south, ordering the 2d Battalion, 1st
Independent Mixed Infantry Regiment to
attack from the Salami Plantation area, north
of Hyane Harbor, in conjunction with a further
counterattack by the 1st Battalion, 229th Infan-
try, from the southern sector. The attack was
to be launched on the night of 2 March, but
due to heavy enemy air and naval bombard-
ments, it had to be delayed.

Spearheaded by the 2d Battalion, 1st Inde-
pendent Mixed Infantry, the main attack was
finally launched on the night of 2 March. The
enemy positions were successfully infiltrated,
but the curtain of mortar and artillery fire
encountered by the 2d Battalion was so intense
that its gains could not be exploited. This
abortive attack was the last large-scale effort
which the Japanese forces in the Admiralties
were able to mount. Thereafter, although
fighting continued on Los Negros until 12
March and on Manus until early April, the
outcome was inevitable.

With the Admiralties in their grasp, the
Allied forces were now squarely astride Eighth
Area Army supply lines and in a position to
isolate the large numbers of Japanese troops
remaining on New Britain, New Ireland and

106 The Hyane (Momote) airfield had been used mainly as a staging field for air units moving to advanced
bases in the southeast area. At the time of the Allied landing, there were no operational aircraft on the field. (State-
ment by Lt. Col. Ohta, previously cited.)

107 In anticipation of new Allied attacks in late February. Imperial General Headquarters had ordered the transfer
of five air regiments to New Guinea from the southwest area. These reinforcements had arrived in the theater prior
to the enemy landing in the Admiralties, but adverse weather at the time of the landing prevented effective operations
against the enemy invasion force. ( i ) (Statement by Lt. Col. Koji Tanaka, Staff Officer (Air), Imperial General Head-
quarters, Army Section. (2) Southeast Area Air Operation, op. cit., pp. 62-7.

245

in the Solomons. They were also in possession
of a base from which further amphibious
attacks might be mounted against Japanese
rear bases on New Guinea. Such an attack
was anticipated about the end of April."*

Bougainville Counter-offensive

While the Admiralties campaign was in
progress far to the rear, the Seventeenth Army
on Bougainville launched the last large-scale
Japanese offensive effort in the Solomons in an
attempt to wipe out the enemy beachhead in
the Empress Augusta Bay area.

On 21 January, the Eighth Area Army
Commander, General Imamura, flew from
Rabaul to Bougainville and set early March
as the target day for the attack. In mid-
February Lt. Gen. Hyakutake, Seventeenth
Army Commander, conducted extensive recon-
naissance of the enemy front and began as-
sembling his forces for the offensive. Training
had been tough and thorough, and the assault
units moved overland from thetr bases confident
of victory.

By 25 February the troops were m forward
assembly areas, and on 2 March Lt. Gen.
Hyakutake arrived from Erventa to take com-
mand. The plan of maneuver called for the
main effort to be made on the right across the
Laruma River by a force consisting of the 6th
Infantry Group fone battalion, 13th Infantry
and 23d Infantry Regiment) and the 45th
Infantry Regiment. A secondary attack was
to be launched across the Torokina River by

the 13th Infantry (less one battalion). The 6th
Field Artillery Regiment, reinforced by a bat-
talion from the 4th Heavy Artillery Regi-
ment, was to support the attack.

On the night of 6 March the Japanese units
deployed in great secrecy along a line 500 to
800 yards from the enemy positions. During
the following day enemy outposts were driven
in, and final preparations were completed. At
0415 on 8 March, under cover of a heavy
artillery barrage, the attack was launched.
Operations proceeded smoothly, and by the
morning of 12 March several deep wedges had
been driven into the American positions and
the main line of resistance penetrated. The
enemy, however, counterattacked with powerful
armored forces, inflicting heavy casualties and
making it impossible to fully exploit the initial
success.""

Lt. Gen. Hyakutake planned to renew the
offensive on 15 March with the direction of the
attack slightly altered. Since reinforcements
were badly needed, the 2d Battalion of the 4th
South Seas Garrison Unit, which was following
from Erventa, and the 6th Cavalry Regiment
(dismounted), which had been guarding rear
areas, were both ordered into the line. These
dispositions completed, the attack was resumed
on 16 March. On 17-18 March the enemy
lashed back in another fierce counterattack.
The Japanese front-line units, decimated by
disease and casualties and without air support,
were gradually forced to withdraw to their
initial positions.

On 26 March the Torokina campaign was

108 (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, p. 5. (2) " The taking of the Lae-Salamaua
area was the turning point of the New Guinea campaign, but the final step was the taking of the Admiralty Islands. . . .
Two large airfields fell to the Allies, and Japanese supply lines (to Rabaul) were cut off, Also from these islands the
Allies were able to isolate the individual Japanese positions along the New Guinea coast and to prevent any large-scale
withdrawal." Interrogation of Col. Shigeru Sugiyama, Senior Staff Officer, Eighteenth Army.

109 There were no important changes in the order of battle of the forces on Bougainville after the original
Allied landing on 1 November. These forces were assembled in February from Erventa on southern Bougainville,
Kieta on the east coast, and from the northern tip of the island. Southeast Area Operations, Record, Part II, op. cit.
Vol. II, pp. 189-29.

1 10 Ibid,, pp. 196-202

246

SUMMARY OF JAPANESE MOVEMENTS
IN EASTERN NEW GUINEA

JULY (942 - APRIL 1944

LEGEND

South Seas DeKBuna Det)
*£+-»■

5 l st Div

20th Div

41st Div
Dates indicate when
withdrawals took place

PLATE NO. 63

Summary of Japanese Movements in Eastern New Guinea, July 1942 — April 1944

brought to a final halt by Eighth Area Army
order, and Seventeenth Army began to redeploy
its units for a holdout campaign. The 6th
Division was assigned to the western and
southern parts of Bougainville, while the 17th
Infantry Group was deployed along the east
coast. The main body of each unit was
pulled from the line behind covering rear-
guard actions and proceeded to the Erventa and
Kieta areas, respectively. By this time sea
and air communications with Rabaul were
almost completely cut off, and it became neces-
sary for the units on Bougainville to maintain
their fighting strength by becoming totally
self-sufficient. So successfully was this accom-
plished that the defenders were still in posses-
sion of the greater part of the island at the
of hostilities.

Southeast Area Situation, March 1944

The nine-month period which ended on 30
March 1944 had witnessed a serious disintegra-
tion of the Japanese position in the southeast
area under the impact of swift, overpowering
blows by the Allied forces, severe attrition of
ground, sea and air strength, and insurmount-
able logistical difficulties.

The vast quantities of men and material
which were poured into the area had not sufficed
to turn the tide.'" Despite the utmost efforts
of the area army and navy commands, and
despite the fortitude and endurance of the

officers and men of both fighting services under
conditions of severe hardship, Lae and Sala-
maua, New Georgia, Kolombangara, the
Ramu Valley, Finschhafen, Cape Gloucester,
Saidor, the Admiralties and part of Bougainville
had been wrested from Japanese hands in a
series of disheartening reverses.

Moreover, as a consequence of the Allied
seizure of the Admiralties, approximately 175,
000 army troops and naval personnel in eastern
New Britain and Rabaul, on Bougainville and
New Ireland had been by-passed and isolated
in the wake of battle, and were henceforth
unable to make any significant contribution to
the war effort." 1

On the New Guinea front. Eighteenth Army,
also cut completely off from Rabaul by the loss
of the Admiralties and Cape Gloucester, was
forced to move the center of its resistance to
the west. The seizure of the Admiralties also
created the grave possibility that the next Allied
attack in New Guinea might be much more
ambitious than a move merely against the area
east of Hansa Bay. Consequently, Eighteenth
Army was forced to begin full-scale defensive
preparations at Wewak and Aitape as well.
(Plate No. 63)

On 10 March Lt. Gen. Adachi ordered the
main body of the 41st Division to proceed to
Hansa Bay and begin organizing the defenses
of that area. The Eighteenth Army command

oti 17 March, and only the Shoge Detachment,

111 Total army and navy forces dispatched to the southeast area from the initial invasion of the Bismarcks up
to March 1944 aggregated roughly 300,000. The Army alone supplied i,8oo aircraft and 2,000 pilots. Both the
Army and Navy sent the largest consignments of newly manufactured planes to the southeast area. Arms and am-
munition enough to equip six combat divisions passed through or were stocked at Rabaul. The Navy lost 50 combat
ships and 300,000 tons of transport shipping. (Statements by Col. Kumao Imoto, Staff Officer (Operations), Eighth
Area Army ; and Cape. Ohmae, Col. Takayama and Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.)

112 Distribution of isolated Eighth Area Army troops was as follows: Rabaul area, 56,512; Bougainville,
31,024; New Ireland, 8,082. Total Army troops, 95,618. In addition there were 12,416 military labor personnel,
mostly in the Rabaul area, and about 53,000 naval shore personnel throughout the Army area. Grand total, aboul
161,000 (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part IV, op. cit., pp. 324-5 (2) Statistics complied by 2d Demo-
bilization Bureau, Nov 50.

248

consisting of ebments of the 41st Division, was
left in Maclang as an outpost guard." 1 The
51st Division was ordered to proceed with ail
possible haste to Wewak to organize ground
defenses, while the 20th Division was given
the same mission in the Aitape area.

In view of the fart that the outpost line in
the southeast area had now been seriously
breached, Imperial General Headquarters has-
tened action to organize and strengthen the new
national defense zone in western New Guinea.

On 25 March the Second Area Army, under
command of General Korechika Anami, with
headquarters at Davao on Mindanao, absorb-
ed the Fourth Air Army and the Eighteenth
Army in the New Guinea area. Responsibility
for operations west of the 147th meridian was
transferred to the Second Area Army, while
east of this line the isolated Eighth Area
Army, supported by the Southeast Area Fleet,
was to continue the defense of eastern New
Britain, New Ireland, and Bougainville,

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113 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 21-2.

249

CHAPTER X

WESTERN NEW GUINEA OPERATIONS

Strategic Planning

By April of 1944, under the impact of Gen-
eral Mac Arthur's two-pronged offensive against
the Japanese forward line in the southeast area
and the parallel enemy thrust into the outer
defense rampart of the Central Pacific mandated
islands, the operational center of gravity in the
Pacific theater of war was moving relentlessly
closer to the line which the Army-Navy Central
Agreement of 30 September 1943 had defined
as the boundary of Japan's " absolute zone of
national defense."'

In drafting this agreement, Army and Navy
strategists recognized that the continuous at-
tenuation of Japan's fighting potential made it
unwise, if not impossible, to attempt a decisive
defense of the existing Pacific front line under
the increasing weight of Allied offensives.
Therefore, the mission of the forces in
Northeast New Guinea, the Bismarcks,
Solomons, Marshall and Gilbert Islands
was limited to one of strategic delay, and
plans were laid to build a main line of resistance

along a restricted perimeter from the Marianas
and Carolines to Western New Guinea and the
Banda and Flores Seas/ These were to be
flanked by the Bonins and Kuriles to the
north and the Sundas to the west.

The essential points of the Army-Navy
Central Agreement embodying this vital revi-
sion of Central and South Pacific war strategy
were as follows : s

1. Key points in the southeast area, extending
from Eastern New Guinea to the Solomon Islands,
mil be held as long as possible by destroying enemy
forces whenever they attack,*

2. With a view to the rapid completion of
counteroffensive preparations, the following missions
will be accomplished by the spring of 1944 :

a. Defenses will be strengthened, and tactical
bases developed, in the areas of the Marianas and
Caroline Islands, Western New Guinea, and the
Banda and Flores Seas.

b. Baiei will be developed in the Philippines
area for strategic and logistic support.

c. Ground, sea, and air strength will be built
up in preparation for counteroffensive action.

3. In the event of an enemy approach toward
the areas mentioned in paragraph 2a, powerful com-

1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Capt. Atsushi Oi, Imperial Japanese Navy. Duty assign-
ments of this officer were as follows: Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry, Jan 41 — Mar 43; Executive Officer, 21st
Base Force (Soerabaja), 23 Mar-25 Jun 43 ; Staff Officer 1st Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Section, 2 Jul-14 Nov 43; Staff Officer (Operations), General Escort Command, 15 Nov 43-21 Aug 45. All
source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 Cf. Plate No. 57, Chapter IX.

3 Daikaishi Dai Nihyakuhacbiju-go Bessatsu l Chunambu Taikeiya Hornen Riku-kaigun Chuo Kyotei ^cf$taS?31f A
+MBIlfH} c f , lSnf^:¥ff^'fiiFJi6¥ r }' 1 ifetSS (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 280, Annex: Army-
Navy Central Agreement re Central and South Pacific) 30 Sep 43.

4 Cf. Chapter IX for discussion of Eighth Area Army and Southeast Area Fleet plans implementing the Central
Agreement provisions for Eastern New Guinea, New Britain and the Solomons.

250

ponents of all arms mil be concentrated against his
main attacking front, and every means will be
employed to destroy his forces by counteroffensive
action before the attack is launched.

4. After the middle of 1944, if conditions permit,
offensive operations will be undertaken fro n the area
including Western New Guinea and the Banda and
Flores Seas. Separate study will be made to determine
the front on which such operations should be launched,
and necessary preparations will be carried out accord-
ingly.

The deadline fixed by Imperial General
Headquarters for the completion of preparations
along the new defense perimeter was based upon
the estimate that full-scale Allied offensive
operations against either the Western New
Guinea or Marianas-Carolines sectors of the
line, or possibly against both sectors simulta-
neously, would develop by the spring and
summer of 1944. Although a six months'
period was thus allowed for execution of the
program, its actual start was somewhat delayed.
Moreover, the scope of preparations envisaged
was so vast that it was problematical whether
the nation's material and technical resources
would be equal to the task.

Primary emphasis in these preparations was
placed upon the development of air power.
After the bitter lessons taught by the south-
east area campaigns of 1942—43, Army and
Navy strategists unanimously agreed that the
air forces must be the pivotal factor in future
operations, whether defensive or offensive. To
successfully defend the new " absolute defense
zone " against the steadily mounting enemy air
strength, they believed it imperative to have
55,000 planes produced annually. At the
same time a large number of air bases,
echeloned in depth and mutually supporting,

had to be built and equipped over the widely
dispersed areas of the new defense zone.

To meet the first of these requirements was
impossible considering the current production
level and the overall natural resources.' There-
fore, at the Imperial conference of 30 Septem-
ber 1943, a compromise was reached which set
a production goal of 40,000 planes for the fiscal
year 1944, a goal still thought extremely
difficult to attain. The airfield construction
program was equally ambitious. In the
area embracing Western New Guinea, the
Moluccas, Celebes, and the islands of the
Banda and Flores Seas, where the existing
number of fields totalled only 27, plans were
laid for the construction of 96 entirely new
airfields and the completion of 7 others al-
ready partially built, bringing the total number
of airfields planned for the area to 120.* This
program was to be completed by the spring or,
at latest, by the summer of 1944.

Although the central strategic concept of the
new defense zone was one of powerful air
forces rapidly deployable to prepared bases
in any threatened sector, it was also obviously
essential to build up adequate ground defenses
to protect these bases from attack. In the
early stages of the war, troops and materiel
had been thrown into the exterior perimeter
of advance, and development of a reliable
inner defense system had been neglected. The
powerful Allied offensives of 1943 in the
southeast area aggravated this situation by
drawing off and consuming a large portion
of Japanese war strength, with the result that
rear-area defenses in Western New Guinea,
the Carolines and Marianas remained seriously
weak and, at some points, non-existent. The

5 Monthly aircraft production figures for the period August —October 1943 were as follows : August, [,360 ;
September, 1,470 ; October, 1,620. Dai Toa Senso Shmen ni kansuru Shiryo ^&&"^B?&KMi~ b~&P( ( Data Bearing
on the Termination of the Greater East Asia War) Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 14 Aug 45, p. 22.

6 Imperial General Headcjuarters Navy Directive No. 280, Annex, op. cit.

251

plan to forge these areas into a main line
of resistance consequently necessitated the
movement of substantial troop reinforcements
and a large volume of supplies.

In view of Russia's continued neutrality
and a relatively quiet situation on the China
front, Imperial General Headquarters decided
to redeploy a number of troop units from
the Continent to the areas along the new
Pacific defense line. The transportation of
these units, however, presented a difficult pro-
blem because of the serious depletion of ship
bottoms. The Army and Navy pressed for the
allocation of additional non-military shipping
to military use, but the tonnage demanded
was far in excess of what could be spared with-
out impairing the movement of raw materials
urgently required for the war production
program. The compromise figure of 250,000
tons finally agreed upon at the Imperial con-
ference of 30 September was barely enough to
compensate for losses of military shipping in
current operations. 7 However, it was considered
the maximum that could be drawn from the
non-military shipping pool, which itself was
below existing requirements. 8

The critical shipping situation and the dif-
ficulties of procuring defense equipment greatly
retarded the reinforcement of the new defense
zone. At the end of 1943 the Marianas and
Carolines, forming a vital sector of the peri-

meter line, were still garrisoned only by
skeleton naval base forces.

Western New Guinea, lying directly astride
the axis of General MacArthur's advance, also
was weakly held by scattered naval base units
and Army line of communications troops. The
only sector adequately manned was the south-
ern flank of the line in the Banda and Flores
Seas area, the defenses of which had been
comparatively well organized by the Nineteenth

with headquarters at Ambon. 9

Western New Guinea Defenses

To provide for the defense of Western New
Guinea, Imperial General Headquarters had
decided at the end of October to transfer from
Manchuria the headquarters of the Second
Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Fusataro Te-
shima, and to assign to it two first-line divisions,
the 3d and 36th, then stationed in China. At
the same time, it was decided to relieve the
Second Area Army headquarters of its current
duties in Manchuria and to place it in com-
mand of both the Second and Nineteenth
Armies, thus unifying the direction of Army
forces in the Western New Guinea and Banda-
Flores Sea sectors.' General Korechika Anami,
Second Area Army commander, provisionally
established his headquarters at Davao, in
the southern Philippines, on 23 Novem-

7 Gun Hoyu Sempaku Hendo ni kansuru Sbuyo Jiko Iftffi^OftSIKfKlfSfl:^ 5 ^Sj-SPl (Principal Matters Pertain-
ing to Changes in Military Shipping) Shipping Division, General Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Transportation, 20
Jan 46.

8 As of 1 September 1943, 2,497,000 gross tons of shipping were available for non-military use, while 2,844,000
gross tons were allocated to the Army and Navy. Even prior to the planning of the huge aircraft production program,
the minimum estimated tonnage requirement for non-military use was 3,000,000 tons. Ibid.

9 Main combat strength of the Nineteenth Army consisted of the 5th Division on the Aroe, Kai, and Tanim-
bar Islands, and the 48th Division on Timor. These were reinforced in February 1944 by the 46th Division (less
145th Infantry Regt.), which was stationed on Soemba Island, west of Timor. (Interrogation of Col. Kazuo Horiba,
Staff Officer (Operations), Second Area Army.)

to Daihonyei Rikugun Tosui Kiroku jz^i£WW-WMi\!.& (Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command
Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Nov 46, pp. 186-7.

252

ber," and on i December assumed operational
command of the Second and Nineteenth
Armies, the 7th Air Division, and the 1st
Field Base Unit." Also by 1 December,
Second Army headquarters had moved to
Manokwari, Dutch New Guinea, where Lt.
Gen. Teshima took command of forces in the
assigned Army area.

The operational zone assigned to the Second
Area Army extended on the west to the Makas-
sar and Lombok Straits, on the north to five
degrees N. Latitude, and on the east to the
140th meridian, which marked the boundary
with the Eighth Area Army. (Plate No. 64)
Within this zone, the Area Army was to
exercise direct command over the northern
Moluccas, northeastern Celebes, and Talaud
Islands. The Nineteenth Army remained charg-
ed with operations in the Banda-Flores Seas
area, and the Second Army was assigned
responsibility for all of Dutch New Guinea
west of the 140th meridian.''

Imperial General Headquarters instructed
General Anami that the main defensive effort
of the Area Army should be made in Western
New Guinea. However, when the new com-

mand dispositions went into effect on r Decem-
ber, the situation of the Second Army was
hardly favorable for the establishment of strong
defenses in this area. The 36th Division was
still en route from China, while the 3d Division,
operating on the Central China front, had not
yet been released for shipment, with the result
that there was not a single ground combat unit
in the entire Army zone. Nor could Nine-
teenth Army furnish reinforcements since its
two (later three) combat divisions were scattered
over the many islands of the Banda and Flores
Seas, then still considered a vital sector of the
defense zone.' 4 Moreover, the shortage of ship-
ping and the menace of Allied air and sub-
marine attacks militated against the ready
transfer of units from the Nineteenth Army area
to Western New Guinea.

Although the situation improved with the
arrival of the main elements of the 36th Divi-
sion' 5 on 25 December, Second Army troop
strength was still inadequate to assure the
defense of its broad operational zone. Pending
final formulation of an over-all defense plan for
Western New Guinea, Lt. Gen. Teshima sta-

1 1 The provisional Area Army headquarters was set up at Davao in accordance with a directive by Imperial
Genera! Headquarters. It was not until 26 April, following the Holtandia landing, that the headquarters finally ad-
vanced into the Area Army's operational zone, establishing itself at Menado, in the northern Celebes. Gohoku Sakusen
Kiroku 8E4l:ffciltfrII& (North of Australia Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Jul 46, pp. 13-4, 107.

12 The 1st Field Base Unit was activated in Japan in October and assigned to Second Area Army to control all
service and rear-echelon units in the Area Army zone of direct command. The zd Field Base Unit, activated simultan-
eously, was assigned to Second Army to perform the same mission in Western New Guinea. Both were commanded
by major generals and were the only headquarters of this type in the southern area. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kotaro
Katogawa, Staff Officer (Operations), Second Area Army,)

13 North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 38-9.

14 Ibid., pp. 24-5.

15 The 36th Division, with a total strength of about 13,700, had been reorganized as a regimental combat team
type division and equipped for amphibious operations. The artillery regiment was dropped, and a battalion of light
artillery was made an organic part of each infantry regiment. Order of battle was as follows :

Division Headquarters 36th Division Tank Unit (four companies)

222d Infantry 36th Division Signal Unit (one company)

223d Infantry 36th Division Transport Unit

224th Infantry 36th Division Sea Transport Unit

North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit. Annex I, Attached Table 1.

253

PLATE NO. 64
Dispositions in New Guinea, 21 April 1944

Sarmi. The 222c! Infantry, reinf. was dispatch-
ed to Biak Island to begin organizing the
defenses of that strategic position.

The Second Army's plan for the defense of
Western New Guinea emphasized the impor-
tance of securing Geelvink Bay. This plan
was based upon the availability of only two
divisions, the troop strength originally allotted
by the High Command. The three key posi-
tions in this defense scheme were the Sarmi-
Wakde area, Biak Island, and Manokwari.' 6
As finally decided on 8 January, the outline of
planned strength dispositions was as follows :' 7

SarmiWakde One division (less one inf. regt.)

East Japen
Koeroedoe I.
Noeboai
Biak

Manokwari
IVissel Lake

One inf. regt. (reinf.)

One division (less one regiment)
One regt. (less one battalion)
One battalion

Under this plan, the 222d Infantry was to
continue its interim mission of organizing the
defenses of Biak Island until relieved by the
3d Division. The regiment would then proceed
to garrison the east Geelvink Bay sector.

While initial attention was focussed on the
Geelvink Bay area, the Second Area Army
command was also concerned over the weak
condition of the defenses of Hollandia, which
lay just east of the 140th meridian in the
Eighth Area Army zone of responsibility. An
order to dispatch an element of the 36th Divi-
sion to that sector was issued but was quickly
revoked on the ground that it would weaken
the defenses of Geelvink Bay without ap-
preciably strengthening Hollandia.' 8 A large
section of the New Guinea coast between
Wewak and Sarmi thus remained practically
undefended. General Anami promptly dis-

patched a staff mission to Eighth Area Army
headquarters at Rabaul to press for reinforce-
ment of the Hollandia area, and a similar
recommendation was communicated to Imperial
General Headquarters during December. The
6th South Seas Detachment (two battalions),
temporarily stationed on Palau, was dispatched
by the High Command. No other action was
taken, however, since both Eighth Area Army
and Eighteenth Army, after the loss of Finsch-
hafen, were more immediately concerned with
checking further enemy penetration of the
Dampier Strait region.

Though unsuccessful in obtaining action on
Hollandia, General Anami continued to press
the organization of defenses within the Second
Army zone in Western New Guinea despite
severe handicaps. Troop strength remained
seriously short, and in addition the prospects
of adequate air and naval support were discour-
aging. The 7th Air Division, with headquar-
ters on Ambon, in the Moluccas, was the only
air unit assigned to Second Area Army and
was currently recuperating from heavy losses.
Operations in eastern New Guinea between
August and November, had cut down its
strength to only about 50 operational aircraft.' 9
This meager force was devoted almost ex-
clusively to shipping escort missions in the
rear areas.

The prospects for naval air support were no
more encouraging. In case of an enemy attack
directed at Western New Guinea, the Second
Area Army could count upon the cooperation
of the 23d Air Flotilla based at Kendari, in the
Celebes, but the operational strength of this
unit was likewise down to about 50 planes, and
most of its experienced pilots had been trans-
ferred to the naval air forces at Rabaul during

16 Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, Chief of Staff, Second Area Army.

17 Outline of Operational Preparations, Second Army, 8 Jan 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1457, 20 Sept 44.

18 North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., p. 48.

19 Statement by Lt. Col. Katogawa, previously cited.

255

the Solomons and Papuan campaigns. 30 More- weak and uniformly small. During earlier
over, despite the withdrawal of the main operations in the southeast area, Army troops
defense line to Western New Guinea and the had received substantial support from naval
Carolines, the Navy continued to maintain its base forces and special landing forces, but in
most efficient carrier flying units on land bases Western New Guinea the naval base forces
in the Rabaul area to serve as a forward strate- were too small. These were widely scattered
gic air barrier. This policy resulted not only at Hollandia, Wakde, Manokwari, Nabire, and
in the steady depletion of the fleet air arm but Sorong. 21

in the immobilization of the carrier strength In the light of these unfavorable conditions,

which otherwise might have been capable of it was obvious that Second Area Army could

not accomplish the organization of Western
New Guinea defenses without substantial re-
inforcements of well-trained and well-equipped
line units, as well as air strength. In mid-
January, therefore, General Anami forwarded
an urgent request to Tokyo for more troops.
Imperial General Headquarters responded
promptly with a plan to allot 15 infantry
battalions, three heavy artillery regiments, and
one tank regiment, in addition to the 14th
Division, which the High Command now plan-
ned to assign to Second Area Army in place of
the 3d Division."

These reinforcements, together with the
necessary service and supply elements, would
boost the strength of the Area Army from
approximately 170,000 to about 320,000 troops.
The 14th Division was scheduled to arrive by
the end of March, while the other combat
units were to complete their movement to
Western New Guinea by May. 2 ' The transport
of service troops was to continue through
July.

20 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 1946.
Vol. II, pp. 287-8. (Interrogation of Capt. Hironaka fComoto, Staff Officer (Operations), 23d Air Flotilla.)

21 Statement by Comdr, Masataka Chihaya, Staff Officer (Operations), Fourth Expeditionary Fleet.

22 The previous plan to transfer the 3d Division was cancelled because the division could not be released from
its commitments in Central China. The 14th Division, currently stationed in Manchuria, was formally reassigned to
Second Area Army on 10 February. (1) North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., p. 50. (2) Imperial General
Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 188.

23 The 14th Division was to be deployed as previously planned for the 3d Division, i.e., the division main
strength in the Biak area, and one regiment in the Manokwari area. The other combat reinforcements were to be
deployed as follows: Sorong, three infantry battalions ; Halmahera, nine infantry battalions ; Area Army reserve, three
infantry battalions (each of these forces to have appropriate supporting artillery and tank units). (Statement by Lt.
Col. Katogawa, previously cited.)

providing air support at any threatened point
of the main defense line.

The only naval surface combat forces in the
immediate vicinity of the Second Area Army
operational zone were the t6th Cruiser Division
{Asbigara, Kuma, Kitakami, Kinu) and the 19th
Destroyer Division (Shikinami, Uranami, Shi-
gure), both under command of the Southwest
Area Fleet with headquarters at Soerabaja.
Charged with naval missions covering the area
from the Indian Ocean to Western New
Guinea, this fleet obviously had insufficient
strength to provide support against an eventual
enemy attack against the north coast of Dutch
New Guinea. Meanwhile, the Second Fleet,
containing the bulk of the Navy's battleships,
was in the Truk area. Without attached carrier
forces, however, its role was not offensive but
merely to act as a fleet-in-being to deter enemy
attack.

Naval ground forces in Western New
Guinea under the command of the Fourth

Fleet stationed at Ambon, were

256

As a further step to bolster the southern
sector of the national defense zone, Imperial
General Headquarters in December 1943 began
contemplating an important modification of the
command dispositions then in force. Principal-
ly to assure the mobility and economical use of
air power and shipping resources, it was
proposed to combine the Fourteenth Army in
the Philippines and the Second Area Army in
the Western New Guinea — eastern Dutch
East Indies area under the higher command of
Southern Army, at the same time restricting
them to ground forces only and placing the
Third and Fourth Air Armies, as well as
shipping groups, directly under Southern Army
command. Such a step was also deemed neces-
sary to assure that Southern Army would
transfer primary emphasis from the Astatic
mainland to the Pacific front, now clearly the
decisive battlefront of the war. M

Before this proposal had a chance to reach
concrete form, developments on the Central
Pacific front temporarily usurped the attention
of Imperial General Headquarters, with the
result that the final orders directing the modi-
fication of the command set-up were not issued
until 27 March 1944. The effective date of
the new dispositions was fixed at 15 April.

Setbacks to Defense Preparations

The suddenly increased tempo of the enemy
advance in the Central Pacific during February
gave rise to strong belief that an amphibious
assault might develop against the Marianas or
Carolines sector of the main defense line at
any time." 1 This impending danger led the
Army and Navy High Commands to press
successfully for the transfer to military use
of an additional 300,000 gross tons of
non-military shipping during the months of
February, March and April."

First priority was assigned by Imperial Gen-
eral Headquarters to the movement of troops,
munitions, and supplies to the Marianas and
Carolines. Since military tonnage, despite the
scheduled 300,000-ton increase, still fell below
requirements, this decision necessitated the
deferment of scheduled troop and supply ship-
ments to other areas. In the latter part of
February Imperial General Headquarters noti-
fied General Anami that the shipping alloca-
tion to second Area Army was being tempo-
rarily suspended due to the urgency of the
Central Pacific situation. This of course
meant a critical delay in the program to
reinforce Western New Guinea.' 7

24 (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 255, 229. (2) Statement
by Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

25 Following the enemy invasion of Kwajalein on 1 February, a powerful American naval task force carried out
a destructive two-day attack on the key Japanese fleet base of Truk in the Carolines on 17-18 February, while an enemy
amphibious force simultaneously landed on Eniwetok in the western Marshalls. These startling developments had sharp
repercussions in the Army and Navy High Commands. On 21 February General Tojo, already serving concurrently
as Premier and War Minister, took over the post of Chief of Army General Staff from Field Marshal Sugiyama,
and Navy Minister Admiral Shigetaro Shimada concurrently assumed the post of Chief of Navy General Staff, replacing
Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano.

26 Principal Matters Pertaining to Changes in Military Shipping, op. cit.

27 On 10 March the chiefs of staff of all major subordinate commands under Second Area Army met at Davao
for a conference on operational matters. In view of the suspension of the Area Army's shipping allocation, a major
problem considered was an emergency plan for Western New Guinea to meet a possible enemy attack before the deploy-
ment of reinforcements to the theater could be carried out. Under this plan, the 36th Division in the Sarmi area was
to prepare to move rapidly against an enemy force which might land to the east of Sarmi, but at the same time Second
Army was to spread out its available forces to secure as many key points as possible. An implementing Second Army
order issued 29 March called for the stationing of small units on W.n'geo and Mapia Islands and at various points along
the north coast of the Vogelkop Peninsula, while two companies were detached from the 222d Infantry on Biak to
garrison Noemfoor and Sorong. The 2d Field Base Unit commander at Manokwari was placed in command of the
Geelvink Bay defenses to the west of Biak. (1) North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 49, 51,-81 -3.
(2) Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, previously cited. (3) Second Army Operations Order No. 5}, 29
Mar 44. ATIS Bullerin No. 1457, 20 Sep 44.

257

The suspension also led to changes in troop
allocation plans. The 14th Division, previously

allotted to Second Area Army, was

on 20 March to the newly-activated Thirty-first
Army for the defense of the Marianas and
Carolines. 38 In its place Imperial General
Headquarters early in April assigned the 35th
Division to Second Area Army, directing
employment of the division main strength on
Western New Guinea. 11 ' However, the actual
movement of the division main elements from
China still had to await restoration of Second
Area Army's shipping allocation.

In addition to, and partially as the result of,
the shortage of shipping, slow progress in both
the aircraft production and airfield construction
programs seriously undermined the entire plan
for the new Pacific defense line. Average
monthly production for the period January-
April 1944 was about 2,200.'° This did not
augur well for the attainment of the production
goal of 40,000 planes for the fiscal year 1944.
The prospects were even darker due to the
fast dwindling cargo-carrying bottoms resulting
from the transfer to the military of 30,000
tons and the tremendous losses from enemy
action in recent months.

The ambitious air base construction program
for Western New Guinea and the eastern
Netherlands East Indies had meanwhile bogged
down seriously. In these areas even combat
units had been put to work as labor troops
in an effort to carry out the plans formulated
by Tokyo, but shortages of materials, trans-
portation capacity, available field labor, and
mechanized equipment, together with de-
ficiencies in engineering technique, slowed
down progress to a minimum. Less than one-
third of the projected bases was completed by
the time they were critically needed, and the
funneling of effort into their construction
materially delayed other operational prepara-
tions by the field forces. Of the 35 new airfields
planned for the Western New Guinea area, only
nine were available for use by the end of April
1944. All other installations used by the air
forces during the Western New Guinea cam-
paign had already been in existence prior to the
start of the construction program. J1

Despite the lack of progress in aircraft
production and the building of new bases, the
Army and Navy made serious efforts to re-
plenish their first-line air strength, both in
planes and pilots, in preparation for decisive

28 North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., p. 50

29 In a directive dated 4 April supplementing the assignment order, Imperial General Headquarters specified that
the 219th Infantry Regiment, currently in Japan, was to be detached from the 35th Division to garrison the St. Andrew
Islands, lying between Patau and Western New Guinea. The regiment embarked from Yokohama on 6 April for
Palau together with the 35th Division headquarters, which was to trans-ship at Palau for Western New Guinea. Since
detachment of an entire regiment would seriously upset existing plans for the defense of the Geelvink Bay area, General
Anami instituted negotiations with Imperial General Headquarters while the convoy was en route to Palau and succeeded
in obtaining a modification of the 4 April directive. Imperial General Headquarters now agreed to the trans-shipment
of the main strength of the 219th Infantry from Palau to Western New Guinea, leaving only one battalion to garrison
the St. Andrew Islands. (1) Dairikmhi Ddi Senkyuhyakuyonjuni-go ^M^u'Ht'j^jl.W—^t (Imperial General Headquarters
Army Directive No. 1942) 4 Apr 44. (2) Statement by Lt. Col. Katogawa, previously cited. (3) Personal diary
belonging to a member of 35th Division covering the period 1 Apr-16 Jul 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1500, 12 Oct 44.

30 Monthly production figures during this period were: January, 1,815; February, 2,060; March, 2,711 ; April,
2,296. Data Bearing on the Termination of the Greater East Asia War, op. cit., p. 22.

31 The nine new airfields built in Western New Guinea under the September 1943 program were at Hollandia
(Sentani and Cyclops), Sarmi (Sawar), Biak (Mokmer and Sortdo), Noemfoor (Kamiri), Moemi, Manokwari and Sorong.
In addition, six existing airstrips were improved, (1) 6th Air Division Operations Order (undated), ATIS Bulletin
No. 1 177, 22 Jun 44. (2) Statement by Comdr. Chihaya, previously cited.

258

Original Painting by Tothi Shimizu

PLATE NO. 65
Japanese Engineer Activities in South Pacific

battle along the new defense line. During the
latter part of February, the Navy began deploy-
ing the newly trained and constituted First Air
Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Kakuji
Kakuta, to the Marianas and Carolines. The
primary mission of the Air Fleet was to coun-
ter any enemy attack in these two sectors,
but it was also to extend its cover to Western
New Guinea. The deployment had barely
begun, however, when a heavy setback was
received. On 23 February, enemy carrier forces
struck the Marianas, and in the engagement
most of the planes of the First Air Fleet advance
echelon, which had just arrived from the home-
land, were either destroyed or heavily damaged.* 3
The Fourth Air Army in Northeast New
Guinea, now consisting of only the 6th Air
Division and 14th Air Brigade, was also under
increasing enemy pressure. On 25 and 26
March Allied planes struck in fcrce at the Air
Army's Wewak bases. Only a few elements
remained there at the time of these attacks,
since the Air Army headquarters and the bulk
of its strength had displaced to Hollandia on
25 March coincident with the transfer of all
Army forces in Northeast New Guinea to
Second Area Army command. 31 However,
the attacks rendered Wewak useless as a
forward base, and between 30 March and 3
April the Allied air forces extended their
attacks to the Hollandia area. There they
succeeded in destroying not only most of the

Fourth Air Army's remaining combat strength,
but a large number of aircraft transferred
earlier from Sumatra."

In the closing days of March, new naval
developments in the Central Pacific rendered
it painfully certain that Japanese defenses in
Western New Guinea would have to bear the
brunt of enemy amphibious attacks without
opposition by the main strength of the fleet.
At this time, Admiral Mineicht Koga, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, was
aboard his flagship, the 64,000-ton battleship
Musasbi, at Koror Anchorage in the Palau
Islands, where he also had at his disposal
Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's Second Fleet. w
However, the Navy's carrier forces (all of which
had been assigned to the Third Fleet) were
dispersed at Singapore and in the home islands
undergoing reconstitution and training.

This was the situation when, on 26 March,
Admiral Koga received reports that a strong
American carrier force was moving into the
waters between Palau and Western New
Guinea. Without carrier strength of his own,
Admiral Koga decided that the circumstances
were not propitious for the decisive battle which
was the central objective of the Combined
Fleet. 5 * He therefore released the .Musasbi
to Vice Adm. Kurita and ordered the latter to
put to sea with the Second Fleet, while the
Combined Fleet headquarters transferred a-
shore. The fleet battle forces sortied on 29

32 Total strength of the First Air Fleet was about 500 land-based aircraft. The advance echelon, which had
reached the Marianas prior to the American carrier force attack, numbered about 120 planes. USSBS, Interrogations of
Japanese Officials, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 376. (Interrogation of Capt. Mitsuo Fuchida, Senior Staff Officer, First Air Fleet.)

33 Cf. Chapter IX.

34 In

late January 1944* Imperial General Headquarters, anticipating the enemy invasion of Madang, ordered
the transfer of three air regiments from Sumatra to New Guinea. Although these units were assigned to the Second
Area Army, they were directed to operate with the Fourth Air Army. (1) North of Australia Operations Record,
op. cit., p. 49. (2) Dairikushi Dai Senhappyakunijuroku-go A'P4H n fe f A TT— + (Imperial General Headquarters
Army Directive No. 1826) 31 Feb 44.

35 The battle line of the Second Fleet, not including the Musashi, consisted of four battleships, n cruisers and
four destroyer divisions. A-Go Sakusen £>S<)cft-i& {A-Co Operation) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Aug 47, p. 17.

36 Combined Fleet policy at this time was to refrain from committing its main battle strength in local opera-
tions in order to keep it intact for one decisive battle. USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, op. cit. Vol. II,
p. 516. (Interrogation of Vice Adm, Shigeru Fukudome, Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet.)

260

March to await further orders in the waters
northwest of Palau. At the same time the
First Air Fleet was ordered to dispatch land-
based fighter strength to Palau as speedily as
possible to operate against the enemy task
force. First Air Fleet attack bombers were to
continue operating from the Marianas.* 7

From dawn of 30 March until dusk on 1
April, aircraft from the enemy carriers carried
out devastating raids on the Palau Islands,
Yap, and Woleai. Land installations were
severely damaged ; two destroyers and 22 fleet
auxiliaries and merchant ships were sunk ;
and anchorages and channels were sewn with
magnetic mines. Attempts by First Air Fleet
planes to stem the attacks only resulted in
heavy losses, totaling more than 100 aircraft,
with comparatively little damage to the attack-
ing force.' 8 Moreover, Admiral Koga and
part of his staff were lost while flying from the
main island of Palau to Davao to transfer
Combined Fleet headquarters."

Aircraft losses in the Carolines battle so
reduced the strength of the First Air Fleet that
it was no longer capable of any significant
contribution to the defense of Western New

Guinea. In addition, the Second Fleet, deprived
of the use of its base at Koror Anchorage, was
ordered to return to home waters to reorganize
and continue preparations for future decisive
battle. The Second Area Army thus lost all
hope, at least for the time being, of obtaining
naval air or surface support from the Central
Pacific.

Hollandia- — Aitape

The beginning of April 1944 found Imperial
General Headquarters still concerned primarily
with preparations to defend the Marianas and
Carolines against threatened American attack
from the Central Pacific, but also forced to pay
heed to mounting signs of an early offensive by
MacArthur's forces in the New Guinea area.
The carrier strike against the western Carolines
at the end of March, together with the rising
tempo of air attacks on Japanese bases along the
north coast of New Guinea, seemed to fore-
shadow such a move. At the same time, there
was an ominous intensification of enemy espio-
nage and amphibious patrol activity along the
coast from Madang as far west as Hollandia. 40

37 USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 520. (Interrogation of Vice Adm. Shigeru
Fukudome, previously cited.)

38 (1) USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 432. (Interrogation of Comdr. Chikataka
Nakajima, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Combined Fleet.) (2) Dai Niji Sekai Taisen Ryaku.eki Otsu t£3ft$MMsft
[l)ft/|f Z Abridged Chronicle of World War II, B) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Mar 46, No. 2, p. 32, No. 3, p. 1.

39 Admiral Koga and most of bis staff took off from Palau aboard two planes on the evening of 31 March.
The flying boat carrying Admiral Koga was never heard from again, while the second plane carrying the Chief of
Staff, Vice Adm. Fukudome, made a forced landing off Cebu Island, in the central Philippines, after detouring off
course to avoid a typhoon. Vice Adm. Fukudome was picked up from the sea by Filipino guerrillas and taken to
the headquarters of Col. James P. Cushing, American guerrilla leader on Cebu, Badly injured, he was shortly released
to the Japanese authorities in exchange for a promise to stop retaliatory action against Filipino civilians. Admiral
Koga's death was not publicly announced until 5 May, together with the announcement of Admiral Soemu Toyoda's
appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. During the interim, Vice Adm. Shiro Takasu, Southwest
Area Fleet Commander, was placed in acting command of the Combined Fleet. (1) USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese
Officials, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 520. (Interrogation of Vice Adm. Fukudome, previously cited.) (2) Statement by Rear
Adm. Iwao Kawai, Personnel Bureau, Navy Ministry.

40 On 24 March it was reported that a group of enemy agents had landed from a submarine in Tanahmerah
Bay. A similar incident was reported in late March in the Aitape area, and there was another report that an Allied
plane had dropped a radio instrument by parachute. These and other evidences seemed to indicate that enemy espio-
nage activities were being rapidly expanded. Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono San : Dai Juhachi Gun no Sakusen
"PH Hi ^" rfil" ft ,iL^i* J Ceo = : SH»A5!tofiMR ( Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III : Eighteenth Army Opera-
tions) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Sep 46, Vol. Ill, pp. 63-4.

261

Ever since the invasion of the Admiralties,
the Eighteenth Army command had anticipated
a new Allied amphibious operation against the
Northeast New Guinea coast by March or April
of 1944, but it had estimated that the target area
would be somewhere to the east of Wewak. 4 '
With the carrier raid on Palau and the extension
of Allied air attacks to Hollandia, a sea ion of
the Eighteenth Army staff saw an increasing
possibility that the objective would lie farther
west, not excluding even the distant Hollandia
area. However, the estimate finally accepted
still placed the most likely area of attack be-
tween Madang and Hansa Bay, including
Karkar Island. Wewak was rated the next
most probable target, with Hollandia least likely
but not entirely excluded. 4 '

One reason for Eighteenth Army's mini-
mization of the immediate danger to Hollandia
was the belief, based on past observation of
General MacArthur's tactics, that landing
operations in that area would not be attempted
until advance bases had been taken, from which
land-based Allied air forces (including fighters)
could neutralize Japanese air bases to the west
of Sarmi and also provide direct support to
the landing forces. 4 ' With the most advanced
Allied bases located at Saidor and in the
Admiralties, almost 500 miles from Hollandia
and over 600 miles from Sarmi, it was considered
almost certain that General MacArthur's next
move would be aimed at seizing a forward

fighter base somewhere between Madang and
Aitape, in preparation for a later invasion of
Hollandia.

The fighter-escorted bomber raids on Hol-
landia in early April forced an upward revision
of the calculated capabilities of enemy fighters
from existing bases. 44 They did not modify
Eighteenth Army's estimate of enemy offensive
plans, however, since effective fighter range for
the continuous type of support required in
amphibious landing operations was still believed
to be only about 300 miles. The possibility
that carrier forces might be borrowed from
the Central Pacific to provide tactical support
was gravely underestimated since none of Gen-
eral MacArthur's previous invasion operations
had been furnished such support.

Other enemy actions also were instrumental
in strengthening Eighteenth Army's belief that
the next blow would fall in the Madang —
Wewak area. One was the unleashing in March
of a heavy air offensive directed at the coastal area
from Wewak eastward, with Wewak itself and
Hansa Bay as the main targets ; another was a
marked augmentation of enemy motor torpedo
boat activity from Dampier Strait west to Han-
sa Bay. 45

Although the next Allied effort was thus
expected to fall short of Hollandia, both Im-
perial General Headquarters and Second Area
Army were strongly convinced that this valuable
base would subsequently be attacked, possibly

41 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 19-21.

42 Ibid., pp. 72-5.

43 Ibid., pp. 73-5.

44 " It was the opinion of our leaders. . . .that Allied fighter planes, which I presume were based at Nadzab,
would not be able to accompany the long-range bombers due to their limited range.. . .However, we were completely
fooled when these fighters were equipped with auxiliary tanks, enabling them to cover the rather long distance to
Hollandia with ease." (Interrogation of Lt. Col. Nobuo Kitamori, Staff Officer (Communications), Second Area
Army.)

45 Access to American operational documents during the preparation of this volume indicates that these enemy
actions were part of a deliberate deception program instituted by General MacArthur's headquarters to cover the planned
invasion of Hollandia and Aitape.

263

as early as June. 46 Not only were the major
base facilities of Fourth Air Army located in
the area, but Hollandia had become an impor-
tant staging point on air transport routes to
Japanese-held areas farther east, 47 as well as the
chief port for logistic support of the Eighteenth
Army. Huge amounts of military supplies were
in open storage along the shore of Humboldt
Bay. All these factors made it appear highly
probable that the enemy eventually would
seek to wrest Hollandia from Japanese control,
especially since it would give the Allies a well-
developed air and sea base, valuable as a staging-
point for large-scale amphibious operations.

Despite growing awareness of the need to
bolster Hollands's defenses, Eighteenth Army
was in no position to take immediate steps to
that end. Although the Army Commander had
issued orders on 10 March for a strengthening
of Aitape, Wewak, and Hansa Bay, the Army
was experiencing great difficulty in moving
troops westward from Hansa Bay because of
the shortage of sea transportation and heavy
enemy air interference from forward bases at
Nadzab and Saidor. 48

Nevertheless, when Second Area Army
assumed operational control of Eighteenth
Army and Fourth Air Army on 25 March,

General Anami promptly ordered Eighteenth
Army to move as soon as possible to the west
of Wewak and consolidate the defense of air
bases, with particular emphasis on the instal-
lations at Aitape and Hollandia. Pursuant
to this order, Lt. Gen. Adachi revised the
existing plan for redeployment of Eighteenth
Army forces along the following lines : 4 *

1. pit Division to move to Hollandia instead of
to Wewak.

2. 41st Division to assume the mission of gam'
soning IVewak instead of Hansa Bay.

3. 20th Division to garrison Aitape, as previously
planned.

Eighteenth Army immediately threw its full
effort into the execution of the revised plan, but
from the outset it faced severe difficulties. Use
of sea routes, normally traversable in a few days,
was interdicted by Allied air and sea superiority,
leaving no alternative but time-consuming
movement overland. Roads were non-existent,
and the native tracks leading west from Hansa
Bay crossed two large rivers, the Ramu and
Sepik, which were completely unfordable near
the coast, and the mouths of which were flanked
by broad stretches of almost impassible man-
grove swampland.' Troop movements were
further hampered by the necessity of keeping

46 (1) " The High Command believed that Wewak would be attacked before Hollandia. . . . Although
we were convinced that the Allies would eventually attack Hollandia, we rather believed that they would attempt to
acquire an important position somewhere east of Aitape (first) " (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Jo Iimura, Chief of Staff,
Southern Army.) (2) " Hollandia was expected to be attacked soon after a preliminary attack on Wewak. However,
the attack on Hollandia was not expected until June." (Interrogation of Col. Arata Yamamoto, Senior Staff Officer
Second Army.) (3) "A study made by Col. Kadomatsu, senior intelligence officer of Second Area Army, estimated
that the Americans would land first at Hansa Bay and then at Hollandia. This estimate was based on a graph of all
enemy landing operations." (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Numata, previously cited.)

47 During January 1944, 94 transport missions were logged through Hollandia en route to Wewak, Madang,
Hansa Bay, Rabaul, and other important bases to the east. Critical cargo, mail, and passengers were thus moved
despite the Allied sea blockade. Transport Journal, Fourth Air Army Liaison Station, Hollandia, Jan 44. ATIS
Enemy Publications No. 170, 14 Aug 44.

48 Statement by Lt. Col. Kengoro Tanaka, Staff Officer (Operations), Eighteenth Army.

49 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 1 2—1 3, 32.

50 At the end of March, about 50 landing barges and 30 fishing and powered sailing vessels were available in
this area. Most of these boats had to be used for ferrying munitions, ordnance and supplies. At the Sepik River, it
was at first impossible to put across more than 50 troops per day on this account, although a maximum of 770 per
day was later reached. It was estimated that it would take until early June to move across all Eighteenth Army
forces, (t) Ibid., pp. 44, 49-50, (2) Statement by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.

264

constantly on the alert for an enemy surprise
landing.

As later events proved, even had Eighteenth
Army been able to adhere to its own timetable
for these movements, they would not have been
completed in time to meet the Allied attack at
Hollandia. Given the most favorable condi-
tions, the first echelon of the 51st Division,
consisting of three infantry battalions, was not
expected to reach Hollandia until late in May.
The 20th Division meanwhile was held up on
the east bank of the Ramu by the shortage of
boats, and its first elements were unable to
leave Hansa Bay for Aitape until early April.

As a stop-gap measure pending the arrival
of the 51st Division, Eighteenth Army in early
April dispatched Maj. Gen. Toyozo Kitazono,
3d Field Transport Unit commander at Hansa
Bay, to Hollandia in order to assume direction
of ground defense preparations by the miscel-
laneous army units already in that area. Just

prior to Maj. Gen. Kitazono's arrival on April
10, Vice Adm. Yoshikazu Endo had temporarily
transferred Ninth Fleet" headquarters from
Wewak to Hollandia. Fourth Air Army
headquarters also was still at Hollandia at this
time but withdrew to Menado immediately
after the Air Army's transfer to direct Southern
Army command became effective on 15 April.
This left Maj. Gen. Masazumi Inada, who had
arrived on 1 1 April to take command of the 6th
Air Division, the highest Army air commander. 51
Due to the brief lapse of time between the
arrival of the new commanders and the Allied
assault on Hollandia, no local agreement for the
coordinated use of all forces had yet been
reached when the attack came." These forces
aggregated about 15,000, including all ground,
air and naval personnel, of which about 1,000
were hospitalized ineffectives. Approximately
80 per cent of the total strength consisted of
service units.' 4 Combat air strength was

51 The Ninth Fleet had no ships of any importance and consisted only of the 2d and 7th Naval Base Forces,
currently at Wewak. The 7th Naval Base Force had just completed a long and costly retreat from Lae-Salamaua via
Madang and was shortly merged with the 2d Naval Base Force to form the 27th Special Naval Base Force. Teikoku
Kaigun Sergi Hensei ^1 H?ifT®#^illJ (Wartime Organization of the Imperial Navy) Navy General Staff, 1944.

52 Maj. Gen. Masazumi Inada had been relieved as 2d Field Base Unit commander at Manokwari to assume
command of the 6th Air Division. Maj. Gen. Shikao Fujitsuka, Chief of Staff, Second Army, took over the 2d Field
Base Unit.

Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit Vol. Ill, pp. 87-8.
Order of battle of Japanese forces in Hollandia at this time was as follows;

53
54

Army Ground and Service Units
Hq., 3d Field Transport Command
Hq., and 1st Bn„ 6th South Seas Detachment
68th Field AAA Bn.
42d Independent Motor Transport Bn.
49th Anchorage
Elms, 31st Anchorage

2.7th Field Depot (Ordnance, Mtr. Trans, Freight)
54th Line of Communications Sector Unit
4th Sea Transport Battalion

79th and 113th Line of Communications Hospital
Misc. sienal, medical, ordnance, motor transport,

68th, 78th, 63d, 248th, 33d, and 77th Fighter Regts.
208th, 34th, and 75th Light Bomber Regts.
7th Air Transport Unit
Hq., 1 8th Air Sector Unit
66th Field AAA Bn.

66th and 39th Field Machine Cannon Cos.
39th Field AAA Co.
3d Searchlight Co.
22d, 38th, and 209th Airfield Bns.
14th Field Air Repair Depot
14th Field Air Supply Depot
Misc. navigation, intelligence, signal, repair,
survey, and construction units.

iisc. signa
field post office, and construction units
Army Air and Air Service Units (no operational aircraft) Naval Units

Hq., 6th Air Division Hq., Ninth Fleet

Hq., 14th Air Brigade 90th Naval Garrison Unit

Hq., Training Brigade 8th Naval Construction Unit

(1) North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 92-3. (2) Chart of Forces Landed at Hollandia, issued by 54th
Line of Communications Unit, Mar 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1055, 20 May 44, (3) Misc. Order Files and Strength
Charts of Units at Hollandia. ATIS Bulletins No. 105 1, 19 May 44; No. 1054, 20 May 44; No. 1139, SJun 44 ;
No. 1 177, 22 Jun 44; No 1187, 25 Jun 44; and No. 1284, 24 Jul 44.

265

also pitifully weak. The 6th Air Division
had only a handful of aircraft still operational,
and chief reliance was placed on the Navy's 23d
Air Flotilla, which transferred its headquarters
on 20 April to Sorong, on the Vogelkop
Peninsula. The greater part of its strength
began operating from a newly completed base
on Biak."

This was the situation of Hollandia's
defenses when, on 17 April, the naval com-
munications center at Rabaul radioed a warning
that Allied landing operations might be
expected imminently at some point on the New
Guinea coast. Radio intercepts by Japanese
signal intelligence revealed that Allied air units
from Lae, Nadzab and Finschhafen were con-
centrating in the Admiralties,' 6 and that a large
number of enemy ships was moving in the
Bismarck Sea, maintaining a high level of
tactical radio traffic.

Two days later, on 19 April, a patrol plane
of the Carolines-based First Air Fleet sighted a
large enemy naval force, including aircraft
carriers, moving north of the Admiralties. The
same day, an army reconnaissance flight from
Rabaul spotted a second convoy of about 30
transports, escorted by an aircraft carrier, two
cruisers and ten destroyers, passing through the
Vitiaz Strait. On the 20th, two large enemy
groups — one a task force with four carriers and
the other an amphibious convoy — were reported
standing westward just north of the Ninigo
Islands, about 200 miles due north of Wewak.

From the course which these forces were
taking, no accurate prediction was yet possible
as to where the enemy would land. However,

the invasion force now turned suddenly south-
ward and, on 21 April, launched simultaneous
air strikes at three different places — Hollandia,
Aitape, and the Wakde-Sarmi area. So violent
were these attacks that the local forces in
each area believed that their own sector would
be the main target of invasion.

At Hollandia the enemy air preparation
began at dawn on 21 April and continued
without interruption until late afternoon. Wave
after wave of both carrier and land-based planes,
numbering approximately 600, pounded the
area, inflicting severe damage, particularly on
the three airfields located in the vicinity of
Sentani Lake. The simultaneous attacks on
Wakde and Sarmi, though less protracted, were
equally devastating. Virtually all base instal-
lations in the three places were completely
wrecked, and the last few operational aircraft of
the 6th Air Division were destroyed. Combat
air strength to the east of Sarmi was now reduced
to nothing.

Beginning at 0530 on 22 April, carrier planes
again struck at the Hollandia airfields and also
at the beaches along Tanahmerah and Hum-
boldt Bays. Combat ships entered both bays
ana laid down a heavy barrage of naval gunfire,
while three carriers approached within ap-
proximately nine miles of the shore. Under
cover of this close support, the enemy rapidly
put ashore the largest landing force thus far
thrown against any Japanese-held point in New
Guinea.' 7 Part of the force landed at Humboldt
Bay, while a second contingent went ashore at
Tanahmerah. (Plate No. 67) The Japanese
forces defending both areas, ,fl stunned by the

55 Seibu Niyuginia oyobi Gohoku Homen no Kcngun Sakusen Mat- - +&'*^fc# fiiOjS^fPliJs (Western
New Guinea Area and North of Australia Area Naval Operations), op. cit., pp 6-7.

56 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit., Vol, III, p. 72.

57 Eighteenth Army estimated the strength of the Allied landing force at Hollandia at about two and a half
divisions. (Statement by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.)

58 The Humboldt Bay sector was defended mainly by Eighteenth Army troops under Maj. Gen. Toyozo
Kitazono, while the Tanahmerah Bay sector was defended by airfield troops under Maj, Gen. Inada. Southeast Area
Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 92-3.

266

PLATE NO. 67
Hollandia Operation, April — June 1944

weigkt of the air and artillery preparation and
without adequate prepared positions on which
to make a stand, were forced to withdraw. By
noon of 22 April, the entire beach and port
areas around both Humboldt and Tanahmerah
Bays were completely occupied by the enemy.

Simultaneously with the Hollandia invasion,
Allied amphibious forces had also effected a
landing in the strategic Aitape sector, about
125 miles east of Hollandia. At 0500 on 22
April, enemy warships began a two-hour bom-
bardment of Aitape itself, of the Tadji airfield
sector eight miles southeast of Aitape, and of
Seleo Island, lying several miles offshore from
Tadji. Under cover of this preparation, enemy
troops landed near the Tadji airfield, where the
Japanese garrison force of about 2,000, inca-
pable of serious resistance, withdrew after a
few skirmishes.' 9 The airfield was immediately
seized by the enemy, who had fighters based
there by 24 April.

With the Japanese ground forces in both
attack areas unprepared to offer a real defense,
the initial reaction to the Allied landings
necessarily was limited to air counterattacks.
These were handicapped by the small number
of planes available, but were prompt and
partially effective. The 23d Air Flotilla,

operating at extreme range from Sorong, 6 "
carried out night attacks with medium torpedo
bombers against Allied surface craft on 22, 23,
and 24 April. Elements of the 7th Air Divi-
sion, which had advanced to Sorong from the
Nineteenth Army area, joined in the attacks
on the night of the 24th.

Still subjected to heavy enemy air and naval
bombardment and lacking unified command,
the defense forces on the Hollandia front had
meanwhile fallen back on the Sentani Lake
airfield sector. Here they were cut off from
their ration and ammunition supplies, which
were stored near the coast, and faced the hope-
less prospect of conducting the defense of the
airfields with less than a week's rations, very
little small arms and machine gun ammunition,
and no artillery. When enemy forces, advan-
cing simultaneously from the Humboldt Bay
and Tanahmerah beachheads, converged on the
airfield sector on 26 April, the defenders were
obliged to withdraw toward Genjem to escape
being trapped, and all three airfields were
occupied by the enemy.

On the night of 27 April, 2?d Air Flotilla
planes again attacked enemy shipping off Hol-
landia, claiming one light cruiser sunk and
another large vessel damaged. 6 ' It was too late,

59 Order of battle of the Japanese forces in the Aitape area at the time of the Allied landing was as follows :

20th Division Replacement Elms

Elms 54th Line of Communications Sector Unit

31st Anchorage Headquarters

3d Debarkation Unit

Elms 27th Field Ordnance and Freight Depots

26th and 86th Airfield Cos.

4th Airfield Construction Unit

Elm 90th Naval Garrison Unit
(1) Ibid., pp. iio-iii. (2) Various Personal Notebooks, Diaries, Order Files, and Official Strength and Situation
Reports. ATIS Bulletins No. 1040, 16 May 44; No. 1054, 20 May 44; No. 1095, 29 May 44; No. 1121, 3 Jun
44 ; and No. 1 177, 22 Jun 44.

60 The Biak airfield was already usable by reconnaissance and fighter planes but lacked a store of torpedoes
and hence could not be used by the 23d Air Flotilla's torpedo bombers. These units were forced to operate from
Sorong, 600 miles from Hollandia. (Statement by Comdr. Chihaya, previously cited.)

61 Western New Guinea Area and North of Australia Area Naval Operations, op. cit,, p. 7.

268

however, for such attacks to have any appreci-
able effect on the ground situation, and due to
the prohibitive losses inflicted by enemy night
fighters and antiaircraft fire, the air offensive
was discontinued.

By 7 May approximately 10,000 army and
navy personnel had concentrated in the Genjem
area, 20 miles west of Hollandia, where a large
truck farming operation afforded limited food
supplies. 6 ' Maj. Gen. Inada, 6th Air Division
commander, now assumed command of all
troops, organized them into several echelons,
and initiated a general withdrawal coward
Sarmi. 6 *

While these developments were under way,
Second Area Army headquarters at Davao
had been giving urgent study to the situation
created by the unexpectedly early Allied inva-
sion of Hollandia. Immediately upon learning
of the enemy landings on 22 April, General
Ana mi took the optimistic view that the enemy
had overreached himself by launching an am-
phibious assault at such great distance from
his bases. He calculated that the local forces
at Hollandia, despite deficiencies in training
and equipment, would be able to offer at least
partially effective resistance until adequate
counter measures could be taken by Eighteenth
Army. In the meantime, he estimated that
the morale of the garrison could be bolstered
and its resistance stiffened by the dispatch of
a small token force to Hollandia by Second
Army. On the same day, therefore, he sent

the following order to Lt. Gen. Teshima :^
The Second Army Commander will immediately
dispatch two battalions of infantry and one battalion
of artillery (from the }6th Division) to the Hollandia
area, where they will come under the command of the
Eighteenth Army Commander.

General Anami's optimistic estimate of the
situation changed, however, as ensuing reports
indicated that the enemy, using forces of con-
siderable size, had easily established beachheads
not only at Hollandia but at Aitape. The
latter move obviously would render extremely
difficult any attempt to move the main body
of the Eighteenth Army westward to bolster
Hollandia. At the same time, it was apparent
that the loss of Hollandia, giving the enemy an
advance base of operations against Western
New Guinea while the Geelvink Bay defenses
were still incomplete, would gravely imperil
the southern sector of the absolute defense line.

In General Anami's judgment, these con-
siderations dictated a more aggressive employ-
ment of Second Army forces. He estimated
that the enemy's plans envisaged following up
the Hollandia invasion by an assault on Biak or
possibly Manokwari, by-passing Sarmi entirely
or attacking it only as a secondary effort.
Reinforcement of both Biak and the Manokwari
area thus appeared vitally necessary. However,
rather than pull back the forward strength of
the 36th Division for this purpose, General
Anami decided to risk waiting for the arrival
of the 35th Division from China and Palau. 6 *

62 These food supplies, however, were sufficient to last only for a few days. Southeast Area Operations
Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, p. 96.

63 Vice Adm. Yoshikazu Endo, Ninth Fleet Commander, had not been heard from since 22 April and was
presumed killed in action. Naval personnel came under Maj. Gen. Inada's Command. (Statement by Rear Adm.
Kawai, previously cited.)

64 (1) North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 96-7. (2) Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Numata,
previously cited.

65 General Anami planned to reinforce Bialc, currently garrisoned only by the main strength of the 222d Infantry
/36th Division, with the main strength of the 219th Infamry/35th Division, coming from Palau. (Cf. n. 27, p. 239).
The 35th Division main elements, en route from China, were to take over from the 2d Field Base Unit the task
of organizing the defenses of Noemfoor, Manokwari and Sorong, with division headquarters at Manokwari. The new
plans further called for the immediate reorganization of all service units in the Western New Guinea area into provisional
combat battalions. (1) North jof Australia Oprrations Record, op. cit., pp. 89, J03-6. (2) Second Army Operations
Order No. 68, 25 Apr 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1457, 20 Sep 44.

269

Meanwhile, in view of the lesser clanger
to Sarmi, he felt that it was pointless to keep
the 36th Division idle in that area when
it might be used in an effort to smash the
enemy at Hollandia, in conjunction with an
Eighteenth Army attack from the east. He
therefore decided to modify the original plan
for dispatch of a token force in favor of a major
counteroffensive by the main strength of the
36th Division.

Pursuant to this decision, Second Area Army
ordered the Second Army on 24 April to
prepare to send the main strength of the 36th
Division from Sarmi to Hollandia. 66 On the
same date, General Anami radioed an urgent
recommendation to Imperial General Head-
quarters, Southern Army, the Combined Fleet,
and the Southwest Area Fleet that all forces at
Sarmi be committed in an attempt to retake
Hollandia, and that strong naval forces be
rushed to Western New Guinea to block any
Allied leap-frog operation toward the Geelvink
Bay area.

Neither Southern Army nor Imperial Gen-
eral Headquarters reacted favorably to the re-
commendation despite the dispatch of Lt. Gen.
Takazo Numata, Second Area Army chief of
staff, to Singapore in an effort to press the plan
upon Southern Army headquarters. 6 ' At the
same time, both Lt. Gen. Teshima, Second
Army commander, and Lt. Gen. Hachiro
Tanoue, 36th Division commander, indicated
that they likewise questioned the advisability
of the plan. Finally, on 27 April, the
Combined Fleet replied that naval strength
adequate to support the plan would not be
available until about the middle of May. 61 *

Although unable to gain support for his plan
to commit the 36th Division in an

counterattack against the enemy at Hollandia,
General Anami allowed his order of 24 April
to remain in effect so that the division would
continue preparations facilitating its eventual
use as a mobile force to be moved quickly to
any threatened sector. Nor did he rescind
the earlier order for dispatch of a token force
to the Hollandia area. The 36th Division
assigned this mission to two infantry battalions
of the 224th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by
half the regimental artillery battalion. After
completing its preparations, this force, under
Col. Soemon Matsuyama, 224th Infantry com-
mander, started out from the Sarmi area on 8
May via overland routes. By this date, the
enemy was in firm possession of Hollandia and
was already using the airfields for operational
purposes.

Meanwhile, far to the east, the Eighteenth
Army command independently revised its own
operational plans in the light of the radically
altered situation created by the Hollandia and
Aitape landings. The main body of the Army,
numbering close to 55,000 troops, including
air force ground personnel and naval units,
now found itself cut off from all outside
sources of supply and deprived, by a combina-
tion of geography, the enemy, and insurmoun-
table difficulties of move ment, of every pos-
sibility of rejoining the Second Area Army
forces west of Hollandia for the crucial defense
of Western New Guinea.

Faced by the certainty that starvation and
disease would gradually destroy his forces even
if they remained passively in their present posi-
tions, Lt. Gen. Adachi decided that it was
preferable to undertake active operations before
the fighting strength of the troops was entirely
dissipated. More important, he saw the possi-

66 (1) North of Australia Operations Record, op. cic, pp. 98-9. (2) Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Numata,
previously cited.

67 Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Iimura, previously cited.

68 North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., p. 100.

270

Original Painting by Kei Sato

PLATE NO. 68
Deadly Jungle Fighting : New Guinea Front

bility that bold counterattacks by Eigbteentb
Army against the enemy's rear might force the
diversion of Allied forces eastward, thus ham-
pering the massing of enemy strength against
the dangerously weak defenses of Western New
Guinea. 6 '

Acting swiftly to implement his decision, Lt.
Gen. Adachi issued orders to the 20th, 41st and
51st Divisions on 26 April to prepare to move
forward for a counterattack against the enemy
beachhead at Aitape. On 7 May, advance
elements of the 20th Division, then the farthest
west of the Eighteenth Army's forces, began
advancing toward Aitape from the Wewak area
and, by early June, had driven in enemy outposts
to reach the Driniumor River, about 12 miles
from the main objective at Tadji airfield. 70

Hollandia nevertheless was irrevocably lost,
depriving the Japanese forces of their most
valuable remaining air base and port on the
northern coast of New Guinea. On the other
hand, General MacArthur's forces had won an
important forward base of operations seriously

jeopardizing Japanese hopes of holding the
absolute defense zone and the approaches to the
Philippines. 71

Failure of the Reinforcement Plan

Almost on the eve of the Allied invasion of
Hollandia, a temporary easing of the shipping
situation finally made it possible for the Japa-
nese High Command to act on its long-delayed
plan to move substantial troop reinforcements
to Western New Guinea. Early in April,
Imperial General Headquarters restored the
shipping allocation of the Second Area Army
and on 9 April directed the immediate move-
ment from China of the main elements of the
35th Division. 72

Pursuant to this directive, the Navy's General
Escort Command organized a special convoy,
designated Take (Yf) No. 1 and consisting of
nine large transports. 73 The convoy was to
carry, in addition to the 35th Division main

69 No formal orders were received by Eighteenth Army either from Second Area Army or from Imperial
General Headquarters directing Lt, Gen. Adachi to take any specified course of action as a result of the Hollandia-
Aitape landings. He was left full discretion to shape Eighteenth Army's future operational plans according to local
circumstances. His decision to counterattack Aitape was also dictated by the Army's desperate supply situation. In late
April, the Army had only two months' rations on hand and, even counting upon additional food supplies obtained
locally, would face wholesale starvation by October at the latest- (i) Statement by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.
(2) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, p. 1 £2.

70 These advance elements fought successful actions against enemy outpost positions at Ulau, 9—16 May, east
of Yakamul, 16—24 May, and west of Yakamul, 2-5 June, thence pushing on to the Driniumor River. These opera-
tions covered the assembly of the main Army strength west of Wewak and recormoitered a line of departure for the
projected counterattack. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 157-64.

71 " By advancing to Hollandia (direct) . . . the Allies cut the length of time required by one-third. Had they
advanced to Wewak, then to Aitape, and then to Hollandia, we would have had time to prepare the defenses of
Sarmi-Wakde, Biak, and Manokwari. . . . As it was, there was very little time to prepare for the defense of Sarmi.
Biak and Manokwari were also placed well within bomber range." (Interrogation of Maj. Gen. Akinosuke Shigeyasu,
Staff Officer (Operations), Second Area Army.)

72 The 35th Division elements awaiting shipment at Shanghai were the 220th and 22 rst Infantry Regiments and
the 4th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment. (Statement by Lt. Col. Katogawa, previously cited.)

73 Until February 1944 Japan's surface escort system was weak, partially due to the lack of escort forces and
partially to the failure to develop an effective command system for individual convoys. In March 1944 the Navy
adopted the policy of using large convoys, at the same time concentrating scattered escort forces into strong units.
Under the new system, convoy formations were to be commanded by officers of tear admiral's rank with good sea
records. Convoy headquarters, however, were usually undermanned because of the shortage of young staff officers.

272

assigned to Fourteenth Army for the reinforce-
ment of Mindanao. Protected by an unusually
large naval escort, the convoy sailed from
Shanghai on 17 April en route to Manila.

On the night of 26 April, four days after the
start of the Hollandia invasion, the Take convoy
encountered its first disaster in the waters
northwest of Luzon. In a sudden attack by
enemy submarines, one of the transports carry-
ing one regiment of the 3 2d Division was
sunk with the loss of virtually the entire
regiment. 74 The rest of the convoy continued
on to Manila, where it arrived 29 April.

In the interim between the convoy's de-
parture from Shanghai and its arrival at Manila,
Imperial General Headquarters had suddenly
altered the assignment of the 32d Division,
transferring it to direct command of Second
Area Army. This was due to realization that
unless swift action was taken under the still
unimplemented plan to strengthen Second Area
Army by 15 battalions, the mounting danger to
shipping movements into forward areas might
completely bar execution of the reinforcement
plan. Hence, when the Take convoy resumed
its voyage from Manila on 1 May, it still
carried the 32d Division.

To lessen the danger of enemy submarine
attack, the convoy took a special route laid out
by the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet.
In broad daylight on 6 May, however, the
convoy was struck again as it neared the north- .
eastern tip of the Celebes. Enemy torpedoes
hit and sank three transports in rapid succession.

Although rescue operations were relatively
successful, the 3 2d Division was reduced to
only five infantry battalions and one and a half
artillery battalions, while the two infantry
regiments of the 35th Division were down to

four battalions, with only a battery of artillery."
The surviving ships of the convoy, carrying
these troops, put in at Kaoe Bay, Halmahera,
on 9 May.

Meanwhile, the definitive loss of Hollandia
had seriously compromised Second Area
Army's hopes of safely moving reinforce-
ments into Western New Guinea, even from the
nearby Halmahera area. The enemy now had
an operating base within easy fighter range of
Sarmi, Biak, and the Geelvink Bay area, while
Allied bombers could strike at Sorong and
Japanese ports and bases in the Moluccas.
Japanese air strength was totally inadequate to
meet this challenge. In view of the insufficient
progress of the aircraft production program, no
large air reinforcements could be allocated to
Western New Guinea, and material defects,
lack of proper maintenance, and other causes
rendered unserviceable a large proportion of
those few aircraft which were sent out from the
Homeland.

The extension of the radius of Allied air
control, coupled with the increasingly bold
incursions by enemy submarines into heretofore
Japanese -controlled waters, so augmented the
menace to Japanese sea transportation that it
appeared seriously questionable whether any
fresh troops could be moved into the threatened
sectors of Western New Guinea. General
Anami faced the discouraging prospect, there-
fore, of defending that portion of the national
defense zone with little more than his current
strength.

Revision of Defense Plans

Imperial General Headquarters was now
called upon to make a difficult decision of

74 (1) Western New Guinea Area and North of Australia Area Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 4. (2) North
of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., p. 102.

75 Ibid., p. 103.

273

In view of the loss of Hollandia and
the obvious difficulty of moving adequate
reinforcements into Western New Guinea, a
minority in the Army General Staff began
broaching the idea of pulling back the
perimeter of the absolute defense zone in the
southern area from Western New Guinea to the
Philippines. 76 On the other hand, the Army
High Command was aware that General
Anami, despite the rejection of his proposal for
an alt-out counterattack to retake Hollandia,
remained inclined toward a decisive defense of
the forward positions in the Geelvink Bay area.

Imperial General Headquarters was in no way
disposed to consider an outright revision of the
national defense zone at this stage, but at the
same time it decided that General Anami must
be restrained from pouring the bulk of the rein-
forcement divisions into the Geelvink Bay
sector instead of using them in the weakly de-
fended Vogelkop — Halmahera zone. With
the Navy section's reassurance that the Bay
sector would have vital value in future naval
operations, the Army Section dispatched a
directive to Southern Army headquarters on 2
May, the main points of which were as
follows : 77

1. The line to be secured in the Western New
Guinea area is designated as a line connecting the
southern part of Geelvink Bay, Manokwari, Sorong,
and Halmahera.

2. Strategic points on
Island mil be held as long as possible.

3. Necessary troops wilt be withdrawn to Biak
from the Sarmi district as quickly as possible.

Before Southern Army dispatched im-
plementing orders to Second Area Army, Gen-
eral Anami had learned of the serious losses
suffered by the Take convoy in the 6 May attack.
He nevertheless wired both Southern Army and
Imperial General Headquarters urging that

76 Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.

77 (1) Imperial General
Col. Hattori, previously cited.

78 Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cic, p. 218.

79 North, of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 109-12.

274

some of the remaining ships of the convoy,
despite the risk, be sent on at least to Sorong,
and preferably as far as Manokwari, to complete
the movement of the 35th Division. The
3 2d Division was to be retained for the defense
of Halmahera.

Because of the grave risk entailed in sending
major fleet units into waters dominated by
Allied air power, General Anamt's request was
flatly rejected by Imperial General Headquar-
ters. Moreover, the serious reduction of 32d
and 35th Division strength led the High Com-
mand to modify the order of 2 May in favor
of a further contraction of the projected main
line of resistance. An Imperial General Head-
quarters directive to Southern Army on 9 May
stated as follows : 78

The line to be secured in the Western New

Guinea area will be a line extettdmg from Sorong
to Halmahera.

2. The area covering the lower part of Geelvink
Bay, Biak, and Manokwari will be held as long
as possible.

Southern Army on 11 May dispatched
implementing orders to the Second Area Army,
tt the 35th 1

There was now a serious and fundamental
conflict of opinion between Imperial General
Headquarters and General Anami with respect
to defense strategy for Western New Guinea.
On the one hand, the 9 May directive discarded
the idea of a decisive defense of the Geelvink
Bay positions, envisaging their use only to
delay the enemy advance as long as possible.
On the other hand, General Anami continued
to hold that the forward line, including Biak,
must be aggressively and determinedly defend-
ed even if adequate reinforcements were

op. cit., pp. 215-17. (2) Statement by

Apart from trie strategic consideration that
Sorong would be difficult to defend if attacked,
and might even be by-passed entirely once the
Geelvink Bay area was in enemy hands, General
Anami was influenced by other factors. First,
the transfer of 36th Division troops from the
Sarmi sector to Biak would be difficult in view of
the lack of shipping and enemy air control
over the area. Second, orders to fight delaying
actions on the forward positions rather than
defend them to the last would be meaning-

less

and detrimental to morale, since the
possibilities of safe evacuation would be slight.
Third, General Anami had discovered that in
the Combined Fleet's plan, the waters between
Palau and Western New Guinea was considered
to be a probable theater for a decisive naval
battle, and thus he felt that a premature relin-
quishment of the Geelvink Bay area, giving the
enemy valuable land air bases close to the
theater of action, would seriously harm the
Navy's chances. 80

General Anami consequently decided to take
advantage of what leeway was left him by
Imperial General Headquarters and Southern
Army directives to continue to throw the bulk
of his strength into the defense of the key for-
ward positions. Since Imperial General Head-
quarters had strongly vetoed the dispatch of mer-
chant shipping into the Western New Guinea
area, General Anami now opened negotiations
with the Fourth Southern Expeditionary Fleet
at Ambon to effect the transport to Western
New Guinea by warships of the 35th Division
troops stranded on Halmahera and Palau.
The plan for the deployment of these units upon
their arrival was now modified as follows: 8 '

/. 3ft h Division Ha. and Special Troops — Manokwari
2. one regiment (less one bn) — Biak

one regiment [less one bn) — Sorong**
4. one regiment [less one bn)- — Manokwari area

On 14 May General Anami proceeded to
Second Army headquarters at Manokwari and
person nally informed the Army commander, Lt.
Gen. Teshima, of these developments, instruct-
ing him to hold the Geelvink Bay area at all
costs and to continue to secure the Sarmi area
as a lifeline held out toward the Eighteenth
Army forces cut off to the east of Hollandia.
At the same time, General Anami dispatched
messages to both the Combined Fleet and the
Southwest Area Fleet outlining his intentions,
substantially as follows :*»

The fact that the Navy is preparing to wage a
decisive battle in the waters near Geelvink Bay in the
near future is a source of gratification to the Second
Area Army. Although at this time changes in the
main line of resistance have been ordered by higher
authority, the Area Army is resolved to bold the
Geelvink region at all costs. It is thus ready to give
all possible assistance to the naval air forces in this
area and to cooperate fully in the decisive naval battle.
Moreover, the Area Army has expressed its opinion
to higher authorities that the Army air forces should
assemble as much strength as possible to cooperate
with the Navy at the time of the decisive battle.

By this time the Navy's preparations for a
showdown battle were well under way. On 3
May, Admiral Soemu Toyoda formally assumed
command of the Combined Fleet in succession
to Admiral Koga, and on the same day an
Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive
to the Combined Fleet ordered plans to be
laid for the so-called A- Go Operation. The

80 (1) North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 109-10. (2; Statement by Lt. Col. Katogawa,
previously cited.

81 North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 103-6.

82 General Anami's decision to station the one infantry regiment at Sorong was a mere token compliance with
Imperial General Headquarters and Southern Army directives. (Statement by Lt. Col. Katogawa, previously cited.)

83 North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 109—10.

275

essentials of this directive were :* 4

1. The Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet,
will swiftly prepare the naval strength required for
decisive battle and, during or after the latter part of
May, will apprehend and crush the main strength of
the enemy fleet in the waters extending from the
Central Pacific to the Philippines and Western New
Guinea.

2. Decisive battle will be avoided, except under
speafied circumstances, until the required strength has
been prepared,

j. This battle shall be designated A-Go Opera-
tion.

Under the plans elaborated by the Combined
Fleet, the First Mobile Fleet, 8 ' and the First Air
Fleet were assigned the principal roles in the
projected battle. The former assembled its
surface strength at Tawitawi in the Sulu
Archipelago on 16 May, while the land-based
units of the First Air Fleet continued to be
widely deployed in the Marianas and Carolines
to take advantage of any tactical opportunity
that might arise. Tawitawi was chosen as the
main staging point for the First Mobile Fleet
because of its proximity to both the refueling
facilities of Balikpapan and the sea area which
the Navy High Command expected to be the
scene of the decisive battle. It was also safely
beyond the range of enemy land-based air power
and afforded greater security against Allied
intelligence than other anchorages in the
Philippines.

In the midst of these preparations, however,
the Western New Guinea front flared into
action again as General MacArthur's forces, less
than a month after the invasion of Hollandia,
launched a new amphibious assault against the

Wakde-Sarmi area guarding the coastal ap-
proach to the vital Geelvink Bay region.

Wakde Sarmi

With the enemy in firm possession of Hol-
landia, it was fully apparent that the Allied
assault on the heart of Japan's Western New
Guinea defenses in the Geelvink Bay area would
not long be delayed. Second Area Army
estimated that Biak would be the next major
objective of General MacArthur's forces, but
defense preparations were also hastened in the
Wakde-Sarmi coastal sector to meet the
possibility that the enemy might first attempt
to seize Japanese air bases there to facilitate
fighter support of subsequent operations against
Biak or Manokwari. 8 *

Under Second Area Army's original plans
formulated late in 1943, the Wakde-Sarmi
sector, roughly 145 miles west of Hollandia,
was to be the forward bastion of the defenses of
Geelvink Bay. Engineer and construction
units, assisted by combat troops of the 36th
Division, had been intensively engaged in
building airfields, roads, bridges, and various
base installations in the area since January
I944- 87 Highest priority was given to airfield
construction. By the time of the Hollandia
invasion, one of four projected airfields had
been completed near Sawar, seven miles below
Sarmi, and another was under construction at
nearby Maffin Bay. 88

The Wakde Islands, lying two and a half
miles off the coast about ten miles east of Maffin
Bay, were at the eastern extremity of the sector.

84 Daikaishi Dm Sambyakushicbijusan-go -JoWm 5?^S"-fc+=:^ (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive
No. 373) 3 May 44.

85 Administratively the First Mobile Fleet consisted of the Second Fleet (battleships, cruisers and destroyers)
and the Third Fleet (carriers, cruisers and destroyers).

86 Interrogations of Maj. Gen. Shigeyasu and Col. Yamamoto, previously cited.

87 Engineer and construction units were grouped under the command of Maj. Gen. Shigeru Yamada, 4th
Engineer Group commander.

88 36th Division Airfield Construction Bulletin, 1 Mar 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1206, 28 Jun 44.

276

Small, flat and coral-fringed, the islands were
not suited for defense against amphibious
assault, but on the main island of Insoemoear
was an airstrip just under 5,000 feet in length,
maintained and used by the Navy but which
the Fourth Air Army used both as an
operational base and as a dispersal and relay
field. 8 '

Japanese troop strength in the Wakde-
Sarmi area at the end of April totalled approxi-
mately 14,000."° The 36th Division under Lt.
Gen. Hachiro Tanoue, less the 2226. Infantry
Regiment already stationed on Biak, was the
principal combat force, supplemented by
various construction units, airfield and antiair-
craft personnel, and supply elements. 9 ' These
forces were concentrated mainly between Maffin
Bay and Sarmi, with only the 9th Company
of the 224th Infantry Regiment, a mountain
artillery platoon, some antiaircraft and airfield
units, and the 91st Naval Garrison Unit
stationed on Insoemoear Island guarding

Wakde airfield.' 1

Prior to the Allied invasion of 1
the development of adequate ground defenses
in the Wakde-Sarmi area had been seriously
hampered by the funnelling of the main effort
of the local forces, including combat troops,
into the long-range airfield construction pro-
gram. The enemy's sudden penetration to
within a little more than 100 miles of Wakde
led Lt. Gen. Tanoue to order an immediate
shift of emphasis to the organization of defenses
against amphibious attack. Time was already
short, however, and Second Area Army's order
directing the dispatch of the 224th Infantry
Regiment (Matsuyama Detachment) toward
Hollandia seriously curtailed the number of
combat troops immediately available.

With only the 223d Infantry, remaining
elements of the 224th and miscellaneous
supporting troops at his disposal, Lt. Gen.
Tanoue decided to center his defensive disposi-
tions in the Maffin Bay-Sawar sector, leaving

89 During March the 45th Fighter and 61st Bomber Regiments operated from Wakde. At the end of March
the 45th Fighter Regiment was withdrawn to Moemi, on the east coast of the Vogelkop Peninsula, and the 61st Bomber
Regiment to Galela, Halmahera. Field Diary of 20th Airfield Battalion, Wakde Expeditionary Unit, 1-3 1 Mar 44.
ATIS Bulletin No. 1148, 11 Jun 44, p. 8.

90 In addition to these 14,000 troops, about 3,000 survivors of the Hollandia fighting, who succeeded in getting
back to the Maffin Bay-Sarmi area, were integrated into the 36th Division combat forces during the latter phases of
the fighting in that area. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Shintaro Imada, Chief of Staff, 36th Division.)

91 Order of battle of the forces in the Wakde-Sarmi area at the end of April was as follows :

36th Division (less 222d Infantry) 16th, 103d Airfield Units

Headquarters 228th Independent Motor Transport Co.

223d Infantry (reinf.) 53d Field Antiaircraft Bn.

224th Infantry (reinf.) 42d Field Machine Cannon Co.

36th Division Tank Unit 4th Field Searchlight Bn.

Division Special Troops Elms 24th Signal Regt.

Headquarters, 4th Engineer Group nth Debarkation Unit

16th, 17th Mobile Lumber Squads 54th, Special Water Duty Co.

20th Airfield Bn. 91st Naval Garrison Unit

(l) North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit.. Annex No. 1 and Attached Table t. (2) Cohoku Sakusen
Kiroku Furoku Dai Ichi : Dai Ni-Gun Sarumi Biaku Nunhoru oyobt Maru Sento Gaish: ti&ltif-'fhiiliWii&k'tfi— ffZZSffrJb
S 1S7?-X y^^JkU^J^^mlSi^. (North of Australia Operations Record, Supplement 1 1 General Outline of
Second Army Operations at Sarmi, Biak, Noemfoor and Maru,) 1st Demobilization Bureau Jul 46, p. 3. (3) Western
New Guinea Area and North of Australia Area Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 8. (4) Intelligence Report No. 7,
36th Division, 25 Jan 44, Supplement II, Attached Chart No. 5. ATIS Bulletin No. 1277, 22 Jul 44.

92 ATIS Bulletin No. 1148, 11 Jun 44, p. 7.

277

the coastal stretch east of the Tor River and
opposite Wakde unguarded. (Plate No. 69)
A 36th Division order issued on 8 May set
forth the essentials of the operational plan
substantially as follows ; 9J

1. The division will assume new dispositions and
prepare to destroy the enemy at close range.

2. The Right Sector Unit will consist of the 16th
Airfield Survey and Construction Unit, with the re-
maining elements and part of the artillery of the 224th
Infantry Regiment attached. Main strength of the
unit will secure the Mt. Irier and Mt. Sakusin sectors,
and an element will secure the Toem area.

3. The Central Sector Unit will consist of the
223d Infantry (less 2d Battalion), with the Division
Tank Unit (less one platoon) and the 103d Airfield
Survey and Construction Unit attached. It will
secure the area from the Mt. Saksin — Mt. Irier line
to the Sawar River.

4. The Left Sector Unit will be composed of the
2d Battalion, 223d Infantry, with one tank platoon
attached. It will secure the area from the Sawar
River to Sarmi, including the Mt. Hakko position.

5. Above units will hold as many mobile reserves
as possible. Enemy landing forces wilt be smashed
at the beach.

6. The 4th Engineer Group Commander will
supervise the construction of fortifications in the
various sectors.

7. The Division command post is at Mt. Hakko
but will later move to Mt. Saksin.

While these dispositions were hastily being
put into effect, enemy air attacks on the Sawar
and Wakde airfields, begun soon after the fall
of Hollandia, increased in frequency and inten-

sity. Since the meager remaining combat
strength of the Japanese air forces in the
Western New Guinea area had already retired
to rear bases less vulnerable to attack, these
raids appeared to be only a precautionary
measure to ensure that the fields could not be
used. The enemy bombing offensive reached
maximum violence in the middle of May, with
apparent emphasis on the coastline of Maffin
Bay. At the same time, frequent appearances
by Allied destroyers and motor torpedo boats
in the coastal waters near Sarmi gave further
indication that an early landing might be
attempted. 94 On 16 May Lt. Gen. Tanoue
communicated the following estimate of the
situation to his subordinate commanders :«
On the basis of the daily increasing severity of
enemy air attacks, the constant activity of warships off
the coast. . . . and the relative situation of our and
the enemy's forces, it appears highly probable that
landings are being planned near Wakde Island and
Sarmi Point.

This estimate proved true sooner than
anticipated. At 0400 on 17 May, an enemy
task force of heavy surface units began a fierce
three-hour bombardment of Insoemoear Island,
interspersed with heavy air strikes, and at 0700
Allied troops began landing operations on the
mainland opposite Insoemoear, in the sector
between Toem and Arara. The main Japanese
forces, concentrated as they were to the west
of the Tor River, were unable to offer any
opposition to the landing.* 6 By the evening of
iyMay,the Allied forces had established a firm

93 (0 3<>ih Division Operations Order No. A-121, 8 May 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1 148, 1 1 Jun 44, pp. 1-2.
(3) Statement by Maj. Naoshi Hanami, Staff Officer (Intelligence), 36th Division.

94 The activities of enemy torpedo boats and destroyers became so persistent that Lt. Gen. Tanoue issued an
order on 12 May directing that each sector unit commander station a platoon of 75 mm howitzers in selected coastal
positions to fire on enemy craft, and that armed patrols make a thorough search of the coast to mop up enemy agents
and coast watchers. 36th Division Operations Order No. A 125, 12 May 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1137, 7 Jun 44.

95 36th Division Staff Intelligence Report No. 17, 16 May 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1137, 7 Jun 44.

96 The only Japanese forces located to the east of the Tor were a two-gun artillery platoon and a small infantry
element of the Right Sector Unit disposed there in compliance with the 8 May operation plan of the 36th Division.
These troops withdrew at the beginning of the violent enemy naval gunfire preparation, and the Allied landing in the
Toem-Arara sector was thus completely unopposed. (Statement of Maj. Hanami, previously cited.)

278

PLATE NO. 69
Sarrni — Wakde Operation, May— July 1944

beachhead, between the Tementoe and Tor
Rivers.

At 2200 the same day, Lt. Gen. Tanoue
ordered his forces to prepare for an attack to
wipe out the enemy beachhead, simultaneously
ordering the Matsuyama Detachment, then to
the east of Masi Masi on its way toward Hol-
landia, to return to the Toem area as quickly
as possible and attack the enemy from the east. 97
As these preparations were getting under way,
the enemy on 18 May moved strong amphibi-
ous forces across to Insoemoear Island and
wiped out the small Wakde garrison in brief
but sharp fighting. 9 " With the capture of
Wakde airfield, the enemy achieved what
seemed to be his main strategic objective.

Although not certain as to the exact situation
east of the Tor River, Lt. Gen. Tanoue rushed
his attack preparations and, on the nigbt of 18
May, ordered the Right Sector Unit to cross
the river and begin a preliminary attack,' 9 The
following day an order was received from the
Second Army Commander directing an all-out
on the enemy in the Toem sector.
r, Lt. Gen. Tanoue at iooo on 19
May issued a new order, the essential points of
which were as follows : 100

ed that the strength of the enemy
I in the vicinity of Toem, is about
two infantry regiments and about 100 tanks and
armored cars.

2. The Matsuyama Detachment is returning and
will attack the enemy. The Right Sector Unit is
also preparing to attack.

3 . The division main strength will annihilate the
enemy in the vicinity of the Tor River.

4. The Central Sector Unit will cross the Tor
River by dawn of 22 May and prepare to attack
Toem. Special assault and incendiary units will be
organized. The main strength of the artillery will
remain in their present positions on the coast.

j. The division command post will move to Ml.
Saksin before dawn on 22 May.

Execution of the attack plan, however, ne-
cessitated moving the main strength of Lt,
Gen. Tanoue' s forces across the wide and un-
bridged Tor River. Since movement along
the coastal road and a crossing near the river
mouth would be exposed to enemy naval gun-
fire, the 36th Division commander decided to
move his units inland through jungle and
mountainous terrain to cross the Tor at its
confluence with the Foein River, and then
swing back toward the enemy beachhead. In
preparation for this operation, Lt. Gen. Tanoue
on 20 May ordered the 36th Division bridging
unit to move landing craft and collapsible
boats via the Foein River to the proposed
crossing-point on the Tor.""

While the Central SectorUnit(223d Infantry)
was beginning its difficult march to attack
positions east of the Tor, the Right Sector
Unit commenced operations in the Maffin
sector on 19 May. A reconnaissance to the
east of Maffin village on that date revealed
that the enemy had already crossed the Tor
River near its mouth and established a small
bridgehead. By 21 May, this Allied element

97 36th Division Operations Order No. A- 134, 17 May 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1167, 19 Jun 44.

98 North of Australia Operations Record, Supplement I, op. cit., p. 4.

99 36th Division Operations Order No. A-138, 18 May 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1167, 19 Jun 44.
100 36th Division Operations Order No. A-140, 19 May 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1181, 15 Jun 44.

tor (1) 36th Division Operations Order No, A-147, 20 May 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1179, 22 Jun 44.
(2) Field Message, 36th Division Bridging Unit Commander, 21 May 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1167, 19 Jun
44-

280

had pushed to a point about one mile east of
Maffin, stoutly resisted by rear echelon troops
of the 224th Infantry, which had been organized
into a provisional battalion. By 24 May, the
enemy occupied Maffin village and continued
to advance westward, threatening the Mt.
Irier-Mt. Saksin positions occupied by the
main strength of the Right Sector Unit. The
Allied force, however, halted at the east bank
of the Maffin River and did not launch an
immediate assault on the hill positions. Lt.
Gen. Tanoue took advantage of this momentary
lull to order the Left Sector Unit {2d Battalion,
223d Infantry) to move immediately to the
Mt. Irier line and bolster the rapidly weaken-
ing Right Sector Unit. Pending arrival of
these reinforcements on 29 May, the Right
Sector Unit hastily organized defenses in depth
on the high ground west of Maffin."* 2

While the Right Sector Unit was heavily
engaged in the Maffin area, the 223d Infantry,
delayed in its overland march to the assigned
crossing point on the Tor and handicapped by
the slowness with which the assault boats were
brought forward, finally crossed the Tor on 25
May, three days behind schedule. Meanwhile,
the Matsuyama Detachment completed its
forced march back from the east, closed up to
the right bank of the Tementoe River, and
prepared to attack the enemy's left flank at
Toem.

On the night of 27 May, the Matsuyama
Detachment crossed the Tementoe River and
launched a surprise attack on Toem. This
operation met with limited success. A part
of the detachment penetrated as far as the beach,

forcing a number of the enemy to flee offshore
in landing boats. The enemy's artillery and
naval gunfire reaction to this attack was ex-
tremely violent. Heavy casualties were sus-
tained, and before dawn on 28 May, Col.
Matsuyama, fearing that the narrow salient
might be pinched off, withdrew the advance
elements and allowed his exhausted troops a
breathing spell.' 03

Meanwhile, the 223d Infantry, having com-
pleted its arduous trek from the Sawar area,
began assembling in the jungle about two miles
south of Arara on the night of 27 May and
prepared to attack. Completion of the as-
sembly and attack preparations consumed three
days, and it was the night of 30 May before
the regiment was ready to strike in force. The
attack penetrated the outer part of the enemy
perimeter, but again the Japanese lacked the
means to exploit the initial success. The
regiment withdrew before dawn on 1 May but
kept up nightly raiding attacks thereafter. 101

While the 223d and 224th Infantry con-
tinued their pressure on the enemy's Toem-
Arara beachhead, the situation in the Maffin
area improved." 55 The Right Sector Unit
commander, having been reinforced by the
2d Battalion, 223d Infantry, on 29 May,
decided to recapture Maffin village. This
attack was carried out on the night of 3 1 May
but did not succeed. On the night of 2 June,

was reoccupied. The Japanese continued the
attack eastward against increasing enemy resist-
ance but did not succeed in wiping out the
Allied bridgehead across the mouth of the Tor.

102 Statement by Maj, Hanami, previously cited.

103 Statement by Col. Soemon Matsuyama, Regimental Commander, 224th Infantry Regiment.

104 Statement by Col. Naoyasu Yoshino, Regimental Commander, 223d Infantry Regiment.

105 The Japanese pressure on the Toem- Arara beachhead caused a slowing down of the enemy's operations in the
Maffin area and facilitated the subsequent seizure of the initiative by the Japanese. (Statement by Maj. Hanami,
previously cited.)

281

The initiative seized by the Right Sector
Unit was shortlived. On 6 June, the enemy
struck back at the Japanese positions about
one-haif mile east of Maffin village. This
attack continued on 7 June and was so powerful
that the exhausted Right Sector Unit was
finally obliged to conduct a delaying action
back through Maffin and thence southward to
draw the enemy away from Mt. Irier.'" 6

The situation of the 36th Division was now
extremely precarious. To the east of the Tor
was the main body of the division at the end
of a long supply line which wound circuitously
through the dense jungle interior. Without
naval or air support any further efforts on the
part of the 223d and 224th Infantry Regiments
to reduce the enemy beachhead seemed fore-
doomed to failure. To the west of the Tor,
all that stood between the enemy and the
Sawar airfield-Sarmi village area was a handful
of exhausted troops entrenched on Mt. Irier
and Mt, Sento. This situation led Lt. Gen,
Tanoue, on 8 June, to order the Matsuyama
Detachment to withdraw immediately west of
the river. On 10 June a similar order was
transmitted to the 223d Infantry. It was hoped
that the two regiments would arrive in the
Mt. Irier-Mt. Sento area in time to meet the
enemy assault on that critical position.' 07

The withdrawal of the division main body
was a difficult and protracted operation. How-
ever, the stubborn resistance of the Right
Sector Unit near Maffin delayed the enemy's
approach to the Mt. Irier-Mt. Sento positions
until mid-June, and the main strength of Lt.
Gen. Tanoue's forces had by that time com-
pleted its withdrawal west of the Tor. The

division commander now deployed the 1st
Battalion, 224th Infantry, on Mt. Irier, the
224th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) on Mt. Sento,
and the 223d Infantry in the sector west of
Mt. Saksin as a mobile reserve.'" 8

Following a small-scale attack on Mt. Sento
on 17 June, the enemy on the 23d began a
series of attacks on Mt. Irier. The battle
raged for two days, during which the heights
changed hands three times. However, relent-
less enemy pressure backed by intense air and
artillery bombardment finally carried the posi-
tion. Meanwhile, a new enemy landing to the
west of the Woske River mouth on 24 June
menaced the Japanese rear. Lt. Gen. Tanoue
promptly ordered the 224th Infantry to fall
back to the Mt. Sento-Mt. Saksin line, and
the 223d Infantry to withdraw west of the
Woske to meet the threat to Sawar airfield.' 09
Actually, the enemy never attempted to seize
either Saxvar airfield or Sarmi village. His
main objectives appeared to have been won,
and the presence in the area of the exhausted
remnants of the 36th Division had no im-
portant effect on the subsequent strategic
situation.

Fighting in the Wakde-Sarmi sector after
27 May had been overshadowed by a far
more crucial battle farther west. Having
gained control of Wakde airfield for use as a
forward base, the enemy, without waiting to
complete the defeat of Lt. Gen. Tanoue's forces,
had already launched an assault on Biak
Island, the keystone of the Japanese defenses
in Western New Guinea.

106 Statement by Maj. Hanami, previously cited.

107 Statements by Col. Yoshino, Col. Matsuyama, and Maj. Hanami, all previously cited.

108 The main body of the 223d Infantry arrived in the area west of Mt. Saksin on 14 June. The 224th
closed into the Mt. Sento position on the 16th. (Statement of Maj. Hanami, previously cited.)

109 Ibid.

282

Biak First Phase

The swift Allied advance to Wakde left
no doubt that the enemy was rapidly pre-
paring for the final phase of his campaign to
win control of all New Guinea and force
the Japanese back upon the Philippines. Be-
cause of its vital strategic importance as a base
from which to extend the radius of Allied air
domination, Biak Island — less than 600 miles
from Halmahera and Palau, and barely 900
miles from Davao, on Mindanao Island — was
considered certain to be a major objective of
this final drive.

Second Area Army, when it first formulated
its plans to develop the Geelvink Bay area
into the main line of resistance in Western
New Guinea, decided to make Biak the key
strongpoint of the line. As elsewhere along
the absolute defense zone perimeter, primary
emphasis was laid upon the construction of
airfields. Between December 1943 and the
enemy invasion of Hollandia in April 1944,
two of three projected fields on southern Biak
were completed and put into operational use

no The two airfields completed were the Sorido No. t and Mokmer fields. The Sorido No. 2 field was still
under construction. In addition to these fields, provided for under the Army-Navy Central Agreement of 30 Septem-
ber 1943, the local forces planned the construction of three others in the Bosnek sector. Inability to obtain the neces-
sary materials and equipment, however, prevented the start of actual construction on all but one of these fields.
(1) Notes on Operational Preparation of Biak Airfields. ATIS Bulletin N . 1176, 21 Jun 44. (2) Statement
by Comdr. Chihaya, previously cited.

in One of the most effective stratagems employed by the forces on Biak was the emplacement of 75mm field
howitzers in c^w positions where they were masked from enemy observation. The naval force on the island also had
a 105mm disappearing-gun battery on Hodai Mt. overlooking the airfield sector. This was the largest calibre gun
available for the defense of the island. (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Numata, previously cited.)

112 Had the enemy landing on Biak taken place three days later, the emplacement of these guns would have
been completed. Ibid.

1 13 The headquarters, 2d and 3d Battalions, 221st Infantry were transported from Halmahera to Manokwari by light
surface units of the Fourth Southern Expeditionary Fleet between 18-19 May, followed by the 1st Battalion on 23 May.
The 219th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) was moved by the 16th Cruiser Division from Palau to Sorong between 20-24
May and trans-shipped by small craft from Sorong to Manokwari, despite Second Amy's request to higher command
to ttansport it direct to Biak, where the Allied invasion fell only a few days later. It completed its movement on 27
May. The 220th Infantry (less Hq. and elms) completed movement from Halmahera to Sorong by t June.

Although the 219th Infantry was slated for Biak under existing plans, the earlier arrival of the 221st Infantry at
Manokwari caused Second Army to alter the plans, reassigning the 221st Infantry to Biak and the 219th to Noemfoor.
The 2d Battalion, 221st Infantry began moving from Manokwari to Biak by small craft on 31 May, four days after
the enemy landing on Biak, The 220th Infantry remained in the Sorong area as previously planned. (1) North of
Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 103-6. (2) Misc. Field Orders, Field Diaries, Personal Notebooks, and
Dispositions Charts of 35th Division units. ATIS Bulletins No. 1264, 15 Jun 44; No. 1360, 18 Aug 44 ; No. 1396,
28 Aug 44; No. 1457, 20 Sep 44; and No. 1503, 12 Oct 44,

283

by planes of the Navy's 23d Air Flotilla."
Their usefulness ended almost immediately,
however, when the enemy's vastly superior air
forces began operating from Hollandia bases.

As in the Wakde-Sarmi sector, the con-
centration of effort on airfield construction
until the Hollandia invasion resulted in dan-
gerously delaying the preparation of ground
defenses against enemy amphibious attack. In
the five weeks which elapsed between the
Hollandia and Biak invasions, the Biak garrison
forces, under able leadership and by dint of
desperate effort, succeeded in organizing a
system of strong cave positions, which proved
highly effective after the enemy landing. 1 "
However, time, equipment and manpower were
so short that defensive preparations could not
entirely be completed. Some 15-cm naval
guns, brought to Biak immediately after the
Hollandia invasion to strengthen the coast
defenses, were still unmounted when the island
was attacked." 1

The Allied blow also fell before Second
Area Army had been able to execute its plan
to reinforce the Biak garrison with elements of
the 35th Division."* The 2226. Infantry, 36th

Division, under command of Col. Naoyuki
Kuzume, continued to constitute the combat
nucleus of the garrison, the remainder of which
consisted of rear echelon, service, and construc-
tion units. In addition to the Army troops,
2,000 naval personnel were on the island,
bringing the aggregate strength of the forces
on Biak to approximately 12,000."*

Five days after the enemy landings at Hol-
Iandia, Col. Kuzume took initial action to
organize and dispose his forces to meet a pos-
sible amphibious attack. These dispositions
were laid down in an operations order issued
on 27 April, the essentials of which were as
follows : 115

/. The Biak Detachment will destroy at the
water's edge any enemy force attacking this island.
The detachment main strength will be disposed along
the south coast immediately.

2. Rear area forces will be converted into combat
units. The detachment will asiume command of
Navy ground troops,

5. Coastal sectors of responsibility are designated
as follows :

ipth Naval Garrison Umt—Bosnek to

114 Order of battle of the forces on Biak at the time
Army Forces

222d Infantry (less 2 cos.)

Elms 36th Div. Sea Transport Unit

Elms 14th Div. Sea Transport Unit

17th, 107th, 108th, Airfield Constr. Units

Elm 109th Airfield Constr. Unit

Elms 248th Independent Motor Trans. Co.

15th Formosan Special Labor Group

41st Special Land Duty

50th and 69th Construction Cos.

1st Bn, 222d Infantry — sector east of Opiaref
2d Bn, 222d Infantry — Sorido to Bosnek
3d Bn, 22 2d Infantry—detachment reserve
Tank Company — take position at Arfak Saba
and prepare to move against enemy landing,
if. Detachment headquarters will be 2-j miles
north of Jadiboeri.

On the heels of this order, the Allied air
forces on 28 April carried out a heavy raid on
the Sorido airfield sector, marking the begin-
ning of a month-long air assault which con-
stantly hampered the progress of defensive
preparations." 6 From 17 May, when the Allied
landing in the Wakde area took place, the
bombings increased sharply in violence and
assumed the characteristics of pre-invasion
softening-up operations.

In view of the intense enemy concentration
on the Sorido-Mokmer airfield sector, Col.
Kuzume decided on 22 May to shift the
operational center of gravity of the detachment
to the west. The 1st Battalion, 222d Infantry,
was relieved of its mission in the sector east of
Opiaref and sent to replace the naval garrison
unit in the Bosnek sector. The naval troops
were, in turn, shifted westward into the Sorido

of the Allied landing on 27 May was as follows :
1st Branch, 36th Division Field Hospital
30th Field Ordnance Depot Branch
Elms 24th Signal Regt.
5th, 1 2th Mobile Lumber Squads
Elm 47th Anchorage Hq.
Navy Forces

Elms 28th Naval Base Force
33d and 105th Antiaircraft Units
19th Naval Garrison Unit
202d Civil Engineer Unit

3d Btry, 49th Field Antiaircraft Bn.
(1) Mimeographed Organization Tables of Biak Garrison. 29 Apr 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1274, l 9 J u ' 44- ( 2 )
Miscellaneous documents published in following ATIS Bulletins: No. 1176, 21 Jun 44; No. 1231, 6 Jul 44; No.
1249, ti Jul 44; No. 1283, 24 Jul 44.

115 Biak Detachment Operation Plan, 27 Apr 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1266, 16 Jul 44.

116 The narrow Sorido — Mokmer airfield sector was attacked frequently by as many as 150 Allied planes at
one time. Diary of Petty Officer Seishichi Kumada, 2o2d Pioneer Unit. ATIS Bulletin No. 1265, 16 Jul 44.

284

airfield sector, while the tank company was
brought over horn Arfak Saba and assembled
in the area northwest of Mokmer airfield." 7

On 25 May, Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, Chief
of Staff of Second Area Army, flew in to Biak
from General Ana mi's headquarters at Menado
in order to inspect the condition of the Biak
defenses." 8 Also on the island at this time
was Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Senda, commander
of the 28th Naval Base Force, who had come
from his headquarters at Manokwari to inspect
the local naval forces. All indications pointed
to the conclusion that the enemy's assault was
not far off.

The attack, however, came even sooner than
anticipated. At 0500 on 27 May, a powerful
enemy naval force estimated at three battleships,
two cruisers, and ten destroyers, accompanied
by a number of troop transports, appeared off
the south coast of Biak and began a fierce
artillery bombardment of shore installations.
After two hours of preparatory shelling, enemy
troops estimated at about one division began
landing operations in the vicinity of Bosnek
at 0700." 9 (Plate No. 701

Although the landing could not be pre-
vented, the topographical features of the Bosnek
sector were highly favorable to the defense
once the enemy was ashore. The coastal plain

was a narrow strip extending only 400-800
yards inland, where it was hemmed in by a
steep, 250-foot coral ridge, in which cave
positions and artillery emplacements had been
built. Because of the extreme narrowness of
the beach and the few entrances inland, deploy-
ment of the large enemy landing force was
bound to be difficult. Col. Kuzume decided
to seize this momentary advantage and swiftly
ordered the 1st and 3d Battalions, 222d In-
fantry, to carry out an attack all along the
Bosnek beachhead during the night of 27
May.' 2 "

Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy
in this attack, but the Japanese force was too
small to achieve any marked reduction of the
beachhead. On 28 May the Allied troops
drove vigorously to the west, and an infantry
battalion, supported by amphibious tanks and
heavy naval gunfire, succeeded in pushing into
Mokmer against weak resistance by elements
of the 3d Battalion and the 14th Division Ship-
ping Unit,'*' A further enemy advance was
successfully blocked by the main strength of
the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry disposed west
of Mokmer.

Col. Kuzume now decided to commit his tank
force in an effort to roll up the extended enemy
flank. During the night of 28-29 May, nine

117 (t) 1st Battalion, 222d Infantry Operations Order, as May 44. ATIS Bulletin 1228, 6 Jul 44. (2)
Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Numata, previously cited.

118 After a two-day stay on Biak, Lt. Gen. Numata was about to take off from Mokmer Airdrome on the
morning of 27 May on his return flight to Menado when the Allied attack began. Enemy shelling of the airfield
prevented the take-off, and Lt. Gen. Numata remained on the island until 10 June. Although not the ranking officer
during this period, Col. Kuzume remained in operational command.

119 (1) North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit. Supplement I, p. 15. (2) The south coast of Biak, where
the airfields were concentrated, was regarded as the most probable enemy landing point, and the Japanese defenses were
strongest in that sector. Some possibility was also seen of a landing in the vicinity of Sawabas on the opposite side
of the island, north of Bosnek, but troop strength was inadequate to organize that area. (Statement by Lt. Col.
Katogawa, previously cited.) (3) Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Numata, previously cited.

120 (1) 1st Battalion, 222d Infantry Operations Order, 27 May 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1182, 24 Jun 44.
(2) Bidku Sento Gaiyo t' T t^'iM^i (Summary of Biak Battle), Second Army Headquarters, Nov 45, pp. 2-3.

121 The sudden appearance of the enemy in the Mokmer sector led to the mistaken belief that a second am-
icus landing had been made.

285

PLATE NO. 70
Biak Operations, May — June 1944

attack would succeed m pushing the enemy
back into the sea. Local enemy air and naval
control, however, presented a serious obstacle
to complete success. To overcome this, Lt.
Gen. Numata and Rear A dm. Senda, on May
29, dispatched a joint message to higher Army
and Navy headquarters urging the immediate
commitment of fleet and air strength in the
Biak battle. The message stated

The officers and men on Biak Island are firm in
their resolution to crush the enemy. However, our
operations are severely restricted by the uncontested
superiority of the enemy's fleet and air units. We
believe that the immediate commitment of our air
forces and, if possible, some fleet units would give us
a splendid opportunity to turn the tide of battle in
the whole Pacific area in our favor.

Meanwhile, independent pressure by higher
echelons of the Army and Navy operational
command had already brought the issue of
throwing additional strength into the defense
of Biak squarely before Imperial General Head-
quarters.

The Kon Operation

The operational policy laid down by the
Army Section of Imperial General Headquar-
ters on 9 May had clearly stipulated that the
main line of resistance in the Western New
Guinea area would henceforth be the line

122 {1) Situation of the Tank Battle, 29 May 44, Biak Detachment. ATIS Bulletin No. 1270, 19 Jul 44.
(z) Summary of Biak Battle, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

123 Three enemy planes were reported shot down, and several landing craft set afire. Western New Guinea
Area and North of Australia Area Naval Operations, op. cit., p. tl.

124 These reinforcements consisted of 70 fighters, 16 carrier-type bombers, and four reconnaissance planes.
A-Go Operation Record, op. cit., p. 8.

125 Western New Guinea Area and North of Australia Area Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 11.

126 The only unfavorable development at this time was a shortage of rations and, to a lesser extent, of am-
munition. The rapid enemy landing in the Bosnek sector had overrun vast stocks of supplies piled near the beach
preparatory to dispersal to inland dumps. The naval shelling also destroyed considerable quantities of stores. (Inter-
rogation of Lt. Gen. Numata, previously cited.)

127 This message was addressed to Southern Army, Second Area Army, Fourth Air Army, Fourth Southern
Expeditionary Fleet, Southwest Area Fleet and Combined Fleet. North of Australia Operations Record, op, cit., p. 120.

tanks of the 36th Division Tank Unit assem-
bled in defilade north of Mokmer airfield, and
at 0610 on the 29th attacked toward Mokmer,
in support of the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry.
Although severe reaction by enemy aircraft,
artillery, and armor resulted in the destruction
of seven of the tanks, the attack succeeded in
pushing the enemy completely out of the Mok-
mer sector. At the end of the action, Col.
Kuzume's troops firmly held both Mokmer
and Parai and had restored the line as far
east as Ibdi.'"

The 23d Air Flotilla and 7th Air Division
meanwhile threw what strength they could
muster into attacks on the enemy landing force.
On 27 May four Army heavy bombers and nine
Navy fighters carried out a daylight attack
against fierce air opposition, all but four fight-
ers failing to return.' 1 * The Combined Fleet
on the same day ordered the First Air Fleet to
dispatch strong reinforcements to the 23d Air
Flotilla,' 24 and on 29-30 May the flotilla carried
out fresh attacks on the Biak landing force. 12 '
Though losses were again great, the air offen-
sive continued to harass the enemy until 8
June.

On the ground, the situation appeared high-
ly favorable.'* 6 The enemy was now crowded
into a small beachhead on the narrow coastal
shelf in the vicinity of Bosnek, and Col. Kuzu-
me, with considerable uncommitted strength at
his disposal, was confident that a determined

287

Sorong-Halmahera, with the Geelvink Bay
positions, including Biak, becoming a forward
barrier to be held as long as possible by the
forces already present. Though the Imperial
General Headquarters Navy Section first gave
unreserved consent to the Army Section's
policy, it was soon realized that the Navy's
own planning for the A-Go Operations placed
new emphasis on the strategic importance of
Biak.

The over-all plan of the A-Go Operation
formulated by the Combined Fleet in early May
envisaged challenging the enemy's main fleet
strength in decisive battle in the general area
of the Patau Islands, then estimated to be the
most probable target of the enemy's next move
in the Central Pacific. ,lS This rendered it
vitally important to retain possession of the
Biak airfields, which were strategically located
to provide land-based air support of the fleet
operations. Conversely, enemy seizure and
use of the airfields would seriously impair the
Navy's ability to retain air control over the
battle zone and thus diminish the chances of
victory.' 29

These considerations led the Southwest Area
Fleet, charged with implemental planning for
support of the A- Go Operation, to initiate

discussions with Southern Army in mid-May
concerning a proposal for the dispatch of troop
reinforcements to Biak aboard naval combat
ships. The Allied invasion of the Wakde-
Sarmi area, which followed immediately, spur-
red the negotiations, and by about 20 May a
tentative joint plan had been drawn up between
the two headquarters envisaging the transport
to Biak by Southwest Area Fleet of the 2d
Amphibious Brigade, then at Zamboanga,
Mindanao.' J0

The tentative plan had not yet been referred
to the central Army and Navy commands for
approval, however, when the unexpectedly early
invasion of Biak occurred on 27 May. Spur-
red into action by this menacing development,
Southern Army and Southwest Area Fleet, on
the 28th, dispatched an urgent joint recom-
mendation to Imperial General Headquarters
and the Combined Fleet, in substance as
follows :

1. It is recommended that the 2d Amphibious
Brigade be transported to Biak immediately aboard
two battleships,

2. If this is not feasible, it is recommended that
the brigade be transported to M-mokwari via Sorong
or direct to Manokwari, for trans shipment to Biak, by
the 16th Cruiser Division and the 19th and 2/th De-
stroyer Divisions,

128 The operational planning staff of the Combined Fleet estimated that there was a slightly smaller probability
of an enemy invasion of the Marianas area. In the outline plan of the A-Go Operation, the decisive fleet battle areas
were designated as (a) the Palau area and (b) the western Carolines, The plan provided that, should the enemy move
toward the Marianas or into both the Marianas and one of the above areas simultaneously, that portion of the enemy
in the Marianas area would be attacked only by the base air forces in the Marianas. The main factor in this concept
of operations was the acute shortage of fleet tankers which made it impossible to give logistical support to any large-
scale operation in the Philippine Sea at this time. (1) Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 76, 3 May
44. ATIS Limited Distribution Translation No. 39, Part VIII, p. 170. (z) Statement by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae,

129 Ibid.

130 The 2d Amphibious Brigade was one of several special units of this type organized and stationed at strategic
points in readiness to move, by naval ships, to any sector invaded by the enemy. These units were developed to off-
set japan's inability to garrison all sectors of its overextended area of operations with adequate troop strength. Author-
ized wartime strength of ?n amphibious brigade was 5,400. It was made up of three infantry battalions, a machine
cannon unit, a tank unit, and appropriate service elements.

131 Statement by Col. Horiba, previously cited.

288

The joint recommendation, gained the im-
mediate concurrence of Combined Fleet and
the Navy Section of Imperial General Head-
quarters, but the final consent of the Army
High Command was obtained only after a
joint staff conference on 29 May, attended
by the chiefs of both the Army and Navy
General Staffs.'* 2 On the same day, instructions
were radioed to Combined Fleet and Southern
Army directing them to execute the proposed
reinforcement plan, designated as the Kon (p£)
Operation.

As finally agreed upon, the Kon plan called
for the transport of the 2d Amphibious Brigade,
to be released by Southern Army to temporary
command of the Second Area Army, from
Mindanao to Korim Bay, on the north central
coast of Biak. Embarkation preparations were
swiftly completed, and the main convoy, con-
sisting of a transport group carrying the main
strength of the brigade and a screening group
of cruisers, destroyers and one old battleship,' 35
sortied from Davao on 2 June under the com-
mand of Rear Adm. Naomasa Sakonju. (Plate
No. 71) Remaining elements of the brigade
embarked simultaneously at Zamboanga aboard
other naval ships. The scheduled date of de-

barkation on Biak was set at 4 June.

On 3 June, when the force was still 600 miles
northwest of Biak, a scout plane reported a
strong American carrier group approaching the
waters east of Biak, and at the same time Rear
Adm. Sakonju radioed to Combined Fleet
that the convoy had been detected by an enemy
submarine and was being tracked by two B-24
bombers. Unwilling to risk so many ships
under these circumstances, Combined Fleet
ordered the Kon Operation suspended and
directed most of the screening group to return to
Davao. The transport groups and the 27th
Destroyer Division were ordered to proceed
to Sorong.

On 4 June it was discovered that the repor-
ted approach of an enemy carrier force was er-
roneous, and the Combined Fleet ordered re-
sumption of the operation, this time employing
only six destroyers with Rear Admiral Sakonju
flying his flag aboard the Shikindmi, one of the
destroyers. In order to make the run from
Sorong to Biak, however, three warships first
had to be refueled, necessitating a 700-mile
round-trip to Ambon since no fuel was availa-
ble at Sorong. This delayed the final departure
for Biak until midnight of 7 June.' 5 ''

132 The Army General Staff adhered to the line of the 9 May direccive, taking the stand that it was tactically
and strategically unfeasible to commit additional troops to the defense of Biak in view of the enemy's possession of
air bases at Hollandia and Wakde, The Navy's strong insistence on the necessity of holding Biak, however, finally
won the consent of the Chief of Army General Staff. (Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.)

133 Composition of the Kon Force was as follows :
From Davao : Transport Group

16th Cruiser Division : Aoha and Kinu
19th Destroyer Division: Shikinami, Uranami, Shigure
Screening Group

5th Cruiser Division : Myoko, Haguro
27th Destroyer Division : Harusame, Shiratsuyu, Samidart
10th Destroyer Division : Asagumo, Ka^agumo
Independent Unit : Fuso (BB)
From Zamboanga : Independent Group

(two minelayers, two submarine chasers, one mine-sweeper, one armed transport)
(1) Western New Guinea Area and North of Australia Area Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 12. (2) USSBS,
Interrogations of Japanese Officials, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 450. (Interrogation of Capt. Momochiyo Shimanouchi, Staff
Officer (Operations), 16th Cruiser Division.)

134 The transport group consisted of the 19th Destroyer Division and carried only a portion of the 2d Am-
phibious Brigade, numbering about 600. The 27th Destroyer Division was its screening group. Western New Guinea
Area and North of Australia Area Operations, op. cit., p. 15.

289

PLATE NO. 71
Naval Movements During Biak Operation, 2-13 June 1944

At 1245 on 8 June, the Kon formation, then
200 miles northwest of Biak, was suddenly
attacked by an Allied fighter-bomber force of
about 50 planes. The destroyer Harusame was
heavily hit and sank in five minutes, while
minor damage was sustained by other ships of
the convoy. The formation pressed on, how-
ever, also refusing to be deterred by a report at
i8oo the same day that an enemy task force of
one battleship, four cruisers and eight destroy-
ers was approaching east of Biak at high speed.
At 2230 the destroyer-transports arrived off
Korim Bay and prepared to dash in to debark
the troops.

Barely ten minutes later, a destroyer of the
screening force signalled the approach of the
Allied task force. Seriously outweighed, the
Kon formation, without effecting the debarka-
tion, retired westward at full speed with the
enemy force in pursuit. Two hours later, a
brisk three-hour gunfire and torpedo action
ensued, but no serious damage was received,
and at 0345 on 9 June, the Kon force disengaged
and returned to Sorong and Halmahera.'"

Despite this second failure, the Navy was
still determined to carry out the Kon plan. On
9 June, Vice Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa, Com-
mander-in-Chief of the First Mobile Fleet, who
had been holding the bulk of the Navy's sur-
face and carrier strength at Tawitawi in readi-
ness for the A-Go Operation, sent a message
to the Combined Fleet stating in substance :' j6

The battle of Biak has taken an unfavorable turn.
If we should lose the island, it would greatly hinder
our subsequent operations. I am therefore in favor
of sending reinforcements, especially since this might
draw the American fleet into the anticipated zone of
decisive battle and enable us to launch the " A-Go "
Operation. I am prepared to dispatch the 2d Car-

rier Division to the Biak area to support the reinforce-
ment plan, though this ts the maximum strength which
I can divert at this time.

Upon receipt of this message, Admiral
Toyoda, Commander- in-Chief of the Combined
Fleet, swiftly decided to reinforce the Kon force
for a new attempt to move troops to Biak. Al-
though rejecting Vice Adm. Ozawa's recom-
mendation to use the 2d Carrier Division, he
issued an order on ro June directing the
addition to the Kon force of the tst Battle-
ship Division, comprising the 64,000-ton Ya-
mato and Musashi and the 2d Destroyer
Squadron. Vice Adm. Matome Ugaki, 1st
Battleship Division commander, was placed
in command of the augmented task force and
was directed to carry out the operation as fol-
lows :' i7

z. Crush enemy reinforcement convoys in the
Biak area, and destroy by bombardment the enemy
forces on Owi Island,

2. Move the 2d Amphibious Brigade to Biak.

3. Operate so as to draw the enemy s fast carrier
forces to the decisive battle area, if the situation per-
mits.

Vice Adm. Ugaki designated Batjan an-
chorage, in the Moluccas, as the rendezvous
point, and by the morning of 12 June the Ya-
mato, Musashi, and other ships of the force had
assembled in readiness for the start of the
operation.' 38 On 11 June, however, carrier-
planes from a powerful enemy task force had
begun a sustained attack on Japanese bases
in the Marianas. On 13 June a surface force
stood off Tinian and Saipan Islands, subjecting
the coast defenses to heavy preparatory shelling.
With the enemy's intentions now clear, Admi-
ral Toyoda, at 1730 the same day, suspended
all fleet commitments, including the Kon opera-

135 Western New Guinea Area and North of Australia Area Naval Operations, op. cit,, pp, 15-6.

136 A-Go Operation Record, op. cit., p. 51.

137 The 4th Destroyer Division (Yamagumo and Nowaki), already accompanying the 1st Battleship Division,
formally enrolled in the Kon force on 11 June. Ibid., pp. 33-4, 104.

138 Ibid., p. 34.

291

tion, and ordered the Navy's full strength
thrown against the enemy in the Marianas.' 19
This meant that the hard-pressed Japanese
forces on Biak would have to continue without
reinforcements pending the outcome of the
decisive fleet engagement now about to unfold
on the central sector of the national defense zone.

Philippines Sea Battle

Immediately upon receipt of Admiral Toyo-
da's order, the First Mobile Fleet began gather-
ing its dispersed forces to move against the
enemy. The main body, which was currently
displacing to a new training base in Guimaras
Strait, south of Panay, to escape an enemy
submarine concentration in the Tawitawi area,
refueled at the strait and headed for the Mari-
anas. Meanwhile, the ist Battleship Division
and other units detailed to the Kon Operation
sortied immediately from Batjan to rejoin the
fleet, and First Air Fleet units previously sent
to Western New Guinea and Halmahera to
reinforce the 23d Air Flotilla were ordered back
to the Marianas." 10

On 16 June the big Japanese surface force

rendezvoused offPalau and started for the battle
area. The preceding day Admiral Toyoda had
dispatched a message to all units of the fleet
declaring, " The fate of the Empire rests upon
this single battle. Every man is expected to do
his utmost."" 1 ' Meanwhile, fighting in the
Marianas had entered the ground phase with an
enemy landing on southwestern Saipan on the
morning of the 15th. Within a few days,
despite determined Japanese counterattacks, all
the Saipan air bases were lost to the enemy.' 11
The curtain now opened on the second larg-
est sea engagement of World War II,' 43 At
0634 on ro June, a scouting plane spotted an
enemy carrier group 360 miles east of Vice
Adm. Ozawa's main carrier strength. No enemy
aircraft had yet appeared over his own force,
and Vice Adm. Ozawa believed that surprise
had been gained and therefore could seize the
initative. To take advantage of their longer
range, he immediately ordered his carrier aircraft
to launch an attack. The enemy, however,
was apparently aware of the approach of the
Japanese force, and the attacking air formations
were ambushed with heavy losses before they
had succeeded in locating the enemy carriers.' 41

139 This radical departure from ihe plan of operations as laid down in the original A-Go Operation was
made possible by a great improvement in the fleet tanker situation as a result of the release of a nunibei of commercial
tankers to the Navy. This, however, had an adverse effect on the fuel situation in the homeland. (Statement of Capt.
Ohmae, previously cited.)

140 These units of the First Air Fleet actually were unable to operate effectively in the A-Go Operation due to
combat losses and depletion of flying personnel by sickness during operations in Western New Guinea. A-Go Operation
Record, op. cit., pp. 86-7.

141 Wording of this message was identical with that of Admiral Heihachiro Togo's message to the Japanese
fleet on the eve of the Battle of Tsushima, in which the Russian fleet was destroyed in 1905.

142 Chubu Taiheiyo Homen Sakusen Kiroku cf 1 £&;&^Prt&I^^t£i$ (Central Pacific Operations Record) ist
Demobilization Bureau, Nov. 46, pp. 68, 74-5.

143 The Japanese fleet consisted of nine carriers, five battleships, and n heavy cruisers in addition to smaller
combat units ; and the air strength employed aggregated 800 carrier and shore-based aircraft. The American fleet
included 29 carriers of all types, 14 battleships, and 10 heavy cruisers; and air strength employed aggregated 1400
carrier-based and 900 land-based aircraft, (t) A-Go Operation Record, op. cit., pp. 17-8, 46-7. (2) United
States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific, Naval Analysis Division), Campaigns of the Pacific War. Appendix 74, p.
*34-

144 The failure to locate the enemy force was caused by an error in its reported position due to an uncorrected
compass deviation. After sustaining severe losses in combat against the intercepting enemy planes, some of the Japa-
nese aircraft headed for land bases on Guam and suffered further losses when they ran into a large number of enemy
fighters in that vicinity. The use of Guam as a return base had been planned since many of the fliers were insufficient-
ly trained in carrier landings, and also to enable [he aircraft to strike at f .he longest possible range, (t) A-Go Operation
Record, op. cit., pp. 67-70. (2) Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited.

292

The air phase of the battle had thus already
turned decidedly in the enemy's favor.' 4 '
Meanwhile, the first blows were struck against
Vice Adm. Ozawa's surface fleet by enemy
submarines. At 0810 on 19 June, the Taiho,
Japan's largest carrier and flagship of the First
Mobile Fleet, received a spread of torpedoes,
and several hours later the carrier Shokaku was
also hit. Both ships subsequently exploded
and sank. Vice Adm. Ozawa shifted his flag
to the carrier Zuikaku and ordered the fleet
to retire to the northwest for regroupment.

In mid-afternoon of the following day, Vice
Adm. Ozawa received reports that the enemy's
fast carrier groups were again approaching his
fleet. He promptly ordered the few remaining
torpedo-planes aboard his carriers to execute
an attack, to be followed by a night attack by
Vice Adm. Kurita's striking force of battleships,
cruisers and destroyers. The torpedo-planes
left the carriers at 1700 but were unable to
find the enemy groups. Meanwhile, at 1730,
powerful enemy air formations struck at the
Japanese fleet, damaging five carriers, one battle-
ship, one cruiser, and three fleet tankers. One
of the damaged carriers, the Hiyo, was torpedo-
ed and sunk by an enemy submarine while
drifting helplessly, and two of the tankers could
not maintain steerage way and had to be sunk
by Japanese gunfire and torpedoes.

In view of the failure of the preliminary
torpedo bomber attack, Vice Adm. Ozawa
decided that it would be futile to commit the
surface striking force in a night engagement
against the unscathed enemy. He therefore
ordered Vice Adm. Kurita at 2100 to retire
quickly to the northwest. hS This terminated
the Battle of the Philippine Sea, which had

cost the Navy most of its carrier air strength
and lost to the enemy complete command of
the sea and air in the Western Pacific. This
defeat, carefuly kept from public notice, made
the loss of the Marianas a virtual certainty and
led to the resignation of Navy Minister
Shimada, a prelude to the collapse of the Tojo
Cabinet.

Biak Final Phase — Noemfoor

Until the enemy's sudden blow at the
Marianas caused the final cancellation of the
Kon Operation, the Japanese forces on Biak
continued to fight with confidence that rein-
forcements would soon enable them to turn
the tide of battle against the invaders. However,
the situation had already begun to deteriorate
in the closing days of May.

By 31 May relentless enemy pressure in the
Bosnek sector had finally resulted in a break-
through of the Japanese ridge positions to the
north. Col. Kuzume's forces reacted vigorously,
launching a strong counterattack on the night
of 2-3 June. The attack was particularly suc-
cessful in the sector north of Mandon, where
the 1st Battalion, 222d Infantry, forced a tem-
porary enemy withdrawal southward. ' 4? How-
ever, troop strength was insufficient to exploit
this momentary advantage, and the enemy,
despite heavy casualties, was able to restore the
situation by the morning of the 3rd. Col
Kuzume's troops continued to conduct night
raids in this sector throughout the first week
in June.

The enemy force which had pierced the
Japanese ridge defenses north of Bosnek now
began advancing westward through the jungle.

145 The land-based air forces of the First Air Fleet had already been crippled in the three-day series of enemy
air attacks on Marianas bases preceding the Saipan landing. A Go Operations Record, Op. Cit., pp. 87-8.

146 Ibid., pp. 76-7.

147 Operation Orders, 1st Battalion, 222d Infantry Regiment, 2 and 3 June 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1271, 19
Jul 44.

293

Original Painting by Yaoji Hashimoto

PLATE NO. 72
Fierce Fighting of Otsu Unit in Saipan

In coordination with this advance, enemy troops
on the Ibdi front also pushed westward, ignor-
ing the coast road to take to the high ground
northwest of Ibdi." 18 This latter maneuver
threatened to outflank the 3d Battalion, 2226.
Infantry and the 14th Division Transport Unit
holding positions along the coast road west
of Ibdi.

The situation of the Biak Detachment was
now desperate. Heavily outnumbered, the
detachment was being split in half by the
enemy's two-pronged westward advance. In
order to relieve this critical situation, the naval
ground units garrisoning the coastal sector
from Borokoe to Sorido and the airfield
construction units from the three airfields were
ordered to move immediately to the West Cave
sector and prepare to meet the enemy advance.' 49

Between West Cave and the advancing enemy
lay dense jungle terrain believed to be impas-
sable to any large force. Enemy air power, how-
ever, paved the way for the ground advance by
flattening the forest cover with bombing attacks.
Even though Japanese combat patrols contin-
ually harrassed the enemy flanks, the advance
was so rapid that by 5 June it had reached
the summit of the coastal terrace overlooking
Mokmer airfield, between East and West Caves.
The enemy was now operating in the detach-
ment's rear area, causing supply and commu-
nications to break down completely. East and
West Caves were cut off from each other, while
the 1st Battalion, 222d Infantry, and detach-
ment headquarters were still far to the east in
the area north of Bosnek, endeavoring to harass
the enemy rear.

On 7 June, enemy troops in the heights
above Mokmer airfield launched a vigorous

attack toward the field, supported by heavy
concentrations of artillery and strong tank
elements. At the height of the battle, an
enemy landing force was put ashore on the
south side of Mokmer drome, and by nightfall
the two arms of this pincers movement had
overrun the field. Col. Kuzume's forces were
now split into three widely separated segments:
one in the area north of Bosnek (Biak Detach-
ment headquarters and 1st Battalion, 222d
Infantry) ; another in the East Cave sector
(elements of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 222d
Infantry, shipping units and other miscel-
laneous service elements) ; and a third in the
West Cave and Mokmer airfield sector (main
strength of the 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry,
airfield construction units, naval garrison unit
and miscellaneous service troops).

Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata now assumed
personal command of the troops in the West
Cave sector and issued orders for a final attack
by all available units to retake Mokmer airfield.
Just before dawn on 9 June, the attack was
launched. The 2d Battalion, 222d Infantry,
advanced about halfway down the airstrip
before being halted by the firmly entrenched
enemy. A company of naval garrison troops,
attacking down the center, infiltrated complete-
ly across the airfield to reach the sea in the
enemy rear, but inadequate strength made it
impossible to press this advantage, and the
company was forced to withdraw to the sector
west of the airfield. 1 '

In view of the deteriorating situation in the
western sector, Col. Kuzume on 8 June direct-
ed the 1 st Battalion, 222d Infantry, to cease
operations north of Bosnek and hurry west to
assist in the efforts to regain Mokmer airfield.

148 Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Numata, previously cited.

149 The naval units mustered a force of about company strength, while the airfield construction units were able
to put about 300 men into the line. These units participated in the defense of Mokmer airfield, operating out of
West Cave. Ibid.

150 (1) Ibid. (2) Summary of Biak Battle, op. ck. p. 10.

295

Detachment headquarters itself left the sector
north of Bosnelc and set out for West Cave
on the 9th. Meanwhile, in the airfield sector,
the enemy quickly followed up his advantage
and by 10 June had compressed the defenders
into a semi-circular area in the immediate
vicinity of West Cave.

With the loss of Molcmer airfield, effective
Japanese resistance on Biak came to an end.' 5 '
Small reinforcements, which moved forward
from Manokwari by small craft, arrived too
late to exert any effect on the tide of battle. 1 ' 1
The cancellation of the Kon Operation on 13
June ended any remaining hope that Biak
could be held. On the 14th, the enemy began
operational flights from Mokmer airfield, and
the next day strong Japanese positions on
Hodai Oft$) Mt. had to be evacuated under
heavy enemy pressure.

By 16 June, Japanese resistance was reduced
to the last-ditch defense of East and West
Caves and of numerous smaller cave positions
scattered along the face of the coral terrace
from a point north of Parai west to Hodai Mt.
Exhaustion of rations and water finally forced
the defenders of West Cave to abandon this

position on 22 June and scatter into the hills
of central Biak. By the end of the month,
the East Cave position had also fallen to the
enemy, and the Biak garrison was reduced to
small groups of starving and exhausted men
hiding in the interior, obtaining food at night
from native gardens, and suffering from ex-
posure, malnutrition, and disease/ 51

The loss of Biak finally sealed the fate of
both the Eighteenth Army forces cut off in
Northeast New Guinea and the 36th Division
remnants still putting up sporadic resistance in
the vicinity of Sarmi. '*' Meanwhile, the enemy,
firmly in possession of the Biak airfields, moved
to consolidate his control of the Geelvink Bay
area by attacking Noemfoor Island, halfway
between Biak and the Second Army strongpoint
at Manokwari.

Noemfoor 's strategic value lay in the exis-
tence on the island's northwest coast of two
airfields : Kamiri field, a first-class completed
air base ; and Kornasoren field, which was only
partially completed. The island was garrisoned
by a small force organized around a nucleus of
six infantry companies, supplemented by a
number of miscellaneous supporting and service

151 Prior to the unsuccessful attempt to retake Mokmer airfield on 9 June, the morale of the Biak defenders
had been very high. Under the combined impact of shortage of rations and water, disease, and tactical failure, the
detachment first showed signs of defeat on 9 June, and its disintegration was very rapid thereafter. ( 1 ) Interrogation
of Lt. Gen. Numata, previously cited, (z) Summary of Biak Battle, op. cit., p. 10.

152 The first reinforcements to arrive were the headquarters and two companies of the 2d Battalion, 221st In-
fantry, which landed at Korim Bay, on the north coast of Biak, on 4 June. These troops had reached the West Cave
area by 8 June but were kept in reserve during the abortive 9 June attack to retake Mokmer airfield. On 16 June about
700 additional reinforcements of the 2d Battalion, 219th Infantry, landed at Korim Bay. These troops did not reach
the vicinity of West Cave until 23 June. Summary of the Biak Battle, op. cit., pp. 5, to, 13.

153 Under orders to return to Second Area Army headquarters, Lt. Gen. Numata left West Cave on 10 June
and departed Korim Bay on the 14th by landing craft. He arrived at Manokwari on 19 June. After leaving West
Cave, Col. Kuzume was killed in action on 2 July north of Borokoe airfield. Rear Adm. Senda died the following
December after spending seven months hiding in the jungle.

154 The Japanese forces in the Sarmi area were obliged to become totally self-sufficient. While they still had
military supplies, however, they conducted sporadic defensive operations against the enemy and held out until the end
of the war, although they were powerless to prevent Allied development and use of the Maffin airfield.

296

units.'" The force, designated the Noemfoor
Defense Detachment, was commanded by Col.
Suesada Shimizu, regimental commander of
the 219th Infantry, 35th Division, who arrived
on Noemfoor on 8 June. Col. Shimizu disposed
his forces in fourteen strongpoints scattered
around the perimeter of the island.' 56

At 0540 on 2 July, an enemy naval force
estimated to consist of four cruisers and four
destroyers approached Noemfoor and began
shelling the south coast. This proved to be a
diversionary operation, and the actual landing
was accomplished on the northwest coast, where
approximately 2,000 enemy troops, accompa-
nied by tanks and with strong air and naval
gunfire support, went ashore squarely in the
Kamiri airfield sector.

Although the terrain of the island was
characterized by the same coral terraces which
had been used to great advantage by the
defenders of Biak, the Noemfoor garrison,
scattered around the entire perimeter of the is-
land, was too small and dispersed to organize
an effective defense. Col. Shimizu's forces
retired inland before the enemy attack, which
swiftly carried beyond Kamiri airfield. On 3
July the enemy was suddenly and heavily rein-

forced,'" and two days later Kornasoren field
was also overrun. After 5 July, the garrison
forces were cut off from all outside contact,
and their activity was limited to harassing
night raids from the interior.

Aitape Counterattack

While the enemy drove an ever-deepening
wedge into the main defenses of Western New
Guinea, Lt. Gen. Adachi's isolated Eighteenth
Army forces far to the east doggedly continued
to mass their strength in the area west of
Wewak in preparation for the planned coun-
terattack on Aitape.

The Eighteenth Army commander planned
to use approximately 20,000 of his total 55,000
troops as attack forces, employing 15,000 for
logistical support and holding there maining
20,000 in the Wewak area for its defense.' 5 * By
the beginning of June, 20th Division elements
had carried out a reconnaissance in force and
had established positions on the east bank of
the Driniumor River, while the 41st and 51st
Divisions labored painfully to move up men and
supplies to the forward assembly area, located
to the west of But.

155 Order of battle of the major units on Noemfoor at the time of the Allied landing was as follows:

Headquarters, 219th Infantry 8th Independent Bn. (Provisional)

3d Bn., 219th Infantry to2d, 117th and tigth Airfield Constr. Units

7th Co., 219th Infantry 248th Independent Motor Transport Co.

One Infantry Gun Co. Elm 47th Airfield Bn.

Elms 9th Co., 222d Infantry 36th Airfield Co.

Elms 6th Co., 222d Infantry 41st Antiaircraft Machine Cannon Unit

Noemfoor Detachment Operation Orders No. A-2, 27 May 1944 ; No. A-22, 6 Jun 44 ; No. A-31, 16 Jun 44 ; No. A-
34, 1 7 Jun 44 ; No. A-37, 20 Jun 44 ; No. A-39, 25 Jun 44 ; and No. A-40, 28 Jun 44. ATIS Bulletins No. 1360, 18
Aug 44 ; No. 1326, 6 Aug. 44, and No. 1289, 26 Jul 44.

156 Disposition of Units and Expected Landing Areas, Noemfoor Island, 25 Jun 44. ATIS Bulletin No.
1287, 25 Jul 44.

157 The Japanese force first learned from Allied radio broadcasts on 13 July that this reinforcement had been
accomplished by dropping parachute troops on Kamiri field. North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit. Supple-
ment I, pp. 26-7.

158 The assault forces were to be composed of 6,6oo men of the 20th Division, 10,700 of the 41st Division,
and 2,860 in Army reserve (of which 2,000 were from the 51st Division). The main body of the 51st Division was
included in the Wewak Defense Force, (i) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 165.
(2) Statement by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.

297

•i

Original Painting by Ryohci Koijo

PLATE NO. 73
Japanese Staff Conference : West Cave, Biak

Throughout the first part of June these
preparations continued. Weakened, by lack of
adequate rations, soaked by interminable rains,
and forced to operate at night to escape air
attack, officers and men alike toiled at trans-
portation duties. Equipment and supplies had
to be carried by hand over the last portion of
the trek to the assembly area, and the heavy
labor exacted of the men resulted in a high
death toll from sickness, malnutrition, and
exhaustion.'" Despite these efforts, the
volume of ammunition and provisions collect-
ed in the forward area by mid-June, when
Lt. Gen. Adachi had hoped to complete all
preparations, was still below requirements for
the start of the offensive.

On 20 June, in view of the steadily deteriora-
ting situation on the Western New Guinea
front and to allow General Anami to concern
himself only with that critical area, Imperial
General Headquarters abruptly transferred
Eighteenth Army from Second Area Army
command to the direct command of Southern
Army.' 6 " The following day General Terauchi,
Southern Army Commander-in-Chief, dispatch-
ed an order to Lt. Gen. Adachi stating that
the mission of the Eighteenth Army would
henceforth be limited to a " delaying action at
strategic positions in Eastern New Guinea."

The Southern Army order, which fully
conformed to the views of Imperial General
Headquarters, confronted Lt. Gen. Adachi with
a difficult decision. The terms of the order
clearly released him from any obligation to carry
out the Aitape attack The Eighteenth Army
Commander, however, remained determined
to make the most effective use of his forces
while they still retained fighting power, with
the objective of diverting as much enemy
strength as possible away from the Western New

159 Approximately 5,000, or one-third of the total troops assigned to logistic support duties, died of these
causes. (Statement by Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.)

160 Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 219.

161 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 180-4.

Guinea battlefront. This, he decided, could
not be accomplished by anything short of a
large-scale counterattack on Aitape , He therefore
allowed the attack plan to stand unchanged.

On 23 June Lt. Gen. Adachi's headquarters,
which had been located at Boikin, about 20
miles west of Wewak, began to displace forward
to the assembly area behind the Driniumor
River line. By 30 June the concentration of
the attack forces, now reduced by malnutrition
and disease to about 17,000 troops, was almost
completed. The Eighteenth Army Com-
mander, by 3 July, had formulated his attack
plans, deciding that the assault on the enemy's
forward positions on the west bank of the
Driniumor River would be made on 10 July by
the 20th Division and the 237th Infantry Regi-
ment of the 41st Division. The assault troops,
after over-running the forward positions, were
to push westward until they contacted the main
enemy positions east of Aitaps and act as a
covering force for the build-up of Army forces
in preparation for the final assault on Aitape.
On 5 July, he issued a message to the troops,
in which he clearly set forth the purpose of the

operation as follows :

. . . .The presence of the enemy in Aitdpe affords
us a last favorable chance to display effectively the
fighting power which this Army still possesses, and to
contribute toward the destruction of the enemy's
strength. It is obvious that, if we resort from the
first to mere delaying tactics, the result will be that
we shall never be able to make effective use of our
full strength. The forces which survive this opera-
tion will be adequate to carry on delaying tactics.

We are resolved to annihilate the enemy in the
Aitape area by an all-out effort. And by our suc-
cess, we shall help to lift the morale of the Japanese
forces on every front and make a valuable contribu-
tion to the over-alt campaign at this critical juncture
when our comrades are courageously fighting in West-
em New Guinea. Thus, we shall display the true
merit of the Imperial Army.

. 161

299

According to plan, at 2200 on the night of
10 July, the attack forces swung into action.' 62
(Plate No. 74) After a ten-minute artillery
preparation, the 20th Division and the 237th
Infantry Regiment crossed the Driniumor
River about two miles upstream from its
mouth and launched a fierce assault against
strong Allied positions on the opposite
bank of the river.' 6 ' During the crossing,
enemy artillery set up such an intense and
accurate barrage that the forward units, par-
ticularly the 20th Division, suffered heavy
losses.' 61 The assault units nevertheless con-
tinued to attack until the positions were
reduced and a sizeable bridgehead established.
The 237th Infantry, attacking in a column of
battalions, enveloped the whole group of enemy
positions downstream from the crossing and
swung north toward the Paup coast. At the

conclusion of the action on the morning of
11 July, the Japanese forces began preparing
for the next phase of the attack, utilizing forest
cover to regroup the forward units and assemble
supplies and reinforcements. The 237th In-
fantry threw out strong patrols toward the
coastal sector in preparation tor a renewal of
the offensive.' 6 *

On 14 July, Lt. Gen. Adachi decided to
exploit the initial success of his forces by
committing all reserve units as soon as possible,
even though most of these units had not yet
arrived in the forward area.' 66 He planned to
send the main body of the 41st Division,
reinforced by the 66th Infantry released from
Army reserve, across the Driniumor River in
the zone of the 237th Infantry and increase
the pressure on the Paup coast. The 20th
Division was ordered to swing south and

162 Order of battle of forces participating in the initial assault was as follows :

20th Division 41st Division

78th Infantry Regt. 237th Infantry Regt.

80th Infantry Regt. 1st Battalion, 41st Mountain Artillery Regt.

79th Infantry Regt. 3d Company, 8th Independent Engineer Regt.

26th Field Artillery Regt.
20th Engineer Regt.

2d Company, 33d Independent Engineer Regt.
A small coastal detachment consisting of one company from the 237th Infantry supported by a battery from the
41st Mountain Artillery Regt. and some infantry cannons from the 237th Infantry, attacked across the mouth of the
Driniumor and penetrated as far as Chakila before being annihilated by an enemy counterattack on 15 July. (1)
Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cil. Vol. Ill, pp. 107-201, 282. (2) Operations Order No. 67, ist
Battalion, 41st Mountain Artillery Regiment, 9 July 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1392, 27 Aug. 44. (3) Statement by
Lt. Col. Tanaka, previously cited.

163 These positions were believed to constitute the enemy outpost line guarding the main defenses near Aitape.
Enemy strength holding this line was estimated at about three infantry battalions, with supporting artillery. Ibid.

164 The ist Battalion, 78th Infantry, of the 20th Division, alone lost 300 men in effecting this river crossing.

165 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 205-9.

166 Units held in reserve were as follows :

20th Division 41st Engineer Regt.

79th Infantry 8th Independent Engineer Regt. (less 3d Co)

41st Division Eighteenth Army Reserve

238th Infantry (less one bn.) 66th Infantry Regt.

239th Infantry 37th Independent Engineer Regt.

41st Mountain Artillery Regt. (less ist Bn.) 12th AAA Headquarters and 62d AAA Bn.
(1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 209-15, 223. (2) Statement by Lt. Col.
Tanaka, previously cited.

300

and occupy the enemy positions in the vicinity
of Afua and Kwamrgnirk, in the foothills o: the
Toricelli Mountains, where it would be joined
by its reserve regiment (the 79th). The division
was then to attack northward, sweeping the left
bank of the Driniumor.' 67

While these plans and preparations were
under way, small enemy units began infiltra-
ting the Japanese lines from 12 July and
regained some riverside positions. An enemy
tank unit also counterattacked the 237th
Infantry in the coastal sector on 13 July,
causing heavy casulties. The small, isolated
skirmishes which accompanied these maneuvers
went largely unnoticed until it suddenly became
apparent that the entire bridgehead was en-
dangered. Since the main body of the 41st
Division and the 66th Infantry had still not
arrived in the forward area, Lt. Gen. Adachi
had no mobile reserve to counter the enemy
threat. By 15 July, all the original crossing
points on the Driniumor had fallen to the
Allied forces, leaving the 20th Division and
the 237th Infantry marooned several miles
beyond the west bank.

Although Lt. Gen. Adachi remained deter-
mined to commit his remaining combat forces
across the Driniumor, the situation continued
to develop unfavorably. On 17 July an attempt
by the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, to retake
one of the crossing points ended in failure.
On 22 July the 237th Infantry was driven out
of the Paup coastal sector by a crushing enemy
counterattack, and the enemy continued to
bolster his positions on the west bank of the
Driniumor.

Meanwhile, in the south, the 20th Division,
in compliance with earlier orders, had already

gathered in the Afua area, where it was joined
on 18 July by the 79th Infantry. The division
began attacking toward Kwamagnirk on 20
July, meeting with initial success.

By this time, however, the deterioration of
the fighting strength of both the 20th Division
and the 237th Infantry, as well as the serious
food situation, made the Army's original plan
of conserving the main effort for the final assault
on Aitape an impossibility. In addition, the
rapid concentration of enemy forces around the
Driniumor River convinced Lt. Gen. Adachi
that the enemy was going to put up its main
resistance in that area. Therefore, Lt. Gen.
Adachi decided to commit his entire forces,
including the Army reserves and the 41st
Division, against the Allied right flank in the
vicinity of Afua, thereby exploiting the initial
success of the 20th Division. On 2 1 July, the
66th Infantry and on 26 July, the 41st Division
were ordered to assemble immediately in the
Afua area and join the 20th Division in its
northward attack. 168

The units involved in this move had almost
reached the Driniumor line in preparation for
the frontal assault. Due to the change in
plan, they were now forced to make their way
through five more miles of dense jungle along
the east bank of the river to Afua. It was
1 August before the 41st Division was able to
join the 20th in the Afua offensive.' 69

The attack of these two divisions finally
succeeded in enfilading the entire enemy line
and carried the attack forces downstream about
two miles. Japanese losses from severe enemy
artillery fire had been so heavy, however, that
the attack forces were not strong enough to
exploit their success. By 4 August the strength

167 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part IIT, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 2to-2.

168 (1) Ibid., pp. 220-8. (2) 41st Division Operations Order No. 224, 26 July 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1435,
7 Sep 44.

169 Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III, op. cit. Vol. Ill, pp. 255-8, 249.

301

PLATE NO. 74
Aitape Counterattack, 10 July — 5 August 1944

of each infantry regiment did not exceed 100
men, and some were down to as few as 30.' 70
In addition, all field rations were exhausted, a- d
the only food available was foraged plants and
vegetables and small amounts of enemy provi-
sions found in evacuated positions.

With his troops obviously unable to continue
the operation, Lt. Gen. Adachi on 4 August
ordered cessation of the attack. The remnants
of the attack forces were directed to return to
the But-Wewak area and consolidate the
defenses there in the hope of denying at least
that area to the enemy. This marked the end
of the last major effort of the Japanese forces in
New Guinea. This effort had cost 13,000
lives, but exerted little effect in checking General
MacArthur's westward advance.

End of the New Guinea
Campaign— Sansapor

The curtain had not yet rung down on the
last phase of Eighteenth Army's counterattack
against Aitape when General MacArthur's
forces, on the heels of Admiral Nimitz' moves
into Tinian and Guam in the Marianas, launch-
ed a new advance to complete the conquest
of western New Guinea and obtain forward
air bases for the final drive toward the
Philippines.

This new move, directed at Sansapor, 200
miles west of Noemfoor on the northwest coast
of Vogelkop Peninsula, was preceded by large-
scale strategic air operations. On 27 July
American carrier planes again attacked the

Palau Islands, while a formidable force of land-
based aircraft operating from Western New
Guinea bases simultaneously struck at Japanese
airfields on Halmahera, destroying about 100
7th Air Division planes newly assembled in
that area.' 7 ' Enemy planes also ranged over
the Banda and Flores Seas as part of the same
strategic preparation.

On 30 July, an Allied invasion force of ap-
proximately one division followed up these
preliminary operations with a landing at
Opmarai Point, about ten miles northeast of
Sansapor, simultaneously seizing the small
islands of Amsterdam and Middleburg, about
three miles offshore. These landings were
completely unopposed since the only Japanese
unit in the area was a line of communications
guard platoon at Sansapor. Units of the 35th
Division and the 2d Amphibious Brigade,
though only 65 miles away at Sorong, were
unable to move against the enemy force because
of a serious shortage of landing craft and the
fact that effective combat strength was down to
only a few hundred troops.' 71

This complete lack of opposition enabled the
enemy to consolidate his position without in-
terference and to carry out the speedy construc-
tion of airfields bringing virtually all of the
Moluccas within the range of Allied fighter
planes. This meant that, even without the
support of carrier air strength, General Mac-
Arthur's forces were now in a position to
undertake an invasion of Halmahera, the last
barrier in the way of a direct thrust into the
southern Philippines.

170 Total casualties in the combat forces numbered about 5,000 killed in action and about 3,000 who died of
disease and malnutrition. (Statement by Lt. Col, Tanaka, previously cited.)

171 Western New Guinea Area and North of Australia Area Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 19,

172 North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., Supplement 1, p. 30.

303

CHAPTER XI
PHILIPPINE DEFENSE PLANS

Strategic Situation, July 1944

So ominous for Japan's future war prospects
were the defeats inflicted by Allied arms in the
Marianas and Western New Guinea in the
early summer of 1944 that, m mid-July, they
culminated in the second shake-up of the
Army and Navy High Commands in five
months, and the first major political crisis since
the Tojo Government had taken the nation
into war. 1

On 17 July Admiral Shigetaro Shimada re-
signed as Navy Minister in the Tojo Cabinet,
and a day later, simultaneously with the
public announcement of the fall of Saipan,
General Tojo tendered the resignation of the
entire Cabinet, yielding not only his political
offices as Premier and War Minister, but
also stepping down as Chief of Army General
Staff. General Kuniaki Koiso (ret.), then
Governor-General of Korea, formed a new
Cabinet on 22 July with Field Marshal Sugi-

masa Yonai as Navy Minister. General Yoshi-
jiro Umezu was named Chief of Army General
Staff. 2 The shake-up was not finally completed
until 2 August when Admiral Shimada also
yielded his post as Chief of Navy General
Staff to be replaced byAdrniralKoshiroOikawa.
While these changes in Japan's top-level war

1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Maj. Toshiro Magari, Imperial Japanese Army. Duty
assignments of this officer were as follows: Faculty, Japanese Military Academy, 7 Jul 41 — 10 Dec 42 ; Army Stan-
College, 10 Dec 42 — 31 Jul 44; Staff Officer (Operations), Thirteenth Army, 31 Jul 44- — 15 Aug 45. AH source
materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 Asahi Nenkan tJJJH^St (Asahi Yearbook) Asahi Newspaper Co., Tokyo, Jun 46, p. 136.

command were still hanging fire, the planning
staffs of the Army and Navy Sections of
Imperial General Headquarters were already
giving urgent attention to the revision of future
war strategy in the light of the new situation
created by the parallel Allied thrusts into
Western New Guinea and the Marianas.
Strategically, as well as in virtually every other
respect, the situation was darker than at any
time since the outbreak of the Pacific War.

The " absolute " defense zone defined by
Imperial General Headquarters in September
1943 had in fact been penetrated at two vital
points. In the south, General MacArthur's
forces, within six months of their break-through
via the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits, had pushed
one arm of the Allied offensive more than one
thousand miles along the north coast of New
Guinea, coldly by-passing and isolating huge
numbers of Japanese troops along the axis of
advance. The capture of Hollandia gave the
enemy a major staging area for further offensive
moves, and his land-based air forces, with

a position to extend their domination over the
Moluccas, Palau, and the sea approaches to the
southern Philippines.

In the Central Pacific, the northern prong
of the Allied offensive had by-passed the Japa-
nese naval bastion at Truk to penetrate the
planned defense perimeter at a second vital

304

point in the Marianas, only 1,500 miles from
the home islands themselves. The seizure
of Saipan not only placed the Volcano and
Bonin Islands within easy range of Allied
tactical bomber aircraft, but threatened Japan
itself with intensified raids by the new 6-29,
already operating from western China. More
serious still, the crippling losses suffered by the
Navy in the Philippine Sea Battle, especially
in air strength, gave the enemy unquestioned
fleet and air supremacy in the Western Pacific.

Because of the vast expansion of the areas
menaced by Allied sea and air activity, it was
necessary to abandon all projects for the
dispatch of major reinforcements to segments
of the outer defense line which still remained
intact, notably Palau and Halmahera. Japanese
lines of communication with the southern area
were pushed back into the inner waters of the
South and East China Seas, and even these
relatively protected, interior routes were now
subject to increased danger since the acquisition
of new bases in the Marianas enabled enemy
submarines to step up and prolong their opera-
tions against convoys moving along the inner
shipping lanes. (Plate No. 75)

Transport losses due to enemy undersea at-
tacks, particularly in the waters adjacent to the
Phil ippines, had already assumed grave propor-

tions before the loss of the Marianas.' Vital
military and raw materials traffic between Japan
and the southern area was seriously affected,
and by the summer of 1944 fuel reserves in the
homeland had dwindled to a critically low point,
while southbound troops and materiel began
to pile up at Manila, the central distribution
point for the entire southern area, for lack of
transport. Personnel replacement depots in
the Manila area were so overcro-.vded that local
food supplies ran short and the troops had
to be placed on reduced rations. 4

The shortage of fuel reserves in Japan Proper
had a hampering effect on the operational
mobility of Japan's remaining fleet strength.
Soon after returning to home bases from the
Philippine Sea Battle, the First Mobile Fleet was
obliged to split its forces, dispatching most of
its surface strength to Lingga anchorage, in the
Dutch East Indies, where sufficient fuel was
available, while the carrier forces remained in
home waters to await aircraft and pilot replace-
ments.'

Importance of the Philippines

With the main Pacific defense line breached
at two points and its remaining segments in-
capable of being reinforced adequately to ensure

3 Initial steps to combat the growing submarine menace to Japanese shipping were taken in the latter part of
1943. On 1 November, Fourteenth Army was ordered by Imperial General Headquarters to cooperate with the Navy in
providing security for convoys in the waters adjacent to the Philippines by the assignment of Army aircraft to
escort and patrol duty. On 15 November the Navy established the General Escort Command and launched serious
study of measures to strengthen the convoy system and improve submarine detection devices. (i) U.S. Strategic
Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 1946. Vol. II, pp. 440-1.
(Interrogation of Capt. Atsushi Oi, Staff Officer (Operations), General Escort Command ; and Comdr. Kiyoshi Sogawa,
Imperial General Headquarters. Navy Section.) (2) Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Niki l±.g}''\ lilt EU-'tt "-$] 'Philippine
Operations Record, Phase Two) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, p. 27. American Editor's Note : The success of
American submarine " wolf-paclcs " in these waters was made possible largely by radio intercepts and prompt intelligence
transmittal by coast-watcher teleradio stations established in the islands in increasing numbers despite severe Japanese
counter-intelligence measures.

4 Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai, Sanki Dai Ikkan Hito nt okeru Dai Juyon Homengun no Sakusen Jumbi Itl&f^Sfe
&m» = JMft-'£Jt& ICiSW 5 jB-f-W^ltfiICf3 ftm m (Philippine Operations Record. Phase Three, Vol. I : Oper-
ational Preparations of the Fourteendi Area Army in the Philippines) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, p. 30.

5 (1) Hito Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono Ni it l&^lfm&V '1 i&Jt— (Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part
II) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 47, p. 37. (2; Statement by Capt. Toshifeazu Ohmae, Staff Officer (operations),
First Mobile Fleet.

305

PLATE NO. 75
Changes in Shipping Routes, January 1943 — August 1944

successful resistance to Allied assault, it was
obvious that Japan must now fall back upon
its inner defenses extending from the Kuriles
and Japan Proper thro jgh the Ryukyu Islands,
Formosa, and the Philippines to the Dutch
East Indies. Plans and preparations must
swiftly be completed with a view to the eventual
commitment of the maximum ground, sea and
air strength which Japan could muster in a
decisive battle to halt the enemy advance when
it reached this inner line.

Because of their key strategic position link-
ing Japan with the southern area of natural
resources, the Philippines naturally assumed a
position of primary importance in the formula-
tion of these plans. Just as their initial
conquest had been necessary to guard the
Japanese line of advance to the south in
1941-2/ so was their retention of paramount

importance to the defense of the Empire
in 1944.

VC'ere the Philippines lost, the already con-
tracted supply lines over which flowed the fuel
and other resources essential to continued
prosecution of the war would be completely
severed, and all of Japan's southern armies
from Burma to the islands north of Australia
would be cut off from the homeland. At the
same time, the enemy would gain possession of
a vital stepping-stone toward the heart of the
Empire and a staging area adequate to accom-
modate the vast build-up of forces and materiel
required for mounting the final assault upon
the Japanese home islands. 7 ( Plate No. 76)

Imperial General Headquarters estimates of
Allied offensive plans also underlined the im-
portance of the Philippines. As early as
March 1944, a careful study of the enemy's

6 Cf. Chapter IV, pp. 48-9.

7 The various considerations which made the Philippines of central and primary importance in the formulation
of Japan's defensive war plans in the summer of 1944 are set forth in the following interrogations made subsequent to
the surrender by key staff officers of the Army and Navy Sections of Imperial General Headquarters :

(1) Viewed from the standpoint of political and operational strategy, holding (he Philippines was the
one essential for the execution of the war against America and Britain. With the loss of these islands, not only
would Japanese communications with the southern regions be severely threatened, but the prosecution of strategic
policies within the southern regions as far as supply and reinforcements were concerned would be of paramount
difficulty. . . .The islands were also essential and appropriate strategic bases for the enemy advance on Japan.
After their capture, the advantage would be two to one in favor of the enemy. . . . (Interrogation of Lt. Gen.
Shuichi Miyazaki, Chief, ist Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 1944-5.)

(2) To shatter American war plans, the Army held it necessary to maintain the Philippines to the end
and to fight a decisive battle with the Americans, who planned to recapture the islands. Furthermore, the Philip-
pines were absolutely necessary to the security of traffic between Japan Proper and the southern area. (Interroga-
tion of Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, Chief, 2d Bureau (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section,
1942-5.)

(3) Japan recognized that the Philippines were important as a line of communications center on the route
to the South Pacific and that they must be held at all costs. (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Hiroshi Nukada, Chief,
Transport and Communications Bureau, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 1943-5.)

(4) The Philippines were regarded as the supply distribution point for the occupied areas in Java,
Sumatra, Borneo, Burma, Malaya, and New Guinea. They were also a key point in the chain which linked
these areas with the homeland. In July 1944 these islands became the key defensive position. Retaining control
of the Philippines was necessary to link the southern areas with Japan. (Interrogation of Col. Sei Matsutani,
Chief, War Policies Board. Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 1943-4.)

(5) After the fall of Saipan, the Philippines became the last line of national defense. The major portion
of the Fleet was committed at Leyte. This was considered the final stand, and the loss of the Philippines left
no hope for the successful continuation of the war. (Interrogation of Rear Adm. Tasuku Nakazawa, Chief, ist
Bureau (Operations,) Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, 1943-4,)

307

STRATEGIC POSITION OF PHILIPPINES

JULY 1944

OUTER MONGOLIA

«S!:£5ft7J

Novo forces

Anticipated attack
subsequent to invasion
Of Philippines

80O 400 MO 800 .

PLATE NO. 76

Strategic Position of Philippines, July 1944

probable future strategy arrived at the conclu-
sion that there was only slight possibility of a
direct advance upon Japan from the Central
Pacific, primarily because the absence of land
bases within fighter range of the main islands
would make effective air support of an invasion
via that route extremely difficult. Instead, it
was considered most probable that the enemy
offensives from New Guinea and the Central
Pacific would first converge upon the Philip-
pines in order to sever Japan's southern line of
communications, and that, with these islands
as a major base, the advance would then be
pushed northward toward Japan via the Ryukyu
Island chain. 8 Land-based air power would be
able to support each successive stage of this
advance.

The enemy thrust into the Marianas in June
caused Imperial General Headquarters to re-
examine the possibilities of a direct advance
upon the homeland from that direction, but
while a capability was accepted, the High
Command did not diverge from its previous
estimate that the enemy's most probable course
would be to undertake reconquest of the Phil-
ippines as a prior requisite to the invasion of
Japan Proper. 9

On the basis of these estimates. Imperial
General Headquarters decided that top priority
in preparations for decisive battle along the
inner defense line must be assigned to the
Philippines. It was anticipated that the enemy
would launch preliminary moves against Patau
and Halmahera about the middle of September

in order to secure advance supporting air bases,
and that the major assault on the Philippines
would come sometime after the middle of
November. to

With the short space of only four months
remaining before the anticipated invasion dead-
line, all Japan's energies now had to be con-
centrated on the task of transforming the
Philippines into a powerful defense bastion
capable of turning back and destroying the
Allied forces.

Local Situation

For almost a year and a half following the
completion of the Japanese occupation of the
Philippines in June 1942, little attention had
been given either by Imperial General Head-
quarters or by the occupying forces to prepara-
tions against an ultimate Allied reinvasion.
Japan's full war energies were thrown into the
outer perimeter of advance to meet steadily
intensifying Allied counterpressure, and the
development of a strategic inner defense system
went neglected until the establishment in Sep-
tember 1943 of the " absolute defense zone "
embracing areas west of Marianas — Carolines
— Western New Guinea line.

Under the plans worked out for this zone,
as outlined earlier," the Philippines were to
play the role of a rear base of operations, i. e.,
an assembly and staging area for troops and
supplies and a concentration area for air re-
serves, to support operations at any threatened

8 (t) Daihonyei Rikugun Tosui Kiroku jzfcW£MWM«£& (Imperial General Headquarters Army High Com-
mand Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Nov 46, p. 210. (2) Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief,
Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

9 Slightly less probability was seen of a direct enemy invasion of Formosa or of the Ryukyu Islands, by-passing
the Philippines. The homeland was rated third in order of probability, and the Kuriles last. (Ibid,)

10 (1) Hito Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono Ichi Jifi^'ig^-ftlfc^- (Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part I)
2d Demobilization Bureau, Aug 47, p. 7. (2) Statement by Col. Ichiji Sugita, Stall Officer (Operations), Imperial
General Headquarters, Army Section.

11 Cf. Chapter X, pp. 232-3.

309

point on the main defense perimeter from the
Marianas south to Western New Guinea and
the Banda Sea area. To implement these
plans, Imperial General Headquarters in Octo-
ber directed the Fourteenth Army 12 to complete
the establishment of the necessary base facilities
by the spring of 1944.

Major emphasis in this program was laid
upon the construction of air bases. The Army
alone planned to build or improve 30 fields in
addition to 13 already in operational use or
partially completed.' 3 The Navy projected
21 fields and seaplane bases to be ready for
operational use by the end of 1944, expand-
ing its total number of Philippine bases to
33. 14 Line of communications and other rear-
area base installations were also to be expanded
and improved.

To speed up the execution of the program,
Imperial General Headquarters dispatched ad-
ditional personnel to the Philippines in No-
vember, and ordered the reorganization and
expansion of the 10th, nth, and 17th Inde-
pendent Garrison Units, currently stationed on
Mindanao, the Visayas, and northern Luzon
respectively, into the 30th, 31st, and 33d
Independent Mixed Brigades, with a strength
of six infantry battalions each, plus normal
supporting elements. In addition, the 33d

at Fort Stotsenberg, Luzon, by
various garrison units."

In the political sphere, Japan sought to win

increased Filipino cooperation in October by
setting up an independent government under
the presidency of Jose P. Laurel. A treaty
of alliance concluded simultaneously with the
inauguration of the new government provided
for close political, economic and military
cooperation " for the successful prosecution of
the Greater East Asia War " and was supple-
mented by attached "Terms of Understanding"
which stipulated : " 6

The principal modality of the close military coop-
eration for the successful prosecution of the Greater
East Asia IV ar shall be that the Philippines will afford
all kinds of facilities for the military actions to be
undertaken by Japan, and that both Japan and the
Philippines will closely cooperate with each other in
order to safeguard the territorial integrity and in-
dependence of the Philippines.

In accordance with these provisions, the
Laurel Government promulgated orders to
ensure cooperation with local Japanese military
commanders, and steps were taken through
local administrative agencies to recruit Filipino
labor for use in carrying out the airfield con-
struction program and the improvement of
defense installations. As General MacArthur's
forces steadily forged ahead toward the Philip-
pines in the spring of 1944, however, coopera-
tion with the Japanese armed forces gradually
broke down, giving way to sabotage and active
hostility.' 7

Anti-Japanese feeling and discontent were
heightened by food shortages. Prior to the

12 On 29 June 1942, following the completion of the campaign to occupy the Philippines, the Fourteenth Army
was removed from the command of Southern Army and placed directly under Imperial General Headquarters. Cf.
Chapter VI, p. 113.

13 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., p. 41.

14 (1) Ibid., p. 42. (2) Philippine Naval Operations Part I, op. cit., pp. 2, 6.

15 (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., pp. 53-4, 75. (2) File on reorganization of forces
under 16th Group (Philippines). ATIS Bulletin No. 1631, 21 Dec 44, pp. 1-3.

16 Foreign Affairs Association of Japan. Japan Yearbook Tokyo, Dec 44, pp. 1031-2.

17 The labor recruiting program lagged so badly that, in the summer of 1944, President Laurel issued a
proclamation reminding the Filipinos that they were obligated by the treaty of alliance with Japan to cooperate in the
execution of defense measures. Despite this reminder, results remained unsatisfactory. (Statement by Maj. Mikio
Matsunobe, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Fourteenth Area Army.)

310

war a substantial volume of food products had
been imported, but as the intensification of
enemy submarine warfare cut down shipping
traffic, these imports almost ceased. Com-
modity prices soared to inflation levels, and
Filipino farmers refused to deliver their pre-
scribed food quotas to government purchasing
agencies. Allied short-wave propaganda broad-
casts effectively played upon this unrest by
emphasizing Allied economic and military
superiority and the certainty of Filipino libera-
tion.

The local situation was deteriorating so
rapidly that a report drawn up by Imperial Gen-
eral Headquarters at the end of March 1044
summarized conditions in the following pessi-
mistic terms : '*

Even after their independence, there remains among
all classses in the Phdippines a strong undercurrent
of pro-American sentiment. It is something steadfast,
which cannot be destroyed. In addition, the lack of
commodities, particularly foodstuffs, and rising prices
are gradually increasing the uneasiness of the general
public. The increased and elaborate propaganda
disseminated by the enemy is causing a yearning for
the old life of freedom. Cooperation with and con-
fdeme in Japan are becoming extremely passive, and

guerrilla activities are gradually increasing.

It was these guerrilla activities, which the
small Japanese occupation forces had never
been able to stamp out, that posed the most
serious potential threat to military operations.
In the spring of 1944 the total strength of the
organized guerrillas was estimated at about
30,000, operating in ten "battle sectors".'*
Allied submarines and aircraft operating from
Australia and New Guinea brought in signal
equipment, weapons, explosives, propaganda
leaflets and counterfeit currency for the use of
the guerrilla forces, 20 and liaison and intel-
ligence agents arrived and departed by the
same means.

Particularly dangerous to the Japanese forces
was the gathering and transmission by the
guerrillas of intelligence data to the Allies.
A network of more than 50 radio stations, at
least five of which were powerful enough to
transmit to Australia and the United States,
kept feeding out a constant flow of valuable
military information : identifications and loca-
tions of Japanese units, troop movements, loca-
tions and condition of airfields, status of new
defense construction, arrival and departure of

18 Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section Report, Saikin ni okeru Hito Jijo fkfcKlfcrt SJt&lCfS
(Recent Situation in the Philippines) 31 Mar 44, p. t.

19 The geographical locations of these sectors, and the respective leaders of the guerrilla forces in each, were
as follows :

1st Battle Sector
2d Battle Sector
3d Battle Sector
4th Battle Sector
5th Battle Sector
6th Battle Sector
7th Battle Sector
8th Battle Sector
9th Battle Sector

North Luzon

Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Vizcaya
Bulacan, Pampanga, Zambales
Tayabas, Laguna, Balangas, Cavite
Sorgosen, Camarines
Panay
Negros
Cebu, Bohol
Leyte, Samar
Mindanao

Maj. Russell Volkmann
Maj. Robert B. Laphan
Maj. Edwin Ramsey
Capt, Bernard Anderson
Lt. Col. Salvador Escudero
Lt. Col. Macario Peralta
Lt. Col. Salvador Abcede
Col. James Cushing
Maj. Gen. Ruperto Kangleon
Brig. Gen. Wendell Fertig

10th Battle Sector
Ibid., Table No. 7.

20 (1) Ibid., pp. 4-5. (2) Field Diary and Intelligence Reports, Iloilo Military Police Unit, 1-31 Aug 44.
ADVATIS Translation Nos. 24, 25 Dec 44.

311

aircraft, ship movements and defense plans. 11

Intelligence agents operated boldly in virtu-
ally every part of the Philippines, but the
greatest activity appeared to be concentrated in
the area around the Visayan Sea and on
Mindanao, a fact which suggested the proba-
bility of an eventual Allied landing in that
area. 12 Japanese local units repeatedly under-
took campaigns to eliminate the guerrillas and
silence their radio stations but as soon as the
troops withdrew after a clean-up expedition,
guerrilla activity would spring up anew.

Until the summer of 1944, direct military
action by the guerrillas was generally limited to
sporadic hit-and-run attacks on small Japanese
units in out-of-the-way areas and on supply
columns. 1 ' Such harassing tactics did not
affect the overall dispositions of the Japanese
forces, but they required that small garrisons
keep constantly on the alert. Moreover, as
enemy invasion became a more and more im-
minent probability, the activities of the guer-
rillas grew bolder and more flagrant, aided by
the fact that the Japanese forces were increas-
ingly preoccupied with defensive preparations
and were obliged to concentrate troop strength
in anticipated areas of attack.

Southern Army Defense Plans

Between October 1943 and March 1944, mil-

itary preparations in the Philippines remained
confined to the development of the islands as
a rear operational base for support of decisive
battle operations along the Marianas — Caro-
lines — Western New Guinea line. No plans
were yet considered for fortifying the Philip-
pines themselves against enemy invasion, par-
tially because Japan's resources were already
heavily taxed in order to complete preparations
along the main forward line, and partially
because of belief that the Allied advance could
be stopped at this forward barrier.

In March, however, the first indications of
a change in strategic thinking with regard to
the Philippines appeared. On 27 March Im-
perial General Headquarters, Army Section
ordered a revision of the command set-up for
the southern area, expanding Southern Army's
operational control to take in the Fourteenth
Army in the Philippines, the Second Area
Army in Western New Guinea and the eastern
Dutch East Indies, and Fourth Air Army.
These new dispositions were to become effective
5 1 April. 14 The same order directed Fourteenth
Army to institute defense preparations, particu-
laly on Mindanao, and on 4 April Imperial
General Headquarters transferred the 32d
Division to Fourteenth Army for the purpose
of reinforcing the southern Philippines. 15

Consequent upon the revision of command,
Southern Army drew up new operational plans

21 Recent Situation in the Philippines, op. cit,, pp. 7-8. American Editor's Note : These operations were
carried out by clandestine sections of General MacArthur's intelligence system, i.e., the A.I. B. (Allied Intelligence
Bureau) and P. R. S. (Philippines Regional Section). See G-2 Historical Section, GHQ FEC, Genera! Intelligence
Series : Vol. I, " The Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines " and Vol. II, " Intelligence Activities in the
Philippines During the Japanese Occupation."

22 Ibid., p. o.

23 Interrogation of Col. Shujiro Kobayashi, Chief, Operations Section, Fourteenth Area Army.

24 Cf. Chapter X, p. 239.

25 The 32d Division sailed from Shanghai in the Take convoy on 17 April together with the 35th Division
destined for Western New Guinea. While the convoy was en route to Manila, Imperial General Headquarters suddenly
decided to reassign the 32d Division to Second Area Army for the purpose of reinforcing Halmahera, and the division
therefore did not disembark in the Philippines. On 28 April, an Imperial General Headquarters order formally trans-
ferred the 32d Division to Second Area Army and, in its place, assigned the 30th Division, then in Korea, to Fourteenth
Army. (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 230-1. (2) Dai Ni
Homengun Dai juyon Homtngun Ida Hyo %;~%m%>-\-m (Table of Movements of the Second and
Fourteenth Area Armies).

312

■ (Kf^JvV^iBi) * £ M IS fi weiwtwmiwHw

Original Pointing by Manjiro Tenucfu

PLATE NO. 77
Unloading Operations, Philippine Area

covering its expanded zone of responsibility and
specifying the missions of subordinate forces.
An essential feature of these plans was the
emphasis placed upon strengthening the Phil-
ippines, not merely as a rear supporting base,
but as a bastion against eventual direct invasion
by the enemy. The main points were as
follows : 16

Southern Army's main line of defense will be
the line connecting Burma, the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands, Sumatra, Java, the Sunda Islands, the north
coast of New Guinea west of Sarmi, Halmabera
and the Philippines. The Philippines, Halmahera,
Western New Guitiea, Bengal Bay and the Burma
sectors of this line are designated as "principal
areas of decisive battle." The Philippines shall be
the " area of general decisive battle" 1 ''

2. The forces defending the sectors designated as
" principal areas of decisive battle" (Fourteenth Army,
Second Area Army, Seventh Area Army, Burma Area
Army) will, in cooperation with the Navy, strengthen
combat preparations and annihilate the enemy if and
when he attacks on those fronts. The forces holding
other sectors of the Army's main defense line will
secure key points and repulse enemy attacks.

3. Ground and air forces in the Philippines will
be reinforced, and in the event that the enemy offensive
reaches this area, Southern Army will mass all its
available ground and ah strength there for the general
decisive battle.

4. The Fourth Air Army will be responsible for
operations in the Philippines and eastern Dutch East

Indies (including Western New Guinea) ; and the
Third Air Army will be responsible for operations to
the west of and including Borneo. In the event of
enemy attack on the Pacific sector of decisive battle,
ho'vcver, the full strength of both Air Armies will be
concentrated on that front and annihilate the enemy. 1 *

Thi

ius, even while preparations were under
way for a decisive defense of the Marianas —
Western New Guinea line, Imperial General
Headquarters, Army Section and Southern
Army already had begun to envisage an even
greater decisive battle in the Philippines, which
would spell the fate of Japan's entire conquered
empire in the south. The enemy's startling
advance to Hollandia, which occurred while
the Southern Army's plans were in the final
stage of preparation, served to underline the
new emphasis given to the Philippines.

The substance of these plans was communi-
cated to the commanders of the various armies
under Southern Army control at a conference
specially summoned for that purpose at Singa-
pore on 5 May. In mid-May Field Marshal
Hisaichi Terauchi, Southern Army Commander-
in-Chief, transferred his headquarters to Manila
in order to exercise closer control over opera-
tions on the Army's eastern decisive battlefront,
and at the same time the 3d Shipping Trans-
port headquarters, which controlled all ocean
transportation within the Southern Army area,
displaced from Singapore to Manila. 2 '

26 (1) Nampo Gun Sakusen Kiroku ffi'Ji'AL'.'lffkZilBk (Southern Army Operations Record) tst Demobilization
Bureau, Jul 46, pp. 136-8. (2) Statement by Coi. Kazuo HoKba, Chief, Operations Section, Southern Army. (3)
Nampo Gun Sakusen Keikaku faiko ^Jf^HJj-SfcfclH (Outline Policy of Southern Army Operation Plan) 1 May 44.

27 The term " area of general decisive battle " was used in a dual sense. First, it denoted Southern Army's
intention to commit virtually all its strength in the Philippines in the event of enemy invasion, even at the cost of a-
bandoning its commitments on other fronts within the Army's zone of responsibility. For the Southern Army this
was considered the final decisive battle. Second, it was intended to convey the strategic concept of the Philippines as
an area in which the Army and Navy would completely coordinate their forces in a general decisive battle. This
latter concept became the central principle of the Sho-Go Operation plans elaborated by Imperial General Headquarters
in July. (Statement by Col. Horiba, previously cited.)

28 If, prior to an attack on the Philippines, the enemy launched offensive operations on the Burma front or
against the Palembang area, the main strength of the Fourth Air Army, conversely, was to be shifted to the western
front to reinforce the Third Air Army. Southern Army Operations Record, op. cic., p. 137.

29 Statement by Maj. Jiso Yamaguchi, Staff Officer (Operations), Southern Army.

51 I

Southern Army meanwhile hegan pressing
for action to increase troop and air strength in
the Philippines to more adequate levels. At
the beginning of May, Fourteenth Army's
combat ground forces consisted of only one
division (16th) and four independent mixed
brigades, with one additional division (30th)
already allocated by Imperial General Head-
quarters late in April and scheduled for early
transfer form Korea. As against this meager
strength, the operations staff of Southern Army
estimated that fifteen field divisions would be
required for decisive battle operations in the
Philippines, in addition to eight independent
mixed brigades for security control and garrison
duty. JO A large-scale reinforcement of the
Fourth Air Army was also considered vitally
necessary.''

Southern Army recognized, however, that
the prior demands of reinforcing the Marianas
■ — Western New Guinea line (eft no immediate
possibility of boosting troop strength in the
Philippines up to the level of its estimated
requirements. No formal representations were
therefore made to Tokyo, although the Army's
views were informally communicated to Imperial
General Headquarters staff officers who visited
Singapore and. subsequently, Manila for liaison
purposes. The need of allocating sufficient
shipping to Southern Army to permit moving

troops from otrer sectors of its own responsible
area to the Philippines was also stressed in
these conversations.' 2

The Fourteenth Army Commander, Lt. Gen.
Shigenori Kuroda, H had meanwhile taken initial
steps in April to regroup the forces already at
his disposal with a view to ultimate defense
against invasion. The 16th Division I less the
33d Infantry and other minor elements de-
signated Army reserve) was transferred from
Luzon to Leyte and, with the 3 tst Independent
Mixed Brigade attached, was made responsible
for the defense of Visayas. The 32d and 33d
Independent Mixed Brigades were directed to
undertake defense preparations in northern
and southern Luzon, respectively. The 30th
Division, upon arrival from Korea, was to be
assigned to the defense of Mindanao, reinforced
by the 30th Independent Mixed Brigade,
already in the Mindanao area,'*

While the Army was carrying out these
preliminary moves to revitalize the defenses of
the Philippines, the major elements of the
Navy were fully occupied in preparations for
the planned decisive battle operations in the
Western Pacific. n The 3d Southern Expedi-
tionary Fleet, which had been responsible since
January 1942 for local naval security in Philip-
pine waters, had only small forces and was
unable to take more than limited measures to

30 (1) Statement by Col. Horiba. previously cited. (2) Fourteenth Army, in an earlier estimate submitted
to Imperial General Headquarters in March, had placed troop requirements for securing the Philippines at a mini-
mum of seven field divisions, with 24 additional infancry battalions to maintain public order and combat guerrilla
forces. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., p. 60.

31 For this purpose, Fourth Air Army headquarters was to be moved back from Mcnado to the Philippines to
effect a reorganization of the Army's component air groups, using reinforcements to be sent out gradually from the
Homeland. Southern Army Operations Record, op. cit., p. 138.

32 Statement by Col. Horiba, previously cited.

33 Lt. Gen. Kuroda assumed command of Fourteenth Army on 19 May 1943.

34 The east coast of Mindanao was regarded, at this time, as a probable landing point in case of enemy invasion
of the Philippines. The 30th Division was therefore ordered to deploy its troops in the Surigao area when the division
arrived in the latter part of May. (Statement by Lt. Gen. Gyosaku Morozumi, Commanding General, 30th Division.)

35 Cf. discussion of Combined Fleet preparations for the " A-Go " Operation, Chapter X.

315

strengthen the islands' sea defenses.* 6

The situation in regard to air strength also
remained unsatisfactory pending the execution
of plans to reinforce the Fourth Air Army.
Of the Air Army's existing components, the
6th Air Division had lost virtually all of its
remaining strength at Hollandia, while the 7th
Air Division was fully committed in the
Ceram area.' 7 Active operations on the Burma
front meanwhile barred any early transfer of
Third Air Army strength to the Philippines
area.** Naval air strength was chiefly- limited
to the 26th Air Flotilla, which had moved
back from the Rabaul area to Davao in Feb-
ruary for reorganization and training."

Battle Preparations No. 11

The enemy's unexpectedly early penetration
to Hollandia in April brought wider recog-
nition that no time must be lost in strengthen-
ing the defenses of the Philippines. The main
Western New Guinea defense line under pre-
paration in the Geelvink Bay area was still
incomplete and inadequately manned, and
serious doubt began to be felt that it would
succeed in stopping General MacArthur's

36 Since early in 1944, the Navy had been preparing Tawitawi and Guimaras anchorages, in the Philippines, to
accommodate major elements of the Combined Fleet in support of planned operations in the Marianas and Carolines
areas. Preparations had also been started in March to establish facilities for accommodating command posts of the
Combined Fleet and First Air Fleet at Davao. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

37 Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono San : Dm Jukachi Gun no Sakuseu ffi^ffsifeWdh&^Mi- K$<Dfrv!l
(Southeast Area Operations Record, Part III : Eighteenth Army Operations) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Sep 46, Vol.
Ill, pp. 78-9.

38 Southern Army Operations Record, op. cit., pp. i6r-2.

39 The 26th Air Flotilla was assigned to the First Air Fleet on 5 May but did not participate in the Philippine
Sea Battle of 19-20 June. AGo Sakusen bffiYfM (" A-Go " Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Aug 47, pp.

accelerated drive toward the Philippines.

To meet this danger, Imperial General
Headquarters, Army Section in the middle of
May ordered Southern Army to carry out a
program of operational preparations in the
Philippines, designated as Battle Preparations
No. u.*° The Army High Command recog-
nized that air power would be of key importance
in de r ending so large an island area and there-
fore assigned first priority in this program to
preparations for large-scale air operations.
Army ground forces were charged with full
responsibility for carrying out the airfield con-
struction program, which was expanded to
provide for 30 new fields in addition to those
projected in October 1943.'' 1

A sufficient number of additional fields were
to be ready for use by the end of July to permit
the deployment of four air divisions, and
subsequent construction was to proceed rapidly
enough to enable two more air divisions to be
deployed in the Philippines by the end of
1944. Already established fields, such as those
at Manila, Clark, Lipa, Bacolod, Burauen, Del
Monte and Davao, were to be maintained as
air bases.'' 1

Shortly prior to the issuance of Battle

40 Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 232.

41 Of the 30 Army airfields projected in October 1943, six had been generally completed by May 1944, and 24
were still under construction. Of the 21 projected Navy fields, 15 were still incomplete.

42 Each air base consisted of several airfields, each of which was an integral part of the base. The advantages
of this arrangement were ; (a) closer and more effective coordination of defense measures j (b) more concentrated
and efficient use of air strength; (c) better command and maintenance facilities. Bases varied in size from those
capable of accommodating a full air division down to bases which could accommodate half a division. Imperial
General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 206.

316

Preparations No. n, Imperial General Head-
quarters had taken initial steps to reinforce air
strength in the Philippines, ordering the
transfer of the 2d and 4th Air Divisions from
the Second Air Army in Manchuria. The
4th Air Division was directly assigned to the
Fourth Air Army, while the zd was assigned
to Southern Army, which subsequently placed
it under Fourth Air Army command. Late
in May the first increment of these reinforce-
ments arrived in the Philippines, and on 1
June Fourth Air Army headquarters effected
its planned transfer from Menado to Manila. 4 '
Before leaving Manchuria, the 2d and 4th Air
Divisions were reorganized, most of the flying
units being assigned to the 2d 44 and base main-
tenance units to the 4th. 4 '

Under Battle Preparations No. 11, steps
were also taken to bolster Fourteenth Army
troop strength. During June 15,000/20,000
filler replacements were transported to the
Philippines, and Fourteenth Army was ordered
to reorganize and increase its four independent
mixed brigades to divisions, using these replace-
ments to fill them up to division strength. 46
The new divisions and their locations were as
follows :

Ind, Mixed Division

Brig. Designation Headquarters
30th 100th Division Davao, Mindanao
31st W2d Division Cebu
$2d 103d Division Baguio, Luzon
33d 105th Division Las Bahos, Luzon
In addition to these units, two new independ-
ent mixed brigades, the 54th and 55th, were
activated on Luzon, the 55th remaining in Cen-
tral Luzon and the 54th transferring to Zambo-
anga via Cebu shortly after organization was
completed. 47 The 58th Independent Mixed Bri-
gade, just organized in Japan Proper, was also as-
signed by Imperial General Headquarters order
to Fourteenth Army as a further step to streng-
then the ground forces in the Philippines. 4 *

Despite the shift of a portion of the airfield
construction program over to the 4th Air Divi-
sion, a large part of the Army ground forces
still had to be allocated for this purpose in-
stead of to the immediate preparation of ground
defenses against invasion. Fourteenth Army,
however, was keenly aware of the detri-
mental consequence which the same course had
produced with respect to the tenability of the
Western New Guinea defense line, and decided
that August must be fixed as the deadline for
the switch-over of all ground forces to prepara-
tions for ground operations. 49

43 Hito Koku Sakusen Kiroku Dai Niki it J^tE'^f^UffiSSsB— MB (Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two)
1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 4-5.

44 The 6th and 10th Air Brigades of the 2d Air Division moved forward to the Philippines in June, followed by
the 7th and 13th during July and August. The 2d Air Division also assumed command of the 22d Air Brigade, already
in the Philippines. Report on reinforcements sent to the Philippines, prepared by the 1st Demobilization Bureau in
reply to memorandum of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 27 Oct 45. Submitted 14 Nov 45.

45 The 4th Air Division, upon its arrival, was assigned the primary mission of executing part of the airfield
construction program. Two air reconnaissance companies, with about 20 aircraft, were assigned to the division, how-
ever, and allocated to anti-submarine patrol duty.

46 The organization of [hese new divisions differed from the standard Japanese infantry division in that each
had two infantry brigades made up of four independent infantry battalions, with an approximate over-all strength of
10,000 troops. Rikugun Butai Chosa Hyo f$_i$. tl% (Table of Army Units) War Ministry, 28 Oct 45, Part I,
pp. 36-8.

47 (1) Dairikumei Dai Sennijukyu-go IirJft : f'~-t" ft-StE (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1029)
15 Jun 44. (2) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 10— 11.

48 (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 250-60. (2) Philippine
Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 12.

49 Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Sanki Dai Nikan Furoku Reile Sakusen Kiroku ttj|fi^ftS»S!S^~^Jifcv-i
7"fr4ft£H (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, Vol. II, Supplement: Leyte Operations Record) 1st Demo-
bilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 9-10.

317

Efforts were also launched to increase the
efficiency of the line of communication system
and to accumulate reserves of military supplies.
One of the first moves was the formation of
the Southern Army Line of Communications
Command on 10 June."*' This headquarters
took over command of all line of communica-
tion units in the Philippines and, in addition,
was charged with responsibility for logistical
support of the entire Southern Army,

Concurrently with the execution of the
Army's Battle Preparations No. it, the Navy
also took steps to reinforce its Philippine de-
fenses, especially in air strength. After suffer-
ing heavy losses in June and early July at the
hands of enemy carrier forces in the Central
Pacific, the 6ist Air Flotilla of the land- based
First Air Fleet'' was ordered back to Philippine
bases and immediately began reorganizing and
replenishing its strength with replacements
arriving from Japan. 51

Meanwhile, on 12 July, Southwest Area Fleet
transferred its headquarters from Surabaya to
Manila in order to assume closer control of naval
base and surface forces in the Philippines."

The sharp acceleration of defense prepara-
tions in the Philippines made it necessary to
allocate additional shipping for military use.
In August 105,000 tons of general non-military

ships were made available to the Army and
earmarked for employment in reinforcing the
Philippines. At the same time, in order to
speed the importation to Japan of oil and
critical raw materials from the southern area,
the Government in July transferred 200,000
tons of shipping from general freight transport
between Japan and China— Manchuria to the
southern shipping route, and ordered the con-
version of 232,000 gross tons of cargo ships
into oil tankers. 54

To achieve maximun utilization of shipping
space, a central coordinating control body was
established in July, composed of representatives
of the War, Navy and Transportation Ministies.
This body permitted a more flexible system
whereby military shipping, which might return
to Japan empty after discharging troops or
supplies at Manila for example, could be
diverted to Singapore or some other southern
port to pick up critical cargo for the Home-
land. Similarly, non-military freighters hitherto
sent out empty to southern ports could be used
to carry military traffic as far as Manila. 55

Along with these measures, the Navy, after
considerable experimentation, achieved a more
effective system of convoy protection. The
number of escort ships was increased to 80,
almost three-fourths of which operated on the

50 (1) Dairikumei Dai Sennijuicf)i-go £ i $ 1$ T" ~. + (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1021)
7 Jun 44. (2) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 27.

51 The other major elements of the First Air Fleet at the end of June were : 22d Air Flotilla, stationed on Trulc ;
23d Air Flotilla, which had been transferred from the control of the Southwest Area Fleet on 5 May and was deployed
in the Ceram-Halmahera area; and the 26th Air Flotilla, which was still at Davao. The 62d Air Flotilla had been
organized in Japan and assigned to the First Air Fleet early in 1944. Just before the Philippine Sea Battle in June, it
was transferred temporarily to direct Combined Fleet command. " A-Go," Operation, op. cit., pp. 11-14.

52 Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., p. 30.

53 Southwest Area Fleet had previously made preparations to transfer its headquarters to Kendari, in the Cele-
bes, or to Halmahera, in order to facilitate support of operations in Western New Guinea. With the invasion of
Hollandia, however, these plans were cancelled in favor of a transfer to Manila. Ibid., pp. 28-9.

54 Gun Hoyu Sempaku Hendo ni kansuru Shuyojiko ftjMSttfttCfft" S £3? ggg (Principal Matters Pertaining
to Changes in Military Shipping) Shipping Division, General Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Transportation, 20 Jan 46.

55 Statement by Capt. (Navy) Oi, previously cited.

318

southern route under the ist Escort Force
headquarters, located at Takao, Formosa.' 6
Four escort carriers, converted from merchant
ships, were also made available for escort duty,
and new air groups, with radar-equipped planes,
were organized exclusively for patrolling ship-
ping lanes. 57 Navy seaplanes were also being
equipped with a newly-perfected magnetic
device for the detection of submerged sub-
marines.' 8

Central Planning for Decisive Battle

Initial steps to gird the Philippines against
eventual enemy invasion were thus already
under way when the penetration of the main
Western New Guinea defense line and of the
Marianas made it evident that Japan must now
prepare to wage an all-out decisive battle in
defense of the inner areas of her Empire.

Although the Philippines were expected Co
be the first of these inner areas to be attacked,
Imperial General Headquarters also had to
consider the possible contingency that the
enemy might strike alternatively at Formosa or
the Ryukyu Islands, or possibly even at the
anese home islands themselves. Compre-
hensive operational plans therefore had to be
worked out to cover all these possibilities,' 9

The basic strategic principle adopted as the
foundation of these plans was that whichever
of the inner areas first became the object of in-
vasion operations by the main strength of the
enemy would be designated as the "decisive

battle theater," and that as soon as this theater
was determined, all available sea, air and
ground forces would be swiftly concentrated
there to crush the enemy. Because of the
necessity of central control and coordination,
the decision as to when and where to activate
decisive battle operations was reserved to the
highest command level, Imperial General
Headquarters. 6 "

Detailed matters discussed in connection
with the plans included problems relating to
the preparation and concentration of all three
arms, an undertaking which exceeded in scale
anything attempted by the Japanese High
Command since the initial war operations in
December 1941. A further vital topic of dis-
cussion centered around the most effective em-
ployment of air, sea and ground forces during
the various stages of an enemy invasion.

The first major problem concerned the em-
ployment of air forces, the most mobile arm
and therefore the one which could be most
rapidly concentrated at any point of attack.
The High Command estimated that the Allied
forces would employ the same tactical pattern
of invasion which they had established in the
Marshalls, at Hollandia and at Saipan, i. e.,
carrier-based planes would first endeavor to gain
air superiority by neutralizing Japanese base air
forces ; second, while Allied aircraft maintained
control of the air, naval surface units would
seek to destroy ground defense positions near
the beach by concentrated shelling ; and third,
troop transports would begin disembarking the

Jap

56 Bciioku Senryaku Baltttgeki Chosa Oboegaki Dai Ntjuyongo ni taisuru Katto i*t jS^ 35 11+135^ It
ftti>^\S (Reply to United States Strategic Bombing Survey Memorandum No. NAV-a4) Navy Ministry, 26 Nov
45, Chart C.

57 USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 440-1. (Interrogations of Capt. Oi, and
Comdr. Sogawa, both previously cited.)

58 Ibid., pp. 309-10. (Interrogation of Capt. Shunji Kamiide, Commander, 901st Air Group, Imperial Japanese
Navy.)

59 General data regarding Imperial General Headquarters planning of the decisive battle operations were fur-
nished by Col. Hattori, Col. Sugita, and Capt. Ohmae, all previously cited.

60 Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 251-2.

319

assault troops.

Against these Allied tactics the Japanese
heretofore had followed the practice of com-
mitting most of their available air strength in
attacks directed at the enemy carriers during
the first phase of invasion. The plane losses
suffered in such attacks, however, generally
were so high that insufficient strength remained
to carry out effective attacks against the enemy's
troop transport during the third and critical
phase. The transports consequently were able
not only to approach the landing points with-
out having suffered any appreciable damage at
sea, but to ride relatively unmolested in an-
chorage while the troops debarked.

In the light of this past experience, Imperial
General Headquarters concluded that a change
in air tactics was necessary. It was estimated
that the most effective results would be obtained
if the employment of the main strength of the
Air forces were withheld until the third phase
of the enemy attack and the maximum strength
were then thrown simultaneously against both
troop transports and carriers. In accordance
with this plan, the High Command decided to
employ the main strength of the Army Air forces
in attacks against troop transports and the main
portion of the Navy Air forces against enemy
carriers.*' These assignments were subsequent-
ly embodied in a Army-Navy Central Agree-

ment covering air operations, issued on 24 July.

Withholding air attacks until the third phase
necessitated the fortification of airfields to with-
stand enemy bombing and strafing attacks dur-
ing the first two phases. Additional construc-
tion was therefore planned, 61 and as an added
precautionary measure to reduce losses during
the first and second phases, it was decided to
disperse air units at fields staggered in depth.

The employment of naval surface forces, the
next most mobile element, constituted the sec-
ond major problem confronting Imperial Gen-
eral Headquarters in preparing the plans for
decisive battle. The problem was rendered
doubly difficult by the fact that the Combined
Fleet, as a result of its heavy losses in the
Philippine Sea Battle on 19—20 June, was so
depleted in both aircraft carriers and, to an
even greater degree, in carrier-borne air forces,
that its ability to wage a modern-type sea battle
was seriously impaired. No more than six
carriers, of which only one was a regular,
first-class carrier, remained in operation, plus
two battleships fitted to launch aircraft by
catapult. 63 The Fleet, however, still possessed
considerable surface firepower, including the
two 64,000-ton super-battleships Musasbi and
Yamdto, five other battleships, 14 heavy
cruisers, seven light cruisers and about 30
destroyers. 6 *

61 Ibid., pp. 266-7.

62 Since 1943 some fortification work had been done on airfields within the national defense sphere. Concrete
revetments had been constructed to protect fuel and ammunition and control installations. Efforts were now renewed
to complete this work in the Philippines. (Statement by Col. Sugita, previously cited.)

63 The Zuikaku, of about 29.800 tons, was the only regular carrier remaining. The Chiyoda, Cbitose, Zuibo and
Ryuho. all with an approximate tonnage of 14,000, had been converted from seaplane and submarine tenders and were
classed as light carriers. The Junyo, 27,500 tons, was a converted merchant ship. The Ise and Hyuga, converted
from battleships, had no flight decks and carried only 22 aircraft which were launched by catapult. (1) Kakukan
Kozokuryoku To Icbiranhyo ftfJfeKJJUjS'J *1HK (Table Showing Radius of Action of Naval Ships) 2d Demob lization
Bureau, 19 Jul 47, p. 3. (2) Japanese Na\al Vessels at the End of the War, 2d Demobilization Bureau, Apr 47, p. 2.

64 The size, structure, and armament of the Musashi and Yamato were one of the Japanese Navy's most closely
guarded secrets. The five other battleships of the fleet included two old, slow-speed ships, the Fuso and Yamashiro.
The Fuso had participated in naval actions since early 1944 under direct Combined Fleet command. On 10 Septem-
ber, it was assigned together with the Yamasbtro to the Second Battleship Division. Philippine Naval Operations, Part
II, op. cit., p. 37.

320

SHI S Sit 1 K K I S wi<

Original Painting by Toichiro Fujimoto

PLATE NO. 78
Subchaser in Action

In spite of the serious weakness in aircraft
carriers, the Navy High Command opposed
adoption of passive defense tactics on the
ground that the Fleet would face annihilation
at some later date under still more unfavorable
conditions if the enemy succeeded in occupy-
ing any of the inner areas. The Third and
Fifth Fleets, both of which were in the Inland
Sea, would be cut off from indispensable fuel
supplies of the southern area, while the Second
Fleet, which had left home waters on 9 July for
Lingga Anchorage, would be separated from its
source of ammunition resupply in the home-
land. Moreover, the sea areas in which the
Navy must operate would thereafter be within
range of superior enemy land-based air forces.

On the basis of this reasoning, the Navy
Section of Imperial General Headquarters
decided in favor of risking the full remaining
strength of the Fleet in bold offensive action.
Surface forces, supported, by land-based air
strength, would launch a concerted attack
designed to catch and destroy the enemy fleet
of invasion transports at the points of landing.
The assault was to be facilitated by a diver-
sionary move to draw off the enemy naval
forces covering the landing operations.

Because of the absolute necessity of prevent-
ing enemy penetration of the inner defense line
and the inadequate sea and air forces available
to oppose such a penetration, Imperial General
Headquarters also considered the possible in-
itiation of tokko, or special-attack, tactics for
the purpose of destroying the enemy at sea. 6 *

In planning the most effective method of
using the ground forces, the Army Section of
Imperial General Headquarters gave particular
attention to a revision of the hitherto accepted
tactical concepts of defense against enemy
landing operations. Almost complete reliance
had hitherto been placed upon strong beach

positions, with little or no emphasis on secon-
dary defenses. The primary tactical principle
had been to destroy the enemy troops from
these beach positions as they attempted to come
ashore. The successive defeats suffered since
Tarawa, however, had demonstrated that such
positions could not be decisively held under
the type of devastating preparatory naval bom-
bardment employed by the Allied forces.

As a result of the careful studies made of
this problem over a period of some months,
the Army Section decided that new tactics of
defense should be employed in the ground
phase of the pro jected operations. These tactics
involved; (1) preparation of the main line of
resistance at some distance from the beach to
minimize the effectiveness of enemy naval shell-
ing: (2) organization of defensive positions
in depth to permit a successive wearing down
of the strength of the attacking forces ; and
(3) holding substantial forces in reserve to
mount counterattacks at the most favorable
moment.' 16

Instructions based upon the conclusions
reached by Imperial General Headquarters were
subsequently communicated to all armies in
the field.

Army Orders for the Sho-Go Operations

By the latter part of July, the basic plans
covering the decisive battle operations to be
conducted along the inner defense line had
been completed. Imperial General Headquar-
ters designated these operations by the code
name Sho- Go (tJjUife I. meaning "victory," and
proceeded to issue implementing orders to the
various Army and Navy operational commands.
The basic order governing Army operations
was issued by the Army Section of Imperial
General Headquarters on 24 July, stating in

65 Cf. Chapter XVII for detailed discussion of special attack, tactics and organization.

66 Imperial Genera! Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 262-3.

322

part as follows i* 7

1. Imperial General Headquarters is planning to
initiate decisive action against anticipated attack by
the enemy's main force during the latter part of the
year. . . . The decisive battle area is expected to be
Japan Proper, the Nanset (Ryukyu) Islands, Formosa
or the Philippines. The zone of decisive action
and the date of the initiation of opeiations will be
designated by Imperial General Headquarters.

2. To accomplish their respective missions, the
Commander-in-Chief, Southern Army, the Com-
mander, Formosa Army, the Commander-in-Chief,
General Defense Command, the Commander, Fifth
Area Army, and the Commander-in-Chief China
Expeditionary Army will swiftly prepare for decisive
action in cooperation with the Navy.

A directive implementing the above order
was issued the same day by the Army Section,
Imperial General Headquarters, including the
following instructions :* s

/. Army commanders will generally complete
preparations for decisive action in their respective
area by the following dates : Philippine area (Sho
Operation No. 1) ; end of August : Formosa and
Nansei Islands (Sho Operation No. 2) j end of
August i Japan Proper, excluding Hokkaido (Sho
Operation No. 3); end of October, Northeastern area
(Sho Operation No. 4); end of October.

Air operations were specifically dealt with in
a Army-Navy Central Agreement which was
appended to this directive. The principal
stipulations of this agreement were as follows : 6 '
1. Operational Objective :

The Army and Navy Air forces will complete
preparations for decisive action by mid-August.
In the event of an enemy invasion, the total Air
forces of both the Army and Navy shall be
concentrated in the area of decisive action and

will engage and destroy the invading forces
through coordinated action.

Imperial General Headquarters shall determine
the ;one wherein decisive action shall be executed.

2. Disposition dnd Employment of Air Forces:

a. The basic disposition of Army and Navy
Air forces shall be as follows :

Northeast area — Twelfth Air Fleet : 1st Air
Division.

Japan Proper (excluding Hokkaido) — Third
Air Fleet ; Air Groups attached to Third
Fleet (if stationed in Japan) ; Training
Air Army; 10th Air Division: 11th Air
Division ; and 12th Air Division.

Nansei Islands and Formosa Area — Second
Air Fleet : 8th Air Division.

Philippines, Western New Guinea — Halma-
hera, and Central Pacific areas — First Air
Fleets , Fourth Air Army.

Present dispositions will be maintained on
other fronts.

b. Plans for employment of Air forces:
For Sho Operation No. i, the Navy shall

concentrate the First and Second Air Fleets
in the Philippines, hold the Third Air Fleet in
reserve, and transfer the Twelfth Air Fleet to
Japan Proper. Besides the total strength of
the Fourth Air Army, the Army shall send as
reinforcements to the Philippines two fighter
regiments and one heavy bomber regiment
from the Training Air Army, one fighter
regiment, one light bomber regiment, and
one heavy bomber regiment from the 8th Air
Division, and two fighter regiments from the
Fifth Air Army in China. The 1st Air Divi-
sion shall be held as strategic reserve.

3. Allocation of Missions and Command

67 Dairikumei Dai Senhachijwchi-go A'P^I ft (Brf A.+— Sf (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. to8t)
24 Jul 44.

68 Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 252-3.

69 (1) Ibid., pp. 254-8. (2) Daikauhi Dai Yonhyakusanjugo-go Beaatsu kM\n : ?MS7^+fi'i}i%Wi {fmperia\
General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 435, Annex) 26 Jul 44.

70 The First Air Fleet had under its command the 15th Air Regiment (Army), which was attached on 16 May
1944 to assist in long-range reconnaissance. (1) Daikaishi Dai Sambyakushichijuku-go -^iifin &2 if L'i'A.s'^ (Imperial
General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 379) 16 May 44. (2) Teraoka Nikki 1 1 ill (Diary of Vice Adm.
Kimpei Teraoka) First Air Fleet Commander.

323

PLAN FOR SHO OPERATION NO.

PLATE NO. 79
Plans for Sbo Operation No. i, August 1944

a. Operations in the Philippines, Western
New Guinea — Halmahera, and Central Pacific
areas shall be the joint responsibility of the Army
and Navy Air forces. The respective missions
of these forces until the development of decisive
action in the Philippine area will be :

(1) Navy — Air Operations m the Cen-

tral Pacific area and long-
range patrols in the Philip-
pine area.

(2) Army — Air Operations in the

Western New Guinea—
Halmahera area.

b. In the event decisive action develops in the
Philippine area, the following procedure will be
followed to achieve coordinated action by both
Air forces:

(1) When the emphasis is in on surface
operations, Fourth Air Army units designated
for attacks on enemy carriers will be placed
under the tactical command of the Com-
mander, First Air Fleet.

(2) When the emphasis is on land oper-
ations, the necessary forces of the First Air
Fleet will be placed under the tactical com-
mand of the Commander, Fourth Air Army.

4. Basic Operational Procedure for Decisive Air
Action :

a. Base air operations before the start of
decisive action: The objective shall be the
destruction of the enemy i fighting potential and
the minimization of out lossei by dispersing our
Air forces in depth ami by adopting a tactical
command which is both aggressive and flexible.
For this purpose, particular emphasis will be
placed on frequent surprise raids against enemy
basei and on timely interceptions. Direct air
defense of our bases will be provided by antiair-
craft fire as a rule.

b. Decisive air action against enemy am-
phibious attack forces: The general plan will
be to send elements of our attack forces to drain
the enemy carrier strength, and then to muster

the entire Army-Navy air strength for bold,
repeated, day-and-night attacks after permitting
the enemy to come as close as possible to our
bases, and to destroy both enemy carriers and
troop convoys.

c. In the event of enemy carrier raids against
strategic points in Japan Proper, air defenses will
be strengthened, and the enemy will be attacked
offensively regardless of the procedure in item (b).

The Army Section directive of 24 July also
included a troop employment plan for the shift-
ing of ground units of specified strength from
various areas along the inner defense line to
the invasion point. In case of the activation
of Sho Operation No. 1 for the Philippines,
the plan provided that the Formosan Army
would dispatch a force of one infantry briga de
plus supporting elements, and that reinforce-
ments of approximately division strength would
be sent from Shanghai. 7 ' Both these reinforce-
ment groups were to be dispatched to the
northern Philippines upon receipt of orders
from Imperial General Headquarters.

On the same day that the basic Sho-Go Oper-
ations order and directive were issued, Col.
Yozo Miyama, Chief of Operations Section,
Southern Army headquarters, along with
representatives of all subordinate commands
concerned, attended a conference at Imperial
General Headquarters in Tokyo to discuss
the broad phases of the plans. At this
conference, Col. Miyama received an " Outline
of Essential Instructions for Sho Operation No.

1," in which was stated the desision of the
Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section
that Fourteenth Army should prepare to fight
the decisive ground battle on Luzon and in the
event of a prior enemy in cursion into the central
or southern Philippines, should limit its action
there to delaying the enemy and securing the
local air and naval bases as long as possible. 72

71 Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 253-4.

72 Ibid., p. 270.

325

Cogent reasons made it appear advisable to
the Army High Command to determine in
advance the exact sector of the Philippines in
which decisive ground action should be fought.
The most important of these reasons was that
Japanese troop strength was inadequate to
permit the stationing beforehand of enough
strength in all sectors to fight decisive action
wherever the enemy might strike. Coupled
with this was the expectation that the com-
mitment of all Japanese sea and air forces to
attack on the enemy invasion fleet would make
it impossible to provide the necessary escort for
movements of troop reinforcement from other
sectors of the Philippines to the particular is-
land which the enemy chose for his attack.
Hence, decisive battle stations must be prede-
termined, prepared and manned in advance.

A combination of factors led Imperial Gen-
eral Headquarters to the selection of Luzon as
the sector for decisive ground battle. The
High Command estimated that the initial
Allied landing would probably be made in the
central or southern Philippines rather than
on Luzon, and it would have preferred to fight
the decisive ground action there in conjunction
with the planned decisive action of the sea and
air forces. However, there was no absolute
certainty that the enemy would not by-pass the
central and southern Philippines, nor any
means of predicting, if he did attack there,
which of the numerous islands he would
invade. On the other hand, Luzon, because

of its great value both strategically and politi-
cally, was considered certain to be invaded
sooner or later. Further factors which influ-
enced the decision were that ground operations
on Luzon would be less hampered by logistic
difficulties, and that Japanese troops would pos-
sess greater mobility due to the existence of a rel-
atively well-developed transportation network.

On the basis of these considerations, Im-
perial General Headquarters concluded at this
stage that the greatest chances of success in
ground action would be obtained by massing
troops on Luzon and awaiting the Allied inva-
sion of that island. The resultant corollary
was that, if the initial enemy invasion were
launched in the central and southern Philip-
pines, the Japanese ground forces in that area
would fight essentially a delaying action, en-
deavoring to hold on as long as possible to key
air and naval bases and to consume the maxi-
mum degree of enemy strength.

On 4 August, eleven days after the is-
suance of the Sho-Go plans, Imperial General
Headquarters ordered a reorganization of the
Army command in the Philippine area, setting
the date of activation at 9 August. By this order,
Fourteenth Army was elevated to the level of
an Area Army, Lt. Gen. Kuroda stepping up
to assume the new command. The Area Army
was to be responsible for the over-all conduct
of Army operations in the Philippines, and
in addition to exercise direct command over
the defense forces on Luzon. 71 By the same

73 Much discussion had centered around the most desirable division of operational responsibility in the Philip-
pines. In view of the political and strategic importance of Luzon, it was decided that one Army should control that
key island. On the other hand, the central and southern Philippines not only were closely interrelated topographical-
ly but also were expected to be the target of the initial Allied invasion. Decision was therefore reached to assign the
responsibility for securing that sector to another Army. Finally, Imperial General Headquarters concluded that it
would be desirable to have a single headquarters maintain unified command over the entire Philippine area, thus
retaining maximum flexibility in the employment of ground forces and facilitating necessary coordination between the
air and ground forces. To fulfill this mission it was decided forthwith to raise the status of the Fourteenth Army to
that of an Area Army with additional responsibility for the direct defense of Luzon. (1) Imperial General Head-
quarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 278-9. (a) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Two, op, cit.,
pp. 63-4. (3) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 22-3.

326

order, the Thirty-fifth Army was activated
under command of Fourteenth Area Army to
take over conduct of operations in the central
and southern Philippines. Lt. Gen. Sosaku
Suzuki, who had hitherto commanded the
Central Shipping Transportation headquarters
in Japan, was appointed Thirty-fifth Army
Commander, with headquarters at Cebu.

In July and early August, Imperial General
Headquarters also took action transferring ad-
ditional troops to the Philippines. These
troops consisted of three first-class, seasoned
divisions, i. e., the 26th from the China
Expeditionary Army, and the 8th Division
and 2d Armored Division from the Kwantung
Army, supplemented by the 61st Independent
Mixed Brigade, which had been activated in
Japan on 10 July.

In addition to these transfers. Imperial Gen-
eral Headquarters further implemented the
troop employment plan applicable to Sho Ope-
ration No. 1 by designating the 1st Division, 74
which was to be stationed in Shanghai under
direct Imperial General Headquarters com-
mand, and the 68th Brigade, stationed in
Formosa under the Formosa Army Comman-
der, as reserves for decisive battle operations
in the Philippines area. As stipulated in
the Army directive of 24 July, these units
were to be committed to the northern

Meanwhile, on 5 August, the Southern
Army Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal
Terauchi, called together the commanders and
ranking staff officers of subordinate ground and
air commands at Manila for map maneuvers to
study problems involved in the execution of
Sbo Operation No. 1. A Southern Army
order of the same date embodied the essentials
of the Imperial General Headquarters Army
Section directive and instructions specifically
relating to the Philippines. 75 Essentials of
this order were as follows: 7 *

_J. The Fourteenth Area Army Commander will
speedily perfect airfield installations and execute other
preparations in accordance with Battle Preparations
No. 11. He will conduct operations in accordance
with the following :

a. Luzon will he the mam area for decisive
ground battle.

b. In the central and southern Philippines,
the principal aim will be to hold strategic areas in
order to facilitate the decisive operations of the
Navy and Air forces.

Following up this order, Southern Army for-
mulated a theater operational plan which fur-
ther implemented the designation of Luzon as
the sector for decisive ground operations. The
plan provided that preparations for ground
operations should be carried out according
to the following instructions for specific
areas : 77

74 The 1st Division, stationed in North Manchuria, was reorganized on 24 July and began moving to Shanghai
on 20 August, completing its movement in early September. Dai Ichi Shidan Sakusen Koda Gaiyo £fl — -(Trp [§] fts® i J lEA
<{5^£ (Summary of Operations, 1st Division) Home Depot Bureau, t Mar 47, p. 6.

75 In addition to the provisions of the basic Sho-Go plan, an important amendment was adopted regarding the
inclusion of the Moluccas in the strategic scheme for the defense of the Philippines. Lt. Gen. Numata, who attended
the 5 August conference, urgently recommended that this area be regarded as a vital outpost of Philippine defense
and appropriately reinforced, particularly with air contingents. This recommendation was adopted by the conference,
and plans were subsequently made to furnish substantial air reinforcements to the Halmahera area. (Interrogation
of Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, Chief of Staff, Second Area Army).

76 Nampo Gun Sakumei Ko Dai Hyakugoju-go & %&JL+%1 (Southern Army Operations Order A,
No. 150) 5 Aug 44.

77 Hito Homcn Sakusen Shido no Taiko it$>3) Bff$ttft$$<&fcM (Outline of Operational Policy Concerning
the Philippine Area) 24 Aug 44.

327

Batan and Babuyan Islands area : An element
of the Area Army will secure strategic positions and
bar enemy attempts to gain advance air bases.

Luzon area ; The main Area Army strength will
be concentrated in this principal area of decisive
ground battle and will destroy the main force of the
invading enemy.

Central and southern Philippines : Substantial
forces will be employed to hold strategic points, block
enemy attempts to advance his sea and air bases, and
maintain pivotal centers of decisive sea and air
operations. In particular, it is vital to secure air
bases on Leyte and southeastern Mindanao.

Navy Orders for the Sho-Go
Operations

Three days prior to the issuance of the
Imperial General Headquarters Army order
covering the Sho-Go Operations, the Navy
Section of Imperial General Headquarters, on
21 July, had issued a directive outlining " naval
policy for urgent operations " and ordering
preparations for decisive battle to be waged in
the event of enemy attack on the inner defense
line. Essential portions of this directive were
as follows : ?8

i. Operational Policy:

tain and make advantageous use of the strategic
status quo ; make plans to smash the enemy's
strength ; take the initiative in creating favorable
tactical opportunities, or seize the opportunity as it
presents itself, to crush the enemy fleet and attack-
ing forces.

b. In close conjunction with the Army, the
Navy will maintain the security of sectors vital to
national defense and prepare for future
eventualities.

c. It will also cooperate closely with related
forces to maintain the security of surface routes
between Japan and vital southern sources of

materials.

2. Various types of operations:

a. Operations by base Air forces: Main
strength of the base Air forces will be stationed in
the Homeland (Hokkaido, Honshu, Sbikoku, Kyu-
shu), the Nansei Islands, Formosa, and the
Philippines, and part strength in the Kuriles, vital
southern sectors and the Central Pacifc, with the
object of attacking and destroying the enemy fleet
and advancing forces.

b. Mobile forces and other surface forces will
station the majority of their operational strength
in the Southwest Area and, in accordance with
enemy movement, will move up to the Philippines
or temporarily to the Nansei Islands. Some surface
elements will be stationed tn the Homeland area.
Both will engage in mobile tactics as expedient,
coordinating their action with that of the base Air
forces to crush the enemy fleet and advancing
forces.

c. Protection of surface lanes of communica-
tion and anti-submarine warfare : Important
strategic points are to be protected and maintained
in order to preserve the safety of surface communi-
cation between Japan and the southern area.
Simultaneously, the forces concerned mil maintain
close cooperation in nullifying attacks by enemy
task forces, air-raids from enemy bases, and the

3. Operations in various areas:

a. Homeland (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku,
Kyushu) Nansei Islands, Formosa and Philippines,
(applicable also to the Bomn Islands) : The Navy
will cooperate with the Army and related forces,
giving priority to strengthening defenses and
taking all measures to expedite the establishment of
favorable conditions for decisive battle. In event
of enemy attack, it will summon the maximum

sectors, in general intercepting and destroying the
enemy within the operational sphere of the base
Air forces.

78 Dmkaishi Dm YonhyAusanjuichi.go ^SfgOTW— H Wi (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive

No. 431 ) 21 Jul 44.

328

Following the issuance of the Army's basic
Sbo-Go Operations order on 24 July, the Navy
Section of Imperial General Headquarters on
26 July issued a new directive fitting its previous
outline of naval policy for urgent operations into
the framework of the Sho-Go Operations plan. 79
To implement both these directives, the Com-
bined Fleet on 1 August issued Combined
Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 83,
which specified the following general missions
of the naval forces in the Sho-Go Operations :*°

1. Operational Policy I

a. The Combined Fleet will cooperate with
the Army according to the operational procedures
specified by Imperial General Headquarters for the
Sho-Go Operations in order to intercept and destroy
the invading enemy in decisive battle at sea and
to maintain an impregnable strategical position.

2. Outline of Operations :

a. Preparations :

(j) Air bases will be prepared as rapidly
as possible in the Philippines to permit deploy-
ment of the entire air strength of the First and
Second Air Fleets. Air bases in the Clark
Field and Bacolod areas will be organized
rapidly in accordance with the Army-Navy
Central Agreement.

b. Operations :

(1) Enemy aircraft carriers will be destroy-
ed first by concentrated attacks of the base air
forces.

(2) Transport convoys will be destroyed
jointly by the surface and air forces. If the
enemy succeeds in landing, transports carrying

reinforcements and the troops already on land
will be the principal targets so as to annihilate
them at the beachhead.

(3) Surface forces will softie against the
enemy landing point within two days after the
enemy begins landing. All-out air attacks will
be Lunched two days prior to the attack by the
surface forces.

Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations
Order No. 84, also issued on 1 August, fixed
the new tactical grouping of naval forces for the
Sho-Go Operations. Almost the entire surface
combat strength of the Fleet was included in a
Task Force placed under the overall command
of the First Mobile Fleet Commander, Vice-
Adm, Jisaburo Ozawa. This force was broken
down into three tactical groups : (1) the Task
Force Main Body, directly commanded by Vice-
Adm. Ozawa and consisting of most of the
Third Fleet (carrier forces): (2) the First
Striking Force, commanded by Vice Adm.
Takeo Kurita and made up of the Second Fleet
with part of the 10th Destroyer Squadron
attached: (3) the Second Striking Force,
commanded by Vice Adm. Kiyohide Shima
and composed of the Fifth Fleet plus two
destroyer divisions and the battleships Fuso
and Yamashiro. 8 '

The manner in which these tactical forces
were to be employed in the planned decisive
battle operations was set forth in more detail in
an " outline of operations " annexed to Corn-

Top Secret Operations Order No.

79 Datkaishi Dai Yonbyakusanjugo-go ^Slt^O t? = -t-2I§lj| (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No.
435) 26 Jul 44-

80 These missions were set forth in a separate annex to the order. The original text of this annex is not
available, but the essential portions paraphrased in this volume were reconstructed from the following sources :

(1) Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 84, 1 Aug 44; Task Force Top Secret Operations Order No.
76, 10 Aug 44; Second Striking Force Top Secret Operations Order No. t, 10 Aug 44. ATIS Limited Distribution
Translation No. 39, Part VIII, 4Jun 45, pp. 226-33 ; Part I, 22 Apr 45, pp. 3-8; Part V, 28 May 45, pp. 5-1 1.

(2) Philippine Naval Operations Part I, op. cit., pp. 14-19. (3) Statement by Comdr. Sakuo Mikami, Staff Officer
(Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section.

81 ATIS Limited Distribution Translaation No. 39, op. cit. Part VIII, pp. 227-33 and Part V, pp.

5-1 1.

329

85, issued on 4 August. The gist of this
outline applying to surface force operations was
as follows : Si (Plate No, 79)

1. Disposition of forces: The First Striking Force
will be stationed at Lingga Anchorage, while the Task
Force Main Body and the Second Striktng Force will
be stationed in the western part of the Inland Sea.
However, if an enemy attack becomes expected, the
First Striking Force will advance from Lingga An-
chorage to Brunei, Coron or Guimaras ; the Task
Force Main Body and the Second Striking Force will
remain in the Inland Sea and prepare to attack the
north flank of the enemy task force.

2. Combat operations: If the enemy attack
reaches the stage of landing operations, the First
Striking Force, in conjunction with the base Air forces,
will attack the enemy in the landing area.

a. If the enemy attack occurs before the end
of August, the Second Striking Force, plus the 4th
Carrier Division and part of the 3d Carrier Divi-
sion, will facilitate the operations of the First
Striking Force by launching effective attacks against
the enemy and diverting his task forces to the
northeast.

b. If the enemy attack occurs after the end of
August, the Second Striking Force will be in-
corporated under the command of the Task Force
Main Body as a vanguard force. The Main
Body will then assume the mission of diverting the
enemy task forces to the northeast in order to
facilitate the attack of the First Striking Force,
and will also carry out an attack against the flank

of the enemy task forces.^'

During August, the Navy Section of Imperi-
al General Headquarters also took, action to
give the Combined Fleet more unified opera-
tional control of naval forces in order to facili-
tate the execution of the Sho-Go plans. On 9
August the General Escort Command and units
assigned to naval stations were placed under
operational command of the Combined Fleet,
and on 21 August the China Area Fleet was
similarly placed under Combined Fleet com-
mand.* 4

Preparations for Battle

In line with the broad plans handed down
by Imperial General Headquarters, Army and
Navy preparations for decisive battle in the
Philippines area were pushed ahead on a first
priority basts during August. 8 ' Particular
urgency was attached to the early completion of
preparations by the Air forces, which were to
play the key role in the initial phases of an
enemy invasion.

Shipping to the Philippines continued to be
severely limited, but air reinforcements and
supplies arrived steadily. Meanwhile, ground
units made every effort to speed the airfield
construction program. By the end of Septem-
ber, over 60 fields considered good enough for

82 Original text of the operational outline annexed to Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 85 is
not available. The substance of this outline relating to surface force operations is given here on the same sources as
listed in n. 80.

83 The outline further contained a paragraph regarding the employment of surface special attack forces. This
paragraph provided that the use of such forces would be subject to direct control by Imperial Genera! Headquarters,
and that the latcer would issue a special order for their employment in combat. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I,

Op. Cit., p. 21.

84 (1) Daikairei Dai Sanjusan-go ~kiU'T>fl S"t*Hi8 (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 33) o Aug
44. (a) Daikairei Dai Sanjugo-go >cifcfr$ . + £§8 (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 35; 21
Aug 44.

85 Concurrently with these military and naval preparations, steps were taken to assure coordinated action on the
political and diplomatic fronts. An Imperial conference held on 19 August called for a thorough mobilization of
national strengrh by the end of the current year and for decisive action to improve the Empire's diplomatic position.
(Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.)

330

all-weather use were in operational condition.
(Plate No. 80)

Completion of the movement of the 2d and
4th Air Divisions from Manchuria brought the
total strength of the Fourth Air Army in the
Philippines up to approximately 420 aircraft of
all types by the latter part of August. 86 The
2d Air Division, which contained all the combat
flying units, commanded five air brigades, one
air regiment, and other small elements. 87 These
were deployed principally at the Clark Field
and Bacolod bases, where they had been under-
going intensive training since their arrival from
Manchuria.

On 7 September, the 2d Air Division Com-
mander with part of the headquarters staff
moved to Menado in the Celebes. 88 Prior to
his departure, the 2d Air Division Commander
ordered battle preparations for three of the
devfsion's air regiments in order to bolster the
air strength of the 7th Air Division,** which
was deployed in the Menado area for support
of Second Area Army operations. Minor
elements of the 2d Air Division were also
dispatched to bases on North Borneo.

Parallel with the strengthening of the Fourth
Air Army, the reorganization and replenish-
ment of the naval land-based air forces also
proceeded according to plan. By the end of
July, the combat flying elements of the 23d Air
Flotilla in the Celebes and the 26th and 61st
Air Flotillas at Davao had been reconstituted
as the 153d, 201st and 761st Air Groups,
respectively. 9 " These three combat air groups,
under an Imperial General Headquarters Navy
order of 10 July, were to be detached from
their respective flotillas and operate under
direct command of the First Air Fleet. 9 '

The headquarters of the First Air Fleet,
which had been virtually wiped out in the
Marianas operations, was under reorganization
in Japan. On 7 August the reorganization was
completed, and the newly appointed Air Fleet
commander, Vice Adm. Kimpei Teraoka, left
shortly thereafter with his staff to set up the
headquarters at Davao. 92 On 10 August, to
unify the command of naval forces in the
Philippines, Imperial General Headquarters
transferred the First Air Fleet from direct
Combined Fleet command to that of the South-

86 The 2d Air Division had 400 planes, and the 4th Air Division (mostly base maintenance personnel) about
20. The 7th Air Division operating in the Second Area Army zone had about 70 planes. The 6th Air Division had
remained inoperational since losing its last strength at Hollandia and was finally deactivated on 19 August. (1) Philip-
pine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., pp. 25^6. (2) Damkumei Dai Senhyakugo-ga f$g&fjffiWM$&
(Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1 105) 19 Aug 44.

87 Principal units assigned to the 2d Air Division at the end of August were : 6th Air Brigade (65th and 66th
Fighter-Bomber Regiments); 7th Air Brigade (12th and 62d Heavy Bomber Regiments) ; 10th Air Brigade (27th and
45th Fighter- Bomber Regiments); 13th Air Brigade (30th and 31st Fighter Regiments); 22rJ Air Brigade (17th and
19th Fighter Regiments); 2d Air Regiment; one squadron, 28th Air Regiment and 31st Independent Reconnaissance
Squadron. Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., pp. 22-3.

88 One reconnaissance company also made the move to Menado. Washi Sakumei Ko Dai Rokuju-ga ffixtfjT Fp
(2d Air Division Order A, No. 60) 22 Ang 44.

89 Principal units operating under the 7th Air Division at this time were : 3d Air Brigade (13th Fighter Regi-
ment and 75th Light Bomber Regiment) ; 9th Air Brigade (24th Fighter Regiment and 61st Heavy Bomber Regiment) ;
two reconnaissance squadrons. (1) Ibid. (2) Philippine Air Operation Record, Phase Two, op, cit., p. 23.

90 Nihon Kaigun Hensei Sui, oyobi Heiryoku Soshitsu Hyo U^W^W\UTMty&&f)U'klk (Tables Showing
Organizational Changes and Losses of Japanese Naval Forces) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 49, pp. L-31-2.

91 (1) Ibid., pp. L-31-3. (2) Teikoku Kaigun Senji Hensei gMfeflQIIIjMlfc (Wartime Organization of
the Imperial Navy) Navy General Staff, Vol. II, 15 Aug 44, p. 32. (3) At the same tLne the service units of the
26th Air Flotilla had been organized as the Philippines Airfield Unit.

92 Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., p. 30.

331

Lonag

Rosoles

Lingayen

Bambon

Maboiocoi East
-f'iTil ■ b S
Mobolocoi West

Clark North

Clark Central

Clark South
7Hi • ^
Margot

Angeles Wflsl
T>Vl-?.li
Angeles South

*— 9

Pqroc

Del COTmen

+ ^T/t-t'l /

San Marcelino

Caloocan

Morikino
*-•/>
Quezon

Zoblon

Nei'son

Nichols HI

NicholsUZ

Lubang
')

Lipo West

7 i n r-7 'I
Puerto Princesa

/ j — SS/6FB
/ ElnVSth Air Brif

BORNEO

JAPANESE AIR DISPOSITIONS IN PHILIPPINES

— A HAS

9 SEPTEMBER 1944

T'vlJ
Aparri

Tuguegarao

Echague North

Echague Soulh

Army
SX
Naval

LEGEND

HMHRI

airfield available
for us«.

> *

yiLES

Valencia
9 £ t)/;>
Tacloban

Burouen North

Burouen South

Son Pablo

Dulog

Cebu

Motion

Surigao
Cogayan West

Z o nboango tt

If:

Za nboonga 3 2
•■>»

Tawl

l Cogayan Soulh

I Trt.*>-rit
1 Del Monte North

I T»t>iJ

I Del Monte East
I 'L ^t- > -r j§
Del Monte West
f rfj
Del Monte South

- -7-7 4 'iv-j

Malaybalay

- >\Vsv*?
Valencio

77?*

Mora mag

S^i-
Losong

I Dovaoni

\ DavooBZ
|J tl
Libby
9 'I
Oalioo

PLATE NO. 8o
Japanese Air Dispositions in the Philippines, 9 September 1944

west Area Fleet, which already controlled all
naval ground and surface elements in the
Philippines area. 91

With the establishment of First Air Fleet
headquarters at Davao, the flying elements be-
gan an intensive training program to raise com-
bat efficiency. By the early part of September
most of these elements were deployed at bases
on Mindanao and Cebu in readiness to carry
out the missions assigned to the Navy Air forces.
The combat air groups, however, were still short
of both trained flying personnel and aircraft. 94
Despite the attachment of the Army's 1 5th Air
Regiment equipped with long-range reconnais-
sance planes, the First Air Fleet was unable to
perform its preliminary mission of patrolling
the waters east of the Philippines with complete
adequacy.

Back at Homeland bases, the Second Air
Fleet, which had been activated on 15 June, was
conducting a program of specialized training in
preparation for its scheduled deployment to
Formosa and Ryukyu Island bases in Septem-
ber. 95 Under the Army-Navy Central Agree-
ment on air operations (cf. p. 294), the Second
Air Fleet was to advance from these bases to
the Philippines and reinforce the First Air Fleet
upon the activation of Sho Operation No. 1.

To the Second Air Fleet was assigned the
particular mission of attacking enemy carriers.
Its flying units were therefore specially trained

and equipped for this purpose, and a special
force designated as the "T" Attack Force was
organized to carry out surprise attacks at night
or under adverse weather conditions. 96 The
bulk of the best pilots in the Navy Air forces
were assigned to this unit. 9 *' In addition, the
7th and 98th Air Regiments (Army), equipped
with new Type IV twin-engine bombers, were
attached to the Second Air Fleet on 25 July. 9 *
The bombers were modified for carrying tor-
pedoes, and training instituted in executing
attacks on carriers.

Detailed plans for air operations under the
Sho No. 1 pi an were meanwhile under joint
study by the Army and Navy High Com-
mands in Manila. By early September, the
main lines of these plans had been worked
out as follows

/. Prior to the start of decisive battle operations,
surprise hit-and-run attacks will be directed ag-itnst
enemy land -based air forces in order to gradually
reduce their strength. Enemy air attacks agjinst our
bases mil be intercepted in planned localized actions
so as to minimize the dissipation of our combat strength.

2. In the event of enemy task force raids, de-
signated air units will execute attacks on the enemy
force at night or in poor weather. Under favorable
circumstances, daylight attacks may also be carried out.

J. In the event of enemy invasion operations, the
invading forces will be drawn as close as possible be-
fore the full weight of our Air forces is thrown into

93 Wartime Organization of the Imperial Navy, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 32.

94 The 153d, 201st and 761st Air Groups had a total strength of about 400 aircraft, only about half of which
were in operational condition. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 32—3.

95 Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited.

96 The " T " Attack Force was so designated because of its ability to fight even in adverse weather. The letter
"T " stood for taifu, the Japanese word for " typhoon ".

97 Philippine Naval Operations. Part II, op. cit., p. 3,

98 (1) Daikairei Dai Sanjuichi-go ^Ci^^'ft'^ "| Sf£ (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 3t) 24

Jul 44. (2) Dairikumei Dai Senhachiju-go ^Sl#jf ! f t A+tt (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1080)
22 Jul 44.

99 (1) Philippine Air Operations Record, Phase Two, op. cit., pp. 5-8, 14-15, 33-9. (2) Dai Roku Kicbi
Koku Butai Meirei Saku Dai Roku go Bessatsu m^i&^tm^l^^f.M} (Supplement to Sixth Base Air Force
Operations Order No. 6) 5 Sep 44. (3) Hito Homen Koku Sakusen ni kansuru Rtku-Kaigun Genchi Kyotei jtA^BS
ftt"5f^lfelCBSi"SHfS¥^ilfitaji£ (Army-Navy Local Agreement Concerning Philippines Air Operation) 1 Sept 44.

333

the attack. Concentrated attacks by all available air
units will begin one day prior to the anticipated day
of arrival of the invasion convoy at the landing point
(X-Day), to be announced later.

a. Attacks will be carried out in accordance
with the Table of Assignments decided by Imperial
General Headquarters."-

b. In attacking the enemy carrier groups, the
first target will be the regular carrier group in order
to facilitate subsequent attacks on the transport
group.

c. Attacks will be launched against the trans-
port group, as a rule, after the enemy ships have
entered the anchorage. Fighter units and surprise
attack units will attack first, followed by all types
of aircraft.

While Army and Navy Air forces girded
themselves for decisive battle, the widely-
dispersed naval surface forces also continued
preparations for the vital role they were to play in
the Sho-Go Operations. At Lingga Anchorage,
south of Singapore, the First Striking Force
concentrated on training in night attacks and
the use of radar fire control, the latter of
which had not been extensively employed
hitherto. The Task Force Main Body and the
Second Striking Force remained in the Inland
Sea, the former still occupied primarily with
the replenishment and training of its carrier
air groups.

On 10 August the ist Carrier Division,
reorganized around two newly-commissioned
regular carriers, was added to the Task Force
Main Body.' 01 Vice Adm. Ozawa, Task Force
Commander, meanwhile set 15 October as the
target date for completion of the reorganization
and training of the 3d and 4th Carrier Division
air groups. ,M Concurrently with these prepara-
tions, steps were taken to strengthen the
antiaircraft armament of combat units.' *

Ground force strength in the Philippines also
mounted steadily as the units newly assigned
by Imperial General Headquarters in July and
early August began arriving. Movement of
the 26th Division from Shanghai to Luzon
was completed by 29 August. During Septem-
ber advance echelons of the 8th Division, 2d
Armored Division, and 61st Independent
Mixed Brigade arrived. Movement of the
remaining strength of these units continued in
October, and the last elements of the 61st
Independent Mixed Brigade reached the Batan
Islands, off northern Luzon, only in November.
Enemy submarine attacks inflicted substantial
troop losses during these movements despite
efforts to ensure adequate protection of the
convoys.' 01

Arrival of the 8th and 26th Divisions, 2d
Armored Division, and 61st Independent
Mixed Brigade brought the major combat forces

100 This Table of Assignments specified the types of Army and Navy aircraft to be employed for different pur-
poses. Against enemy carriers, the Army Air force was to use only the Type IV bomber, while the Navy was to
employ both land-based and carrier-borne bombers, torpedo planes and fighters. Against enemy transports, a variety
of Army as well as Navy planes was to be used. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 15-6,

101 The ist Carrier Division was composed of the newly-completed Unryu and Amagi, with the 6oist Air Group
providing the air complement. Philippine Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., p. 69.

102 The 3d Carrier Division was reorganized on 10 August to consist of the carriers Chiyoda, Cbitosc, Zuiho and
Zuikaku, with the 634th Air Group. The 4th Carrier Division was assigned the he, Hyuga, Junyo and Ryuho, with the
654th Air Group. Ibid.

103 Battleships were armed with 120 25-mm automatic cannons, cruisers with 80, and destroyers with 40. These
numbers represented an increase of six to ten times the numbers of automatic cannon mounted on combat vessels
during operations in the Solomons in 1942. Ibid., p. 37.

104 Transports carrying one infantry battalion of the 26th Division and one infantry battalion, three tank
companies, and three artillery batteries of the 2d Armored Division were sunk by submarine attack during these
movements. Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 78 (chart).

334

of the Fourteenth Area Army up to nine
divisions and four independent mixed brigades.
In line with Imperial General Headquarters and
Southern Army directives designating Luzon as
the principal area of decisive ground battle, Lt.
Gen. Kuroda retained all the newly-assigned
forces under direct Area Army command for
the defense of Luzon. The allocation of troop
strength was thus as follows : "*'

Fourteenth Area Army (Luzon, N. Philippines)

8th Division

26th Division

103d Division

105th Division

2d Armored Division

58th Independent Mixed Brigade

61st Independent Mixed Brigade

Area Army Reserve : 33d Infantry Regiment
55 th Independent Mixed Brigade

Attached troops
Thirty-fifth Army {Central Southern Philippines)

16th Division (less 33d Inf. Regt.)

30th Division

100th Division

W2d Division

54th Independent Mixed Brigade
Attached troops

Troop dispositions ordered by Fourteenth
Area Army for the defense of Luzon were as
follows : 8th Division in the Batangas area ;
103d Division on northern Luzon, with head-

quarters at Baguio; 105th Division on southern
Luzon, with headquarters at Naga; Kawashima
Detachment (elements of 105th Division)
in the Lamon Bay area ; 58th Independent
Mixed Brigade, reinforced by the 26th Inde-
pendent Infantry Regiment," 1 * in the Lingayen
area; 61st Independent Mixed Brigade on the
Batan and Babuyan Islands'" 7 ; 26th Division
and 2d Armored Division in the central plain
area as Luzon reserve.' 08

While these dispositions were still being
put into effect, Fourteenth Area Army head-
quarters in the latter part of August reappraised
the enemy situation, concluding on the basis
of weather conditions and the progress of
enemy air concentrations that an attack on
the Philippines might be expected at any time
after the end of August. Enemy intentions
were estimated as follows : ,ov

1. Enemy forces will advance on the Philippines
either directly from the New Guinea area or Saipan,
or after capturing intermediate bases.

2. The initial landing will probably be made in
the central ot southern Philippines, somewhere be-
tween (and including) Leyte and Mindanao. 110

3. The possibility of a direct attack on Luzon
must also be considered. In this eventuality, probable
landing points are the Legaspi, Baler Bay, Dingalan
Bay, Lamon Bay, Aparn and Lingayen sectors.
Should the enemy contemplate an early advance^to
Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, his plans will include

105 Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 259-60.

106 The 26th Independent Infantry Regiment was added to Fourteenth Area Army order of battle on 20
July and moved from Manchuria to the Philippines early in September.

107 Responsibility for the defense of Batan Island was assigned to Southern Army on 1 September. Prior
to that date, the operational boundary between the Southern Army and the Formosan Army ran between the Batan
and Babuyan Islands, only the latter falling within Southern Army's zone. Dainkumei Dai Senhyakujuyon-gp jcMuirM
fW-HBil (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 11 14) 26 Aug 44.

108 Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 24

109 Ibid., pp. 4, 7, 9, 15, 18.

110 This represented a modification of earlier estimates by Fourteenth Area Army. Strong probability was
previously seen of a direct invasion of Luzon by American forces advancing from Saipan. (Interrogation of Col.
Kobayashi, previously cited.

335

INDIA N
3fa. 4fa ttffi^sais t-r

3rd a 4th Air Armies directly under Sou hern Army
t3AF sTNitfJU**. ft3Rt:S'J. mffi^«KK5l**^i±

Corndr of Southwest Area Fleet was also Comdr of 13th Air
Fleet, main strenglh of which was in Borneo & Malaya.

St JC- k a

* Km ft

• BONIN IS

. ma

HAHA- JIM/-

JAPANESE DISPOSITIONS IN SOUTHERN AREA

■ig.jL* ¥

P 4 C I F I C

■ ') r t & ii

MARIANA IS

OCEAN

anus)

EARLY SEPTEMBER 1944

LEGEND

Army

— ■ * m

Navy

KF ItlB

Southern Expeditionary Fleet

Elevation in melon

an mo

■ 10°

321ft!

•32 planes)

3. b'Otmg)

PALOU IS

C A

:4F ••-

31 A --

(I div a 3 brigs)

tit a

PQNAPE

R L I N E

I S ;

8HA

(3 divs ft 4 brigs)
Southeast Areo Fleet

*■ v e x,
^ULi.^'' SOLOMON IS

8F * ^

PLATE NO. 8 1
Japanese Dispositions in Southern Area, September 1944

securing air and naval bases in the vicinity of Aparri.

4. The enemy will be able to employ from eight
to ten infantry divisions, including a considerable
number of airborne and tank units, if Luzon is
invaded.

Landings will be powerfully supported, and
will be preceded and accompanied by intensive
neutralization air attacks on Japanese air bases.

Final Preparations, Central and
Southern Philippines

As the critical period for the anticipated
Allied invasion drew nearer, the Thirty-fifth
Army in the central and southern Philippines,
where the initial enemy blow was expected to
fall, hastened to effect last-minute preparations.
The Army's general missions had been laid
down by Fourteenth Area Army in an order to
the Thirty-fifth Army Commander, Lt. Gen.
Suzuki, when the latter assumed command on
These missions were:'"

To support and execute preparations for air
in the central and southern Philippines.

2. To defend the central and southern Philip-
pines and, in particular, secure air and naval bases
in that area.

3. In the event of an enemy landing, to conduct
operations designed to reduce the fighting power of the
enemy forces as much as possible and to prevent the
establishment of enemy bases.

Since May 1944 the ground forces in the

central and southern Philippines area had been
primarily engaged in the air base construction
program together with air force ground person-
nel. However, Fourteenth Area Army had
decided that all ground forces must switch over
to ground defense preparations at the end of
August. Only a few weeks still remained before
this deadline, and Lt. Gen. Suzuki consequently
ordered work on the projected bases to be
accelerated as much as possible." 1

The fact that some of the bases, particularly
those at Davao and at Burauen, on the east
coast of Leyte, lay close to possible enemy
landing points caused marked concern on the
part of the ground force command. Because
of the difficulty of securing them, ground force
staff officers recommended that emphasis be
shifted to the development of major bases
farther inland, but this view was not accepted
by the Air forces on the ground that coastal
bases were essential to give them maximum
operational range against an approaching enemy
invasion force." 3 Air force opposition, plus
the shortness of time available, resulted in a
decision to avoid any change in plan.

When Lt. Gen. Suzuki took over his com-
mand, Thirty-fifth Army strength was thinly
scattered over the central and southern islands.
The 16th Division, less the 33d Infantry
Regiment," 4 was stationed on Leyte, with an
element of about battalion strength garrisoning

Samar."' The i02d Division was dispersed over
in Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II Supplement, p. 4.

112 At the end of September, the status of the major airfield projects in the central and southern Philippines
as follows : The base at Bacolod, on Negros Island, was already completed, but because of poor drainage, its

use could not be depended upon in the rainy season. The projected fields at Burauen, on Leyte, were about 90 per
cent completed, while those at Davao and Del Monte, on Mindanao, were about 70 and 80 per cent completed,
respectively. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

113 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

114 The 33d Infantry Regiment was retained on Luzon as strategic reserve under direct command of Fourteenth
Area Army. Cf. p. 310.

115 When the 16th Division was assigned to the Leyte-Samar area in April, headquarters and two battalions
of the 9th Infantry Regiment were stationed on Samar, In July the regimental headquarters and one battalion were
ordered back to Leyte, leaving only one battalion on Samar. 2d Battalion/9th Infantry Operations Order No. 97,
22 Jul 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1656, 28 Dec 44, p. 13.

338

PLATE NO. 82
Japanese Ground Dispositions in the Philippines, September 1944

the islands of the Visayan Sea. The 30th
Division was on the northern tip of Mindanao
around Surigao. The 100th Division occupied
other key points on Mindanao fromZamboanga
on the west to Dansalan on the north and
Davao on the southeast. A force of only about
one battalion was stationed in the Davao area.
The 54th Independent Mixed Brigade was in
the vicinity of Cebu.

Lt. Gen. Suzuki summoned his subordinate
commanders to Cebu on 18 August for a
conference on the operational plans to be em-
ployed in the event of an Allied landing in the
Army area." 6 The substance of these plans
was as follows : " 7

t. Operational objectives: The Army will secure
the central and southern Philippines, particularly the
air bases near Davao and on Leyte, and will destroy
enemy landing forces in coordination with the decisive
operations of the sea and air forces.

2. Outline of Operations:

a. The Army will maintain a tight defense
in the Davao sector and the Leyte Gulf area with
the tooth Division and the 16th Division, respec-
tively. The main body of the jotb Division
and elements of the ioid Division will constitute a
mobile reserve to be committed to any key area
which the enemy may attack

b. Suzu Operation No. 1 i If the principal
effort of the enemy invasion is directed at the
Davao sector, the main body of the }oth Division,
three reinforced infantry battalions of the W2d
Division, and other forces will be committed to
the area.

c. Suzu Operation No. 2 : If the principal
effort of the enemy landing is directed at the Leyte
Gulf area, the main body of the 50th Division,
two reinforced infantry battalions of the W2d

Division, and other forces will be landed at Ormoc
to reinforce the 16th Division.

d. If the enemy lands powerful forces at both
Davao and Leyte Gulf, it is tentatively planned
to commit the main body of the 30th Division to
Davao and elements of the W2d Division to Leyte.

In accordance with these plans, the 100th
Division was immediately ordered to con-
centrate its main strength in the Davao area,
while the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade was
dispatched from Cebu to take over the mission
of defending western Mindanao and Jolo
Island. The main strength of the 30th
Division, consisting of the division headquar-
ters and two reinforced infantry regiments,
was directed to move from Surigao to the
vicinity of Malaybalay and Cagayan, a cen-
tralized location more suited to the division's
mission as mobile reserve." 8 The 16th
Division on Levte and ro2d Division in the
Visayan area were not affected by this
regrouping.

Naval ground forces in the central and
southern Philippines were also being reinforced
and regrouped. During August and Septem-
ber, nine naval construction units with a total
strength of about 9,000 arrived in the Philip-
pines, a portion of this strength being allocated
to the central and southern islands." 9 The
33d Special Base Force was activated early in
August at Cebu. The 36th Naval Guard unit
at Guimaras Anchorage was ordered to move to
Leyte in early October to expedite defense
preparations in the vicinity of the naval airfield
at Tacloban. The 3 2d Special Base Force still
remained responsible for the defense of naval
and harbor installations at Davao. These

1 16 At the time he assumed command, Lt. Gen. Suzuki estimated that the most probable target of the enemy's
initial assault would be Davao, with the beaches along Leyte the next most likely landing spot. Philippine Operations
Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II Supplement, pp. 7, 21-2.

117 Ibid., pp. 23-5.

118 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

tig Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 38-9.

340

various units were primarily concerned with the
construction of such fortifications as were
necessary for the direct protection for naval
installations.

The primary mission of the 16th Division
on Leyte was to secure the vital air bases at
Tacloban, Dulag and Burauen. Until midsum-
mer, however, the division was so occupied in
the construction of new airstrips and in anti-
guerrilla operations that organization of ground
defenses had not proceeded beyond the construc-
tion of coastal positions facing Leyte Gulf.' 10
The construction of inland positions did not
get under way until July, when the main
strength of the 9th Infantry Regiment was
moved back from Samar to Leyte to speed
defense preparations.

Concerned by the 16th Division's over-
concentration on beach defenses, Thirty-fifth
Army in August directed Lt. Gen. Makino to
place greater emphasis on the preparation of
defenses in depth and suggested that strong
positions for the main body of the division be
organized along an axis running through
Dagami and Burauen. In compliance with
these instructions, work on inland positions was
accelerated in September, although seriously
hampered by the difficult terrain and guerrilla
activity.

Concurrently with these preparations, the
Army began building up reserves of ammuni-
tion and rations with a view to the possible
interruption of supplies from the rear during an
enemy attack. Each division stocked sufficient
food to be self-sustained for a period of one

month and from 1,050 to 1,500 tons of
ammunition. ,3 ' In addition, a reserve supply
of one month's rations and 750 tons of
ammunition was stored on Cebu.

In late August Southern Army headquarters
at Manila decided that the defenses of the
Thirty-fifth Army area were inadequate and
ordered Fourteenth Area Army to reinforce the
troop strength in specified sectors up to
prescribed minimum levels. These levels, in
terms of nuclear infantry strength only, were
as follows :

Davao sector:
Leyte Gulf sector :

Z.amboanga :
Job Island:
Surigao :

At least one division
One division
Three battalions
Three battalions
Two battalions
Strong elements

To provide Thirty-Fifth Army with the
necessary additional strength to implement these
orders, Fourteenth Area Army released to it
the 33d Infantry Regiment 16th Division and
the 55th Independent Mixed Brigade, which
had previously been designated as Area Army
reserve. At the same time Lt. Gen, Suzuki
was ordered to effect a further regrouping of
his forces to meet the prescribed troop levels
fixed by Southern Army.

The 30th Division, the main body of which
had not yet completed its movement to the
Malaybalay-Cagayan area, was now ordered
to dispatch one regiment to Sarangani to release
the 1 ooth Division elements stationed there.
Upon being relieved, these elements were to
move to the Davao area, rejoining the main

120 These coastal defenses consisted of a series of strongpoints built at strategic points along the coast between
Palo and Abuyog. Lt. Gen. Makino, 16th Division commander, ordered key emplacements to be constructed strongly
enough to resist 15-cm howitzer shells.

121 This overall tonnage was broken down as follows: 300 rounds per rifle ; 20,000 rounds per machine gun;
10,000 hand-grenades per division ; 300 rounds per " knee " mortar ; 1.500 rounds per 7.5 cm artillery piece. (State-
ment by Col. Ryoichiro Aoshima, Staff Officer (Line of Communications), Fourteenth Area Army.)

122 (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, op. cit. Vol. II Supplement, pp. 25-6. (2) Fourteeth
Area Army Operations Orders. Published in XXIV Corps ADVATIS Translation XXIV CAET No. 7, 12 Nov 44.
(3) Thirty-fifth Army Operations Orders. XI Corps ADVATIS Translations No. 38, 14 Jan 45.

341

body of the division." 1 The 54th Independent
Mixed Brigade, previously allocated to garrison
both Zamboanga and Jolo, had not yet com-
pleted its movement from Cebu and was now
relieved of responsibility for the defense of Jolo.
This latter mission was assigned to the 55th
Independent Mixed Brigade.' 24

While these new shifts in troop assignments
caused a certain delay in ground defense
preparations on Mindanao, the forces in the
central Philippines were able to continue
making ready for impending Allied attack.
Heavy rains during this period, however,
impeded troop movements over the inadequate
road nets and also generally retarded the

construction of defensive fortifications.' 15

As the first half of September wore on,
indications mounted that the Allied forces in
Western New Guinea and the Marianas were
about to launch new offensive operations.
Guerilla activities in the Philippines increased
sharply. More significant, intelligence gathered
from enemy intercepts and a sudden increase in
the scale of air and submarine activity appeared
to foreshadow an imminent move against either
the Halmaheras or the western Carolines.' 16

These were the final barriers which stood in
the path of the Allied advance upon the
Philippines.

123 The 166th Independent Infantry Battalion of the 100th Division, stationed around Cotabato, was not pulled
back to Davao, but was transferred to joth Division command and remained in the vicinity of Cotabato. (Statement
by Col. Muneichi Hattori, Chief of Staff. 100th Division.)

124 The 55th Independent Mixed Brigade moved first from Luzon to Cebu, re-embarking there for Jolo. The
last elements of the brigade reached Jolo on 5 October. (Statement by Maj. Tokichi Temmyo, Commander, 365th
Battalion, 55th Independent Mixed Brigade.)

125 Statement by Col. M. Hattori, previously cited.

126 mm Sekm Tauen Rytkurek,, (Otsu) ®r?MW*''i«g(Z, ) (Abridged Chronicle of World War II,
(B) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Mar 46, Part III, p. 17.

342

CHAPTER XII
PRELUDE TO DECISIVE BATTLE

Initial Air Strikes

While the Japanese forces in the Philippines
hastened to complete preparations against
anticipated Allied invasion, enemy carrier-borne
aircraft served sudden warning on 9 September
1944 that the date of this invasion was fast
drawing near.' In the first large-scale air
operation by the Allies against the Philippines,
an estimated 400 carrier planes staged a devas-
tating ten-hour offensive against southern
Mindanao, concentrating their attacks on
Davao, Sarangani, Cagayan and Digos.

Since Japanese air patrols had failed to
discover the enemy task force/ the attacks
achieved complete surprise and inflicted wide-
spread and severe damage to ground installa-
tions, airfields, anchorages, and lines of com-
munication. Reconnaissance units of the First
Air Fleet immediately flew off search missions,
which revealed that the attacks originated from
three enemy naval task groups boldly maneu-
vering in the waters southeast of Mindanao.
Two of these groups were reported to have
nuclei of two aircraft carriers each; the com-

position of the third was not ascertained.

The First Air Fleet's 153d Air Group was
the only combat flying unit actually based at
fields in the Davao area at the time of the
strike. 4 Despite damage to some of its fighter
aircraft which were caught on the ground, this
unit, as well as the 761st Air Group's torpedo
bombers based at Zamboanga, were in a
position to attack the enemy carrier groups had
Vice Adm. Teraoka, First Air Fleet Com-
mander, ordered such action. However, the
Sbo-Go Operation plans covering employment
of the air forces rested on the basic tactical
principle of not committing those forces against
pre-invasion raids by enemy task forces, but
conserving their strength for all-out attacks
when the enemy was about to launch actual
landing operations. The First Air Fleet there-
fore withheld retaliatory action pending further
developments.

Ground and naval units in the Davao area
were nevertheless ordered on the alert to meet
the possible contingency that an invasion
attempt would follow the air strikes, and the
Japanese armed forces throughout southern
Mindanao became tense with expectancy. A

1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Maj. Toshiro Magari, Imperial Japanese Army. For duty
assignments of this officer, cf. n. i, Chapter XI. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2
Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 The effectiveness of Japanese air patrols was reduced by the fact that radar equipment was still in the develop-
mental stage. Also the shortage of planes made it impossible for the First Air Fleet to cover all sectors in its air
search and patrol operations. Hilo Homen Kaigun Sakusen Sono Ichi ktt} A* tflffj 3£ f1=Nl$ .Hr — (Philippine Area Naval
Operations, Part I) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Aug 47, pp. 43, 46.

3 The 201st Air Group, containing the bulk of First Air Fleet fighter strength, had displaced from Davao to
Cebu between 3 and 6 September owing to the increasing frequency of raids on Davao bases by enemy tand-based
bombers operations from Sansapor. These raids had resulted in the destruction of a considerable number of aircraft.
The 761st Air Group had moved earlier to bases at Zamboanga. on western Mindanao, and on Jolo Island, in the Sulu
Archipelago. No Army air units of any importance were stationed anywhere on Mindanao at this time. (1) Ibid.,
p. 45. (2) Teraoka Nikki P nt3 (Diary of Vice Adm. Kimpei Teraoka) First Air Fleet Commander.

343

feeling of nervousness gripped the weak local
forces at Davao 1 and rapidly spread to the
large Japanese civilian colony. A wave of wild
rumors swept the city. On 10 September, a
second series of heavy enemy raids aggravated
this state of alarm. The city and harbor were
reduced to a shambles and communications
paralyzed. Panic and civil disorder broke out.

In the midst of the alarm and confusion
caused by the air strikes, a 3 2d Naval Base
Force lookout post on Davao Gulf suddenly
sent in a report at 0930 on 10 September that
enemy landing craft were approaching the
shore.' The Base Force headquarters hastily
transmitted the report to the First Air Fleet,
which in turn radioed all navy commands
affected. Not until mid-afternoon, several
hours after the report had been broadcast, was
it established by air reconnaissance over the
gulf that there were actually no enemy ships
present. The First Air Fleet thereupon radioed
at 1630 that the previous report was erroneous."

In the interim, however, higher army and
navy headquarters had reacted swiftly. Admiral
Soemu Toyoda, Commander-in-Chief of the
Combined Fleet, had ordered all naval forces
alerted for the execution of Sho Operation
1. Thirty-fifth Army headquarters at

Cebu had simultaneously issued an alert for
Suzu No. 1 Operation, applicable to an enemy
invasion of the Davao area. 7 The 30th Divi-
sion main strength in the Cagayan area was
ordered to prepare immediately to move to
Davao to reinforce the 100th Division, and
the io2d Division in the Visayas was directed
to release two infantry battalions for dispatch
to Mindanao. The Fourth Air Army mean-
while issued orders directing the 2d Air
Division elements which had just advanced to
Menado for the purpose of reinforcing the 7th
Air Division 8 to return immediately to Bacolod. 9

Following receipt of the First Air Fleet's
retraction of the earlier invasion report, the
Combined Fleet and Thirty-fifth Army can-
celled the Sho No. 1 and Suzu No. 1 alerts
late on 10 September. The whole incident,
however, had a vital influence on later devel-
opments. The acute embarrassment caused
by the false landing scare made military and
naval commanders excessively chary of accept-
ing later invasion reports at face value.

Less than 48 hours after the termination of
the raids on Mindanao, the enemy struck again,
this time in the central Philippines. On the
morning of 12 September, a navy radar picket
station on Suluan Island, in Leyte Gulf,

4 "The 100th Division was hurriedly concentrating near Davao, but the military strength immediately available
in that area in the middle of September consisted of not more than two infantry battalions. Moreover, no defense
installations of any kind had been built in the vicinity." (Statement by Col. Muneichi Hattori, Chief of Staff, 100th
Division.)

5 This erroneous report was evidently due to the fact that the lookout post observers, nervously expecting an
enemy invasion, mistook some unusual wave contours on the horizon level at the entrance of Davao Gulf for ships
and promptly reported that enemy landing craft were approaching. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cic,
pp. 4 8 " -

6 Diary of Vice Adm. Kimpei Teraoka, op. cit.

7 Cf. Chapter XI, p. 314. Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dai Sanki Dai Nikan Furoku: Reile Sah
M=M1H 4 HMftiK** (Philippine Operations Record, Phase Three, Vol. II Supplement:
1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 28-9.

8 Cf. Chapter XI, p. 307.

9 In accordance with these orders which reached Menado on the night of 10 Sep, Lt. Gen. Masao Yamase, 2d
Air Division commander, took his headquarters back to Bacolod. Kimitsu Sakusen Nisshi tSf'#f ft- ft 1 1 & (Top Secret
Operations Log) Aug-Sep 44, Fourth Air Army Staff Files : 2d Air Division Detailed Action Report, 16 Sep 44.

10 Cf. Chapter XIII, p. 338.

144

broadcast over the general air-warning net that
a vast formation of enemy carrier planes was
heading westward toward the Visayas. Since
the Suluan Island lookout was only about
twenty minutes* flying time from Cebu, the air
forces there could not be alerted quickly enough
to put up an effective defense. By 0920 the
enemy planes were already swarming over the
Cebu airfields, where the main fighter strength
of the First Air Fleet was based following its
transfer from Davao. Although the attacks
extended over the entire Visayan area and later
took in Tawitawi, in the Sulu Archipelago,
the Cebu fields appeared to be the principal
objective.

In the three days over which this air
offensive continued, the First Air Fleet suffered
damage to 50 Zero fighters on Cebu alone,
while in other areas 30 additional aircraft of all
types were rendered non-operational. Flight
personnel suffered numerous casualties, and
training was disrupted." Heavy damage was
also sustained by Army air units. The 1 3th
Air Brigade, made up of Type I fighters, was
so hard hit that it had to be ordered back to
Japan for regrouping, while the 45th Fighter-
bomber Regiment was reduced to half strength.
In addition, 1 1 transports totalling 27,000 gross
tons and 13 naval combat vessels were sent to
the bottom of Cebu harbor.' 1

The carrier raids on Mindanao and the
Visayas at once strengthened the conviction
of the Southern Army command that the
Allies were preparing for an early invasion of
the Philippines. At the same time, they had

shown all too clearly that the tactical policy of
not committing available air strength against
raiding enemy task forces was open to serious
question as a means of conserving that strength
for subsequent decisive battle. After carefully
studying the over-all situation, Field Marshal
Terauchi and his staff therefore prepared re-
commendations to Imperial General Headquar-
ters substantially as follows :**

1. It is recommended that Imperial General
Headquarters activate Sho Operation No. 1 as soon
as possible and accelerate the planned reinforcement
of the Philippines.

Justification 1 It is estimated that the Philip-
pines will he the next target of enemy invasion, and
that the attack will come very soon. Our intelli-
gence cannot be relied upon to provide us with
timely warning, and much time is still needed for
the assembly of forces, particularly air units. If
the activation is delayed, these units may be obliged
to enter the theater with insufficient time to prepare
for battle and familiarize themselves with the
terrain.

2. It is further recommended that the Fourth Air
Army be given immediate authorisation to employ its
mam strength against enemy carrier task forces.

Justification : The policy previously fixed by
Imperial General Headquarters and providing for
conserving our air forces in order to strike with full
force at the moment of an attempted enemy land-
ing is impossible to implement on the local level
since our airdrome defenses do not appear capable
of protecting the air strength which we are trying
to conserve. If, on the other hand, we at once
attack and destroy the enemy's carrier task forces,
we will gain time and freedom of action to com-
plete further operational preparations.

11 Training in skip-bombing had been under way since late August for fighter units. Basic training was
scheduled to be completed in mid-September, and the flying personnel were gradually developing confidence in the new
technique. However, the Cebu raids caused training to be broken off, and all units became so preoccupied with com-
bat operations and maintenance that the program was never completed. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit.,
pp. 35-6.

12 Naval vessels sunk were: 8 PT boats, 3 converted gun-boats, 1 converted minesweeper, and 1 submarine
chaser. Three torpedo boats were heavily damaged, and six others received lesser damages. Ibid., pp. 51-2.

13 Nampo Gun Sakusen Kiroku M^W^Wt&fl (Southern Army Operations Record; 1st Demobilization Bureau,
Jul 46, pp. 143-5.

PLATE NO. 83
Preliminary Operations in the Philippines
9 September — 16 October 1944

Although these recommendations were put
into final form prior to 15 September, Marshal
Terauchi desired to back them up with a
simultaneous and full report on the damage
done by the Allied carrier air strikes of 9 and 12
September. He therefore delayed forwarding
them pending receipt at Manila of reports
from all sectors which had been attacked.
Col, Yozo Miyama, senior operations officer
of Southern Army, was ordered to proceed to
Tokyo by air to place the recommendations
and report before Imperial General Headquar-
ters, finally leaving Manila on 18 September." 1

Meanwhile, it had already become apparent
that the enemy's carrier strikes against Min-
danao and the Visayas were not the prelude to
a direct invasion of the Philippines themselves,
but a cover for the launching of preliminary
amphibious assaults on two vital defensive
outposts — the Palau Islands in the western
Carolines and Morotai in the northern
Moluccas.

Invasion of Palau

Indications that the enemy contemplated an
imminent invasion of the Palau group, strategic
eastern gateway to the Philippines, had been
mounting for some time. Following a three-
day carrier air strike against the islands late in
July, enemy planes had continued small-scale
attacks and reconnaissance activity throughout

August. With the beginning of September,
powerful carrier-borne forces launched a new
offensive of full pre-invasion intensity, carrying
out daily attacks which continued almost with-
out interruption through 14 September. By
the latter date, these attacks had done severe
damage to antiaircraft installations, gun em-
placements, beach defenses, and vital supply

While the enemy's carrier aircraft pounded
targets throughout the Palau group, strong
surface elements also subjected the southern-
most islands of Peleliu and Angaur to a series
of heavy naval gunfire bombardments directed
against shore defense positions. These bom-
bardments reached greatest intensity on 12
September, when the island of Peleliu received
a concentration of 2,200 rounds of gunfire,
knocking out important defense installations
and communications facilities.' 6

At 0730 on 15 September, following a final
sharp naval gunfire and air preparation, the
enemy began landing on Peleliu with an
estimated strength of one infantry division and
more than 150 tanks. The landing caught
the bulk of the Japanese defense forces concen-
trated on Babelthuap, the main island of the
Palau group, with only minor 14th Division
and other elements present on Peleliu to contest
the invasion. 17 The heavily outnumbered gar-
rison fought tenaciously, but the enemy suc-

14 Col. Miyama reached Tokyo late on 18 September and laid the Southern Army recommendation-, before the
Army Section of Imperial General Headquarters the following day. (Statement by Col. Yozo Miyama, Chief, Oper-
ations Section, Southern Army.

15 Between 6 and 14 September inclusive, enemy aircraft flew a total of 1,647 sorties against Peleliu, Koror,
and Babelthuap Islands. The attacks were heaviest on 7 September, when a total of 583 sorties was recorded. Pcre-
riu Angauru-to Sakusen no Kyokun *i >) 'Ji-TX* *J As£ii{Wfk<0$(M (Lessons of the Peleliu and Angaur Operations)
Imperial General Headquarters, Feb 44, pp. 4-6.

16 Naval surface bombardments were carried out on 7, 12, 13 and 14 September. Ibid., p. 5.

17 The main strength of the 14th Division, 53d Independent Mixed Brigade, and 30th Special Naval Base Force
was disposed on Babelthuap and the adjacent island of Koror. Units garrisoning Peleliu were r 2d Infantry Regiment,
14th Division ; one battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment, 14th Division; one infantry battalion, 53d Independent Mixed
Brigade; 14th Division Tank Unit; 33d, 35th, and 38th Provisional Machine Cannon Units; elements, 14th Division
Special Troops. Naval Units were : Headquarters, West Carolines Airfield Unit ; elements, 45th Naval Garrison
Unit. (1) Ibid. Attached Charts II, III, and V. (2) Chubu Taiheiyo Homen Sakusen Kiroku $f|&4^|F$ftik£

(Central Pacific Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Vol. II, pp. 2-3, 98-9.

347

ceeded in expanding the initial beachhead so
rapidly that, by 19 September, the righting had
moved into the central highlands.

Troop reinforcements were subsequently
ferried in to bolster the defense, and naval
seaplanes operating from secret bases on Babel-
thuap carried out night attacks 011 the American
forces. Nevertheless, Peleliu airfield remained
securely in the enemy's hands. American
fighter aircraft began using the airdrome opera-
tionally from 27 September.' 8

Meanwhile, the enemy had already moved
to expand his foothold in the Palau group by
invading the small island of Angaur, southwest
of Peleliu. At 0900 on 17 September, a
strong force, supported by the usual air and

face of scattered resistance by the small Japa-
nese garrison of one infantry battalion, an
artillery battery, and a handful of miscellaneous
troops. The island was quickly overrun, and
the fate of the defenders was never known.

Babelthuap still remained in Japanese pos-
session, but the enemy had apparently achieved
his objectives with the capture of Peleliu and
Angaur and made no attempt to invade the
main island. From rapidly developed bases
on Peleliu and Angaur, enemy air power not
only could keep the forces on Babelthuap

helplessly pinned down in their hill positions, 10
but could effectively deprive the entire western
Carolines of any further value to the Japanese
as a defensive outpost guarding the eastern sea
approaches to the Philippines. 1 '

Defense of Morotai

Concurrently with the enemy advance to
Palau on the Central Pacific front, General
MacArthur's forces in Western New Guinea
had also taken an essential preliminary step
toward the final reinvasion of the Philippines
by landing on the strategically situated island
of Morotai, off the northeast coast of Hal-
mahera.

Ever since the seizure of Sansapor by Mac-
Arthur's forces in July, the Second Area Army
command at Menado had anticipated an early
enemy invasion of the Moluccas, estimating
that the main island of Halmahera would be
the most probable target of attack. Through-
out August and the first part of September,
Allied air raids on Halmahera steadily increased
in both weight and frequency. When a Japa-
nese reconnaissance aircraft, on 1 1 September,
reported a heavy concentration of enemy inva-
sion shipping in Humboldt Bay, Hollandia,"
it appeared likely that the anticipated drive
was about to get under way.

18 General narrative on the Peleliu fighting is based on Lessons of the Peleliu and Angaur Operations, op. cit.

19 Japanese units on Angaur at the time of the enemy landing were: 1st Bn. 59th Infantry Regiment, 14th
Division; one battery, 59th Infantry Regimental Artillery Battalion; elements, 14th Division Special Troops. (1)
Ibid., Attached Charts II and IV. (2) Central Pacific Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 101-3.

jo The troops on Babelthuap were powerless even to prevent Allied use of Kossol anchorage, situated just north
ol the mam island. The Japanese expected that this anchorage would be made the main advance bis..- of the enemy
fleet for subsequent operations against the Philippines. However, a submarine reconnaissance on 7 October revealed
that Ulithi Atoll, in the northwestern Carolines, had been occupied by the enemy and was being used instead of
Kossol as the main advance fleet base. The Japanese had no forces on Ulithi and were unaware until this discovery
that the enemy had captured the atoll. (Statement by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Staff Officer (Operations), First
Mobile Fleet.)

21 Until the enemy invasion, seaplanes of the 30th Base Force and small elements of the First Air Fleet used
Palau as a reconnaissance base. Stoppage of this activity meant that the Japanese now became virtually blind to enemy
Heel movements in the western Carolines and Philippine Sea areas.

22 This concentration was reported to include two aircraft carriers, three battleships, eight cruisers or destroyers,
and no transports. Gohoku Sakusen Kiroku Furoku Dai Ni ; Dai Sanjunt Shidan Morotai To Senlo Gaishi f#t^t 1¥ic iiOffii
$$.% r ,~lft-.-i-ZLf4Wi*:t> 9 -f &M'j\M$. (North of Australia Operations Record, Supplement 2: 32d Division
Operations on Morotai) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Jul 46, p. 4.

}4H

Inadequate troop as well as air strength had
seriously impeded Second Area Army efforts
to bolster the defenses of the Halmahera-Moro-
tai area. The 32d Division under Lt. Gen.
Yoshio Ishii, which was the principal combat
force charged with the defense of the area, was
understrength due to heavy losses suffered en
route from China in May. 1 ' Lt. Gen. Ishii
initially assigned two battalions of the 211th
Infantry Regiment to garrison Morotai, but in
mid-July, as General MacArthur's offensive
neared the western tip of New Guinea, this
force was withdrawn to bolster the thinly-spread
Japanese troops on Halmahera itself. 14

Upon the withdrawal of the 211th Infantry
elements, Lt. Gen. Ishii assigned the mission
of securing Morotai to a small, provisionally-

organized force designated as the 2d Provisional
Raiding Unit/' The advance echelon of this
force arrived on Morotai on 12 July, but its
meager strength led the 32d Division, on 30
July, to order the construction of dummy
positions and encampments, the lighting of
campfires throughout the jungle, and other
measures of deception to lead the enemy to
believe that the island was strongly held.* 6

By 19 August the remaining strength of
the 2d Provisional Raiding Unit had arrived,
followed on 13 September by elements of the
36th Division Sea Transport Unit. Troop
strength still remained dangerously low, how-
ever, and had to be so thinly disposed that it
was completely impossible to plan an effective
defense. - Maj. Takenobu Kawashima, 2d

23 These losses, suffered as a result of submarine attacks on the Take convoy, reduced the }2<i Division to only
five infantry battalions and one and a half artillery battalions. Cf. Chapter X, p. 252.

24 It appeared probable at this time that Second Area Army would receive neither air nor ground reinforcements
for the defense of the vital northern Moluccas. The Area Army expected that the enemy's attack, would be directed
at Halmahera and therefore considered it necessary to concentrate the bulk of its meager troop strength on that island.
(Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, Chief of Staff, Second Area Army.)

25 The raiding unit (yugeiitai jfiSJSisfc) was a relatively new permanent-type organization established by Imperial
General Headquarters as a result of the successes achieved in eastern New Guinea by provisionally-organized volun-
teer groups using infiltration and guerrilla tactics. Cadres for the new permanent units were trained at a special school
in Tokyo under the direction of the Director of Military Intelligence, Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters.
The training course covered infiltration tactics, demolition, and use of special weapons and equipment. Due to the
late date at which the organization and training of such units began, their deployment to active fronts was delayed.
On 15 January 1944 the 1st Raiding Unit, planned to consist of ten raiding companies, was added to the order of
battle of Second Area Army, and in April and May two companies and the headquarters were ordered to Western
New Guinea. Four other companies were scill in process of organization in Japan, and four were to be activated
by Second Area Army in the field. Although the headquarters reached Western New Guinea and was attached to
Second Army, shipping difficulties held up the movement of subordinate units to such an extent that none had yet
arrived by the time the enemy capture of Sansapor virtually terminated the New Guinea campaign. One company
which had reached Luzon was subsequently assigned to Fourth Air Army for conversion to an airborne raiding
unit, and elements on Halmahera were reorganized by Second Area Army in July as the 2d Provisional Raiding
Unit, attached to the 32d Division. (1) Statements by Maj. Takenobu Kawashima, Commander, 2d Provisional
Raiding Unit, and Lt. Col. Kotaro Katogawa, Staff Officer (Operations), Second Area Army. (2) Second Army
Operations Order No. A-142, 9 Jul 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1457, 20 Sep 44.

26 32d Division Operations Order No. A-491, 20 Jul 44. ATIS Bulletin No. 1570, 9 Nov 44, p. t,

27 Japanese units present on Morotai at the time of the enemy landing were:

2d Provisional Raiding Unit Headquarters

4 provisional raiding companies

1 plat., nth Co., 2tith Infantry Regt.

1 plat., tst Co., 32d Engineer Regt.

Elms, 8th Field MP Unit

Elms, 36th Div. Sea Transport Unit

Elms, 26th Special Naval Base Force
(1) North of Australia Operations Record, Suppl. 2, op. cit., p. 2. (2) Statement by Maj. Kawashima, previously
cited. (3) Miscellaneous field orders, official files, letters, notebooks and diaries published in the following ATIS
Bulletins: No. 1542, 29 Oct 44, p. 1 ; No. 1583, 14 Nov 44, p. 7; No. 1632, 22 Dec 44, p. 5 ; ADVATIS
Bulletin No. 161, 18 Jan 45, p. 2.

349

Provisional Raiding Unit commander, deployed
his small combat force chiefly in the southwest
sector of the island, while the remaining mis-
cellaneous elements were scattered in lookout
posts and security detachments around the
island perimeter.

This was the situation when, at 0600 on 15
September, an enemy amphibious task force of
about 80 ships appeared off Cape Gila and
began shelling the entire southwest corner of
Morotai. Following this gunfire preparation,
reinforced by attacks from the air, the enemy
put ashore a force estimated at one division.
The 2d Provisional Raiding Unit, unable to
offer effective resistance to the overwhelming
enemy force, retired in good order, and by early
morning of the 16th, the beachhead had been
expanded to the Tjao River. 28 (Plate No. 84)

While Maj. Kawashima endeavored to
assemble sufficient strength for a small-scale
counterattack, 7th Air Division planes, operat-
ing from bases on Ceram and the Celebes,
launched a series of nightly hit-and-run raids
with small numbers of aircraft, aiming princi-
pally at enemy shipping.* 9 These attacks had
little more than a harassing effect, and the
enemy, having reached the Tjao River, paused
to consolidate his gains, at the same time
hastening construction on the airfield at
Doroeba.

On 18 September the main body of the 2d
Provisional Raiding Unit, which had moved
into position along the upper Tjao, launched
a strong night infiltration attack with the
objective of disrupting the enemy's rear area

in the vicinity of Doroeba and Gotalalmo.
Although deep penetration of the enemy lines
was achieved and considerable casualties inflict-
ed, the attack failed to reduce the beachhead
or to interfere with the enemy's rapid prepara-
tion of Doroeba airfield. On 20 September
enemy fighters began using the strip.

The 32d Division command on Halmahera
had realized from the very beginning that suc-
cessful development of an enemy base of air
operations anywhere in the Moluccas would
seriously compromise the future defense of the
Philippines. Lt. Gen. Ishii therefore took im-
mediate steps to reinforce Maj. Kawashima's
forces, ordering the 211th and 212th Infantry
Regiments and the 10th Expeditionary Unit
to organize temporary raiding detachments for
immediate dispatch to Morotai. The 210th
Infantry Regiment was also ordered to prepare
one battalion as a follow-up force. On 25
September the three raiding detachments were
ordered to proceed to Morotai as follows :

1. The 1st Raiding Detachment (from the 212th
Infantry) will embark at Bolola on the night of 26
September and will land at Cape Posipost at dawn
of the 27th.

2. The 2d Raiding Detachment (from the 2itth
Infantry) will embark at Cape Djere on the night of
26 September and will land in the area between
Wadjaboela and Tilai on the morning of the 2/th.

3. The 3d Raiding Detachment [from the 10th
Expeditionary Unit) will embark on the night of 2/
September at Nupu. The landing point will be near
Tilai.

Although the detachments successfully car-

28 General narrative of the Morotai campaign is based on the following sources: (i) Butai Ryakureki Dai Ni
Yugckitai jStH?!^ (Unit History, 2d Provisiona I Raiding Unit). (2) North of Australia Operations
Record, op. cit, Suppl. 2, pp. 4—6. (3) Statement by Maj, Kawashima, previously cited.

29 During the period 15-19 September, the 7th Air Division flew a total of 33 sorties against the enemy at
Morotai. Reported results were: 30-40 enemy landing craft sunk or damaged; one cruiser and one large transport
heavily damaged. Five aircraft failed to return. The 7th Air Division continued similar small-scale night raids
during the next three months, at least two of these attacks (on 22 and 30 November) doing considerable damage to
enemy aircraft and installations on Doroeba airdrome. North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 24-6.

350

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MOROTAt OPERATION

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1944

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PLATE NO. 8 4

Morotai Operation, September — October 1944

ried out their movement to Morotai according
to plan, strong enemy patrols which had been
landed at various points around the perimeter
of the island blocked the use of the coastal
tracks, forcing the reinforcement units to move
through the jungle. Three weeks thus elapsed
before the detachments were able to complete
their juncture with the 2d Provisional Raiding
Unit on 20 October.' In the interim, Maj.
Kawashima's force had continued to execute
nightly raids against the enemy defense pe-
rimeter, without any appreciable effect, how-
ever, in deterring the use of Doroeba airfield.
On 28 September multi-engined enemy bomb-
ers were observed using the held.

Studying the unfavorable developments on
Morotai, the Second Area Army command
decided that more energetic action must be
taken to bar the enemy from making effective
use of the Doroeba base. On 8 October,
therefore, Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, Second
Area Army Chief of Staff, radioed the follow-
ing instructions to the commander of the 3 2d
Division :

The enemy apparently has no intention of land-
ing on any islands (in the Moluccas group) other
than Morotai. It is therefore highly necessary for
the 32d Division to move as much strength as possible
to Morotai from other areas in order to destroy the
enemy force there. At the very least, the enemy s
development and use of air bases must be checked, and

his strength weakened. . . . By order of the Command-
ing General, Second Area Army.

In compliance with this directive, Lt. Gen.
Ishii planned to dispatch additional reinforce-
ments composed of the main strength of the
210th Infantry Regiment and elements of the
211th Infantry and 18th Shipping Engineers.
Meanwhile, under earlier plans, the 3d Battal-
ion, 210th Infantry, had already embarked for
Morotai, landing on 9 October tn the Boeso-
boeso sector on the southeast coast. From
there it began a grueling, costly trek through
the jungle to join the 2d Provisional Raiding
Unit in. the Pilowo-Sabatai River area. 5 '

Without waiting for the arrival of the bat-
talion, the 2d Provisional Raiding Unit in
mid-October began a new series of night
infiltration raids, some of which penetrated to
the airfield itself. Substantial casualties were
inflicted on the enemy, and considerable
damage was done to rear installations.' ' It
nevertheless proved impossible to achieve the
central objective of denying the use of the field
to the enemy air forces.

Despite strong reinforcements which reached
Morotai from Halmahera during the next two
months,' 3 the enemy's hold could not be
shaken, nor could the Japanese forces effectively
prevent the development of the island into a
valuable advance base of operations for Allied
land-based air power. All of Mindanao, as

30 Unit History, 2d Provisional Raiding Unit, op. cit.

31 The battalion did not finally make contact with the 2d Raiding Unit until 20 November. Disease, starvation
and casualties caused by enemy action had reduced its strength by this date to no more than 100 effectives. (State-
ment by Maj. Kawashima. previously cited.)

32 Up to 15 December the Japanese forces on Morotai claimed to have inflicted a total of 4,031 casualties on
the enemy, in addition to the capture of substantial amounts of arms, supplies and equipment. On 1 December the
Second Area Army cited the entire garrison for its exploits. North of Australia Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 20—2

33 On 16 November the 211th Infantry Regiment (Morita Detachment) successfully landed 1,900 reinforce-
ments south of Wadjaboela. Col. Morita, the regimental commander, took command of all forces on Morotai, and
raiding activity was intensified during December. After 1 January 1945, however, enemy torpedo boats tightened the
blockade of the island, and it was impossible to ferry in the ammunition and rations required for a major offensive
effort. Ibid., pp. 17, 23.

352

well as the southern Visayas, now lay within
easy range of enemy bombers, and the path
stood open for the invasion of the Philippines.

Hour of Decision Nears

The Patau and Morotai invasions were less
than a week old when the enemy's carrier task
forces gave a further and even more startling
demonstration of their offensive power. This
time they stmck at Manila itself, the nerve-
center of the Japanese military command and
communications network for the entire Philip-
pine area.

As in the earlier strikes on Mindanao and
the Visayas, the presence of the enemy force
was discovered too late to permit effective
warning. A naval seaplane on patrol off the
east coast of Luzon spotted the carrier group at
0905 on 21 September and immediately radioed
a warning back to its base at Cavite, but by the
time the alert was relayed to air bases and
defense installations in the Manila area, the
first wave of enemy planes was already overhead
and launching the attack. 11

Between 0930 and 1800, four waves totaling
well over 400 aircraft swept in to bomb and
strafe the harbor area and the airfields around
Manila, including Clark and Nichols Fields.
In the attacks on the harbor and on shipping
along the west coast, 22 vessels aggregating
over 100,000 gross tons were sunk or heavily
damaged, while the raids on airfields caused
considerable damage to grounded planes.
Forty-two Zero fighters were able to get into
the air to attack the enemy formations, but 20
of these failed to return."

At 0610 the following day, 22 September,
search planes discovered the enemy carrier
groups still lurking off the coast of Luzon, and
at 0730 a hit-and-run attack was carried out by
27 Japanese aircraft, with reported bomb hits
on two carriers and one cruiser. Enemy planes
nevertheless renewed their attacks on the
Manila area between 0740 and 0950, inflicting
further damage in the harbor sector. Naval
air units at Legaspi attempted to carry out a
second attack on the enemy carriers during the
late afternoon, but the attack force of 19 planes
failed to locate the carrier groups. 56

The extension of the enemy's carrier-borne
air offensive to Luzon, coupled with the am-
phibious moves to Palau and Morotai, left
scant doubt in the minds of both the Army
and Navy Sections of Imperial General Head-
quarters that Allied strategy aimed at launching
the invasion of the Philippines at an early
date. The High Command still considered it
premature to order outright activation of Sbo
Operation No. 1, under consideration since 19
September, but it decided that operational pre-
parations must be pushed with the utmost
speed on the assumption that the Philippines
would be the decisive battle theater. Accord-
ingly, on 21 September, the Navy Section of
Imperial General Headquarters issued a direc-
tive which stated : 57

Execution of the Sho~Go Operation in the Philip-
pine area {including the Sulu Archipelago) in or after
thelast part of October is anticipated. Naval forces
will prepare for Sho Operation No. t with the highest
priority.

The Navy directive was followed on 22
September by an Imperial General Headquar-

34 Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 54-5.

35 Ibid., pp. 55-6.

36 Ibid., pp. 56—8.

37 Daikaisht Dai Yonhyakurokujuni-go JtMtfi •MB'Bi^+Z.ffi, (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No.
462) 21 Sep 44.

353

ters Army order to the same effect,*" This
order read: 19

/. Imperial General Headquarters tentatively de-
signates the Philippine Islands as the area of decisive
battle and estimates that the time of this battle will be
sometime during or after the last ten days of October.

2. The Commanders-in-Chief of the Southern
Army and the China Expeditionary Army and the
Commander of the Formosa Army will generally
complete operational preparations by the last part of
October for the accomplishment of their respective
missions.

Further implementing this decision, the
Army Section of Imperial General Headquar-
ters ordered the ist Division, hitherto scheduled
under the Sho-Go plans to be held at Shanghai
as strategic reserve until the activation of actual
decisive battle operations in one of the Sho
areas, to move immediately to the Philippines.
Plans were also made to assign ten surface
Raiding Regiments to the Philippine area. 40

With respect to Southern Army's request for
authorization to employ the main strength of
the Fourth Air Army against raiding enemy

carrier forces, Imperial General Headquarters
demurred on the ground that such action would
probably entail losses of aircraft and pilots in-
commensurate with the amount of damage
which could be inflicted on the enemy.
Authorization was granted, however, to carry
out hit-and-run attacks with small elements
whenever the situation appeared especially favor-
able for such operations. *'

On 22 September Imperial General Head-
quarters also acted to implement plans for the
reinforcement of the Fourth Air Army. The
16th Air Brigade (51st and J2d Fighter Regi-
ments) was ordered to proceed to the Philip-
pines at once, and the 12th Air Brigade (ist,
nth and 2 2d Fighter Regiments) was directed
to prepare for subsequent movement upon the
activation of Sho No. £, In addition, three
more fighter regiments, one light bomber regi-
ment, three heavy bomber regiments and one
reconnaissance regiment were allocated to
Fourth Air Army, to advance to the Philip-
pines upon the activation of Sho No. i f* On
1 1 October, a further order activated the 30th

38 Imperial General Headquarters Army and Navy Section orders required Imperial signature, whereas directives
were issued in the name of the Army and Navy Chiefs of General Staff. Since the Army Section on this occasion
issued an order, its issuance was delayed one day by the necessity of obtaining the Imperial signature.

39 Dairikumei Dai Senhyakusanjugo-go JdSkffrljlFf' HH+ESiS£ (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No.
1 135) 22 Sep 44.

40 Dairikumei Dai Senhyakusanjuroku-go oyobi Daisenhyakuianjuhachi-go ^fgnlr^FWH+Alg&IS^Fl? H+A§fc
(Imperial Gereral Headquarters Army Orders No. 1136 and 1138) 22 Sep 44.

41 Under the Sho-Go plans, enemy task forces conducting raids prior to invasion were to be attacked only by
designated air units. These units, with the exception of some army air units equipped with Type IV bombers and
undergoing special training in Japan Proper, were entirely navy. The Fourth Air Army at this time had no units
equipped with Type IV bombers or trained in attacking carriers. Under the more flexible policy established by Impe-
rial General Headquarters, Fourth Air Army units executed a number of hit-and-run raids on enemy carrier groups
during the tatter part of September, but no appreciable results were obtained.

42 This brought the number of stand-by reinforcement regiments to be sent to the Philippines to II, three more
than provided for in the original Sho-Go plans. In addition, the 67th Fighter-Bomber Regiment was ordered to the
Philippines on 22 September for anti-submarine patrol work. (1) Dairikumei Dai Senbyakuyonju-go ^cSiifrM^P tTK+sft
(I) Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1 140) 22 Sep 44. (2) Datrikusht Dai Nisenhyakusbichijugo,
Dai Nisenhyakushichijuroku, Dai Nisenhyakuihijushichi-go, "fSt+S., t$Z. "fSt+^t tft—^f EHS-fHsSfc
(Imperial General Headquarters Army Directives No. 2175, 2176, 2177) 22 Sep 44.

354

PLATE NO. 85
Air Force Day : Propaganda Poster

Fighter Group headquarters to command the
12th and 16th Air Brigades, and another fighter
regiment (200th) was added to its order of
battle. 4 *

In the Philippines, a sudden and marked
increase in guerrilla activity during September
heightened apprehension that an enemy attack
was imminent. Small Japanese garrisons were
attacked, pro-Japanese Filipinos molested and
intimidated, and communications disrupted.
In central Luzon there were indications that
some guerrilla units were planning a move to
the Lamon Bay area in order to be the first to
cooperate with an American landing force, and
on Negros and Panay guerrilla raids on Japa-
nese airfields became boldly persistent. Four-
teenth Area Army feared that, as soon as enemy
forces landed, the guerrillas would not only give
them direct assistance as scouts and guides, but
seriously hamper Japanese operations by attack-
ing rear communication lines.

The widespread destruction and panic caused
by the enemy's carrier-borne air attacks had
meanwhile resulted in outbreaks of civil dis-
order in many parts of the Philippines. On
22 September, therefore, martial law was
proclaimed throughout the archipelago, and on
the following day a state of war was declared
against the United States and Great Britain.

On 24 September, only two days after the
close of the aerial assault on Manila, enemy

carrier planes struck again. Cebu was hit for
the second time, and Legaspi and Coron Bay
also underwent attacks which caused exceeding-
ly heavy damage to naval and air installations. 44
Six days later, on 30 September, enemy land
bombers and fighters operating from the newly-
conquered base on Morotai carried out a
powerful attack on Balikpapan, in Dutch
Borneo, demonstrating that Morotai-based air-
craft could, at extreme range, cover not only the
southern but the central Philippines. 45

The deadly effectiveness of enemy air attacks
had meanwhile led the Southern Army opera-
tions staff at Manila to question the feasibility
of the basic strategy laid down by Imperial
General Headquarters for the defense of the
Philippines. Under the Sho-Go plans, only the
sea and air forces were to wage decisive battle
in the central or southern Philippines. The
ground forces were to hold their main strength
on Luzon, fighting only a delaying action
in the central or southern Philippines if the
enemy first landed there.

The Southern Army staff, however, reached
the conclusion that it was unrealistic to prescribe
separate decisive battle areas for the air-sea
and the ground forces. 46 This conclusion
rested on the argument that it would become
impossible to conduct decisive ground opera-
tions on Luzon once the enemy had acquired
bases in the central and southern Philippines,

43 Ddirikumei Dai Senhydkugoju-go ~2\ffei!\t t$^~W JL't'ffi (Imperial Genera! Headquarters Army Order No. 1150)
1 1 Oct 44. (All regiments assigned to the 30th Fighter Group were equipped with the new Type IV fighter, the
only armya ircraft which could engage in combat against the latest type American carrier-borne fighters on anything
like even terms.)

44 The attack on Coron Bay was a complete surprise since the Navy believed that this area lay beyond the range
of the enemy's carrier planes. Philippine Naval Operations, Part I, op. cit., pp. 58-9.

45 The 22d Special Naval Base Force at Balikpapan first reported that this raid was carried out by carrier air-
craft. It was subsequently established, however, that the raiding planes were land-based, presumably operating from
Morotai. (Statement by Comdr. Masataka Chihaya, Staff Officer (Operations), Fourth Southern Expeditionary Fleet.)

46 A minority of the Southern Army staff had held this view from the initial formulation of the Sho-Go plans.
As a result of the damaging enemy air attacks during September, it gradually became the majority opinion.
(Statement by Lt. Gen. Jo Iimura, Chief of Staff, Southern Army.)

enabling the joint use of land and carrier-based
air in massive support of invasion operations
farther north. Therefore, concerted employ-
ment of air, sea and ground forces in defense
of the central and southern Philippines
appeared advisable.

Although this view was not officially trans-
mitted to Tokyo, the Army High Command
was aware of the trend of thinking in Southern
Army headquarters. At this stage, however,
it did not consider that the fundamental situ-
ation on which the original operational plan
was based had undergone any radical change.
On 26 September General Tomoyuki Yama-
shita, commander of the First Area Army in
Manchuria, was transferred by Imperial General
Headquarters order to command of the Four-
teenth Area Army, replacing Lt. Gen. Kuroda.
Stopping in Tokyo for consultation en route to
his new command, General Yamashita was
explicitly informed that the Army High
Command still intended the decisive ground
battle in the Philippines to be waged on Luzon,
and that preparations should be made on this
basis. 47

The basic policy governing ground opera-
tions under the Sho No. 1 plan thus remained
unchanged. On 6 October General Yama-
shita arrived in Manila to assume command of
Fourteenth Area Army forces and prepare for
the execution of this policy. On 1 1 October
he summoned a conference of all subordinate
commanders and notified them that the Area
Army would "seek decisive battle on Luzon",
while in the central and southern Philippines

its objective would be to delay the enemy's

advance and prevent his

and air bases. 48

Formosa Air Battle

General Yamashita had barely set his
shoulder to the task of completing preparations
for a battle of decision on Luzon when the
sudden appearance of powerful enemy naval
task forces in the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands
area, less than 400 miles from the coast of
southern Kyushu, set in train a series of events
and last-minute changes in plan which exerted
a fateful influence on the subsequent opera-
tions in defense of the Philippines.

The first indication that an enemy naval
force might be operating near the Ryukyus
was received on the morning of 9 October,
when a navy plane on patrol between the
Ryukyus and Bonins suddenly ceased radio
communication with its base at Kanoya, on
Kyushu, and subsequently failed to return.
Second Air Fleet and Army and Navy forces in
the Kyushu-Ryukyus-Formosa area went on the
alert. They did not have long to wait, for at
0640 on io October enemy carrier planes
launched a massive air assault on Okinawa and
several other islands in the Nansei group.' 49

It was evident that the enemy, emboldened
by his successful air strikes against the Philip-
pines, had now sent his carrier task forces to
attack targets on the very threshold of the
Japanese home islands. Since early air recon-
naissance established that these forces were

47 Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattori. Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

48 Hito Sakusen Kiroku Dm Sunki Dai Ikkan Hito m okeru Dai Juyon Homengun no Sakmcn Jumbi jtftf^i|Jife|^
$SgB$ -m&&ltt1£rt Zm+m^ltiWVftMmm (Philippine Operattons Record, Phase Three, Vol.1: Opera-
tional Preparations of the Fourteenth Area Army in the Philippines) ist Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 38-43.

49 Between 0640 and 1600 four waves of enemy planes attacked, aggregating about 400 aircraft sorties. The
attacks covered Okinawa, Amami Oshima, Oki Erabu, Minami Daito, Kume and Miyako Islands. Hito Homen Kaigun
Sakusen Sana Ni itSsJjmUW-l'fW^ — (Philippine Area Naval Operations, Part II), 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct
47> P- 4-

357

not accompanied by an invasion convoy of
transports,' the situation did not for the mo-
ment appear to be one which called for the
immediate and full activation by Imperial
General Headquarters of the Sho-Go plans.
However, the Navy considered that decisive
action by its own air forces was imperative.

The opening of the attack on the Ryukyus
found Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander-in-
Chief of the Combined Fleet, at Shinchiku,
northern Formosa, on his way back to Tokyo
from a command inspection trip to the
Philippines. This had a vital effect on subse-
quent events, for it meant not only that Admiral
Toyoda's decisions were psychologically in-
fluenced by his presence virtually on the front
line of battle, but that full, direct consultation
with the Navy High Command was rendered
impossible. During the ensuing action, Admiral
Toyoda, while delegating the power to make
minor decisions to his Chief of Staff in Tokyo,
actually directed operations from Formosa,
issuing some orders direct and others through
Combined Fleet headquarters in Tokyo.

To Admiral Toyoda, it seemed that the
enemy, by sending his carrier forces into the
northern Philippine Sea within striking range
of the major concentrations of Japanese land-
based air strength, had presented an opportuni-
ty that might never arise again, to deal the
enemy fleet a crippling blow and disrupt the
entire Allied invasion timetable. He therefore
decided to gamble all available naval air

strength in a determined effort to destroy the
enemy carrier forces.

This meant a sharp divergence from the
tactical concepts which formed the basis of the
original Sho-Go plans. The central idea of those
plans was to husband air, sea and ground
strength until a major enemy invasion attempt
against any of the areas constituting Japan's
inner defense line, and then to commit all
forces in decisive battle. Accordingly, while
the use of minor elements of naval air strength
against raiding enemy task forces prior to an
invasion was authorized, commitment of the
main strength of both Army and Navy air
forces was to await Imperial General Head-
quarters decision activating one of the Sho
operations."

Actually, experience in the earlier Philip-
pine strikes had shown that passive tactics
against enemy task force raids were of doubt-
ful effectiveness in conserving air strength.
Moreover, discussions between the Navy's top
operational commanders and the Naval
General Staff had emphasized the impossibility
under all circumstances of rigidly adhering to
the Sho-Go plans with regard to air action a-
gainst enemy task forces, and had resulted in
agreement that a large measure of discretion
must bel eft to the Combined Fleet command' 1
to determine the opportune moment for com-
mitting the naval air strength. Now, that
moment appeared to be at hand.

Admiral Toyoda promptly decided to remain

50 Nava! search planes established at 1540 on 10 October that two task groups were operating to the east-
southeast of Okinawa, at distances of about 100 and 140 miles, respectively, from Naha. One group was reported to
have a nucleus of three carriers, and the other to consist of two carriers and about ten cruisers and destroyers. Philippine
Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., p. 5.

51 Cf. Chapter XI, p. 296,

52 The Sho-Go plan provisions regarding air operations were discussed at a Combined Fleet operational conference
at Kure on ti August and again at a conference in Tokyo on 8 September, attended by Admiral Toyoda, Second Air
Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Fukudome, and Vice Chief of Navy General Staff Vice Adm. Seiichi Ito. These con-
ferences resulted in a decision that the time for initiating general attack by the naval air forces against enemy task
forces must be left flexible, to be determined by the Combined Fleet on the basis of circumstances as they arose.
(Diary Notes of Capt. Bunzo Shibata, Staff Officer (Operation), Second Air Fleet.

358

Original Painting by Tonji hhikawa

PLATE NO. 86
Transoceanic Air Raid During Typhoon

on Formosa and assume personal direction of
battle operations. At 0923 on 10 October,
approximately three hours after the start of the
enemy air assault on the Ryukyus, Combined
Fleet headquarters in Tokyo, acting at Ad-
miral Toyoda's direction, alerted all naval
land-based air forces for Sbo Operation No. 2.
At 12 14 the same day Admiral Toyoda, by
order from Shinchiku, extended the alert to
include Sbo No. 1 as well"

On 11 October the enemy carrier groups
turned south to effect small-scale reconnais-
sance raids over the Aparri area, on northern
Luzon. The following day, however, the air
offensive was resumed in full force, this time
against Formosa and adjacent islands. Admiral
Toyoda now decided that it was time to strike.
Again acting through Combined Fleet head-
quarters in Tokyo, he ordered the naval base
air forces, at 1030 on 12 October, to execute
Sbo Operations Nos. 1 and 2, with the objec-
tive of destroying the enemy carrier forces in
the northern Philippine Sea."

Vice Adm. Shigeru Fukudome's Second Air
Fleet, main strength of which was still deploy-
ed at bases in southern Kyushu," immediately
prepared to attack. Meanwhile, to throw as
many aircraft as possible into the battle, Com-
bined Fleet headquarters in Tokyo ordered
Vice Adm. Ozawa, First Mobile Fleet Com-
mander, to release the newly-reconstituted fly-
ing groups oi the 3d and 4th Carrier Divi-
sions, which had not yet completed their

combat training in the Inland Sea, to tem-
porary command of the Second Air Fleet.
These groups were immediately ordered to
bases in southern Kyushu and the Nansei
Islands to operate with the land-based air
forces.' 6

The first attack on the enemy carrier groups,
three of which were now reported operating off
the east coast of Formosa, was carried out be-
tween 1900 and 2020 on 12 October. Taking
off from Kanoya air base, 56 planes of the "T"
Attack Force struck at the enemy within the
perimeter of a sudden typhoon and then put
down on Formosan bases. The pilots report-
ed four enemy carriers sunk, and ten other
major units set afire. Meanwhile, a separate
force of 45 torpedo planes and Army Type-
IV torpedo-bombers' 7 sortied from bases on
Okinawa and carried out an attack, in which
two unidentified fleet units were reported set
aflame. 58

Despite these reported successes, the enemy
carrier forces renewed their assault on Formosa
on 13 October, sending over a total of about
600 aircraft during the day. Damage in these
raids was light, and the "T" Attack Force
sortied from Kanoya late in the afternoon
to strike back. Locating two enemy carrier
groups southwest of Ishigaki Island, in the
southern Ryukyus, the attack formation of 32
planes struck at dusk, reporting four ships
sunk, of which two were carriers, and a third
carrier left in flames. 59

53 Philippine Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., p. 5.

54 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

55 Original plans called for the transfer of the Second Air Fleet main strength to Formosan bases in September.
Because of incomplete training, however, only a portion of this strength had moved to Formosa by 12 October.

56 These air groups were then located at Oita and Kagoshima in Kyushu, at Kure and Iwalcuni in western
Honshu, and at Tokushima on Shikoku. The air groups of the 4th Carrier Division completed concentration at
southern Kyushu bases by the evening of 13 October, while those of the 3d Carrier Division sent off their first echelon
for Okinawa early on the 15th. (1) Philippine Naval Operations, Part II, Op. Cit., p. 6. (2) Statement by Capt.
Ohmae, previously cited.

57 These Army air units were assigned to the Second Air Fleet. Cf. Chapter XI, p. 308.

58 Philippine Naval Operations, Part II, op, cit., pp. 6, 9.

59 Ibid., pp. 6-7, 9.

360

On the basts of the reported results of the
attacks thus far, it appeared that at least one
segment of the enemy task forces had been
decisively crushed. This estimate was seeming-
ly confirmed by the fact that carrier-plane raids
on Formosa were resumed on a sharply reduced
scale at 0700 on 14 October and ceased com-
pletely at 0930. It appeared that the enemy
forces had initiated a retirement to the
southeast.

Complete victory now appeared almost with-
in grasp. To accomplish the total destruction
of the damaged and withdrawing enemy, the
Second Air Fleet ordered its entire strength of
450 planes to sortie from southern Kyushu.

Admiral Toyoda ordered the Second Strik-
ing Force under Vice Adm. Kiyohide Shima
to sail from the Inland Sea and sweep the
waters east of Formosa to mop up remnants
of the reportedly crippled enemy task forces. 6 "

On the afternoon of 14 October, 100 B-29
bombers evidently operating from China struck
at Formosa in what was believed to be a cover-
ing operation for the retirement of the enemy
fleet. Meanwhile, at 1525, the first wave of
Second Air Fleet planes (124 aircraft) attacked
an enemy group southwest of Ishigaki Island,
claiming hits on one carrier and three cruisers.
A second attack wave of 225 planes sortied but
was unsuccessful in finding the enemy. The
third, striking after nightfall with 70 aircraft,
including Army torpedo bombers, claimed two
carriers, one battleship and one heavy cruiser
sunk, and one small carrier, one battleship and
one light cruiser set afire. 6 '

Events on 15 October caused optimism to
remain at a high pitch. Second Air Fleet
search planes reported that one aircraft carrier
and two battleships, all trailing oil slicks and
without steerage way, were spotted off the coast
of Formosa under guard of 1 r destroyers. 62
Admiral Toyoda ordered naval air units to
continue the attack despite heavy plane losses.
Meanwhile, the Second Striking Force was
already racing south from the Inland Sea at
high speed to assist the air forces in cleaning
up the enemy remnants.

Farther south, an enemy task group, with
four carriers still intact, appeared off the east
coast of Luzon and at tooo on 15 October sent
off a force of 80 planes to attack Manila. In
interception operations, Japanese fighters claim-
ed 32 enemy aircraft shot down or damaged,
while two separate attacks on the enemy task
group by a total of 1 1 5 Army and Navy planes
from Philippine bases were reported to have
sunk one of the carriers and set afire the flight
decks of two others. 6 '

On 16 October regular morning search mis-
sions over the western Philippine Sea brought
in disquieting reports that did not seem to tally
with earlier claims of damage to the enemy
forces. Three separate task groups with a total
of 13 carriers were reported navigating in the
area. 6,1 Forces aggregating 247 naval aircraft
immediately sortied from Okinawa, Formosa
and Luzon to search for the enemy groups.
These units swept wide areas of the Philippine
Sea but only a small number of the planes
found the carriers.

lans cove-

60 This was a special operation conceived by Admiral Toyoda outside the framework of the Sho-Go pla
ring surface forces. As constituted for this special mission, the Second Striking Force consisted of two heavy cruisers,
one light cruiser, and seven destroyers. After executing its mission, the force was to return to the Inland Sea and
hold itself in readiness to execute the planned Sho-Go Operation for the surface forces. (Statement by Capt. Ohmae,
previously cited.)

61 Philippine Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., pp. 7, 9,

63 Philippine Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., p. 8.

64 Ibid., pp. 9-10.

361

Despite the conflicting reports, Admiral
Toyoda and the Navy High Command were
still inclined to believe that the enemy was
attempting to cover the retirement of badly
damaged and disorganized carrier task forces.
If it were true, however, that enemy strength
in the area was still as large as indicated by
the reconnaissance reports of 16 October, the
SecondStriking Force, then passing east of the
Ryukyus, was sailing directly into an engage-
ment in which it would be heavily outweighed.
The Chief of Staff of Combined Fleet there-
fore radioed a suggestion to Vice Adm. Shima
that he change course to the west, pass through
the northern Nansei Islands, and run south
through the East China Sea in order to stay
out of range of Allied carrier planes. This
was followed by an order from Admiral Toyoda
directing Vice Adm Shima to prepare to sortie
again into the Pacific and fight a night engage-
ment if an enemy force of appropriate size pre-
sented itself If no such opportunity arose,
the Second Striking Force was to proceed to
the Pescadores and await further orders. 6 '

Final reconnaissance reports on 17 October
confirmed that considerable enemy strength re-
mained present in the waters east of Formosa
and Luzon, but also indicated that substantial
damage had been inflicted. Of four separate
task groups spotted, one of about 20 ships, in-
cluding three carriers and three battleships, was
reported withdrawing eastward at a reduced
speed of ten knots with one of the battleships
under tow. This strongly suggested that the
group was composed of damaged ships retiring
from action. Orders to attack were immedi-
ately issued, but contact was subsequently lost

and the attacks could not be carried out.**

The Formosa air battle had now ended, and
the Navy High Command undertook to assess
the damage done to the enemy's carrier fleet.
The necessity of avoiding any exaggeration of
enemy losses was clearly recognized because of
the importance to future operational planning.
Combined Fleet staff officers thoroughly stu-
died and sifted the action reports of the combat
flying units. Although these reports were
considered of dubious reliability, Second Air
Fleet strongly insisted upon their accuracy, and
in the absence of adequate post-attack recon-
naissance, the Navy Section of Imperial Gen-
eral Headquarters had no choice but to base
its assessment on the reports at
losses were finally listed as follows :* 7

Sunk :

11 carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, 1
destroyer [or light cruiser).
8 carriers, 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1
destroyer (or light cruiser), 13 unidenti-
fied ships. In addition, at least 12 other
ships set afire.

results, officially accepted and an-
added up to the most phenomenal

These
nounced,

success achieved by the Japanese Navy since
the attack on Pearl Harbor. The nation was
swept by a sudden wave of exhilaration which
dispelled overnight the growing pessimism over
the unfavorable trend of the war. Mass cele-
brations were held in many cities throughout
the country, and government spokesmen pro-
claimed that " victory is within our grasp ! "
All Army and Navy units concerned were
honored by the issuance of an Imperial Re-
script.

65 On the afternoon of 16 October, Combined Fleet also alerted Vice Adm. Kurita's First Striking Force to
be ready to sortie from Lingga anchorage. His plan was to throw this force against the remnants of the enemy car-
rier groups after further damage had been inflicted in continued attack operations by the naval air forces. Philippine
Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit., pp. 58-9.

66 Ibid., p. 10.

67 Imperial General
paper) Tokyo, 20 Oct 44.

362

Headquarters

19 Oct 44. Asahi Shimbun $H|TrJ]fl (Tokyo Asahi News-

However, while the nation thrilled to a
victory which events soon proved to be a bitter
illusion, the situation brought about by the
Formosa air battle was actually fraught with
potential disaster. The battle had cost the air
forces 312 planes of all types, a level of losses
which they could ill afford to sustain. The
Second Air Fleet, comprising the main
strength of the Navy's base air forces, had lost
50 per cent of its strength and was reduced to
230 operational aircraft. 6 * The First Air Fleet
and Fourth Air Army in the Philippines were
left with a combined operational strength of
only a little over 100 aircraft. 60 Of 143 carrier
planes used to reinforce the Second Air Fleet,
about one-third, with their flight crews, had
been lost. 7 "

The losses in carrier aircraft and flying per-
sonnel meant further delay in remanning the
3d and 4th Carrier Divisions, which Admiral
Toyoda had hoped to send south to join the
First Striking Force, thus providing it with des-
perately needed air striking elements. 7 ' More-
over, the Second Striking Force, scheduled
under the Sho-Go plans to operate as a vanguard
to Vice Adm. Ozawa's Task Force Main
Body, was now far from its base and had con-

sumed tons of precious fuel in a fruitless oper-
ation. It was hoped that the damage inflicted
on the enemy's carrier forces would slow up his
invasion schedule long enough to permit the
replenishment of aircraft losses and the rede-
ployment of the surface forces. However,
this hope was to prove vain.

The credence temporarily placed in the
Navy's claims regarding the Formosa air battle
also paved the way for a momentous change in
plans regarding decisive ground operations in
the Philippines. On the basis of the results
officially claimed by the Navy for the Formosa
Air Battle, it appeared likely that an enemy
invasion of the Philippines would be delayed,
or if undertaken soon, would be unsupported
by strong carrier forces. Consequently, the
Army Section of Imperial General Head-
quarters now became more favorably inclined
toward modifying the Sho-Go plans along the
lines of Southern Army thinking. However,
there seemed to be ample time to study the
matter in detail before reaching a final
decision. 71

That decision was still pending on 17 Octo-
ber, when the American invasion of the
Philippines began in earnest.

68 Philippine Naval Operations, Part II, op. cit„ p. 10.

69 Ibid.

70 Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited.

71 It had been tentatively decided at the end of September that Vice Adm. Ozawa, First Mobile Fleet com-
mander, would go south with the carrier forces as soon as the refitting of the ships and the training of the air groups
were completed. These forces were to join the First Striking Force, which henceforth would operate under Vice
Adm. Ozawa's direct command. This was a long-range plan, and it was not believed that it could be carried into
effect until November. For that reason, no orders were issued, and the task organization of the fleet under the Sho-Go
plans remained unchanged. (1) Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited. (2) United States Strategic Bomb-
ing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, Interrogation of Japanese Officials, Vol. I, pp. 210-20, (Interrogation
of Vice Adm. Jisaburo Ozawa.)

72 Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattori, previously cited.

363

REPORTS OF GENERAL MacARTHUR

VOL I : The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific

VOL I: Supplement: MacArthur in Japan : The Occupation, Military Phase
VOL ! ! : Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area

". , , This report has been prepared by the General Staff to serve as a background for, and intro-
duction to the detailed operational histories of the various tactical commands involved.

The pressure of other duties having prevented my personal participation in its preparation, it has
been entrusted by me to that magnificent staff group which actually conducted the staff work during
the progress of the campaigns. They speak with that sincere and accurate knowledge which is possessed
only by those who have personally participated in the operations which they record . . ."

Preface by Cieneral Douglas MacArthur.

Senior Commanders: Southwest Pacific Areas

Gen W. Kmeger: Sixth Army; Lt Gen R. L. Eichelbergcr: Eighth Army: Gen Sir Thomas Blarney:
Aust. Imp. Forces; Lt Gen G. C. Kenny: AAF; Adm T. H. Kinkaid, USN: Seventh Fleet

The General Staff: GHQ: Southwest Pacific Area

LtGen. R. K. Sutherland, CofS; Maj Gen R. J. Marshall, D CofS; Maj Gen C. P. Stivers, G-i : Maj
Gen C. A. Willoughby, G-2; Maj Gen S. J, Chamberlin, G-3; Maj Gen L, J. Whitlock, G-4; Maj
Gen S. B. Akin, CSO; Maj Gen W. F. Marquat, AAO; Maj Gen H. J. Casey, CE; Brig Gen B. M.
Fitch, AG; Brig Gen L, A. Diller, PRO.

Editor in Chief
Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby, G-2

Senior Editors

Col E. H. F. Svensson, G-2; Gordon W. Prange PhD; Mr. Stewart Thorn

Associate and Contributing Editors

Brig Gen H. E. Eastwood, G-4; Col F. H. Wilson, G-2; Col R. L. Ring, G-2; Col W. J. Niedcrpruem,
G-3; Lt Col M. K. Schiffman, G-2; Maj J. M. Roberts, G-3; Capt J. C. Bateman, G-2; Capt Mary
Guyette, G-2; Capt John L. Moore, G-2; Lt Stanley Fa!k, G-2; Mr. Jerome Forrest; Mr. Kenneth
W. Myers; Miss Joan Corrigan.

Translation-Interrogation- Production

Lt Col W. H. Brown, G-a; Louis W. Doll, PhD; Capt E. B. Ryckaert, G-a; Capt K. J. Knapp, Jr.,
G-2; Lt Y. G. Kanegai, G-2; Mr. James J. Wickel; Mr. John Shelton, ATIS; Mr. Norman Sparnon,
ATIS; SFC H. Y. Uno, G-a ; Mr. K. Takeuchi; Mr. S. Wada.

vol 11 rt 1

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